La cátedra Jean Monnet es una cátedra universitaria otorgada por la Comisión Europea en el marco de su plan de acción. Tienen como objetivo reforzar la docencia y la investigación sobre la integración europea en las universidades, tanto de los Estados miembros como de terceros países. Su nombre hace honor a quien fuera un político francés que, como asesor de Robert Schuman, contribuyó decisivamente a poner los cimientos de las entonces Comunidades Europeas. -- La primera etapa de esta publicación concluyó en el año 2018, comenzó una segunda época en el año 2019 con el nombre Revista "Integración Regional y Derechos Humanos". -- NA: El Tribunal de la Función Pública (creado en 2004) puso fin a sus actividades el 1 de septiembre de 2016, tras traspasar sus competencias al Tribunal General. -- Apéndice jurisprudencial.
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The Biden administration recently approved five major arms sales to Israel for F-15 fighter aircraft, tank ammunition, tactical vehicles, air-to-air missiles, mortar rounds, and related equipment for each. Though technically sales, most if not all of this matériel is paid for by U.S. taxpayers — Israel uses much of the military aid Congress approves for it effectively as a gift card to buy U.S.-made weapons.
The total value of the five weapons sales exceeds $20.3 billion.
More extraordinary than the price tag of these arms deals is that the White House made them public. Prior to last week's announcements, it had disclosed just two arms sales to Israel. By March, the Biden administration had already greenlit more than 100 separate weapons deals for Israel, or about one every 36 hours, on average. The administration presumably kept the value of each arms deal "under threshold" to avoid having to notify Congress.
From 2017 to 2019, the U.S. had approved thousands of below-threshold arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates worth a total of $11.2 billion. Exploiting this loophole helped the Trump administration avoid scrutiny of its enabling of a devastating and indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen. The Biden administration appears to be following the same playbook for the destruction it is enabling in Gaza.
The White House isn't shy about publicizing arms transfers to other countries. For example, it has been very transparent about the military aid it sent Ukraine since February 2022. Biden promotes arming Ukraine as industrial policy, marketing the military aid as a boon for domestic manufacturing and jobs. The Pentagon not only itemizes what specific matériel the U.S. sends to Ukraine, but also shows on a map where in the U.S. those weapons and equipment are made.
By contrast, nearly all the publicly available information on U.S. arms transfers to Israel comes from leaks reported by the media. The Biden administration says very little about the weapons it delivers to Israel or how the Israeli military uses them. The following analysis is intended to shed light on both. In doing so, it helps explain why the Biden administration prefers to arm Israel in secret.
What follows is a non-exhaustive list of attacks by the Israeli military since October 7 that likely violated international law, grouped by the type of U.S.-supplied weapon involved in the attack.
In order for an attack to be listed below, there must be sufficient evidence that it violated international law. In all of the following cases, it's at least more likely than not that the attack was a violation. Many of them almost certainly were in breach of international law. This is a very high threshold — as former State Department lawyer Brian Finucane wrote in Foreign Affairs, "The law of war permits vast death and destruction. This is true even under restrictive interpretations of the law."
Furthermore, in order for an attack to be listed, there must be concrete forensic evidence that a U.S.-supplied weapon was likely used to commit the probable violation of international law. Only the types of weapons the U.S. has reportedly delivered to Israel since October 7 are considered. This report draws from forensic investigations that have been conducted by reputable international organizations, civil society groups, media outlets, and independent analysts.
The following 20 incidents represent a small fraction of potential war crimes committed with U.S.-provided weapons. First, information gathering and fact finding is extremely difficult. Israel restricts U.N. and NGO access to Gaza and doesn't cooperate with investigations into misuse of U.S.-supplied arms. Members of the press are routinely denied access or attacked: Since October 2023, 116 journalists and media workers have been killed by Israeli airstrikes or sniper fire in Gaza, representing 86 percent of all those killed worldwide, according to data from the Committee to Protect Journalists. Prolonged communication blackouts are commonplace in Gaza.
Second, Israel's military campaign relies on U.S. weapons, and so U.S. matériel is involved in nearly every facet of Israel's campaign. For example, Israel uses U.S.-made aircraft like the F-35, F-16, and F-15 to drop U.S.-made bombs, including the MK-84 (2,000 pounds), MK-83 (1,000 pounds), MK-82 (500 pounds), and 250-pound "small diameter" bombs, which can be fitted with U.S.-made Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance kits.
The vast majority of bombs Israel drops on Gaza are U.S.-made. The U.S. even provides Israel with jet fuel. The U.S. has sent so many arms to Israel since October 7 that the Pentagon has struggled to find sufficient cargo aircraft to deliver the matériel.
Third, Israel's campaign is historically destructive. In the three weeks after October 7, Israel dropped an average of 6,000 bombs on Gaza per week. By comparison, U.S. and coalition forces dropped on average 488 bombs per week on ISIS militants in Iraq and Syria during Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) between August 2014 and March 2019. OIR caused immense civilian harm — particularly in densely-populated areas like Mosul and Raqqa — but the scale of death and destruction doesn't come close to what Israel has done in Gaza.
A former high-ranking officer in the Israeli military told Haaretz that Israeli forces could have made as much progress as they have so far in Gaza with one-tenth of the destruction. This "unusually wasteful" and "reckless" conduct "reflects an absolute assumption that the U.S. will continue to arm and finance it," he is quoted as saying.
What's more, according to reporting, Israel has used an Artificial Intelligence program called "Lavender" to generate an unprecedented number of bombing targets with minimal human oversight. The AI program is coded with instructions that appear inconsistent with international law and is deployed with little to no human oversight.
The Biden administration acknowledges that Israel likely broke human rights law with U.S.-supplied weapons, but claims it doesn't have enough evidence to link U.S.-supplied weapons to specific violations that would warrant cutting off military aid to Israel. As national security adviser Jake Sullivan told CBS, "We do not have enough information to reach definitive conclusions about particular incidents or to make legal determinations, but we do have enough information to have concern…Our hearts break about the loss of innocent Palestinian life."
None of that is believable. As this report demonstrates, there is more than enough available information. If the Biden administration is truly concerned about the loss of innocent Palestinian life in Gaza, it can stop Israel's atrocities by denying it the tools it needs to commit them. MK-84 and other 2,000-pound bombsAmount delivered since October 7: At least 14,100 (as of June 28). The U.S. sent Israel at least 14,000 MK-84 2,000-pound bombs from early October to late June. Another shipment 1,800 MK-84s is pending: The White House approved their transfer in March, but then paused shipping them in May. The U.S. also delivered 100 2,000-pound BLU-109 bunker-buster bombs between October 7 and December 1.By mid-December, the Biden administration had already provided Israel with more than 5,000 MK-84 2,000-pound bombs, four times heavier than the largest bombs the U.S. dropped in Syria and Iraq in its war against ISIS. In the first month of its military offensive in Gaza, Israeli forces dropped more than 500 2,000-pound bombs, more than 40 percent of which were dropped in Israeli-designated safe zones. Six weeks into the war, Israel had dropped 2,000-pound bombs in areas to which it had instructed civilians to flee more than 200 times. October 9, 2023: Israeli airstrikes hit a busy market in Jabalia refugee camp, killing at least 69 people. The market was more crowded than usual because people were in the process of fleeing their homes at the instruction of the Israeli military. The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) analysis reported that "one or two GBU-31 air dropped munitions were used" and found no military objective to justify the strike. The GBU-31 is made from a U.S.-made 2,000-pound MK 84 or BLU-109 bomb and a JDAM guidance kit. Neither U.N. OHCHR nor Amnesty International found evidence of a military target at the time of the attack. Even if there was a legitimate military target, the scale of destruction indicates the Israeli military's attack was disproportionate. Disproportionate attacks are war crimes — international law prohibits attacks that are expected to cause excessive civilian harm compared to the direct and provable military advantage anticipated from the attack.October 17, 2023: After the Israeli military told Gazans to flee to Khan Yunis for their safety, it bombed the al-Lamdani family house in Khan Yunis. Between 15 and 40 people were killed in the attack. Remnants of a U.S.-made MK-84 2,000-pound bomb were found at the siteOctober 25, 2023: Israeli airstrikes flattened at least 5,700 square meters in the Al Yarmouk neighborhood of Gaza City, killing at least 91 people, including 39 children. A U.N. assessment determined that "several" 2,000-pound GBU-31s air-dropped munitions were likely dropped by Israeli forces in the attack. According to a report from U.N. OHCHR, "The use of a GBU-31 or a GBU-32, in such densely populated areas in the middle of residential neighborhoods when extensive civilian harm would be foreseeable, raises very serious concerns that those attacks were disproportionate and/or indiscriminate, and that no or insufficient precautions were taken."October 31, 2023: After Israeli airstrikes on Jabalia, Gaza's largest refugee camp, a nearby hospital said it received 400 casualties, including 120 dead, most of whom were women and children. An analysis of the site showed at least five craters, the largest one likely from a GBU-31. The GBU-31 is made from a JDAM and either a 2,000-pound BLU-109 or MK-84 bomb. According to reports, Israeli forces gave no warning before the attack, and no effort was made to evacuate the residential buildings. U.N. OHCHR said the attack on Jabalia refugee camp could amount to a war crime.January 13, 2024: Israeli forces dropped a U.S.-made MK-84 2,000-pound bomb from a U.S.-made F-16 aircraft on a house in Deir al-Balah but it didn't explode. A second airstrike did destroy the home, leaving an approximately 40-foot size crater, characteristic of a 2,000-pound bomb with a delayed fuse. The Israeli military had designated Deir al-Balah as a safe zone in October. Israeli forces instructed Palestinians in northern Gaza to flee there on December 11 and told Palestinians in central Gaza the same thing on December 22. By mid-January, Israeli bombing had leveled entire city blocks and dozens of family homes in Deir al-Balah.GBU-39 and other 'small diameter' bombsAmount delivered since October: At least 2,600 (as of June). More than 2,000 of these "small-diameter" bombs are 250-pound GBU-39 munitions. After Israel received an expedited shipment of 1,000 Boeing-made GBU-39s in early October, the Biden administration approved the transfer of more than 1,000 GBU-39 bombs for Israel on April 1, the same day that Israeli forces bombed a World Central Kitchen convoy, killing seven aid workers. It's likely that far more GBU-39s have been delivered to Israel than the amount listed here.Purportedly out of concern for Palestinian civilians, the Biden administration is urging the Israeli military to use more 250-pound GBU-39s and fewer less-precise 2,000-pound bombs. The result appears to have been a surge in possible war crimes committed with GBU-39s. The relative size of bombs doesn't matter much if Israeli forces disregard fundamental rules governing targeting in international law, including distinction, precautions, and proportionality. As retired U.S. Air Force master sergeant Wes Bryant told the New York Times, "While they're using smaller bombs, they're still deliberately targeting where they know there are civilians."Boeing markets its GBU-39 as a "low collateral damage" precision weapon. Echoing Boeing, White House spokesperson John Kirby said Israel's use of these 250-pound bombs is "certainly indicative of an effort to be discreet and targeted and precise." The blast from a GBU-39 bomb can kill or injure people over 1,000 feet away, and shrapnel from the bomb's steel casing can kill or injure anyone within 570 feet. January 9, 2024: Israeli forces bombed a residential building in a neighborhood the Israeli military had repeatedly ordered displaced Gazans to flee to. The attack killed 18 people, including 10 children, and wounded at least eight others. Israeli forces gave no warning to evacuate. An investigation found no evidence that the building or anyone in it could be considered a legitimate military target. The Israeli government has yet to give a reason for the strike. Fragments from a U.S.-made Boeing GBU-39 were recovered from the rubble.May 13, 2024: Israeli forces bombed a school housing displaced civilians in Nuseirat, killing up to 30 people. A tail fin of a U.S.-made GBU-39 was recovered at the location of the strike(Credit above @AlQastalps)May 26, 2024: An Israeli airstrike on a displacement camp in Rafah filled with makeshift tents killed at least 46 people — including 23 women, children and older adults — and injured more than 240 others. The tail of a U.S.-made GBU-39 bomb was recovered at the site of the attack. The "81873" on the munition fragment is the identifier code the U.S. government assigned to Woodward, a Colorado-based manufacturer that supplies bomb parts, including the GBU-39. The State Department refused to acknowledge that this was a U.S.-made weapon. Israeli forces claimed munitions stored at the camp caused most of the devastation, but there is no evidence of a weapons cache present. (Credit above: @trbrtc/Alam Sadeq)June 6, 2024: At least two GBU-39 munitions were used in an Israeli airstrike on the UN-run al-Sardi school in Nusreit, central Gaza. At least 40 people were killed in the strike, including nine women and 14 children. About 6,000 displaced Palestinians were sheltering at the school when it was bombed. The Israeli military denied that there were any civilian casualties. Israeli human rights group B'Tselem said the attack is a possible war crime. A U.S.-made navigation device manufactured by Honeywell was also documented at the site.August 10, 2024: More than 100 Palestinians were killed in an Israeli airstrike on al-Tabin school in Gaza City, which was being used to shelter displaced people. The Israeli military said it used "precise munitions." Paramedics who arrived at the scene said they found bodies "ripped to pieces" and that many bodies were unidentifiable. Parents reported difficulty identifying their deceased children. Remnants of at least two Boeing-made GBU-39 small diameter bombs were identified at the scene. Two investigations found no evidence that the school was being used for military operations, as the Israeli military claimed. The list of fighters the Israeli army alleged it killed in the strike included several people who had previously been listed as deceased and civilians with no known military ties.Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) Amount delivered since October 7: At least 3,000 (as of December 1).
October 10, 2023: An Israeli airstrike on the al-Najjar family home in Deir al-Balah killed 24 civilians. The code stamped on a recovered munition fragment, 70P862352, indicates that a U.S.-supplied JDAM was used in the attack. The Boeing-made guidance kit was likely fitted to a 2,000-pound bomb. Survivors said Israel gave civilians no warning of an imminent strike. Amnesty International said the attack must be investigated as a war crime.
(Credit: Private/Amnesty International)
October 22, 2023: An Israeli airstrike on the Abu Mu'eileq family home in Deir al-Balah killed 19 people, including 12 children. The home was located in the area to which the Israeli military had ordered residents of northern Gaza to flee on October 13. The code stamped on the recovered scrap, 70P862352, is associated with JDAMs and Boeing. The Boeing-made JDAM kit was fitted to a bomb that weighed at least 1,000-pounds. Survivors said Israel gave no warning of an imminent strike. Amnesty International said the attack must be investigated as a war crime. (Credit: Private/Amnesty International)March 27, 2024: An Israeli strike on the Emergency and Relief Corps of the Lebanese Succour Association, a humanitarian organization, killed seven emergency and relief volunteers in southern Lebanon. The strike used a U.S.-made JDAM guidance kit affixed to an Israeli-made 500-pound bomb. Human Rights Watch said that the incident should be investigated as a war crime. July 13, 2024: An Israeli strike on the Al-Mawasi — an Israeli military-designated "safe zone" — killed over 90 people and injured hundreds more. Remnants of a U.S.-made JDAM were found at the scene. Based on the size of the fin fragment, the JDAM was likely fitted to either a 1,000- or 2,000-pound bomb. Hellfire missilesAmount delivered: At least 3,000 (as of June 28) June 8, 2024: Israel's operation to rescue four hostages in the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza killed nearly 300 Palestinians. A witness reported Israeli attack helicopters launching many strikes in Nuseirat and surrounding areas. Another witness said 150 rockets fell in less than 10 minutes. Remnants of at least two U.S.-made Hellfire missiles were found in a damaged residential building. Video shows U.S.-made Apache helicopters firing several Hellfire missiles into the Nuseirat refugee camp. The Israeli military also bombed a busy market several blocks south of where the Israeli hostages were kept, and in the opposite direction of the evacuation route. U.N. OHCHR said the raid "seriously calls into question whether the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution — as set out under the laws of war — were respected by the Israeli forces."June 23, 2024: An Israeli airstrike on a health clinic in Gaza City killed five people, including Hani al-Jaafarawi, Gaza's director of ambulances and emergency. He was reportedly the 500th medical worker killed during Israel's military campaign in Gaza. The rocket motor of a U.S.-supplied Hellfire missile was recovered at the health care center.July 14, 2024: Hundreds of Palestinians were taking refuge at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) Abu Oraiban school when it was hit by an Israeli airstrike, killing at least 22 people. The Israeli military issued no warning to the displaced people sheltering there before the attack. U.S.-made Hellfire missile fragments were found at the school, including part of its guidance system and motor. (Remnants of a Boeing-made GBU-39's tail section were also recovered at the site.)(Credit above: @Easybakeovensz)120mm tank shellsAmount delivered since October 7: At least 13,981. A day after the U.S. vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza and the unconditional release of hostages, the White House notified Congress on December 8 that it had approved the sale of 13,981 120mm M830A1 high-explosive tank cartridges to Israel.The Biden administration invoked an emergency authority to bypass the congressional review period. Because the shells were sourced from U.S. Army inventory, they could be transferred immediately to Israel. The day before, Reuters, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International all published investigations providing evidence that an Israeli tank likely deliberately fired two Israeli-made 120mm shells at a group of journalists in southern Lebanon in October, killing one Reuters journalist and injuring six others. Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International said the incident was an apparent war crime. Israeli tanks have also struck hospitals and humanitarian shelters using 120mm tank rounds. On August 13, the Biden administration notified Congress that it approved a $774 million arms sale to Israel for 32,739 120mm tank cartridges.January 29, 2024: Six-year-old Hind Rajab was the only survivor in her family's car after Israeli tanks opened fire. Over the phone, Hind begged rescue workers to come save her. The Palestine Red Crescent Society dispatched an ambulance with two emergency workers. At least one Israeli tank opened fire, killing both paramedics. A fragment of a U.S.-made M830A1 120mm tank round was documented at the scene.155mm artillery shellsAmount delivered: At least 57,000 (as of December 1). This total includes thousands of 155mm rounds originally for Ukraine that the Biden administration diverted to Israel in October. Netanyahu specifically requested 155mm artillery shells from U.S. lawmakers in mid-November.Around the same time, more than 30 organizations urged the Biden administration to not supply Israel with these munitions because their inaccuracy and 100-300 meter casualty radius make them "inherently indiscriminate" in the Gaza context. "It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which high explosive 155mm artillery shells could be used in Gaza in compliance with [international humanitarian law]," the organizations wrote.On December 29, the White House notified Congress that it approved the sale of an additional 57,021 155mm shells to Israel. The Biden administration invoked an emergency authority to bypass the congressional review period. Israeli forces will likely fire these rounds from U.S.-made howitzers. The Israeli military announced earlier that month it fired over 100,000 artillery rounds during the first 40 days of its ground invasion of Gaza, adding that artillery plays a "central role" by providing "intense fire cover" for its ground forces.October 16: Israeli forces fired 155mm artillery shells containing white phosphorus into Dhayra, southern Lebanon. At least nine civilians were killed and civilian property was damaged. Lot production codes found on the shells indicate they were made in the US. Amnesty International said the attack was indiscriminate and must be investigated as a war crime.(Credit above: White phosphorus fired by Israeli army to create a smoke screen, is seen on the Israel-Lebanon border in northern Israel, November 12, 2023. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein)Armored vehiclesAmount delivered since October 7: Unknown. The Israeli Ministry of Defense reported on October 19 that U.S. Air Force cargo airplanes delivered the first tranche of U.S.-made David light armored vehicles, part of a $22 million arms deal from April 2023.November 14, 2023: The first photo below from the Israeli Ministry of Defense shows David light armor vehicles after being unloaded from a U.S. Air Force C-17 at Ben Gurion Airport on October 19. The second photo shows Israeli forces using David light armor vehicles to obstruct an ambulance en route to a hospital on November 14, arresting the wounded person inside. International humanitarian law prohibits attacks on and obstruction of medical transport. (Credit aboive @Israel_MOD)(Credit above: @PalestineRCS )
The present study combines data from Mexico's employment surveys (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo and Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo) with the country's official statistics on murder rates to create a state-level panel data set covering the period 1995 to 2013. Including most of the common controls identified by the literature, the results show that the rate of male youth ages 19 to 24 not studying and out of work (the so-called ninis), is not correlated with homicide rates during the period 1995 to 2006. However, there is evidence that a positive correlation between male ninis and murder rates arises between 2007 and 2013, a period during which murder rates in Mexico increased threefold. The association between ninis and homicide rates is stronger in states located along the border with the United States, a region particularly affected by organized crime and the international financial crisis of 2008-09.
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This month's first meeting of the Bossier Parish Police Jury featured a remarkable role reversal concerning the issue of justice of the peace and constable pay, with a longtime advocate of smaller government arguing for the opposite and a more recent advocate of expansive government hinting at a tapping of the brakes on that – and rightly so.
The Jury allows for general comments from the public on any subject prior to tackling its business, and availing himself of that was Republican Justice of the Peace Bill Shelton, who serves District 1 (there are five districts total, 1 and 3-6 where two serve 3 and 6 to make for seven officials; 2 is Bossier City with its own city court and marshal). He said he spoke on behalf of all seven JPs and constables (each JP, which is elective, also has a constable elected who carries out the JPs orders), who collectively wanted a pay raise. Shelton observed that the parish paid out $300 a month to each, implying a total taxpayer expense of $50,400 annually, and said these officers had to pay for office, patrol, and enforcement expenses and didn't want to "go broke" over performing their duties.
Thus, he argued (there was some confusion over the exact amount) for salaries to double, pointing to other jurisdictions that paid much higher and noting that this amount hadn't increased in at least two decades. This he mentioned in the context of upcoming budgetary discussions by the Jury.
Joining him to explain further was Republican Constable Robert Wright, from his district. Wright is a longtime political activist and officeholder within the GOP who has consistently championed limited government. Yet he joined with Shelton in publicly backing increased government spending on this occasion, and actually argued for a boost to $1,000 monthly. Wright also mentioned the parish's bunch wanted to set up a litter court to enforce and prosecute those violations, and cited as an example of an expense incurred in that as driving around looking for obvious large accumulations of trash on public property.
Understanding the appropriateness of this request starts with how these offices are financed. Statute delivers five revenue streams to JPs. One mandates that a parish pay no less than $75 per month, with an unlimited ceiling. Another says the state must match that, up to $120, which was increased from $100 only last year. Still another empowers JPs to collect "customary" fees for weddings. Yet another lets him collect "customary" fees for acting as a notary with limited powers. Finally, a JP may charge fees with maximums set by law for 32 different civil actions.
Additionally, the law allows a JP along with his constable to set up a litter enforcement structure – what Wright had brought up – concurrent with the parish which may be heard in a JP court with consent of the parish, with a limited range of fines and punishments but with summons and services available under the existing fee schedule. A parish also may reimburse JPs and constables, the latter of whom also collects half of the fines from civil actions, for required training which typically runs under $100 annually.
This open-ended financing structure can create problems. Most notoriously, a few years ago a JP and constable in Jefferson Parish – which bent over backwards to give them hefty salaries and a subsidized workplace – lived large on hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenues, illegally obtained.
However, at the same time, it makes sense that, if parishes didn't go beyond the minimums set by law for salary or other reimbursement, these officers should operate on a fee basis: the more they did, the more they should collect, particularly as some do very little. And statute even gives the justification for the one fixed element that does vary by activity, the parish/state salary: "Justices of the peace and constables shall receive no fees in criminal matters or in peace bond cases, but in lieu thereof they shall receive such salaries as are fixed by the parish governing authority and paid by the parish" (emphasis added).
Very little of with what a JP or constable concerns themselves deals with criminal matters, and almost the entirety of what they do consists of civil matters and petty ones at that. Any salary increase therefore should come as a result of an increase in the volume of criminal matters that they adjudicate. Expenses thereof probably are much higher than those dealing with civil matters and a raise is justified if this increases significantly, but if the overwhelming majority of activities deal with matters for which they can assess fees, then any increase in performance of those things would be taken care of by the existing fee structure; the more stuff they did, the more fees they collect. As long as corruption is kept at bay, that model makes imminent sense for an office where the amount of duties performed for it may vary wildly.
Shelton's spiel mentioned none of this. Originally, he mentioned only the parish salary, not that of the state, nor brought up any other of the revenue streams. And from subsequent questions by jurors, despite the fact they turn over more than half a hundred thousand bucks a year to JPs and constables, they had no clue as to any of this as well.
In that absence of knowledge about a parish function, at least some jurors showed some curiosity about the subject. Republican John Ed Jorden asked about whether fees financed the offices. Shelton admitted they did collect fees but both he and Wright alleged they didn't offset much.
However, their required annual audit disclosures to the Louisiana Legislative Auditor appears to contradict that assertion. Given the small amounts that pass through these offices, unlike most government and quasi-nongovernmental agencies that require official audits performed annually, JPs and constables have the option of swearing out an official substitute.
For 2023, Shelton's showed $9,280 in revenues – the monthly $300 from the parish and $120 from the state in salary, plus $4,240 in fees. For expenses, he listed $1,270 paid to Wright as constable, $100 in unspecified travel expenses, and $1,438 for office expenses, to total $2,808. Inferred from this, as he paid Wright only for constable duties, that of his fees he collected $2,540 from his civil duties and the remaining $1,700 came from officiating at weddings or performing limited notarizations (he mentioned he performed around a couple of weddings a month in the $75 range but didn't mention notarizing).
So, in fact Shelton has 90 percent of his total expenses offset by just his fees minus weddings, which surely contributed to his reported expenses. Including wedding/other fees, his revenues exceed his expenses by about half – a very different picture than the one he painted to the Jury. And, he admitted, in his decade in his position, he had heard perhaps 10 court cases – the kinds of work that the salary was designed to cover. This equates to about $5,000 per court case that he now wishes to see go to at least $10,000 each if the trend holds. Keep in mind in 2022 that the remaining "JP" in the parish, Republican Bossier City Court Judge Santi Parks, for a salary from Bossier City including benefits paid outside of his court's revenues received about $50,000, in a year he concluded 1,379 criminal cases (and about 8,000 other matters).
(Wright hasn't filed a disclosure any more recently than calendar year 2021. That year, he reported in salary, fees from Shelton, and training reimbursement $5,991.46 and no expenses.)
Following on, Republican Julianna Parks – wife of Santi Parks – who particularly in other forums has gained a reputation of viewing bigger and more powerful government favorably, then asked more involved questions. She honed in on fees and getting people who used JP services to pay for them. Shelton and Wright dismissed this as "impractical" as well as asking the Legislature for increasing those fees – which isn't actually the case, as almost annually bills come before the Legislature to do just that with the last hike coming only last year and JPs and constables in other parishes collect plenty of fees assessed. She also asked about the civil duties that should occupy the majority of his time, to which Shelton answered vaguely.
In all, the pair came off as poormouthing their situations in a bid to expand what they want to do and have taxpayers pay them for it, contrary to the intent of statute. Again, if Bossier JPs and constables could point to escalating criminal case duties straining their finances, perhaps a salary increase would be justified. But from their comments, it appears they basically argued that Bossier JPs and constables deserved an increase just because of inflation and everybody else has done it, with no scrutiny as to whether the amount they receive at present is justified under statute, and as they intended to expand their duties into litter enforcement.
To summarize, given the statistics, Bossier JPs and constables appear paid plenty for the criminal justice duties they perform. Given their reports, their fees from civil duties appear more than adequate to cover their costs. And the law provides an avenue for them to finance a litter court from an existing fine structure. Nobody's going to go broke here (and if they don't like the current arrangement, nobody is forcing them to run for or stay in their respective offices).
There's no adequate justification here for Bossier jurors to give their JPs and constables carte blanche over an extra $300-700 monthly from taxpayers when JPs and constables have made zero case for how taxpayers would benefit from these amounts of extra largesse headed to – or even justifying the current salaries of – themselves, considering the actual and intended scope of their duties and any potential expansion of these. Jurors should reject the idea out of hand.
This paper surveys empirically the broad features of trade policy in goods for 31 major economies that collectively represented 83 percent of the world's population and 91 percent of the world's GDP in 2013. It addresses the following five questions: Do some countries have more liberal trading regimes than others? Within countries, which industries receive the most import protection? How do trade policies change over time? Do countries discriminate among their trading partners when setting trade policy? Finally, how liberalized is world trade? The analysis documents the extent of cross-sectional heterogeneity in applied commercial policy across countries, their economic sectors, and their trading partners, over time. It concludes that substantial trade policy barriers remain as an important feature of the world economy.
This thesis shall represent the arbitration regime under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in connection with protection mechanism of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). It shall analyse the achievements of ICSID and BITs and their influence of foreign direct investments, investors and the host country. Finally, this thesis will try to assess the achievements in this area and discuss advantages or disadvantages for the involved parties. Individuals and corporations are interested in foreign direct investments (FDI) to exploit new markets, to realize or to sell business ideas, and to raise their market value or personal wealth. Under an economical point of view, money or investments always found its way to the most efficient places on earth which were able to be reached in any century to produce a better or the same product or service for a better price. The raising of profit margins was the driving force to explore new markets; also foreign governments tried to attract investors from all over the world to create new jobs and import new technology for their economies to raise the capacity to compete on an international level. In the early nineteenth century the prevalent form of foreign direct investment was that carried out through loans and government bonds. In contrast, modern foreign investment is more characterized by direct investment on the spot: the building of infrastructure, like railroads or telephone networks, and the establishment of joint-ventures in the car industry, to name but two examples. Investment abroad also means to play in a new and unknown playground. Investors have to place their money in a foreign environment under different laws, different rights and duties, and with unknown future protection of their investments. This makes foreign direct investments an uncertain game, and uncertainty did always keep investors from direct investments in a foreign and unknown country. Furthermore, not only the unknown environment is an investment obstacle, investors also were faced with problems with governments in the foreign market. First foreign governments promoted foreign direct investments to raise their economic power. Large infrastructure projects had an important effect on the countries where they were constructed: they were the basis for a faster growing economy. Later the same governments or new political powers changed government positions regarding foreign investment and they restricted investment related money transfers of investors out of the investment area or they initiated measures and laws to expropriate the property of investors without financial compensation. The big infrastructure investments were seen as a necessity for the welfare of the citizens and as a security of the host state. Many host countries felt that these projects should be controlled by the government and not by foreigners. The treatment of aliens by governments was, and still is, dependent on political theories and influences. A change of the investment climate, the "political risk", can be a huge uncertainty for foreign direct investments. Every investor has to ensure that the investment is lucrative and that he has the possibility to reduce risks and cost in case of changes of the investment climate. In the past foreign investors had no direct way to enforce investments claims against a foreign state for its sovereign acts or for breach of customary international law. Instead, investors had to rely upon their own government taking up the claim on their behalf and try to solve the dispute by diplomatic measures. This dependence on others was inconvenient and unpredictable, and therefore dissatisfying for alien investors. The settlement of foreign investment disputes in the past was a question of political influence and economic power. Individuals or corporations had to influence their governments to take up their case on the state's behalf. This was only possible for very important and influential investors. The investor's state then sent warships to threaten the offending state until reparations were paid. This "gunboat diplomacy" was exercised frequently by European powers until the early twentieth century, for example when faced with Venezuela's default on its sovereign debt in 1902, the governments of Great Britain, Germany and Italy sent warships to the Venezuelan coast to demand reparation for the losses incurred by their nationals. The need for security and predictability for foreign investments was one of the main reasons to establish diplomatic relations with other states. Various ideas from the point of view of money receiving and money spending states were discussed and realized, from the Calvo doctrine - where contracts between the host state and foreign investors included an agreement in which the latter agreed to confine himself to the available local remedies without relying on diplomatic interference of his own state - to the principle of diplomatic protection - where a state espouses the claim of its nationals as a claim on its own behalf. With the Second International Peace Conference of The Hague in 1907, states agreed to a framework for the conclusion of bilateral arbitration treaties which were the basis for independent arbitration tribunals in case of a dispute between two states arising out of particular interests of its national investors. The right of diplomatic protection as mentioned above was still inadequate to promote foreign investments: the Latin American countries relied upon the Calvo Doctrine, which denied the possibility of interference under diplomatic protection principle. Also, the breach of investment treaties by states was still not sanctioned by public international law. Only expropriation was recognised quite early as a possibility for diplomatic protection claims. Furthermore diplomatic protection was only accessible for nationals of the claiming state. Questions arose what happens if transnational corporations claim protection? The obstacle for investors to convince their government to claim diplomatic protection for its nationals was very high and unpredictable to foresee. Also a claim against the home state to exercise diplomatic protection does not exist. Today, in our small world, where businesses are moved from the United States to India, industrial production is transferred from Europe to China, or new infrastructure projects are started in Central Africa, one cannot imagine international business without FDI. Foreign direct investments need security, investors need security. Security is necessary to promote foreign investment which is recognized as one of the driving forces in supporting development in developing and least developed countries. Investors want to know their rights regarding their investments and they want to enforce their rights directly in a fast and cost-effective way. The need for protection is the reason for various measures introduced by governments to secure investments. In the following the system of foreign dispute settlement under the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in combination with Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) shall be highlighted. The ICSID is the result of the investor insecurity mentioned above. ICSID shall also support FDI in the developing countries. The focus shall be on the increased interest for BITs and the therefore increased interest in ICSID arbitrations. Why do states use BITs? Did the establishment of a neutral venue for investment dispute settlement reach its goal to depoliticise disputes? Is it used by investors, and what is protected? Do BITs play an important role in the system of dispute settlement and why? And how do they work together with the ISCID system?
В статье анализируются монои мультилинейные концептуальные подходы к развитию человечества, представленные в трудах таких выдающихся интеллектуалов как Н.Я. Данилевский, О. Шпенглер, А.Дж. Тойнби, Т. Парсонс, И. Валлерстайн, Ф. Фукуяма, Л.Н. Гумилев, С. Хантингтон, Гж. Колодко, Л.С. Васильев, Ю.И. Семенов, М. Музилис, Б. Витрок и др. Подчеркивается, что разнообразие линий социально-экономического развития народов основывается на различиях двух доминирующих макротипов цивилизации «европейского» и «азиатского». В контексте этих и локальных цивилизационных различий рассматриваются модели социально-экономической трансформации постсоциалистических стран; при этом особое внимание уделяется российскому вектору посткоммунистического транзита, в основу анализа которого, по мнению автора, может быть положена теория евразийства Л. Гумилева, Н. Савицкого, Н. Трубецкого и концепции современных российских авторов С.Г. Кордонского, В.Б. Пастухова, О.Э. Бессоновой и других ученыхThe discussion of transformation outcomes has become increasingly tense in the recent years and is now challenging contemporary social sciences. Two major approaches can be distinguished today. According to one of them, transformation is a linear process and it refers to logical transition from non-market to market economy. Such understanding of social development constitutes the classic theory of modernization (W. Rostow, T. Parsons). Similar lack of alternativeness is also a characteristic of the increasingly popular world-system analysis (I. Wallerstain). Yet it can be argued that institutional structure and value systems, which determine the inner logics of social development, are not so universal in nature. The end of 1990s has seen the rise of new theories of non-European modernity, the variety of capitalisms and the trend towards distinguishing modernization from westernization. These ideas have received much support in developing countries. We too argue that the difference of transformation outcomes in European and Eurasian areas cannot be adequately explained in terms of single-vector deterministic model. The reason for the emerging variety of socio-economic developments may very well lie in the inner civilization differences between countries. We argue that both, Marxist and liberal unitarisms with their optionless evolutionary approaches to certain sociohistoric organisms, ignore the interconnection of common and particular in the human history and thus become a subject to discussion. Along with unitarian approach, according to which the development processes within particular sociohistoric organisms follow a single logic in human history, there also exists a pluralist multilinear approach. It implies, that humanity is represented by a set of relatively autonomous historic entities, each of which has a certain life cycle with its own stages of birth, development and decease. The concept of monolinearity has been criticized as far back as in the late XIXth century by a Russian historian N. Danilevsky, whose notion of civilization concurrency ('ryadopolozhennost' tsivilizatsiy') [Danilevsky 2003] suggests that along with some universal essentials civilizations may have very specific goals of development and their own criteria of civilization's successful reproduction. Danilevsky is also the author of the idea that among the factors, which stipulate multilinearity of historical process and the variety of options of social development, a special role belongs to the type of civilization we choose. He also produced his own theory of cultural-historical types: '…civilization is a notion far more extensive than science, art, religion, political, economic or social development taken alone. Civilization includes it all. I am saying that even religion itself is a notion inferior to that of civilization.' [Danilevsky 2003, p.129]. He reckoned that such analysis of history-dependent types of civilization can help explain many phenomena in the past, the present and the future of different peoples, especially since he had learned about the particularities of Russian culture and history. Although he never criticized the Romano-Germanic culture, Danilevsky completely denied its universality and perceived his native Russian civilization as its equal but essentially different counterpart. In XXth century the popularity has come to such advocates of historical pluralism as O. Spengler, A.J. Toynbee, L. Gumilyov, S. Huntington and others. By accepting the possibility of concurrent development for countries, which belong to different civilizations, one does not have to deny the universality of technologies of existence in the very broad sense of its meaning. Although what we must consider is that institutional structure and value systems, which regulate development processes within certain social organisms, may not, and usually are not, universal in nature. Thus it makes sense, that different civilizations and, consequently, national states, which fall under these civilizations, are very likely to develop along different vectors. The institutional theory has also produced a hypothesis, according to which there exist different institutional matrices that can be regarded as latent mechanisms of functioning and reproduction of sociohistoric organisms. The matrix acts as a stable and historically dependent set of interacting institutions that are specific for particular civilizations. By applying this logics in comparative analysis of Eastern and Western macrocivilizations some Russian economists argue that in historical perspective Eastern matrix persistently features non-market mechanisms of distribution, centralized state and the priority of collective values over individual ones. The existing variety of development paths can generally be reduced to the differences that arise between two dominating types of civilization, which contingently can be referred to as European and Asiatic. The first one emerged from ancient polises and, basically, represents the chain of societies with private property, the balance between civil society and civil institutions, advanced personality and the priority of individual values. The latter type Asiatic one is historically connected to Asian despotisms, the domination of state property, all-powerful government institutional structures, the lack of civil society and so forth. We rely on the explanatory concept of basic institutional structures, which distinguish Eastern civilizations from Western ones the so called relations of power-property. This concept has been developed by an outstanding Russian orientalist L. Vasiliev in his works from 1960s 1990s. It is peculiar that in the course of human history this type of civilization has been dominating geographically as well as historically. And it also explains why in the XXth century etacratism (in other terms, etatism or statism) has developed in the countries, which fall under the Asiatic civilization area. Yet it should be underlined that there is no such necessity as to draw the dividing line between monolinear and multilinear approaches. We cannot as well ignore the experience of the previous centuries, which has been institutionalized in verifiable sources. This experience provides evidence of completely different options of social development not only for the organisms that have literally become history, but for those which survived until today. Some of them progressed from savagery feudalism and then onto capitalism; some have initially turned to the Asian mode of production and have only recently developed the advanced forms of capitalism (postindustrialism); the others got 'stuck' in a non-market phase of development and adapted it to the circumstances of contemporary global system. Yet we are only able to speculate within a definite historical horizon, that is measured by the life of a few nearest generations. The point is: there is no sense in crossing swords regarding the future of humanity beyond the XXIst century. Starting from the end of 1990s the Western literature brings an increasingly bigger number of publications, which support theories of non-European modernity and variability of development and attempt to separate modernization concept from westernization. These ideas have gained a lot of support in developing countries, where authors draw attention to the lack of explanatory power of existing social theories, which are incompatible with non-Western forms of contemporary society. According to multilinear approach in the modern world there coexist several main civilizations with distinct institutional, axiological and behavioral characteristics. These civilizations are connected with dominating religious systems. As applied to Central European, Southern European and Eurasian areas (post-communist countries, which are in the process of transformation) these religious systems are Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Islam. The social, economic and political situation in the corresponding countries is essentially different in a number of aspects. Moreover it explains the variation of development paths and the outcomes of liberal reforms in many post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently we argue that these civilization particularities must be closely studied. Even today many European researchers and analysts are still convinced that social and economic order of contemporary Russia is not essentially different from that of the developed European countries a still another type of capitalism. One of the most popular approaches is the so called variety of capitalisms approach [Drahokoupil 2009]. According to this approach the variety of social and economic systems, which exist in contemporary Europe, may be reduced to several fundamental forms (e.g. 'liberal market economies', 'controlled market economies' or even 'dependent market economies'). So it, basically, reduces the problem of determining the outcomes of various policies to the problem of diagnosing various states of capitalism in different countries depending on the structure of its economic institutions and the presence of foreign capital. Yet it is never discussed how and why Russia and its predominantly 'orthodox' post-socialist neighbours deviate from any of these classifications. Etacratism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was enforced from the USSR. The ones that resisted most were the countries which already had the most experience of market economy, some forms of civil society and the rule of law in the course of their history. During the 45 years of Soviet domination these countries have always been the most unreliable periphery of the 'true socialism'. All of them belonged to Catholic and Protestant Christian cultures. At the same time, etacratism voluntarily and rather autonomously developed in countries, which have never known capitalist relations and had a different history China, Vietnam and Mongolia. The contemporary societal system, which formed in CEE countries, was a result of a single anti-communist revolution of 1989 -1991, which according to V. Ilin had a system nature. These revolutions were encouraged by the idea of catch-up modernization. In CEE and Baltia the original goal of transformation, which included higher standards of mass consumption, social state and technological modernization was rather quickly reduced to two basics which represent the idea of progress market economy and competitive democracy (political pluralism along with democratic freedom) [Ilin 2006, p. 262-266]. The development in Russia, as well as some other countries of the former USSR, went in a different manner. The achievements of market economy and liberal democracy were far more modest than in the CEE neighborhood. We hold the following conceptual viewpoint on Russia's development. The contemporary Russian society, as well as Soviet, belongs to a particular civilization (Eurasian), which is essentially different from European (Atlantic) in relation to its institutional structure and system of values. Thus, in the social space of Europe there actually exist at least two substantially distinct 'Europes'.
For many developing countries, natural resource exports such as oil, diamonds and copper continue to be important drivers for economic growth and provide a unique opportunity for generating revenues for much-needed infrastructure and human development. Dependence on extractive resources, however, may also increase the likelihood of underdevelopment, fragility and conflict. The challenges for managing these resources efficiently are likely to expand, as a growing number of developing countries and fragile states emerge as oil and mineral producers. Thus, there is a need to gain a better understanding of the factors that may help prevent violent conflict in resource rich countries. This paper proposes that one way of gaining such understanding and insight is to "conflict-sensitize" the Extractive Industries Value Chain (EIVC), and use it as a framework for conflict prevention in resource-rich countries. In this context, the report's main objective is to examine the potential opportunities for conflict prevention along the extractive industries value chain. Such a body of knowledge can help the World Bank, the UN and EU, as well as client countries and other partners, in their planning and coordination of complementary activities when implementing their programmes and projects, particularly when working in the same resource-rich countries. This paper aims to demonstrate the feasibility and challenges faced by adopting a conflict-sensitive approach within the World Bank's EI Value Chain. The methodology used was a combined desk review and in-depth interviews with regional and country specialists, especially in governance/conflict prevention and extractive industries (Annex 1). The emphasis is on qualitative analysis. The four countries that were desk reviewed for the project, including Chile, Peru, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Zambia, are all copper producers and were selected due to their heavy dependence on revenues from mining. This book is arranged as follows: (i) part one explains extractives, conflict prevention and the value chain; (ii) part two is about the EI value chain as framework for conflict prevention; (iii) part three talks about emerging themes and recommendation; and (iv) part four describes the four country examples and the emerging lessons.
Nigeria accounts for nearly one-fourth of Sub-Saharan Africa s population and is the seventh most populous country in the world. As of April 2014 it is recognized as the continent s largest economy. Ranking 13th in the world for its oil production, Nigeria is Africa s largest producer and holds the second highest proven oil reserves on the continent, after Libya.3 Since embarking on the path of democracy in 1999, the country has enjoyed consistent and high economic growth rates, in the range of 6-8 percent annually in recent years. With its large reserves of human capital and natural resources, a large domestic market, and strong economic fundamentals, Nigeria is well positioned to join the group of large emerging markets and be the continent s powerhouse. Nigeria has already been identified as one of the promising MINT economies (an acronym for Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey), following the BRICs on the path to develop rapidly. Creating jobs to improve the well-being of all Nigerians, regardless of their personal circumstances and location, is a key component of the country s development agenda set out in Vision 20:2020. Good governance and effective institutions at the federal and state levels are critical to strengthening a business climate that encourages inclusive growth. Nigeria s 36 states and Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT) operates with a high degree of autonomy. Without commensurate reforms by state governments, the macroeconomic and institutional reforms of the federal government cannot produce the desired impact to create employment and reduce poverty.
Das Europäische System sozialer Indikatoren umfasst eine systematische Auswahl von Zeitreihendaten, die darauf ausgerichtet ist, die individuelle und gesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt sowie Dimensionen des sozialstrukturellen Wandels im europäischen Rahmen vergleichend zu messen und zu beobachten. Neben den Mitgliedsländern der Europäischen Union umfasst das Indikatorensystem zwei weitere europäische Länder sowie – soweit es die Datenlage erlaubt – mit Japan und den USA zwei nicht-europäische Referenzgesellschaften. Durch einen konzeptuellen Rahmen angeleitet, orientierte sich die Entwicklung des Europäischen Systems sozialer Indikatoren an drei Konzepten: Lebensqualität, soziale Kohäsion und Nachhaltigkeit. Während sich das Konzept der Lebensqualität auf Dimensionen der individuellen Wohlfahrt bezieht, umfassen die Konzepte der sozialen Kohäsion und Nachhaltigkeit Merkmale und Dimensionen der gesellschaftlichen oder kollektiven Wohlfahrt. Das Indikatorensystem ist zudem in insgesamt 13 Lebensbereiche untergliedert. Zeitreihendaten liegen für 9 Lebensbereiche vor, die voll implementiert wurden.
Die Zeitreihen beginnen frühestens 1980 und enden in der Regel spätestens 2013. Soweit es die Datenquellen erlauben, umfassen die Zeitreihen jährliche Beobachtungswerte. Die Indikator-Zeitreihen sind überwiegend nach ausgewählten soziodemographischen Merkmalen untergliedert, wie Geschlecht, Altersgruppen, Erwerbsstatus oder Gebietsmerkmalen. Regionale Untergliederungen liegen – soweit sinnvoll und soweit es die Datenquellen erlauben – auf dem NUTS-1 oder ähnlichem Niveau vor. Das Europäische System sozialer Indikatoren stützt sich bevorzugt auf harmonisierte Datenquellen, die eine bestmögliche internationale und intertemporale Vergleichbarkeit gewährleisten. Die verwendeten Datenquellen umfassen sowohl Aggregatdaten der offiziellen Statistik, wie sie z.B. von EUROSTAT oder der OECD bereitgestellt werden, als auch Mikrodaten aus offiziellen und wissenschaftsbasierten internationalen Surveys, wie z.B. der Europäischen Erhebung über Einkommen und Lebensbedingungen (EU-SILC), den Eurobarometer und World Value Surveys oder dem European Social Survey.
Das Europäische System sozialer Indikatoren ist das Ergebnis von Forschungsaktivitäten im Rahmen des früheren Zentrums für Sozialindikatorenforschung von GESIS, die zunächst als Teilprojekt des EuReporting-Projekts (Towards a European System of Social Reporting and Welfare Measurement) durchgeführt und von 1998 bis 2001 von der Europäischen Kommission über das 4. Europäische Forschungsrahmenprogramm gefördert wurden. Für ausführlichere Informationen zum Europäischen System sozialer Indikatoren vergleiche den Methodenbericht unter "andere Dokumente".
