Suchergebnisse

Israeli hardliners often argue that, instead of an independent state, Palestinians should accept Jordan as their homeland. (After all, Jordan used to rule over the West Bank, and many Jordanians have Palestinian roots.) The most moderate version of this plan involves putting parts of the West Bank that Israel doesn't want back under Jordanian rule. The most extreme version involves physically expelling Palestinians to Jordan.Despite the lack of Jordanian or Palestinian consent, the idea of Jordan as a Palestinian homeland continues to float around in Israeli nationalist circles. And it's gaining traction in unexpected corners of Washington, too. Last month, the liberal-leaning publication Just Security published a "creative, outside-the-box proposal" along those lines by Jonathan Panikoff, director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the centrist Atlantic Council."Some [Israeli] settlements [in the West Bank] and the land they're on are inevitably going to be retained by Israel in any agreement. And the number Israel will insist on retaining increases every year," Panikoff wrote. Without those lands, Palestine cannot be a viable, independent state. Panikoff's solution is to replace the land lost to settlements by giving Palestine some Jordanian territory. In return, Jordan would get some Saudi territory as well as economic concessions. To seal the deal, the Jordanian monarchy would be asked to share its most prized heirloom — custodianship over Jerusalem's holy sites — with Saudi royals.The proposal is worse than asking Jordan to sell its birthright for a mess of pottage. It demands Jordanians to risk the violent collapse of their country. The last attempt to build a Palestinian state within Jordan, the Black September uprising of 1970, ended in a bitter (but mercifully short-lived) civil war. And, the land that Panikoff has in mind, the Jordan River Valley, is the nation's breadbasket. Jordan is already a water-poor country; without the river and the fertile land around it, the nation would face an environmental apocalypse. Just a few miles to the east, Jordan's landscape becomes a black desert unsuitable for large populations.Panikoff's proposal is the symptom of a myopia in Washington about the Middle East. American policymakers often see Israeli interests as existential issues that must be treated with the utmost care. Meanwhile, Arab states, even U.S.-friendly ones, are rarely viewed in the same light. Their vital interests are often treated as goodies that can be traded away. No think-tanker would ask Israel to give up Tel Aviv for Jordan's sake, but Panikoff can casually propose the dismantling of Jordan for Israel's sake.Washington has gotten used to forcing the rest of the Middle East to accommodate Israeli interests. For ideological reasons, American politicians believe that they have a responsibility to protect Israel, which they see as a tiny, vulnerable nation surrounded by powerful Arab enemies. That image is decades out of date. Many regional states, and their citizens, are much more vulnerable to Israeli attack than the other way around.For example, Israeli leaders often say that they need the settlements to maintain "defensible borders." Otherwise, Israeli cities like Tel Aviv would sit under a Damocles sword, less than 20 miles away from Arab territory. But Jordan is similarly vulnerable. The Israeli army is perched just 20 miles away from Amman, the Jordanian capital, and Irbid, the second-largest city. The country's only port, Aqaba, is a 10-mile strip of coastline squeezed between the Israeli and Saudi borders. Just a few miles to the east of the border, Jordan's land becomes a black desert unsuitable for large populations.So when Israeli politicians float the possibility of expelling Palestinians en masse towards Jordan, or stand in front of a map showing Jordan as part of "Greater Israel," Jordanians have every reason to understand it as a threat with potential life-and-death consequences. After all, the West Bank has been part of Jordan when Israeli forces invaded and conquered it in 1967. But no one suggests chopping up Israeli territory so Jordanians can feel safer.Jordan is not the only Israeli neighbor living under this kind of menace. Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon have all had territory invaded and occupied by Israeli forces. Although the United States in the past has tried to restrain both sides, U.S. policy today focuses entirely on ensuring Israeli dominance over Arab states. While Israeli officials threaten to take Lebanon "back to the Stone Age," and Israeli warplanes loudly penetrate Lebanese airspace, Washington debates how to disempower the Lebanese militia Hezbollah and foster a Lebanese military that does not threaten Israel.Jordan and Egypt are unique because the United States considers them "major non-NATO allies." The U.S. government has showered special praise on Jordan for its commitment to "shared strategic goals," and in theory considers the stability of Jordan an American interest. For that matter, Jordan has done a lot to seek peace with Israel on the terms that Washington prefers. The Jordanian government signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, gave up its claims to the West Bank, and absorbed Palestinian refugees into Jordanian society. Thirty years later, Israeli nationalists and their American backers seem willing to punish Jordan for its cooperation.Ironically, Jordan accepted the 1994 treaty to avoid bearing the costs of the Palestinian issue. As former Jordanian foreign minister Marwan Muasher explained in a recent interview, the kingdom gave up its claims to the West Bank in order to establish a permanent border and put to rest the notion that Jordan would be an "alternative [Palestinian] homeland." With Amman out of the picture, Israelis and Palestinians were supposed to resolve their problems within the confines of Israel and Palestine.Panikoff warns that continued Israeli rule over the West Bank "would risk the end of Israel's identity as a majority Jewish state." But the Israeli settlements are not the immovable object that Panikoff portrays them as. Of course, leaving thousands of Israeli citizens under Palestinian rule — or evacuating them before handing the territory over — would be politically painful for Israel. That is an Israeli, not a Jordanian, problem.If Israel really wants to disengage from the West Bank and avoid sharing a state with Palestinians, it will find a way to do so. There is no moral or practical case for making Jordan bear the costs. Panikoff's proposal is really ideological, based on the American belief that Israeli discomfort matters more than Arab suffering.At least threatening Israel's Syrian and Lebanese opponents follows some strategic logic, since they are also U.S. opponents. To play games with the stability of Jordan, a friendly state, makes no sense at all. To do so for the sake of Israeli settlements is just blind fanaticism.

With about 120 days remaining until Taiwanese voters head to the polls for the January 2024 presidential election, it's evident that Lai Ching-te, the candidate of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has established a clear lead over each individual contender (although not when the combined strength of the others is taken into account). Although some public opinion polling has shown a strong sentiment for change in 2024, Lai has been consistently ahead with support fluctuating at around 35 percent, while his opponents have scored an aggregate of around 50 percent since May. And his prospects have improved even more since the founder of electronics manufacturing giant Foxconn, Terry Gou, formally declared his candidacy in late August, further fragmenting Lai's opposition by creating a third opposition candidate alongside Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) and Hou Yu-ih from the Kuomintang (KMT). Even though Hou, Ko, and Gou have all declared a readiness to forge a coalition — a strategy that has emerged as the only plausible possibility of thwarting Lai's occupancy of the presidential palace – the prospect of each assuming a subordinate role in another's campaign likely remains highly unattractive to them, especially to Gou. Moreover, should any party display a willingness to make concessions, reaching consensus will likely require meticulous, confidential, and protracted negotiations. Given the current trend, a critical question looms large regarding the future of U.S.-China relations: Are Washington and Beijing prepared for another DPP administration in Taiwan led by Lai Ching-te, the self-proclaimed "political worker of Taiwan Independence?" Are the two powers ready for the unique set of risks that a Lai-led government in Taiwan could pose to their bilateral relations?As an avid baseball fan, Lai used to describe himself as a "relief pitcher" on the political mound, an observation elaborated by President Tsai Ing-wen, who praised Lai as a "skillful pitcher." Unfortunately, however, in terms of stability across the Taiwan Strait, what Lai could be skillful at is possibly delivering a "strikeout" scenario to the already fragile Sino-U.S.-Taiwan triangle.Lai's "strike one" could very well exhaust Beijing's strategic patience regarding peaceful unification. While discussions swirl about the possibility of Beijing having set a reunification deadline — some U.S. analysts argued for a 2027 timeline, others a 2035 deadline for forceful unification — these predictions often overlook the role that Taiwan's domestic politics could play in affecting Beijing's calculations. Beijing would likely be hesitant to confront a Taiwan leadership aligned with the "92 consensus" should the KMT's Hou pull off next year's presidential election. However, a third consecutive triumph for the DPP's presidential bid led by one of the mainland's least favorite Taiwanese politicians might lead Beijing to conclude that Taiwan's public sentiment has irreversibly shifted in favor of formal independence. If so, the prospects for much greater Chinese pressure on Taiwan – perhaps even a coercive takeover – could increase considerably."Strike two" on Lai's part would be the impact of his policies on the efficacy of Washington's longstanding "dual deterrence" strategy regarding the Taiwan Strait, an approach intended to discourage unilateral changes to the status quo by both Beijing and Taipei. Within the DPP, Lai is seen as a political figure deeply aligned with pro-independence forces, as witnessed by the more extreme stance he took during his challenge to President Tsai in the DPP primary in 2019. Lai's label, promoted at the time as the "golden grandson of Taiwan Independence" frequently evokes parallels with former Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian's moniker of "son of Taiwan."In recent months, some in the United States have seemed to cast doubt on Lai's stated intention to maintain the status quo. However, there is also strong support for Lai's pro-independence stance in Washington, especially in Congress. A Lai victory in next year's election would likely embolden support for Taiwan Independence in Congress and elsewhere and encourage him to alter President Tsai's relatively cautious stance on cross-strait issues and adopt more assertive pro-independence policies, thus undermining Washington's "dual deterrence" strategy.Lai's "strike three" would be the blow that he could deliver to Taiwan's economic prosperity. Despite President Tsai's effort to pursue economic diversification from China through initiatives such as the "New Southbound Policy," Taiwan's economic growth still largely relies on China. As Taiwan's biggest trading partner, China (Hong Kong included) accounted for nearly 40 percent of Taiwan's total trade in 2022. Taiwan's trade surplus with the mainland and Hong Kong even surged to $100.43 billion in 2022 from $66.66 billion in 2016. Such growth could be explained by China's tireless effort to woo Taiwan through economic incentives, as well as the geographically and culturally entwined relationship between Taiwan and the mainland.However, China has also been active in using economic disincentives, by stifling trade and exchanges on certain targeted commodities, to pressure Taiwan. Concerns have recently surfaced about China's possible intention to terminate the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan if Lai were to be elected. Although many argue that such a move itself would have only a limited impact on Taiwan's economy, the deeper implications for Taiwan could be substantially negative, as Taiwan's prosperity relies on investors' faith in a secure and stable environment.Of course, Lai rejects the notion that his presidency would constitute a "strikeout" for Taiwan. In a Bloomberg interview in August, Lai stressed his commitment to peace and the importance of upholding the status quo. In late August, he even playfully conveyed his willingness to share shrimp fried rice and bubble tea with Chinese President Xi Jinping in what was intended as a goodwill gesture.. In early September, Lai stated that he would "fight for peace" and seek cooperation with China if elected. In the eyes of many in Taiwan and across the globe, Lai's rebuttals present a compelling case. There are valid concerns regarding the KMT's pro-Beijing stance and the relative inexperience of the four-year-old TPP's ability to run a national government. These concerns revolve around the potential consequences: either strengthening China's sway and influence within Taiwan if the KMT should win, or weakening Taiwan's governance under the TPP at a time when the need for internal strength and unity is paramount in countering China's mounting pressure. Terry Gou's candidacy raises even more pronounced concerns, primarily stemming from the fact that Foxconn, the multinational company he founded, possesses billions of dollars in assets located within mainland China. This substantial economic stake potentially provides Beijing with significant leverage over a President Gou.These concerns have led many observers to view a government led by Lai as the least risky option, albeit not without its challenges.But a Lai victory in January 2024 will clearly pose major challenges to both Washington and Beijing. It is imperative that both capitals carefully think through the possible consequences that could result from such a development and consider policies designed to avert them. Doubling down on extreme opposition to a President Lai through coercive means (by Beijing) or greater political support for his pro-independence instincts (by Washington) could prove disastrous.

La loi confère aux municipalités locales québécoises des pouvoirs d'adopter des règlements pour régir divers aspects de la vie citoyenne dans les limites de leur territoire, notamment la sécurité, l'approvisionnement en eau potable, la gestion des déchets et des matières recyclables de même que la construction d'immeubles. Bien que ces différentes matières constituent des préoccupations communes à la plupart des municipalités locales québécoises, celles-ci en traitent par un exercice très largement autonome de leurs pouvoirs réglementaires. Cette autonomie réglementaire s'accompagne parfois d'un manque de concertation entre elles, susceptible de faire naître des difficultés pour les autorités locales, leurs agents et les citoyens. En butte aux inconvénients qui peuvent découler de la divergence entre réglementations locales sur un même objet, notamment en raison de difficultés d'application, des gestionnaires de municipalités locales voisines ont été amenés à envisager et promouvoir l'harmonisation de ces réglementations dans différentes régions et à différentes échelles : de quelques municipalités limitrophes à un territoire comprenant plusieurs municipalités régionales de comté. Cette harmonisation normative laisse cependant place à l'adoption de règles uniques à une municipalité en présence de particularité locale dont la source peut être, notamment, son caractère rural ou urbain. Cette thèse présente les pratiques d'harmonisation des réglementations locales qui ont cours sur le territoire québécois en matière de paix, d'ordre et de sécurité publique. En effet, dans plusieurs régions de la province, les législateurs locaux ont exercé leurs pouvoirs de façon concertée à l'échelle d'une municipalité régionale de comté pour l'adoption de règlements dont la mise en œuvre est confiée à des agents d'application dans le cadre d'ententes de services. L'analyse de ce phénomène est effectuée selon les connaissances de la légistique, discipline au service de la création de la législation. Il en ressort que ces pratiques reflètent, dans une large mesure, le modèle théorique de la iii communication législative, laquelle prend appui sur le processus de production normative en quatre phases que préconise la légistique. La faisabilité d'une concertation entre différents législateurs locaux exprime une dynamique collaborative alors qu'une cohérence de leur action publique est utile, voire nécessaire pour l'atteinte d'un objectif commun. La thèse conclut donc en proposant l'optimisation des pratiques d'harmonisation normative observées à la lumière des préceptes de la légistique. Parmi les outils d'action publique dont dispose le palier municipal, l'harmonisation des réglementations locales offre d'intéressantes perspectives. Cette façon de créer le droit positif dans le domaine de la sécurité, de la paix et de l'ordre a fait ses preuves quant à la capacité des administrateurs locaux de différentes municipalités à devenir de véritables partenaires. L'harmonisation réglementaire peut ainsi s'ajouter aux autres instruments d'action publique à la disposition des municipalités locales. En somme, compte tenu du fait que les municipalités locales ont un accès très variable à des ressources pour rendre les services publics à leurs citoyens et régir les enjeux complexes auxquels elles peuvent être confrontées, l'harmonisation normative paraît créer un environnement propice à leur partage. Une mutualisation de l'activité normative résulte de l'exercice concerté des pouvoirs réglementaires alors que plusieurs municipalités locales se voient impliquées dans la production d'une solution normative à une problématique commune. Exercée dans l'intérêt public et sensible aux préoccupations de bonne gestion, l'autonomie réglementaire locale pourrait commander, dans certains domaines au moins, l'exercice concerté des pouvoirs réglementaires comme une façon de rendre les normes locales à la fois mieux adaptées au cadre plus large dans lequel évoluent la municipalité locale et ses citoyens et plus susceptibles d'une mise en œuvre efficace. L'harmonisation des règlements municipaux apparaît ainsi comme un alliage pragmatique d'autonomie et d'interdépendance. ; The laws of the province of Québec grant powers to municipalities that enable them to make regulations governing many aspects of citizen's lives within their boundaries including: public safety, potable water supply, management of waste disposal and recycling, as well as building construction. Even if these matters are of common concern to most Québec municipalities, they are dealt with through an autonomous exercise of local regulatory powers. This regulatory autonomy sometimes leads to a lack of consistency between municipalities which could give rise to challenges for local authorities, their agents and populations. In order to circumvent the inconvenients resulting from the discrepancies between municipal regulations governing the same subject-matter, such as enforcement difficulties, local authorities of neighbouring municipalities have considered the harmonization of their by-laws in different regions and at different scales: from a few municipalities up to a territory including several regional county municipalities. However, this normative harmonization leaves space for the creation of rules that are unique to a single municipality when there is a distinctive feature that could be linked to the its rural or urban character, among other things. This thesis presents the harmonization of municipal by-laws practices that are ongoing on territory of the province of Quebec with respect to peace, order and public safety. In several regions of the province, local legislators, comprised in the territory of a regional county municipality, have exercised their powers in a coordinated manner in order to make by-laws which are to be implemented by enforcement officers through a service agreement. The analysis of this phenomenon is carried out using the knowledge of legistics, a discipline aimed at better law-making. It reveals that these practices reflect to a large extent the theoretical model of legislative communication which is based on a 4-phase process for normative production, as recommended by legistics. v The feasibility of coordinating many different local regulations-makers shows that a collaborative dynamic is emerging as coherence in public action is not only useful, but instrumental to achieve common goals. This thesis concludes by suggesting that the current normative harmonization practices be optimized in light of the methods and knowledge of legistics. Amongst all of the means for public action that are available to municipal authorities, the harmonization of bylaws shows interesting potential. This method of creating regulations governing peace, order and public safety has demonstrated the ability of local authorities from different municipalities to become true partners. Municipal by-laws harmonization could be added to other policy instruments at the disposal of municipalities in implementing their public policies. In essence, since municipalities have an uneven access to resources in providing public services to their population and in dealing with complex challenges, regulatory harmonization seems to be creating an environment conducive to the sharing of all available resources. There is a mutualization of the normative activity resulting from the coordinated exercise of regulatory powers as several municipalities are involved in the production of a regulatory answer to a common issue. Carried out in the public interest and sensitive to sound management, municipal regulatory autonomy might require, at least in some areas, the coordinated exercise of regulation-making powers as a way to make local rules more coherent with the broader environment in which municipalities and their citizens evolve, while potentially contributing to a more effective enforcement. The harmonization of municipal by-laws appears to be a pragmatic combination of autonomy and interdependence.

Sarajevo's contested position at the intersection of geopolitical 'tectonic plates' – situated between Rome and Byzantium, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the Western and Eastern Bloc, de-colonization and re-colonization – resulted in both fertile periods of exchange and moments of devastating conflicts. This inbetweenness has contributed to the (dis)continuous cityscape, characterized by a diversity of spatial productions and radical urban transformations. Therefore, Sarajevo represents an urban laboratory for social and spatial transformation processes. The ETHZ/UTT 'Urban Toolbox' provided a cross-scalar methodological approach for examining the physical typology, program, and actors of Sarajevo's urbanism, spanning from spatial and stakeholder analyses synthesized through critical mapping to the identification of strategic scenarios and the use of digital media. This dissertation zooms both in and out on three time periods between 1945 and 2014, defined by three distinct revolutionary moments. The central theme of this project is the examination of the transformative processes with the focus on the district of Marijin Dvor in New Sarajevo. Previously a peripheral zone, it became a central operational laboratory of the new Sarajevo to test the effects of major geopolitical shifts on the 'heart' and 'brain' of the city. While investigating multiple spatial crystallization points, one building epitomized the correlation between geopolitical power and space – the Museum of the Revolution – a living symbol of the three periods of construction, destruction and fragmentation. The proclamation of Tito's communist revolution in 1945 and the establishment of a socialist Yugoslav federation, created pressing spatial demands for the new urban proletariat. The industrialization and rural-urban migration gave birth to the city's first strategic urbanistic model, enabled by proclaiming the collectivization of land as a common good. The City Planning Institute developed the first General Urban Plan (GUP-Generalni Urbanistički Plan) in 1961. This large-scale urban planning instrument was enabled by the Yugoslav decentralized model of self-management that also included the 'Mjesne Zajednice' (MZs), the local communities. These new societal postulates were decisive for the construction of the flagship project for Sarajevo and its nucleus, Marijin Dvor, as a cultural, educational and industrial hub of BiH, one of Yugoslavia's most ethnically diverse and rural regions. Architects and urbanists were tasked with planning, designing and building a New Sarajevo as a socialist utopia. Buildings, such as the Museum of the Revolution, were constructed as monuments to celebrate both the victory of the partisans over Nazi Germany and the new state design ideology: functionalist modernism. The construction of Marijin Dvor was catalyzed by the Winter Olympic Games, hosted by Sarajevo in 1984 as a result of Yugoslavia's non-aligned foreign policy and the city's status as 'terra neutral`. Later in 1992, as socialist Yugoslavia began to crumble after the geopolitical vacuum of post-1989 Europe, Marijin Dvor became the site of the fruitless peace protests. The city was put under military siege and New Sarajevo was divided along a frontline. Under wartime conditions, the urban utopia was de-urbanized. The collapse of urban infrastructure and the destruction of the human habitat, characterized in Bogdan Bogdanović's description of urbicide, reached its peak in Sarajevo. During this period, Marijin Dvor went through a radical transformation: public spaces became graveyards or urban-agricultural zones for survival. The Museum of the Revolution found itself at the frontline and was bombed as the symbol of a common Yugoslav past. Nevertheless, in acts of popular resistance, destroyed buildings became temporary art spaces. Derelict parks turned into agricultural zones. This attracted a wave of global solidarity as intellectuals visited Sarajevo, including the architect Lebbeus Woods, and formed a vital part of the antiwar movement, analyzing the destruction and proposing both small adaptations and radical post-war reconstruction visions. However, these visions did not adhere to the post-socialist and post-war realities of the newly ethnically divided Sarajevo resulting from the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Common properties had been converted into state ones, which were then auctioned off in a massive privatization wave. These policies fell in line with the country's market liberalization. Within these new realities, MZs maintained the same level of legal status, but under the extreme pressure by neoliberal urban development. New economic and urban mechanisms led to aggressive development driven by investments from across the geopolitical spectrum, which disregarded already destroyed public space in favor of monocultures of generic commercial architecture. Marijin Dvor became a high-density node of real estate speculations and a symbol of socio-economic segregation and spatial fragmentation. The refugia of public space were found in administrative grey-zones of the post-war constitutional changes. Politically contaminated and left out of the legal system and with a new name and no program as a consequence, the Historical Museum, once the Museum of the Revolution, became a host to civic engagements, inviting citizens to figure as curators. This new system and its accompanying urban model revealed ruptures in 2014, symbolized through violent mass protests of the so-called 'Bosnian Spring'. Impoverished and unemployed, Sarajevans turned their anger and desperation against the city's governmental buildings. The dissertation includes 'Reactivate Sarajevo', an activist experiment of spatial agency that connects theory and practice by engaging in-situ. Influenced by both the pioneers of reflective practice, Donald Schön and Kurt Lewin, and the ETHZ/UTT concept of the activist architect, 'Reactivate Sarajevo' exposes the dissertation's work-in-progress to the public. This discourse was initiated through the organization of expert symposia, stakeholder workshops and open discussions with the general public. The production of discourse, curation of performances and reflection of these actions mutually nurtured the theoretical chapters. These acts spawned critical mapping and alternative design concepts, presented through an interactive digital platform, as well as a strategy of inversion to represent Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2016 at the International Architecture Biennale in Venice for the first time in the country's history. The exhibition showcased not only critical research, but also alternative design concepts amplifying civic action as a basis for the integrated and inclusive development of Marijin Dvor. The insights were then transferred back to Sarajevo back via the 'Balkan route' and the exhibition was installed in the Historical Museum. The Experiment contributed to the creation of a network of formal and informal partnerships locally and laid the groundwork for a future urban design and planning project concerning the future planning of Marijin Dvor and Sarajevo. This approach of action research resonated throughout the Balkans and other regions through workshops, lectures and consultancies and formed the basis for the extrapolation and application of the insights to other cities.

Article in U.S. News and World Report based on excerpts from Hays' book A Southern Moderate Speaks ; Inside Story of Little Rock .'Mayor Mann privately expressed concern to me over the danger that the disorder might be too great to be controlled by his small police force, and he asked for my assistance" force in an effort to prevent violence. He knew it would be difficult and recognized the gravity of the situation, but he felt sure of his men and he would certainly not show any weakness himself. I knew that he was planning to resign and that he would be happier if he were able to make an honorable exit before the crisis arose, but he did not propose to fade into retirement with even the faintest stain on his record. There were equivalent promises from his assistant chief, Eugene Smith, another competent peace officer who has since succeeded Mr. Potts. On Friday, Federal Judge Davies ordered the Governor to end his opposition to judicial authority and directed him to stop interfering with integration at Little Rock Central High School. The following is a summary of the court decision: The Court: It is very clear to this court from the evidence and the testimony adduced upon the hearing today that the plan of integration adopted by the Little Rock school board and approved by this court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has been thwarted by the Governor of Arkansas by the use of National Guard troops. It is equally demonstrable from the testimony here today that there would have been no violence in carrying out the plan of integration, and that there has been no violence. The petition of the United States of America as amicus curiae [friend of the court] for a preliminary injunction against Governor Faubus, General Clinger and Colonel Johnson and all others named in the petition is granted and such injunction shall issue without delay enjoining those respondents from obstructing or preventing by use of the National Guard or otherwise the attendance of Negro students at Little Rock High School under the plan of integration approved by this court and from otherwise obstructing or interfering with orders of this court in connection with the plan of integration. Governor Faubus's attorneys walked out of the courtroom in the middle of the hearing rather than stay to cross-examine witnesses and hear the verdict, thus challenging the court's authority. Three hours after the decision, Governor Faubus went on television to announce his withdrawal of the Guard, in compliance with the order, but he had earlier indicated he would appeal the decision of Judge Davies on the ground that the district court did not have jurisdiction against him. He said that the right of Negro children to attend white schools had been upheld by the Supreme Court but that he hoped "by their own volition the Negroes would refrain from seizing upon that right until such time as there is assurance that it can be accomplished in a peaceful manner." He closed with an appeal for "reason and clear thinking and good order." Eisenhower's Reaction In Washington, President Eisenhower called the withdrawal of the Guard "a necessary step in the right direction." He went on to say that he was confident that the citizens of Little Rock would demonstrate that in their city proper orders of a United States court would be executed promptly and without disorder. My wife and I boarded the train for Little Rock early Saturday morning in a driving rain which continued all day. It fitted my mood. Late in the afternoon I was met at a station two hours out of Little Rock by my friend, Clyde Lowry, who drove me the remaining distance in his car so he could counsel with me on the gravity of the situation. My wife continued on the train. Clyde was interested in the political phases of the conflict. He felt that my efforts toward mediation had been applauded but that, since they had apparently failed, I should not jeopardize my political future. It was not the counsel of timidity or defeatism but the product of his deep concern for my political influence and position. Neither of us could see any avenues of further service opening for me. As I look back on it now, and I am sure he would share this feeling, I wonder why we thought that there was nothing left to do. Back in the familiar surroundings of the Sam Peck Hotel, I could only hope that, as the collision between State and federal authorities approached, violence would be avoided and no undue strain placed upon existing relationships. I saw this conflict in the framework of a seething South and a disquieted nation. There were vast repercussions abroad, and I was eager for our national prestige not to be damaged. World peril was too great to permit indifference to the foreign-policy aspects of the struggle. I had endeavored in my talks with the Governor to suggest a condition that would not make federal military policing inevitable. An unexpected call from Mayor Mann came early Sunday morning. The mayor was once again responsible for preserving order in the city, and members of the Little Rock police force took over the guard duty as the National Guardsmen left the school. In a public statement, Mr. Mann had urged Little Rock residents to accept integration peacefully and warned that local law-enforcement officers would be on hand to deal with persons who did not co-operate. Privately, he now expressed concern to me over the danger that the disorder might be too great to be controlled by his small police force, and he asked for my assistance. First Mention of U. S. Troops When I had decided to return to Little Rock I told the press that I now considered my responsibilities heavier than ever, since they were related to the preservation of the peace, and I now assured the mayor of my support. The White House informed me that they wanted to keep the Federal Government from coming into the picture and hoped that local forces could do the job. The school board met in emergency sessions over the week end but no final decisions were made until Sunday concerning entry of the Negro students on Monday, September 23. It was suggested that the city might need federal financial help, at least, in order to pay for temporary police that might be necessary. Police Chief Potts said again he would do his duty, that he would "de-fend" all students, white or black, but he balked at pledging an "escort." At this time Sherman Adams indicated that, if requested by appropriate authority, the Administration might make troops available at the State border in the event that the situation got out of hand. Meanwhile, Governor Faubus flew to Georgia to attend the Southern Governors' Conference and left Lieutenant Governor Nathan Gordon as the State's acting chief executive. When asked in Atlanta if he thought the Little Rock U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 23, 1959 129

Am 29. November 2019 fand in Düsseldorf das CoRE-NRW-Netzwerktreffen zum Thema "Salafismus- und Extremismusforschung 2020: Prävention, Wissenstransfer, Vernetzung" statt. An diesem interdisziplinären Austausch nahmen Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, die in verschiedenen Forschungsdisziplinen zum Thema Radikalisierung arbeiten, sowie Vertreterinnen und Vertreter aus der Präventionsarbeit und der Landesverwaltung teil. In seinem Grußwort hob Thorsten Menne, Ministerium für Kultur und Wissenschaft des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (MKW NRW), hervor, wie wichtig angesichts der aktuellen Bedrohungslage die praxisrelevante, freie Forschung des CoRE-NRW-Netzwerkes ist. CoRE-NRW könne dazu beitragen, neue Perspektiven zu entwickeln, gerade auch, wenn Praxispartnerinnen und -partner in den Forschungskontext mit einbezogen werden. Die neue Koordinierungsstelle, die seit August 2019 beim Friedens- und Konfliktforschungsinstitut BICC in Bonn angesiedelt ist, könne im Auftrag des MKW unterstützen, diese Zusammenarbeit zu stärken.

Seit 2014 stellt Russland die EU auf eine neuartige Bewährungsprobe. Sowohl in ihrer Nachbarschaftspolitik, die auf friedliche Beziehungen, Zusammenarbeit und Wohlstand ausgerichtet ist, als auch im Selbstverständnis der Leitprinzipien ihrer Außenpolitik, die auf den Grundsätzen der Demokratie, der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, der Charta der Vereinten Nationen und des Völkerrechts beruht. Diese Grundsätze stoßen an den Ostgrenzen der EU auf den Gestaltungsanspruch Russlands, der sich teils harter machtpolitischer Methoden bedient und die EU vor die Frage stellt, wie mit ihm umzugehen ist. Der Band erörtert die rechtlichen, ökonomischen und politischen Grundlagen des Verhältnisses zwischen der EU und Russland, die Assoziierungspolitik der EU unter neuen Vorzeichen, die Auswirkungen des Krieges in der Ukraine auf die internationalen Beziehungen, die Sanktionen gegen Russland und die Lage der Kaukasus-Staaten, Weißrusslands, Moldawiens und des Baltikums im Spannungsfeld zwischen der EU und Russland. Mit Beiträgen von: Liana Fix, Caroline von Gall, Marzenna Guz-Vetter, Claus-Friedrich Laaser, Alexander Libman, Barbara Lippert, Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Klaus Schrader, Sven C. Singhofen und Sigita Urdze

In Subsahara-Afrika führen mittlerweile fast alle Staaten Mehrparteienwahlen durch. Doch nach wie vor bleiben viele dieser Abstimmungen hinter normativen Standards zurück. Oft dominiert der Eindruck, Wahlen in Afrika seien vor allem ein Deckmantel für autoritäre Herrschaft und überdies besonders gewaltanfällig. Konkrete Erfahrungen wie zuletzt 2010 in der Elfenbeinküste oder 2011 in der DR Kongo scheinen dieses Bild zu bestätigen. Andererseits setzen multidimensionale Friedensmissionen weiterhin auf Wahlen als wichtigen Schritt zur Konsolidierung nach bewaffneten Konflikten. Außerdem haben auch defizitäre Wahlen in Afrika durchaus das Potential, die Demokratisierung eines Landes voranzutreiben. Welche Trends lassen sich hier tatsächlich feststellen, und welche Konsequenzen ergeben sich daraus für internationale Akteure?

Diese Studie untersucht die 46 Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen, die zwischen Anfang 2010 bis Mitte 2012 in 29 afrikanischen Staaten stattfanden. Dabei zeigen sich sehr unterschiedliche Entwicklungslinien. Wird nach einem politischen Umbruch zum ersten oder zweiten Mal gewählt, ist die Situation der betreffenden Länder – wie in der Elfenbeinküste – meist fragil. Ein gemischtes Bild bietet sich dagegen bei Ländern mit einer größeren Wahlkontinuität. Hier halten sich positive Tendenzen (wie in Sambia oder Tansania) in etwa die Waage mit problematischen Entwicklungen (wie im Tschad oder in Äthiopien). Hinzu kommen Fälle wie Nigeria, wo die letzten Urnengänge zwar eine verbesserte Qualität aufwiesen, zugleich aber mit massiver Gewalt einhergingen. Wahlen haben also in Afrika sehr unterschiedliche Bedeutungen, werden aber in den meisten Ländern weiterhin stattfinden. Externe Akteure sollten deshalb keineswegs davon abrücken, Wahlen in Afrika zu begleiten. Wohl aber gilt es, vorhandene Instrumente stärker den jeweiligen Entwicklungssträngen anzupassen. (Autorenreferat)

"In the light of a growing number of unstabilized regions of warfare or post-war conditions, this paper investigates how civilians survive in the context of a civil war. It analyzes livelihood strategies of farmers in the war-torn areas of Sri Lanka. The analytical framework is based on a revised form of DFID's sustainable rural livelihoods approach placing particular attention on the institutional reproduction of household capital assets in the war economy. The paper delineates a three pillar model of household livelihood strategies focusing on how households (i) cope with the increased level of risk and uncertainty, (ii) adjust their economic and social household assets for economic survival, and how they (iii) use their social and political assets as livelihood strategies. Empirically, the paper analyses four local case studies from the east of Sri Lanka. A key conclusion from the empirical studies was that even though the four case studies were located geographically very close, their livelihood outcomes differed considerably depending on the very specific local political geography. The role of social and political assets is thereby essential: While social assets (extended family networks) were important to absorb migrants, political assets (alliances with power holders) were instrumental in enabling individuals, households or economic actors to stabilize or even expand their livelihood options and opportunities. Hence, civilians are not all victims, some may also be culprits in the political economy of warfare. From a perspective of war-winners and losers, war can be both, a threat and an opportunity, often at the same time." (author's abstract)

Mit viel Lob wurden die Empfehlungen der Brahimi-Kommission zur Verbesserung der VN-Friedenseinsätze bedacht, als sie Ende Juli 2000 von Generalsekretär Kofi Annan der internationalen Öffentlichkeit übergeben wurden. Dann setzte ein zähes Ringen um ihre Verwirklichung ein. Eine unüberwindbare Kluft zwischen den Ländern des Nordens und des Südens bei der Fortentwicklung von Friedenseinsätzen und der Vereinten Nationen schien sich aufzutun, eingeleitet durch eine äußerst kritische Stellungnahme des indischen Vertreters bei den VN. Heute, ein Jahr später, sind dennoch Fortschritte zu verzeichnen. Im Vorlauf zur diesjährigen Generalversammlung veröffentlichte der für die Friedenseinsätze zuständige Peacekeeping-Sonderausschuß nach über 160 Sitzungen seinen abschließenden Bericht, in dem er eine Reihe von Empfehlungen der Brahimi-Kommission zur Umsetzung freigibt. Ob das die Vereinten Nationen jedoch von ihrem weiteren Abstieg bewahren kann, ist fraglich, zumal potente Regionale Organisationen wie EU, NATO und OSZE in Europa und ECOWAS in Afrika (Economic Community of West African States) immer mehr an Terrain gewinnen. (Autorenreferat)

20 Jahre nach dem Brandt-Bericht "Das Überleben sichern" (BA 7/80, 295) ist ein guter Zeitpunkt, um die Wirkung dieses Berichts zu überprüfen. Dies geschieht hier in 25, in Länge und Gehalt durchaus unterschiedlichen Aufsätzen von aus Politik und Wissenschaft bekannten AutorInnen, die vielfach der (von Willy Brandt gegründeten und den Band herausgebenden) Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden verbunden sind. Der Befund ist ernüchternd: Auch wenn die Analysen des Brandt-Berichts und dessen "epochaler Beitrag zur entwicklungspolitischen Bewusstseinsbildung" (überwiegend) bestätigt werden, sind seine Empfehlungen doch kaum umgesetzt worden, z.B. sei die Entwicklungshilfe weltweit sogar drastisch zurückgegangen. Im Sinne von Brandts Leitsatz "Entwicklungspolitik ist Friedenspolitik" und durchaus zukunftsweisend untersucht der Band in verschiedenen Beiträgen die Ansätze, Erfordernisse und Möglichkeiten von "Global Governance". Leider ohne Register. (2) (Siegfried Lörcher)

Der Angriff der palästinensischen Hamas auf Israel am 7. Oktober 2023 überraschte unter anderem wegen der Brutalität der Kämpfer, die mehr als 1200 Menschen auf teils äußerst barbarische Weise töteten - die weitaus meisten davon Zivi­listen, darun­ter zahlreiche Kinder, Frauen und alte Leute. In den folgenden Wochen fiel zudem auf, dass viele Sympathisanten und Unterstützer der Hamas und der Palästinenser in der arabischen Welt und im Westen das Leid dieser Opfer ignorier­ten oder gar Ver­schwörungstheorien über eine israelische (Teil-)Urheber­schaft kolportierten. Beides wurde zu Recht als Hinweis auf tiefsitzenden Juden­hass und Antisemitismus gewertet, der weit über die Hamas und ihre Unterstützer­szene hinaus verbreitet ist. Ihre Wurzeln haben diese Phänomene in der Ideologie der Mus­limbruderschaft, die die Hamas entscheidend prägt und in den letzten Jahrzehnten auch über das islami­stische Milieu hinaus ausstrahlt. Da diese Bewegung in den Gesellschaften der arabi­schen Welt und auch unter Muslimen im Westen trotz vieler Rückschläge eine wich­tige Kraft darstellt, müssen Deutschland und Europa ihr Ver­hältnis zu ihr klären. (Autorenreferat)

For many Africans, water is not only the source of life, but also a means of purification and a centre of regeneration. Water rituals and cults, such as 'Mami Wata', lead their followers to liberation of body and spirit. But customary rites can also cause harm. For example, the ancestral use of irrigation reduces contemporary female labour participation and female property rights. It is crucial to consider gender in resource management in the context of climate change, environmental degradation and population growth, which will exacerbate conflicts over scarce resources such as arable land, water, fishing and hunting. Poor governance leads to the alienation and exploitation of the majority and growing inequality, especially when water is scarce and people's livelihoods are threatened. Sub-Saharan Africa is the continent most affected by climate change, population growth and food insecurity. Yet African states, where water ecosystems are strategic resources, are more inclined to regional conflict than cooperation. In the past, climaterelated shocks have fuelled violent conflict in West Africa. Land pressure and water scarcity are causing increasingly acute crises. Traditional institutions of water and land management are often destabilised by modern irrigation techniques and massive inflows of foreign capital. Modernisation is driven by a Western-centred utilitarianism that cannot be universalised. The intensification of conflicts over water has revealed a general crisis that is likely to worsen, given the dynamics at work. Environmental degradation is one of the undesirable by-products of agricultural productivity growth, but customary institutions cannot provide adequate regulation to mitigate its effects. But even in West African regions where water is plentiful, the resource curse links the abundance of natural resources to higher levels of conflict. The commercialisation of water, including land and water grabbing, can even lead to interstate conflict through the effects of greed or grievances. Ultimately, however, conflicts are often not so much about access to scarce resources such as water, food or land, but rather about changing the political institutions through which resources are distributed. Water scarcity puts pressure on people, resulting in migration, displacement, food insecurity and impoverishment, which can lead to further conflict.