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Haiti's new Dictatorship: The Coup, the Earthquake and the UN Occupation.By JUSTIN PODUR. Pluto Press, 2012. $29.95Reviewed by Natali DownerThe controversial book Haiti's new Dictatorship: The Coup, the Earthquake and the UN Occupation is a significant contribution to current discussions around globalisation, political economy, development, post-colonialism, and human rights. Podur's work provides welcome insight and a critical perspective on the struggle for sovereignty in modern day Haiti. The author takes the reader through Haiti's political history, beginning with the slave revolution of 1804, which established Haiti as the world's first independent black Republic. The historical account grounds the reader in Haiti's reality—the ongoing battle for economic and political sovereignty within its borders. Since its independence, Podur argues, the successful slave revolt in Haiti has been an ontological challenge to those who would seek to impose colonialism; it is the challenge they posed in 1804 and today.Podur sections the book into historical eras, including the Duvalier dictatorship followed by Haiti's popular movement and Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which act as signposts for his study. In Podur's analysis of the second and pivotal coup against Aristide in 2004, he argues that the new dictatorship was imposed and solidified under the control of the U.S., Canada, France and later, the United Nations. Specifically, under the guise of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (the new iteration of the "White Man's Burden",) western countries employed the old colonial pretext in order to "overthrow Haiti's elected government and replace it with an internationally constructed dictatorship." Drawing on Michel-Rolph Trouillot's concept of dictatorship, as the use of violence and centralization of power, Podur adds "impunity" to the description as it characterizes how violations by the regime and its supporters go unpunished. Podur categorises the new international variety of dictatorship as a "laboratory experiment in a new kind of imperialism."Podur discusses the contradictory role of the domestic and international media as contributing to the success of the coup. He argues that the media misrepresented the details surrounding the kidnapping and replacement of a democratically elected prime minister with the dictatorship of the United Nations. He describes the "media disinformation loop" as part of the coup infrastructure by shaping beliefs and actions. Podur's work is an attempt to publicize an alternative to corrupt mainstream reporting.The media did not question the legitimacy of the coup regime or the United Nations' Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Podur argues that the occupation of Haiti by the MINUSTAH occurred under peculiar justifications. He reports that, "in Haiti an internationalized military solution is being offered for what even the UN admitted were problems of poverty and social crime that occur in many places." He argues that violence and murder rates are higher in other countries, including the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica. The mainstream rationale for UN occupation in Haiti has evaded inquiry.Podur's analysis of the coup extends to the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the new dictatorship. In Haiti, Podur argues, NGOs perform tasks that belong in the hands of a functioning public service, accountable to the people. Instead, NGOs operate in the interests of their donor countries—"offering wealthy countries a morally responsible way of subcontracting the sovereignty of the nations they exploit." Making NGOs "less non-governmental and more 'over governmental'" and revealing the determinant role of external intervention in corrupting sovereignty.NGOs are responsible for the bulk of disaster response in Haiti. Podur's analysis of the earthquake of 2010 reveals a stunning account of how well-meaning donors are part of a feedback loop that (in part) finances a corrupt system. This system of local elites, international enterprises, and NGOs acts with impunity as they create and reinforce vulnerabilities because funds are controlled by western technocrats and corporations (particularly in times of crisis). Rather than geographic factors, Podur argues that social factors are the major cause of Haiti's horrific death toll following disasters. The decapitation of Haiti's government and the subsequent program cuts demobilizes the public service while it enables the rise of the "republic of NGOs" and the UN Dictatorship. As Haiti lacks the sovereignty to orchestrate its own disaster response, the failure to rebuild after the earthquake marks the failure of the new dictatorship and not the people of Haiti.Podur illustrates the character of the new dictatorship allowing readers to understand the truly gruesome nature of the post-coup occupiers. Podur's report leaves the reader spinning from accounts of murder and corruption; page after page the reader experiences Haiti's grim reality in the new imperialist regime. While the lists of events in the book become disorienting to read, they serve to demonstrate the brutality of actions performed by western nations, the Haitian elite, and armed factions.In this book Podur argues that Haiti is engaged in a historical struggle for democracy against external control. Podur's work on Haiti reveals how a multilateral violation of sovereignty is organized and carried out, and exposes the "new face of dictatorship in the twenty-first century global order." However, the larger project of this book suggests a call to action. Podur recounts the illegitimacy of the occupation and its atrocities so that widespread recognition can be achieved and policies changed. Podur challenges us to consider what it truly means to help Haiti, to face the consequences of our "do-good" attempts at aid and instead aim to assist Haitians to reclaim national sovereignty.Work CitedTrouillot, Michel-Rolph. Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990. Print.~NATALI DOWNER is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University. Her research explores the contradictions of capitalism as expressed in the twin crisis of peak oil and climate change.

In urban Latin America social housing developments have become a strategy to (re)centre territorial sovereignty with the state, by relocating low-income populations from informal settlements controlled by organized criminal groups. Yet criminal groups wield significant influence in new social housing developments, and states' monopoly on violence continues to be contested. While studies of urban housing in the region have largely disregarded matters of urban security, research on urban security has ignored houses as material agents. Bridging studies of housing and studies of urban security, I promote a broad understanding of security that conceives the cumulative effect of diverse threats to residents' livelihoods. By doing so, I further develop a material approach to state sovereignty in which a house operates both as a material referent and as an affective "object of desire" (Berlant, 2011) in urban security politics. By promising a secure home, social housing developments materialize the state's responsibility to protect its citizens. However, the deficient construction and inadequate design of many new homes expose residents to climatic, health and crime-related threats. I conclude by outlining three interrelated sets of question that arise from conceiving houses as politicized materiality. I base my argument on an ethnographic case study of a social housing development in peripheral Medellín. Resumen: Asegurando el hogar: crimen, soberanía estatal y vivienda social en MedellínEn la América Latina urbana, las urbanizaciones de vivienda social se han convertido en una estrategia para (re)centrar la soberanía territorial en el Estado, reubicando poblaciones de bajos ingresos en asentamientos informales controlados por grupos criminales organizados. Estos grupos criminales ejercen una gran influencia en las nuevas obras de viviendas sociales y se sigue cuestionando el monopolio de violencia de los estados. Mientras los estudios de vivienda urbana en la región han descuidado en gran medida los asuntos de seguridad urbana, las investigaciones sobre seguridad urbana han ignorado la vivienda como agente material. Uniendo los estudios de vivienda y seguridad urbana, promuevo una comprensión amplia de la seguridad que concibe el efecto acumulativo de diversas amenazas al medio de vida de los residentes, desarrollando así un enfoque material de la soberanía estatal en el que la vivienda funciona como referente material y "objeto de deseo" afectivo (Berlant, 2011) en la política de seguridad urbana. Al prometer asegurar el hogar, los proyectos de vivienda social materializan la responsabilidad del Estado de proteger a sus ciudadanos. Sin embargo, construcciones deficientes y el diseño inadecuado de muchas viviendas nuevas exponen a los residentes a amenazas climáticas, de salud y de delincuencia. Concluyo describiendo tres conjuntos interrelacionados de preguntas que surgen de concebir la vivienda como materialidad politizada. Baso mi argumento en un estudio de caso etnográfico de una urbanización de vivienda social en la periferia de Medellín.

Введение: в статье исследуются правовые аспекты распределения социальных рисков как метода управления ими. Цель: автор анализирует механизм распределения социальных рисков применительно к этапам нормативного и индивидуального правового регулирования социального обеспечения. Методы: автором применена совокупность методов научного познания, включающая общенаучные (диалектика, анализ и синтез, абстрагирование и конкретизация) и частно-научные методы исследования (формально-юридический, сравнительно-правовой, технико-юридический). Результаты: на основе признаков социального риска выявлена его структура, которую образуют рисковое обстоятельство (фактор риска), рисковое событие и его социально значимые последствия. При этом социальные риски угрожают гражданам, а неблагоприятные последствия их реализации компенсируются государством или негосударственными субъектами, обладающими специально правоспособностью. Автор приходит к заключению о том, что эффективная организация системы социального обеспечения достигается за счет управления социальными рисками, которое осуществляется с использованием различных методов, в том числе оценки и распределения. Распределение социального риска представляет собой передачу социального риска гражданином как субъектом, испытывающим на себе негативные последствия реализации социального риска, и принятие данного риска государством или иными субъектами, которые тем самым признают за собой обязанность по защите граждан от социального риска и компенсации его последствий. Анализ распределения социального риска проводится в статье применительно к этапам нормативного и индивидуального правового регулирования социального обеспечения, когда социально-обеспечительные обязательства возникают сначала в форме общерегулятивных, а затем относительных правоотношений. Выводы: концепция распределения социальных рисков может быть положена в основу более четкого определения общих принципов формирования и функционирования национальной системы социального обеспечения. ; Introduction: the study analyzes social risk as a basic category of social security law. Purpose: to analyze distribution of social risks in relation to the stages of normative and individual legal regulation of social security. Methods: the author uses a set of methods of scientific cognition, including general scientific methods (dialectics, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization) and specific scientific methods (formal-legal comparative legal, technical-legal). Results: based on the features of social risk, the author educes its structure, which consists of risk obligation (risk factor), risk event and its socially important consequences. Social risk is a menace to citizens, and negative consequences of its implementation are compensated by the government or non-governmental entities that possess special legal capacity. The author makes a conclusion that effective organization of a social security system is attained by social risk management which is implemented by using various methods, including evaluation and distribution. Social risk distribution is when a social risk is reassigned to the government or another entity by a citizen (as an entity that suffers from negative consequences of the social risk implementation) and accepted by the government or another entity, which, in doing so, takes responsibility to protect citizens from social risks and their consequences. The analysis of social risk distribution is carried out with consideration of the stages of normative and individual legal regulation of social security, when social security obligations arise as general-regulatory and relative legal relations. Conclusion: the concept of distribution of social risks can be used as a basis for a clearer definition of general principles of the national social security system formation and functioning.

The term "dirty war" has been applied to various periods of political violence and armed conflict around the world: the dirty wars of Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, the dirty war in Chechnya, and even the dirty war in Israel. Yet, given its broad spectrum of application, there is no established definition explaining what a dirty war is. These conflicts all titled "dirty wars" occur in different times, different locations, and for different reasons. Such ambiguous use of this term in such different environments is extremely confusing. This project set out to establish a working definition for the term, dirty war, by tracing the term through history. The Latin American dirty wars represent the first instances in which the term dirty war was widely used to describe the violence, but is not where the principles of a dirty war originated. Various historical progressions occurred in the decades before the 1970s to develop the techniques that would ultimately be transformed by military governments in Latin America into the first occurrences of dirty war. This project follows these ideas retroactively from Latin America to France, North Africa, Vietnam, and China. Dirty war is a technique used during an armed conflict by national militaries to achieve a political goal and is characterized by a major episode of violence known as politicide. The perpetrators of a dirty war create the illusion of war by manipulating the social perception of threat. Using this constructed social fear of violence, perpetrators of dirty war commit acts of violence they justify as necessary measures to prevent a greater violence. These actions create a submissive society allowing for the standing government to undo the political reforms carried out by its predecessors. The use of dirty war as a technique is justifiable motivation for foreign military intervention on the basis of humanitarian protection as defined by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's report, The Responsibility to Protect. The Chilean case is considered to be the prototypical example of dirty war. This project uses the Chilean case to show how a dirty war presents itself with examples of the techniques mentioned above. After establishing this foundation, the project compares the Chilean and Argentine cases of dirty war. This comparison forces the working definition of dirty war to adopt a degree of flexibility to account for differences that can exist between events that are veritable dirty wars. While these differences do exist in the techniques applied during a dirty war, the most striking differences are found in how effectively the political goals of a dirty war are achieved. This is critical to understand because the social reconstruction element representative of a dirty war's political goals will determine how and why a society reconciles with the violence of a dirty war. This project applies the constructed conceptual framework to a more contemporary instance of "dirty war" in the Russian Republic of Chechnya to prove that the Chechen case is not a dirty war as defined by the Chilean and Argentine cases. The Chechen case is a civil war in terms of loss of life, destruction, and military mobilization. It is "dirty" because the armed conflict in Chechnya is clouded by unknown political motivations and goals, elements of genocide, and transnational terrorism. "Dirty war" here is used by journalists to draw attention to these issues and to persuade the Russian people to end the conflict.

The scientific article pretends to develop from an analytic-reflexive point of view, to provide a broad and significative panorama attending the actual juridical situation in the branch of the international law that affects the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, considering the repercussion that can arouse the foreign policies and particular interests that the international actors like China, Russia and the United States of America have in the internal crisis of this south american nation, delimiting our analysis to determine the international law principles that these global powered nations determine to apply in there foreign policies towards the international community of nations based on the internal political entanglement of Venezuela, taking in consideration the supposed shortage of minimal inputs that every human being is entitled to in the field of human rights. In the same order of ideas of our thematic, will be developed taking in consideration the evolutive phenomenon of the territorial unity of a State as it is determined by the 1514 Resolution promulgated by the General Assembly of the United Nations, focusing in the intrinsic relation of the national unity within the political unity of a country, referring to the innovative international phenomenon denominated hypothesis of political duality in the legal framework of the external auto determination from one country to another, focusing the analysis the political-legal point of the view of the international law in the internal crisis or conflict of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela that generates the antagonism between the principle of self-determination of the people and the principle of responsibility to protect. ; El presente artículo científico pretende desarrollarse desde un enfoque analítico reflexivo para brindar un panorama amplío y significativo en cuanto a la situación jurídica en la rama del derecho internacional que atraviesa la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, en cuanto a la repercusión que puede propiciar las distintas políticas exteriores e intereses particulares de los actores internacionales como lo es China, Rusia y Estados Unidos en la crisis interna de esta nación sudamericana, partiendo el análisis de determinar los principios internacionales que estas potencias mundiales determinan en aplicar como parte de sus políticas exteriores hacia el concierto mundial de naciones, en relación a la crisis política interna de Venezuela, ante el supuesto desabastecimiento de los insumos mínimos al que tiene derecho toda persona en el ámbito de los derechos humanos. Se desarrollará en el mismo orden de idea de la temática, el fenómeno evolutivo del principio de unidad territorial de un Estado como lo determina la Resolución 1514 promulgado por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, en cuanto a la relación intrínseca de unidad nacional, estrictamente en la unidad política de un país, refiriéndonos al innovador fenómeno denominado hipótesis internacional de dualidad política en el marco legal de la autodeterminación externa de un país hacia otro, teniendo como punto de enfoque para el desarrollo de estos puntos, la situación jurídico-político en el ámbito del derecho internacional en el caso de la crisis o conflicto interno de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela que genera el antagonismo entre el principio de autodeterminación de los pueblos y el principio de responsabilidad de proteger.

Youth represent a critical demographic in Timor-Leste in terms of the country's economic development and stability. The slow pace of development has meant that there are very few opportunities for youth to improve their socio-economic well-being and this has had serious economic and security ramifications for Southeast Asia's poorest state. Investing in the development of Timorese youth represents an important strategy for enabling them to contribute to nation building and reducing their propensity to engage in destructive behaviour which threatens to undermine the stability of the fragile state. This is pertinent given that young people aged 15 to 29 will represent almost 40% of the population by 2010. Youth in Timor-Leste face many development challenges which stem from the context within which they live. Since gaining official independence in 2002 following 24 years of brutal Indonesian occupation Timor-Leste has had to rebuild its political, social, judicial and security institutions and infrastructure, a huge task which has been undermined by widespread poverty, a small and undiversified private sector, the poor provision of social services, inadequate security and judicial institutions, political instability and periodic civil conflict. While population growth has ballooned, the economy has remained stagnant and this has led to rising income poverty since 2002. There are multiple challenges for young people in Timor-Leste that have arisen from this development context. Poor quality teaching, high drop-out rates, a deficiency of post-primary and vocational education opportunities and poor linkages between learning outcomes and labour market demands mean that most youth lack the skills needed for gainful employment. Youth unemployment is a major concern, particularly in Dili where 40% of young people do not have a job. The country's weak economy is unable to provide enough employment for the thousands of job seekers entering the labour market every year and most Timorese youth make a living from subsistence agriculture. Up to 70% of young men are involved in some sort of martial arts group and while some groups participate in community development initiatives, many are engaged in crime and gang violence which contributes to insecurity in Timor-Leste. Female youth face their own development challenges including widespread gender-based violence and the burden of high fertility rates with the average women giving birth to 7 or more children. The lack of education and employment opportunities for young people has led to growing feelings of frustration and disenfranchisement among Timorese youth which increases their propensity to engage in crime and violence. This was most evident in 2006 when thousands of bored and disaffected young men joined violent riots sparked by tension within the military. The 2006 crisis highlighted the serious security implications of development challenges for youth because young men were responsible for most of the violence and destruction which forced 150,000 people to flee their homes, caused the economy to contract and destabilised the entire country. Since the 2006 crisis there has been a growing realisation among the development community that the socio-economic predicament of Timorese youth has significant implications for the country's economic development and stability. This is of particular concern to the Australian Government which has invested over AU$4 billion in stabilisation operations and aid to Timor-Leste since 1999. Australian assistance to Timor-Leste stems from its national interest in having a stable and prosperous neighbour, and a humanitarian responsibility to protect Timorese people from violence and help the impoverished country develop. In order to promote economic development and stability in Timor-Leste and prevent the outbreak of future civil conflicts such as the 2006 crisis, Australia should increase its investment in development initiatives for Timorese youth. It is recommended that the Australian Government: 1. Assist the Government of Timor-Leste to implement its National Youth Policy. 2. Invest in education to increase young people's access to quality education and training. 3. Invest in rural development to assist the majority of youth who make a living from subsistence agriculture. 4. Conduct further research into the effectiveness of youth development as a strategy for conflict prevention and promoting stability.

This report seeks to assess how effectively Australia is protecting whales and dolphins in Australia's waters. It asks three main questions: (1) Who is responsible for the protection of cetaceans? (2) What legal frameworks are currently in place to protect cetaceans? (3) How are other jurisdictions seeking to protect cetaceans? Ultimately, this report forms the first comparative discussion on the various legislative provisions penalising those who harm these beloved creatures. The report will first establish why there is such a need for the Australian Commonwealth to protect whales and dolphins. Animal Law experts were interviewed and Australia's current treaty commitments for the protection of whales were reviewed. This research demonstrated that Australia maintains an international obligation to uphold its reputation as a leading cetacean conservationist. Further, there is a social fascination over these creatures which have evolved into public priority for Australians. These factors show that Australia must maintain a legal framework that effectively protects whales and dolphins. Given that there is this need to uphold a legal framework, the report asks the question – who is to take on this responsibility to protect cetaceans through the legislation it administers? Two main bodies are known to provide protections for cetaceans in Australia's waters: the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) and the Department of the Environment (DOTE). Through an analysis of these bodies' legislation – the Fisheries Management Act 1991 and the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Act 1999 respectively, and an assessment of raw data demonstrating main threats to cetaceans, fishers' encounters with these creatures and agency case pursuit, the author establishes a primary responsibility. This responsibility should be bestowed on AFMA given its specific focus on the main threat to cetaceans: fishing activity. This finding demonstrates that AFMA needs to ensure its legislation has the capacity to protect whales and dolphins. At this stage the report seeks to answer the second core question – what legal frameworks are currently in place and how effective are they? One main way to determine how effectively AFMA may be protecting cetaceans is through penalty provisions in its legislation. AFMA's legislation does state that fishers are to avoid harming whales and dolphins; however, AFMA is substantially limited when it comes to enforcing these protections. The author assessed the current framework, examined AFMA's prosecution rates and presented the views of various stakeholders in AFMA's Compliance Unit in order to determine that the framework is ineffective. These results demonstrate the need to reform AFMA's legislation in order to ensure better protection for cetaceans. When determining how to improve AFMA's legislative protections for cetaceans, the report turns to other jurisdictions. It evaluates States, Northern Territory and international comparable fishing countries – New Zealand, Canada and the United States of America – and how these jurisdictions protect cetaceans through their respective legislations. Determining that AFMA's legislation lags those in other jurisdictions, comparisons between the jurisdictions provide direction for establishing ways in which the AFMA's legislation could be improved. The report finally makes recommendations based on the analysis of comparable jurisdictions' legislation. These recommendations include broadening the spectrum of penalties available to AFMA under the Fisheries Management Act 1991 when there is an offence against a cetacean. AFMA must ensure that a variety of fishers' behaviour which pose a threat to whales and dolphins are listed in stand-alone provisions within the legislation, with their own penalty attached. Furthermore, a variety of non-criminal penalties such as forfeiture, civil penalties and enforceable undertakings should be used by AFMA to give effect to penalty provisions protecting cetaceans from harmful fishing activity. These findings are necessary not only to demonstrate how Australia and in particular, AFMA, should effectively protect cetaceans but they also highlight some recommendations for improvement while AFMA undergoes its review of its legislation. Given the results of this report, the AFMA team may reassess how it looks to protecting Australia's most cherished marine mammal.

Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- 1 At the Intersection of Theology and Peacebuilding -- 1 Theological Prospects for Just Peace -- 1.1 For a Peaceful Mind among Believers -- 1.2 Pathways for Peace-oriented Theology -- 1.3 Resources of Peace in Religious Life -- 2 Theological Construction with a Peacebuilding Purpose -- 2.1 An Urgent Issue in a Wide Field of Study -- 2.2 Exploring the Meaning of Life-giving Faith -- 2.3 Theological Mapmaking -- 2.4 Particular Grounds of Common Visions -- 2.5 A Theological Map of Just Peace -- 2 A Faith-Based Endeavour for Peace -- 1 The Ecumenical Movement – A Movement for Peace -- 1.1 Shaped by Periods of International Conflict -- 1.2 Justitia et Pax -- 1.3 Justice, Peace, and Creation -- 2 The Peace Documents -- 2.1 Outset in the Decade to Overcome Violence -- 2.2 The Authors -- 2.3 The Textual Process -- 2.4 Groundwork for a Future Process -- 3 A Possible Resource of Faith-based Peacebuilding -- 3.1 Peacebuilding -- 3.2 In the Arena of Faith-based Peacebuilding -- 3.3 Moral Imagination -- 3 Rethinking Theological Ethics on Peace and War -- 1 What is the Meaning of Just Peace? -- 1.1 Fused Perspectives -- 1.2 An Umbrella-term -- 1.3 Justice and Peace – Coupled Concepts -- 1.4 Justice and Peace on a Collision Course -- 2 A Responsibility to Protect -- 2.1 Principles of a Just War -- 2.2 Sanctioning and Correcting Political Authority -- 2.3 Entering into the Field of International Law -- 2.4 Parallel Perspectives on the Use of Force -- 3 A Non-violent Way -- 3.1 Discipleship in Obedience and Compassion -- 3.2 An Active Nonviolent Approach -- 4 Developing a New Position on Peace -- 4.1 A Common Pathway between Differing Peace Traditions -- 4.2 A Pastoral and Conditional Approach -- 4.3 A Third Stance -- 4.4 Building a Culture of Peace -- 5 Constructing Just Peace Theologically – Perspectives of Theological Ethics -- 4 Rendering Shalom in Contemporary Terms -- 1 Understanding Just Peace – A Hermeneutic Undertaking -- 2 A Landscape of Meanings -- 3 A Peaceful Interpretation -- 3.1 Encompassing the Wellness of Humanity and All Creation -- 3.2 The Dimension of Righteousness -- 3.3 Righteousness and Compassion -- 3.4 A Comprehensive Vision of the Order of Shalom -- 4 Shalom – A Key for Theological Construction -- 4.1 A Hermeneutical Clue -- 4.2 In View of God's Kingdom -- 4.3 Guiding Perspectives in the Terrain of Interpretations -- 4.4 A Theological Map under Construction -- 4.5 A Holistic Outlook -- 4.6 Peace as Process -- 5 Constructing Just Peace Theologically – Perspectives of Biblical Interpretation -- 5 A Spiritual Journey -- 1 Engaging the Heart and Mind -- 1.1 Transforming the Society, the Believer, and the Faith Community -- 1.2 Conversion, Repentance, and Forgiveness -- 2 Reflecting a Holistic Understanding of Spirituality -- 3 Spiritual Formation -- 3.1 Soul-craft -- 3.2 Spiritual Practice -- 3.3 Peace Education -- 3.4 Peace Spirituality – Deepening the Understanding of Shalom -- 3.5 A Transformative Way -- 4 Receptive Ecumenical Learning -- 4.1 A Way of Spirituality -- 4.2 Searching for Christian Unity in a Conflict-ridden World -- 4.3 Learning from the Other – A Complex Undertaking -- 4.4 Fellow Travellers on the Peacemaking Journey -- 5 Constructing Just Peace Theologically – Spiritual Perspectives -- 6 Reconsidering the Ecumenical Vision -- 1 Unity and Peace – Cohabiting Concepts -- 1.1 A New Ecumenical Rallying Point -- 1.2 Modelling Unity, Modelling Peace -- 1.3 Catholicity – Envisioning Unity and Peace Together -- 2 Envisioning the Oikoumene -- 2.1 The Household of God -- 2.2 Oikoumene of Solidarity and Domination -- 2.3 Reflecting the New Ecumenical Paradigm -- 2.4 Unity – An Instrument of Domination -- 2.5 Unity – Conveying Ecumenical Peacebuilding -- 3 A Trinitarian Perspective -- 3.1 The God of Peace -- 3.2 Fostering Peaceful Relations -- 3.3 Heartening Christian Fellowship and Communion -- 3.4 Motivating to Action -- 3.5 A Request for an Authentic and Inclusive Vocabulary -- 3.6 Space for the Radically Different -- 4 Negotiating in the Global Oikoumene -- 4.1 Resisting Homogeneous Unity -- 4.2 A Vital Concern in Faith-based Peacebuilding -- 5 Constructing Just Peace Theologically – Ecumenical Visionary Perspectives -- 7 Discerning the Pathways for Theology in Peacebuilding -- 1 Drawing the Theological Map of Just Peace -- 2 Outlining Theological Resources for the Building of Peace -- Appendices: Information on the Peace Documents -- A Summaries of Drafts and Published Documents -- 1 The First Draft -- 2 The Second Draft -- 3 An Ecumenical Call to Just Peace -- 4 Just Peace Companion -- B Members of the Drafting Groups -- 1 The First Drafting Group -- 2 The Second Drafting Group -- C Affiliations of Draft Respondents -- 1 Affiliations of First Draft Respondents -- 2 Affiliations of Second Draft Respondents -- D Archives of the Ecumenical Peace Declaration -- E An Ecumenical Call to Just Peace -- Bibliography -- Index.

Natural disasters are one of the impacts on environmental dynamics, both natural and as a result of human behavior. The Destana (Disaster Resilient Village) policy is one of the programs created by BNPB (National Disaster Management Agency) and implemented by BPBD (Regional Disaster Management Agency) as one of the government's efforts in dealing with disaster problems. The purpose of the study is to describe how Destana plays an optimal role in increasing community preparedness in dealing with floods. Using a qualitative approach, this study conducted observations on 11 Destana in Bojonegoro, conducted interviews with BPBD and each Destana coordinator and documented the activities Destana had carried out to improve community preparedness. The first finding in the implementation of Destana is a medium for the community together with stakeholders in disaster management to carry out activities related to increasing community knowledge about flood preparedness. The second result is that through Destana the community becomes more aware of its environment and has a responsibility to protect itself. Finally, there is a pattern of optimizing the use of rural resources to be used in every Destana activity. The three results indicate that Destana has been used and is running optimally in an effort to increase community preparedness in facing flood disasters. Optimizing the use of Destana in this study shows that the community plays an active role by utilizing their local knowledge and resources. In addition, the government remains the main actor in implementing disaster preparedness policies. JEL Classification : D78, J24, R58. ; Стихійні лиха – це один із впливів на динаміку навколишнього середовища, як природний, так і результат людської поведінки. Політика Destana (село, стійке до стихійних лих) – одна з програм, створених BNPB (Національне агентство з питань ліквідації наслідків стихійних лих) та реалізовуваних BPBD (Регіональне агентство з управління стихійними лихами) як одна із зусиль уряду щодо вирішення проблем стихійних лих. Мета дослідження полягає в тому, щоб описати, як Дестана відіграє оптимальну роль у підвищенні готовності громади до боротьби з повенями. Використовуючи якісний підхід, це дослідження проводило спостереження за 11 Дестанами у Божонегоро, проводило інтерв'ю з BPBD та кожним координатором Дестани та документувало діяльність, яку Дестана проводила для покращення готовності громади. Перший висновок у впровадженні Дестана – це засіб для спільноти спільно із зацікавленими сторонами в галузі управління катастрофами для здійснення заходів, пов'язаних із підвищенням знань громади про готовність до повені. Другий результат полягає в тому, що завдяки Дестані громада стає більш обізнаною про своє оточення і несе відповідальність за захист себе. Нарешті, існує схема оптимізації використання сільських ресурсів, яка використовуватиметься в кожній діяльності Дестани. Ці три результати вказують на те, що Дестана використовується і працює оптимально, намагаючись підвищити готовність громади до боротьби з повенями. Оптимізація використання Дестани у цьому дослідженні показує, що громада відіграє активну роль, використовуючи свої місцеві знання та ресурси. Крім того, уряд залишається головною дійовою особою у реалізації політики готовності до стихійних лих. JEL Classification : D78, J24, R58. ; Стихийные бедствия – одно из воздействий на динамику окружающей среды, как природных, так и в результате человеческого поведения. Политика «Дестана» («Деревня, устойчивая к стихийным бедствиям») – одна из программ, созданных BNPB (Национальное агентство по управлению стихийными бедствиями) и реализуемых BPBD (Региональное агентство по управлению стихийными бедствиями) в качестве одной из мер правительства по решению проблем стихийных бедствий. Цель исследования – описать, как Дестана играет оптимальную роль в повышении готовности населения к борьбе с наводнениями. Используя качественный подход, в этом исследовании были проведены наблюдения за 11 Дестанами в Боджонегоро, проведены интервью с BPBD и каждым координатором Дестаны и задокументированы действия, которые Дестана осуществила для повышения готовности сообщества. Первый результат внедрения Destana – это средство для сообщества вместе с заинтересованными сторонами в управлении стихийными бедствиями для выполнения действий, связанных с повышением осведомленности сообщества о готовности к наводнениям. Второй результат заключается в том, что благодаря Дестане сообщество становится более осведомленным об окружающей среде и обязано защищать себя. Наконец, существует модель оптимизации использования сельских ресурсов, которые будут использоваться во всех сферах деятельности Дестаны. Три результата показывают, что Дестана работает оптимально, чтобы повысить готовность населения к стихийным бедствиям, связанным с наводнениями. Оптимизация использования Дестаны в этом исследовании показывает, что сообщество играет активную роль, используя свои местные знания и ресурсы. Кроме того, правительство остается главным действующим лицом в реализации политики готовности к стихийным бедствиям. JEL Classification : D78, J24, R58.

Tuberculosis (TB) is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide, killing nearly two million adults annually, the majority of whom live in developing countries. Research has shown that multiple factors— individuals, misunderstandings of TB, economic hardship of patients, the fragmentation of health services, gender, and stigma all influence transmission, detection and treatment of TB. After a decade of implementation of the international TB control strategy centred on the Directly Observed Treatment Short-course (DOTS), TB incidence and prevalence in Cambodia remains among the highest in the world, with a considerable number of cases remaining undetected. However, little is known about the factors hindering the success of the TB control programs efforts. This thesis is based on ethnographic research conducted in Kampong Speu province, Cambodia, aiming to describe TB patients' pathways to the DOTS programs, and factors determining the pathways and treatment adherence. Methods used included in-depth interviews with TB patients, family members, health providers, community health volunteers and Kru Khmer (traditional healers); focus group discussions with community members; a community survey; participation in meetings and workshops aimed at health workers; and observation of daily activities at participating health facilities. The two most important challenges for TB control in rural Cambodia were delayed presentation for TB diagnosis and non-adherence to TB treatment programs. Both contributed to persistent TB infection within the community, and were influenced by the interaction and combination of individual, institutional (related to the health system), and socio-economic factors. TB patients and community members had limited understanding of TB symptoms, causation, and treatment; therefore they did not respond appropriately, and present with early symptoms for timely diagnosis and treatment. Lay explanations of these early symptoms were mostly influenced by folk information shared within community networks. Despite this, community members chose providers of western medicine as their first choice, and only used Kru Khmer when western medicine did not resolve their symptoms. Access to public health service presented significant barriers for obtaining early TB diagnosis, and was critically undermined by the interaction between the five dimensions: accommodation, availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability. Low government salaries and shortages of health staff, limited supplies, and dual job practices of health staff all significantly impacted on public service delivery. This under-performance increased people's reliance on the private health sector which, due to the lack of collaboration between the two health sectors, contributed to delayed TB diagnosis and increased health care costs. Ineffective monitoring of the private health providers further exacerbated diagnostic delays. TB patients experienced prolonged pathways, consulted multiple providers, and spent substantial time and money before reaching DOTS. Large differences in delay were influenced by patients' ability to afford private treatment, TB diagnostics errors, and denial of the possibility of TB. Presentation to DOTS was resultant from social disruption, intervention by significant others and/or self-suspicion about TB. Patients usually enrolled in a directly observed treatment (DOT) promptly after TB diagnosis, however, although this required TB treatment to be taken under DOT by health worker or a community member, all patients self-administered TB medicines without observation. Thus treatment non-adherence was commonly reported, and discontinuation of treatment occurred mainly among vulnerable groups (elderly and poor) for two reasons: feeling better and side-effects. This study raised concerns related to the treatment of re-infection TB cases, as many such people return to treatment but are not correctly registered and treated. Socio-economic factors played an important role in TB treatment-seeking and shaped available family support, ability to pay and stigma associated with TB. Stigma played a considerable role in delaying TB diagnosis, and affected the psychological well-being of patients. It was derived from fears of contagion and the dangers presented by TB, the perceived association between HIV and TB, misunderstanding about TB causation, and attitudes of health staff. Rejection of TB patients was associated with perceptions that TB patients lacked a sense of moral responsibility to protect others from contracting TB; their extremely low social status was also significant. Although TB diagnosis and treatment was within reach of most of the population, obtaining timely diagnosis and compliance with TB treatment remained difficult, particularly for those who were most in need. Although challenges were caused by individual and socio-cultural factors, institutional factors related to the public health facilities created significant barriers for people in accessing the services. Improving TB patient outcomes requires effort and commitment to not only address individual and socio-cultural factors, but to redress shortcomings in health supply and staffing through effective public health system strengthening.

NDI's Chris Fomunyoh is once again joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson as they discuss the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy. They continue their conversation with their thoughts on the key challenges and opportunities facing Africa this year.
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Johnnie Carson: When female voices are not heard, the conversation is crippled, the policy is crippled, the institutions are crippled and the results are crippled.
Chris Fomunyoh: I'm Chris Fomunyoh, senior associate and regional director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, NDI. Welcome to this edition of DemWorks.

Again we're joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a proud member of the board of directors of The National Democratic Institute, NDI with a 37 year career in the U.S. Foreign Service focus on Africa. In our previous episode, you spoke about the risk of back sliding. So for this episode, we will focus on the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy in Africa.

I'd like us to pivot a little bit to the Sahel because in Tanzania we see the back sliding that's coming from political actors themselves, but there's something happening in the Sahel, which is a region in which we see a lot of political commitment to democratic governance, whether it's from the leaders and activists in Niger Republic, in Burkina Faso and in Mali, but at the same time these countries are coming under tremendous pressure from violent extremists who are coming across the desert and destabilizing what would be an emerging democracy and what concerns do you have and how do you think organizations like NDI, like USIP and others that have the self-power expertise, so to speak can contribute to the efforts to counter violent extremism like Sahel and also the whole of Africa?

JC: Chris you're absolutely right and we should all be concerned about outside forces that can come in and destabilize a country, its politics, its economy and its society and across the Sahel we in fact see this happening. The challenges to stability, to democracy to holding free and transparent and creditable elections and having democratic systems that work, are not only challenged by sometimes authoritarian leaders seeking to maintain power and control, we also can see this emerging as a result of exogenous forces coming in from outside, and here we see non-state actors undermining stability across the Sahel, which is creating tension for democracies and tensions for states.

I think one of the things that is absolutely critical in addressing the problems with the Sahel is for government to reconnect with their citizens, to put in place the kinds of services that citizens are looking for and are demanding and expecting. They need to be responsive to the needs that they, citizens believe are not there and they have to have these connections in order to build up resilience, to build up strength against the ideologies and to the negative forces that are brought in by extremist groups.

It is extremists groups across the Sahel are taking advantage of the absence of good services and good connectivity between government and citizens and one of the things that must accompany the security response is in fact a development and government response. Security alone cannot end the problems in the Sahel. It's an important ingredient but the most important ingredient is government going in and establishing responsible connections, providing services, education, healthcare, sanitation, water cattle feeding stations and services that citizens require and are being deprived of.

So one of the things that must be hand in hand and be out front is not the military response and the security response but the governance response, the social service response and if that is absent, the security response will be deficient and will not work.

CF: In fact, I'm so thankful you say that, because I know that you and other members of our board, Secretary Albright, in particular the chair of our board, you've been emphasizing reinforcing this message about democracy and development component as part of the toolkit in conquering violent extremism and in fact, that's the approach that NDI is taking to its work in the Sahel because we currently have ongoing programs in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and our focus, the main focus of that piece of work is on people, processes and the politics and trying to create platforms where governments can reconnect with citizens at a grassroots level.

So in a number of cases we've set up platforms where civil society with legislatures and members of the executive branch, including representatives of the security services get together regularly to figure out what the challenges are in various communities and how to foster inter-communal dialogue and better relationships between the security services and the populations that they seek to serve, because you may remember there was a UN study that said that in many of the cases where violent extremism persist, that 70% of the people who join extremist organizations, are reacting to poor performance by security services and you have paid a lot of attention to Nigerian and the whole Boko Haram phenomenon.

I don't know how this would fit into our conversation with regards to the Sahel as well.


JC: I think it also very pertinent for Nigeria, and I too have seen studies of some very distinguished organizations, Mercy Corps and others that talk about why people are recruited and indeed, the authoritarian sometimes brutal nature of security forces towards communities that they should be protecting drives individuals away from the government and into the hands of Boko Haram.

Even the origin of the current violence in Northern Nigeria has its origins in the brutal extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram's first leader in 2009. His apprehension, his questioning, his interrogation, torture and mistreatment were all recorded on someone's cellphone and became widely seen throughout the country and throughout the north. Two years later, after that event in 2009 we saw and upsurge in 2011 and the activities of Boko Haram and indeed people continued to say that the brutal nature in which the security forces sought to root out Boko Haram, in fact generated more recruits for Boko Haram than it did for support for the government's efforts.

It is absolutely critical, it's absolutely critical that security forces recognize that they have a responsibility to protect the civil liberties and the human rights of the citizens of the state that they are protecting and that the way they treat the individuals in areas that they go into, may have an impact on their ability to ultimately win the conflict, but one thinks of Nigeria and particularly of the North East and there again weak institutions of corruption of lack of social services are all playing a major part in why the conflict in that region continues.

In the north east of Nigeria particularly and the three most affected states, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Those three states have the lowest social indicators of any of Nigeria's 36 states, less access to education, to healthcare, to water resources and to jobs and access and this all plays out as well. Governments needs to be responsive to their citizens and while a security response is important, governance and providing social services and the needs to citizens to build resilience is critical as well.

CF: This seems like a good place to take a short break. For well over 35 years NDI has been honored to work side by side with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help contribute to develop the institutions practices and skills necessary for democracy's success.

I realize it's many countries to cover but in the few minutes that are left, I just see if you have any parting words for four countries that we haven't really focused that much on and those are Ethiopia, Kenya, The Democratic Republic of Congo and we'll exit with Cameroon. What are your thoughts?

JC: My thoughts on Ethiopia. It is absolutely essential that those of us who support a democracy and democratic progress lend all of our efforts to those of the Ethiopian government to ensure that the democratic experiment that is underway is successful. Prime Minister Abiy won the Nobel Prize for bringing about peace with Eritrea but the more important thing is that we, outside step up our effort to help him ensure that his legislative elections, this year, are successful and that we do what we can to strengthen his country's democratic progress.

He has appointed and outstanding leader, Birtukan, former opposition leader, spent many years in jail as his country's election commissioner. We need on the outside to provide the kind of technical and financial and advocacy support that she might need to put in place the architecture for running the country's elections. It will in fact be the first real serious elections in that country since the collapse of the Derg in the early 1990s. So it's important that we help do this.

Ethiopia is Africa's second most populous country behind Nigeria and it's important that we help democracy there. It's also a key and strategic state in the region bordering a number of other countries that will look to the success of what happens here. So we need to support.

Kenya, will have elections next year. It is important that there be a continuation in the improvement of the country's electoral agencies. The shadow of the flawed and failed and controversial and violent elections of 2007 and 2008 continue to be a shadow. The controversies associated with the last elections and court decisions there continue to hang over. It is important to continue to support civil society, support the electoral commission and work with the Kenyan government to ensure an outcome.

It appears very clearly that President Kenyatta wants to leave a positive legacy of progress, economically, politically and electorally. This will be a challenge but we should support the process moving forward. The features are still there.

CF: In fact, I should say before end up with the last two countries that for listeners, Ethiopia has got a parliamentary system of government. That's why the parliamentary elections are extremely important, the national elections for Ethiopia and also with regards to Kenya, as you say, President Uhuru Kenyatta would like to leave a good legacy. He's coming to the end of his second term and NDI working with partners on the continent has been very strong on the issue constitutionalism, respect for rule of law. In fact, we had a continent wide conference in Niamey, Niger Republic last October on the whole question of presidential term limits and we'll be having a second conference in Botswana in June to discuss term limits with former African heads of states and various other partners on the continent.

Just to say that, as leaders relinquish power when their terms come to an end, they help consolidate and strengthen democratic practices and institutions. So, with the two remaining countries-

JC: I applaud President Kenyatta for saying very early on that he would adhere to the constitution, he would serve two terms and step down. This is an important message for the most important country in East Africa, especially looking at the neighboring states, particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda where leaders there have found ways to extend themselves in office. He recognizes the importance of transition at the top and allowing the citizens of the country to select new leadership on a constitutional basis rather than trying to alter the constitution to eliminate term limits, age limits and perpetuate themselves in power.

So I hope others in the region are in fact looking at Kenya's model. One jumps across to West Africa and looks at President Paul Biya who's been in power for three decades, plus shows no desire whatsoever to leave office. Here is a man who has lost touch with his citizens and the communities of his country and because he has lost touch with his citizens, because there have been structural deficiencies and weaknesses and the institutions that he is responsible for, we now see a country that is suffering from three or four major political crisis, crisis with the English speaking portion of this country in the south west, the emergence of Boko Haram and radicalism across the border from Nigeria in the north west and problems of herders and farmers driven by drought and climate conditions.

President Biya has lost touch with the needs of his citizens and his government has not been responsive to anyone but himself and a small political elite. I think it is important for the international community to point out the failures and the flaws of his governance, the corruption that underpins it and to support those internally who are pushing for a constitution and political policies that fundamentally change the nature and structure of society, political architecture in society.

CF: You're so right, because that's one country that it's got tremendous potential but that it's not pulling its weight at all and because of its strategic location, invariably weakens other countries in the central Africa sub region, as well as in West Africa too and it's now taking full advantage of what could be real opportunities to improve the wellbeing of its citizens.

We'll be right back after this quick message.

And let's end with the country right in the heart of the continent, The Democratic Republic of Congo. I was in Kinshasa in October and met with political leaders and opinion leaders across the board, civil society, religious leaders who are very powerful in the Congo, very influential and I came away, I should say, a little more optimistic than I was going in. I was quite apprehensive given what has transpired in the 2018 presidential elections but after talking to the Congolese, I got a sense that a genuine attachment to reform.

Everybody wants some reforms of the political process or the electoral process and the key question is whether they are going to be able to set aside their personal agendas and actually get together to help this country, which has got tremendous resources and tremendous potential get back on its feet. I was very impressed by the fact that most of the leaders in Congo are pretty young. I know that you and I have talked about Congo for many, many times and when you were still in the administration you had to deal with some of their crisis.

I don't know what you take is on the present leadership and the present challenges but also the opportunities that present themselves in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

JC: Let me say that The Democratic Republic of the Congo has more unrealized potential than any other large state in Africa and that potential has continued to be in held in check and not realized because of the poor nature of the politics that have occurred there since the 1960s.

The 2018 elections were deeply flawed and irregular and not representative, I think, of the vote of the people. The one thing that one can say about the process that it did lead to President Kabila stepping down and a new younger president, Tshisekedi coming into power. There was immediately after the election a strong feeling that Tshisekedi was going to be instrument of Kabila going forward in that his leadership and his authority and his ability to do things would be substantially constrained. Tshisekedi has shown some degree of independence.

It is again important to recognize that there is little we can do to rerun that election or to reverse it but there is something that all of us can do going forward, and that to put pressure on President Tshisekedi to ensure that the electoral commission is strengthened, it has more independence, more technical capacity and more of an ability to deliver a more responsible, fair and transparent election going forward.

It is also important that he continue the fight against corruption, that he begin to put in place the kind of economic reforms that are going to unleash the potential of the Congo and to provide the people, The Democratic Republic of the Congo an opportunity to realize so many of the opportunities that they have been denied in the past. He has shown more independence than I thought but it is important that he not stop, that he continue to move forward, that he open up political space and continue to open it up for civil society, for the opposition, for the media, that he not constrain but unleash the country's potential and that he continue to show both in reality and fact his independence away from Kabila and those who were around him in the past.

He will be judged on the next four years very keenly, but it's important that the institutions of democracy to the extent that we can help civil society strengthen them, that they be nurtured and pushed forward. Elections and democracy...Democracy doesn't depend essentially, solely on elections. It is institutions that must be strengthened and we can help the DRC and civil society move those forward.

Again, working effectively with religions groups, Catholic Church, a very powerful instrument, working with women's groups, with working youth groups across the DRC and working with an emerging entrepreneurial class of young Congolese as well. We have to nurture and strengthen and push them forward. These next elections will be able to tell us whether there's been progress. President Tshisekedi needs to continue to move forward.

CF: Thank you very much Ambassador Johnnie Carson. It's really been an honor to have you do this tutor for us on the entire continent. Of course there still would always be ground to cover. As you were speaking, I thought about what late President John F Kennedy said about democracy as a never ending endeavor, and so NDI and similar organizations will continue to work side by side with our African partners to make sure that we can support them, give them the support and share experiences that they need so that we can all collectively, continue to work to strengthen and support democracy in countries like the DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan and across the entire continent.

Thank you also for being a member of our board of directors. We are extremely proud of that and extremely proud of the partnership that NDI has with USIP and hope that our two organizations would continue to work together to support the growth of democracy across Africa and to our listeners, can I just say thank you for sharing in this edition of DemWorks, to follow our next podcast. Please check us out on our website www.NDI.org.

Thank you for listening.


Ambassador Johnnie Carson





Peace, Security and Democratic Resilience,

INTRODUCCIÓNLa instalación de la globalización, luego de la caída de la bipolaridad, ha cambiado dramáticamente la configuración del mundo. Ya instalado el siglo XXI los Estados nacionales, otrora actores de privilegio en las relaciones internacionales, se ven enfrentados con otros actores, legales o ilegales, que en ciertos casos son tan o más poderosos que los propios Estados. Así, éstos ven debilitarse sus capacidades de acción política en un escenario donde los peligros globales se van mezclando con los problemas locales de pobreza y exclusión, cuestionando a la seguridad nacional e internacional, ambas – globalidad y localidad – como dos caras de la misma moneda.Esa dinámica internacional de articulación de lo global y lo local ha ido generando un nuevo escenario, desarmando y reconstruyendo viejos alineamientos políticos, promoviendo nuevas realidades regionales y nuevas afinidades. En ese marco se entiende que las operaciones internacionales de intervención involucran aspectos económicos, sociales, militares y humanitarios y, en última instancia, se articulan – tal vez conflictivamente – con el concepto tradicional de soberanía de los Estados. Por ello, en este artículo nos preguntamos como es que ocurre esa articulación.Este trabajo pretende analizar la relación de la comunidad internacional y sus intervenciones en función de la soberanía de los Estados, todo ello en un escenario de globalización. En este marco global entendemos que los conflictos – tanto latentes como manifiestos – pueden terminar impactando de una manera u otra en la seguridad regional y en la seguridad internacional. No obstante ello, de por sí las intervenciones no son caminos exentos de dificultades, en función de la eventual tensión entre soberanía e intervención.Sobre esa tensión existen muchos puntos de vista remarcables. Así, Deng, Kimaro, Lyon, Rotchild, y Zartman (1996) hacen notar la responsabilidad que conlleva la soberanía estatal en términos de brindar bienestar a los ciudadanos. Esa responsabilidad, concluyen, tiene dos facetas. Una frente a sus propios ciudadanos y otra frente a la comunidad internacional. (Cap. 1) En "The Responsibility to Protect: Report" (2001) también se nos menciona la dualidad de tal responsabilidad, hablándonos de responsabilidad "residual" de la comunidad internacional frente a crisis humanitarias. Por otra parte, también se reconoce que una intervención no deja de ser una suspensión "de facto" de la soberanía bajo el criterio de que paz y estabilidad no pueden ser gestionadas si no se tiene autoridad sobre el territorio. También en sentido de responsabilidad de la comunidad internacional, Lyon y Mastanduno (1995) nos hablan de la generación de la "interdependencia moral," que se relaciona con el sentimiento que un Estado tiene con respecto a las prácticas de otro sobre su población. (pp. 5, 252 – 265) Es que la soberanía westfaliana terminó diseñando al Estado moderno y territorial, pero hoy existe una configuración diferente en función del deterioro de las capacidades de los Estados, la transformación del sistema internacional en función de la globalización y los cambios tecnológicos, así como también las peculiaridades generadas por las presiones de los nacionalismos. Desde esta perspectiva primeramente ubicaremos el escenario que resulta de la globalización, con sus atributos y consecuencias relacionados con los Estados y sus instituciones vinculadas al ejercicio efectivo de la soberanía. En tal sentido, se parte de una idea del marco global de interacción que nos brinda Ulrich Beck (2003), quién plantea que la globalización es irreversible, inexcluyente y se apoya en la conceptualización de la incertidumbre imperante, relacionada con el riesgo y la inseguridad globales. Así, se resaltan los impactos e interrelaciones, tanto entre Estados, entre Estados y organizaciones multilaterales y de la sociedad civil y entre Estados, organizaciones multilaterales y organizaciones delictivas transnacionales. (p. 42) Bajo esta globalización desordenada, el poder de conducción de los Estados va perdiendo preponderancia y deteriorándose en su rol político clásico. Este autor nos dice que pensar los problemas del mundo desde una concepción de soberanía tradicional clásica, es perder capacidad de acción política, porque los conflictos configuran nuevos retos para la política y las instituciones en general, más allá de fronteras.Luego se pretenderá presentar aquí el eventual debate entre soberanía y legitimidad de las operaciones internacionales en tanto intervenciones, vinculándose así el interés nacional de cada Estado y el interés común internacional en relación con el derecho al desarrollo y a la seguridad que tiene la humanidad. Entonces, soberanía como responsabilidad se vincularía con el bienestar de los ciudadanos dentro de un Estado y con la correspondiente responsabilidad gubernamental, frente a sus ciudadanos y frente a la propia comunidad internacional.En ese marco podríamos decir que las operaciones internacionales de intervención desafían el concepto de soberanía de los Estados y se vincularían con la necesidad de actuar frente a una amenaza, latente o manifiesta, de que ocurran pérdidas humanas, así como también situaciones de migraciones y violaciones a los derechos humanos, todo lo cual pone sobre la mesa visiones en pro y en contra de este tipo de intervención.Luego se incursiona en las diferentes categorizaciones y puntos de vista sobre los Estados débiles y fallidos. Así, se verán puntos de vista teóricos y analíticos al respecto de una eventual categorización de Estados fallidos como tales.Si bien aquí no estamos diciendo que sea necesaria la generación de una "Nueva Westfalia" fundacional, lo que aquí sí se pretende es poner sobre la mesa la necesidad de pensar en la generación de nuevos contenidos institucionales para enfrentar nuevos desafíos, evitando así que las viejas instituciones se transformen en aquellas "instituciones concha" que nos define Anthony Giddens (2000, p. 31).Es que, en este escenario incierto, se hace necesario concebir instituciones configuradas de otro modo, tendientes a la idoneidad y credibilidad de las respuestas a las demandas y que no sean meras instituciones vacías de contenido en términos de eficiencia.GLOBALIZACIÓN Y ESTADO NACIÓNHasta el siglo XX el universo estuvo determinado fuertemente por la certidumbre y la fuerza de la razón. Pensado desde las relaciones internacionales y de la guerra, Sigmund Freud (Einstein y Freud, 2001) visualiza la humanidad como una comunidad de personas sometidas a "la dictadura de la razón" (p.90).Pero el mundo actual, en tanto globalizado y firmemente basado en los avances de las ciencias y las tecnologías de la información, ha configurado un sistema de interrelaciones entre actores – estatales o no – con una dinámica propia que permea lo tecnológico y se esparce en todas las actividades humanas, dinámica ésta que genera incertidumbres cotidianas. La globalización se relaciona con el debilitamiento y, eventualmente, la caída de barreras para todo lo que se relaciona con la vida diaria, el control sobre la economía, la información, los riesgos ecológicos y los conflictos en general, mostrando la desfiguración del concepto de distancia. Al respecto, Ulrich Beck (1998a) nos dice que globalización significa ". los procesos en virtud de los cuales los estados nacionales soberanos se entremezclan e imbrican mediante actores transnacionales y sus respectivas probabilidades de poder, orientaciones, identidades y entramados varios" (p.29). En el mismo marco y citado por Beck (1998a), Wallerstein nos dice que transnacional estaría significando " … el surgimiento de formas de vida y acción cuya lógica interna se explica a partir de la capacidad inventiva con la que los hombres crean y mantienen mundos de vida social y relaciones de intercambio 'sin mediar distancias'. (.) que se infiltran, lo que repugna al control estatal – nacional y a su exigencia de orden" (p.57).Entonces esta globalización nos mostraría, por un lado, una eventual erosión en la acción política del Estado Nacional y por otro lado, el accionar de múltiples organizaciones transnacionales, actores, grupos e individuos, más allá de los sistemas políticos, todo esto sin un árbitro internacional claro que pueda evitar la generación de eventuales conflictos.Hoy los Estados Nacionales deben interactuar con diferentes actores nacionales, multilaterales y transnacionales, en virtud de lo cual su poder de conducción se va desfigurando frente a la multiplicidad de espacios y vínculos más allá de lo nacional. El Estado, "atado" a un territorio y estructurado como unidad de asociación política y de organización, va perdiendo preponderancia frente a una globalización de funcionamiento desorganizado y contingente, donde la pobreza, el terrorismo y los problemas ecológicos, configuran nuevos retos para la política, la ciencia y el funcionamiento institucional en general. Como dice Beck (2000) "pensar [hoy los problemas globales] en clave de Estado nacional hace perder toda capacidad de acción política" (p. 104). Desde su punto de vista y citando a David Held, Beck (1998a) propone la necesidad de un equilibrio de poder pluridimensional entre naciones, organizaciones y hombres, donde los grupos organizados se puedan manifestar autónomamente en relación con determinados derechos y deberes, y visualizándose a los Estados nacionales como cediendo parte de poder y soberanía a instituciones y organizaciones multilaterales. (p. 136).En tal sentido, debemos considerar aquí que la soberanía nacional y la articulación de un Estado en organizaciones multilaterales no tienen por que ser dimensiones excluyentes entre sí. En un marco de interdependencia y cooperación, la eventual disminución de autonomía nacional frente a la institucionalidad multilateral aumenta los niveles de soberanía compartida (Rojas Aravena, 1999, pp. 16 – 17). También Carlos Gutiérrez (2001) al respecto nos dice: "Las diversas tendencias a la globalización (…) nos confrontan con problemas que ya no pueden solucionarse dentro del marco del estado nacional. El vaciamiento de la soberanía del estado nacional seguirá ahondándose y, por tanto, resulta imprescindible proseguir con la ampliación de las facultades de su acción política a nivel supranacional." (p. 12).LOS CONFLICTOS EN EL ESCENARIO GLOBALComo se mencionó, en el actual escenario internacional el desplazamiento de poder desde los Estados hacia actores que están fuera del control político y que muchas veces ni siquiera muestran un interlocutor válido, si es que lo poseen, es un atributo del mundo globalizado. En este marco los conflictos entre Estados no son improbables ni impensables, puesto que éstos siguen siendo los principales protagonistas de las relaciones internacionales.Pero los procesos sociales y políticos, las nuevas amenazas y el accionar delictivo de ciertos actores, también puede constituir un elemento que origine conflictos en las sociedades, sea dentro de los Estados y/o más allá de ellos. No obstante, desde esta perspectiva pensamos que los futuros conflictos se relacionarán especialmente con el accionar de los propios gobiernos, su legitimidad frente a la ciudadanía y las actitudes que esa ciudadanía toma frente a los problemas que los involucra cotidianamente. Es que a fines del siglo XX se pudo percibir un eventual retraimiento del Estado de la vida cotidiana, sea por acción, omisión o por deslegitimación del accionar político ante la sociedad civil. Cabe recordar aquí lo que nos dice Beck (2003), "Sin Estado y sin servicios públicos, no hay seguridad, sin impuestos, no hay Estado. Sin impuestos, no hay educación ni sanidad asequible ni seguridad social, sin impuestos no hay democracia, sin opinión pública, sin democracia y sin sociedad civil, no hay legitimidad, y sin legitimidad, otra vez, no hay seguridad." (p. 42) También Beck se pregunta si "¿no será precisamente la falta de Estado, la inexistencia de estructuras estatales que funcionen, el humus de las actividades terroristas?" (p. 31) En el mismo sentido, Juan Battaleme (2002) nos dice que: "Una nación con debilidades institucionales importantes, va a ver estas debilidades reforzadas por la acción de la globalización que opera desnudando las falencias de los mismos en su ejercicio del control y autoridad (tanto doméstica como internacional), y por la erosión que actores nocivos le hacen." (s.p.) En definitiva, entonces, los conflictos están hoy más referidos a la estabilidad democrática de las propias instituciones nacionales de cada uno de los Estados, a la eventualidad del accionar de grupos terroristas o guerrilleros y a las necesidades insatisfechas de las comunidades. En ese escenario, el rol de la comunidad internacional va adquiriendo preponderancia.LA TENSIÓN ENTRE SOBERANÍA E INTERVENCIÓNConceptualizando la SoberaníaDesde Westfalia la soberanía era – y de hecho aún lo es – el recurso más importante de los Estado en un mundo donde reina la asimetría de poder y los peligros que implican la defensa de estilos de vida y recursos naturales. Bajo ese criterio, debemos coincidir en que cualquier operación internacional de intervención debería hacerse con el consentimiento del Estado que tiene soberanía en ese territorio. (Bellamy Williams y Griffin, 2004, p. 11; Lyon y Mastanduno, 1995, pp. 1 – 5) Tal ha sido el espíritu de la resolución 46/182 de la Asamblea General de la ONU cuando nos dice que " … la soberanía, la integridad territorial y la unidad nacional de los Estado deben ser respetadas …" y que, partiéndose que cualquier Estado tiene el control efectivo de su territorio, cualquier asistencia humanitaria debe contar, en principio, con el consentimiento y petición previa del país afectado. No obstante debemos notar que la expresión "en principio"contenida en la resolución podría estar subordinando, en cierta forma, la soberanía a la tragedia humanitaria. Sobre este tema, Boutros-Ghali reconocía que la soberanía e integridad de los Estados "es crucial para el progreso internacional." No obstante, mencionaba que"el tiempo de la absoluta y exclusiva soberanía (…) ha pasado.", enfatizando que es necesario "encontrar un balance entre la necesidad de una buen gobierno interno y los requerimientos de un mundo más interdependiente." Asimismo, definía las operaciones de paz como "un despliegue de la presencia de ONU en el campo, hasta ahora con el consentimiento de todas las partes involucradas". El problema aquí puede surgir con la expresión 'hasta ahora', 'hasta la fecha' o eventualmente 'hasta aquí' (hitherto en inglés), lo que puede resultar controversial. (Bellamy Williams y Griffin, 2004, p. 12; Lyon y Mastanduno, 1995, p. 2).Desde esa perspectiva, la soberanía estatal no estaría implicando necesariamente un poder ilimitado e irrestricto sobre la población de un Estado, Estado éste que – de hecho –debe proteger los derechos de los ciudadanos, brindándoles aquellos bienes básicos que hacen a la vida, la dignidad y los derechos humanos en general, para poder así enfrentar los problemas de salud, hambre, crimen, conflictos tanto políticos como sociales y riesgos como consecuencia de deterioro ambiental. Pero, frente a las necesidades de protección de los derechos humanos de una población, puede ocurrir que tal vez no exista voluntad y/o capacidad por parte del gobierno soberano para cumplir con tales funciones. Entonces frente a esa situación existiría una suerte de responsabilidad "residual" a través de la cual la comunidad internacional debería actuar moral e interrelacionadamente, donde no cabría la posibilidad de no responder frente a la pérdida de vidas y sufrimiento humano. Esa dualidad en tanto responsabilidad frente a la comunidad internacional y frente a los ciudadanos, se vincularía con el respeto de la soberanía de los Estados, por un lado, y el respeto de la dignidad y los derechos humanos básicos de la población dentro de los Estados, por otro. (Deng, et. al. 1996, Cap 1; Lyon y Mastanduno, 1995, p. 252)La contrapartida de esa responsabilidad de los Estados frente a la comunidad internacional se transforma en responsabilidad de proteger e incluso de reconstruir, puesto que la reconstrucción, en sí misma, no deja de ser de ser una medida preventiva de futuros conflictos o desestabilizaciones. En definitiva, existirían dificultades para articular el concepto tradicional de soberanía – referido más hacia la guerra entre Estados – con las actuales situaciones de violencia intra estatal y tragedias humanitarias. Por tanto las operaciones internacionales de intervención seguramente seguirán desafiando al sistema internacional y las interacciones estatales. Si el mundo ha cambiado, tal vez habría que redefinir instituciones e instrumentos que se adecuen mejor a la realidad de hoy.Las intervenciones y su articulación multilateralEntendemos aquí que una de las características de las operaciones internacionales de intervención es el cruce físico de fronteras de un Estado en nombre de la comunidad internacional y con un propósito definido. Esas intervenciones se pueden relacionar con preocupaciones sobre violaciones a valores y principios relevantes, puesto que las eventuales pérdidas de vidas humanas, limpiezas étnicas y demás condiciones de sufrimiento humano, impactan en la seguridad regional e internacional. Pero dichas intervenciones no serían un fin en si mismas sino que tendrían como propósito la transformación de sociedades inestables y violentas en sociedades liberales y demócratas. (Lyon y Mastanduno, 1995, pp. 12 – 14; Bellamy Williams y Griffin, 2004, p. 165; Weiss, 2004, p. 138)En cierta forma este tipo de operaciones internacionales de intervención suspenden la soberanía de un Estado ya que, como nos dicen Rabimov (2005, s.p.) y Rotberg (2003, p. 3), no es posible intervenir o accionar en procura de estabilidad y/o restauración si no existe autoridad sobre el territorio, así como tampoco es posible solucionar el conflicto en un Estado débil e inestable, sin un nivel mínimo de seguridad.De hecho, si bien el mantenimiento del principio de no intervención está vigente en función de la soberanía de los Estados, hoy el imperativo humanitario está pesando cada vez más, especialmente cuando se entiende que existe responsabilidad de la comunidad internacional. Y esta responsabilidad es responsabilidad cuando se interviene frente a calamidades humanitarias, como también es responsabilidad cuando no se interviene frente a la constatación ese tipo de escenarios, lo cual también puede ocurrir en ciertas ocasiones.En otro orden, las operaciones internacionales de intervención han provocado y provocan sentimientos encontrados ya que, en algunas situaciones, las mismas pueden ser percibidas como excusas para el logro de otros intereses ajenos la solución de crisis humanitarias. En ese marco McChrystal, citado por Frye (2000), evalúa las intervenciones internacionales bajo cinco criterios: legitimidad, cuando la intervención es aceptada a los ojos de la comunidad internacional; legalidad, ya que sin base legal las intervenciones son meras invasiones; moralidad, que debe ser genuina y humanitaria; credibilidad, porque hay que cumplir lo que se pregona; y capacidad, dada la gran cantidad de recursos que demandan las intervenciones. (pp. 54 – 71)Desde nuestra óptica hacemos hincapié en la importancia de la multilateralidad en el cumplimiento de operaciones internacionales de intervención. Si bien Hans Binnendikj y Stuart E. Jonson (2004), "… la multilateralidad, si bien contribuye a legitimar "… no garantiza el éxito" (p. xvii), siguiendo a Lyon y Mastanduno (1995, p. 12), se considera aquí que la multilateralidad es la clave ya que una intervención multilateral es más "legitimable". Siendo que "multilateral" es un adjetivo que califica un funcionamiento institucional, la multilateralidad está brindada por los participantes y el accionar es el resultado del liderazgo institucional en función a los principios que los unen. (John G. Ruggie1993, pp. 3 – 47) Entonces, el primer elemento que caracteriza la legitimidad de una intervención es que su definición deberá provenir de organismos multilaterales manifestando su interés en intervenir.Pero desde esta perspectiva también la legitimidad deberá provenir del análisis que haga cada Estado cuando vaya a participar en la operación internacional de intervención en sí misma y para cada caso concreto. Es ahí donde pensamos que también se manifiesta una nueva aproximación de la soberanía estatal. La multilateralidad legitima internacionalmente y cada Estado tiene la posibilidad de legitimar interna e institucionalmente, de acuerdo a su propio marco y esquema de valores. En resumen, una apreciación de situación tamizada de acuerdo a valores nacionales brindaría legitimidad interna al Estado participante, a la vez que la multilateralidad brindaría la legitimidad internacional cuando se implementan intervenciones.Pero la multilateralidad también puede ir de la mano con el regionalismo. Es que, en virtud del conocimiento de los marcos de valores y modos de conducción y liderazgo, para la implementación de operaciones internacionales sería importante tener especialmente en cuenta la participación de aquellos Estados de la región en la que el escenario conflictivo está ocurriendo. El involucramiento de Estados de la región en los eventuales conflictos, aunque siempre manteniendo un adecuado balance entre las razones del conflicto propiamente dicho y las agendas de los propios Estados participantes, configurará un accionar más eficaz en procura de objetivos compartidos por la comunidad internacional.En tal sentido Lyon y Mastanduno (1995) también nos dicen que existe una gran dificultad en determinar la legitimidad o no de la comunidad internacional como tal, en función de las diferencias entre los marcos de valores e intereses que existe entre países desarrollados y otras regiones del globo. (pp. 250 – 265) Tal vez la pregunta más importante sea "¿quién determina que un Estado no está cumpliendo con sus obligaciones y (por tanto) se justifican intervenciones?" (p. 8).(1) The Responsibility to Protect: Report (2001), "The Policy Challenge" (pp. 1 – 9).(2) Ampliando la idea, Anthony Giddens define el concepto de "instituciones concha", a aquellas instituciones " . que se han vuelto inadecuadas para las tareas que están llamadas a cumplir". También en ese sentido Ulrich Beck, (2000) nos menciona: "el inmovilismo de las instituciones está en contradicción con una sociedad cuya vida cambia" (p. 24).(3) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/589/36/IMG/NR058936.pdf?OpenElement (Recuperado el 2/8/2010).(4) The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997 – 2002. (2002), "The Changing Concept of Security" (p. 41).(5) The Responsibility to Protect: Report (2001). "The Policy Challenge". (pp. 1 – 9) "The Responsibility to React" (pp. 29 – 35) "The Responsibility to Rebuild" (pp. 39 – 45); The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. (2001) "Rights and Responsibilities" (pp. 129 – 153). *Licenciado en Ciencia Política, Universidad de la República de Uruguay. Se ha desempeñado como asesor del área política en el Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales y en la Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor Aéreo de la Fuerza Aérea Uruguaya. Fue el Secretario General del Centro de Estudios Estratégicos del Ejército Nacional durante el período 2002 – 2004 y Consejero de Institutos de Formación Militar del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional durante el período 2008 – 2010.BIBLIOGRAFÍA Y OTRAS FUENTESLibrosBellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin. (2004) Understanding Peacekeeping. Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell Publishing Inc.Binnendijk, Hans and Jonson, Stuart. (2004) Transforming for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Washington D.C. USA.: National Defense University.Beck, Ulrich. (2003) Sobre el terrorismo y la guerra. Barcelona: Editorial Paidós Asterisco.Beck, Ulrich. (2000) La democracia y sus enemigos. Barcelona: Editorial Paidós.Beck, Ulrich. (1998a) ¿Qué es la globalización? Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós.Beck, Ulrich. (1998b) La sociedad del riesgo. Barcelona: Editorial Paidós.Brown, Chris. (2002) Sovereingty, rights and justice. Malden, MA, USA: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publisher Ltd. Cambridge – Oxford.Chomsky, Noam. (2006) Failed States: the abuse of power and the assault on democracy. New York: Metropolitan Books.Deng, Francis; Kimaro, Sadikiel; Lyons, Terrence; Rotchild, Donald and Zartman, William. (1996) Sovereignty and Responsibility. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, R. R. Donnelley and Sons Co.Einstein, Albert y Freud, Sigmund. (2001) ¿Por qué la guerra? Barcelona: Editorial Minúscula.Frye, Alton. (2000) Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine. Washington DC: Brookings.Giddens, Anthony. (2000) El mundo desbocado. Madrid: Taurus.Lyon, Gene and Michael Mastanduno, (1995) Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International intervention. Baltimore, MD, USA: The Johns Hopkins University Press.Rotberg, Robert. (2003) When States fail: Causes and Consequences.Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Ruggie, John Gerald. (1993) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis for an Institutional Form. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.The Responsibility to Protect. (2001) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa, Canada; International Development Research Centre.The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations: into de 21st Century. (2002) Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.Weiss, Thomas G. (2004) The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Proterct in a Unipolar Era, Securiy Dialoue. New York: The Graduate Center, The City University of New York. Vol. 35(2).ArtículosRotberg, Robert. (2002) Failed States in a World of Terror, Foreign Affairs, Vol . 81, Nº 4, July / August 2002. pp. 127 – 140.The Status that fail us. (2007) Foreign Policy. July – August. pp. 54 – 63.Publicaciones ElectrónicasAtwood Brian. Security and Development University of Minnesota; Minneapolis, MN US Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. Recuperado el 27 de octubre de 2007 en http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Atwood_paper_security_devlpmt.pdfBattaleme, Juan. Soberanía y amenazas asimétricas: volviendo a pensar el principio de no intervención en los albores del siglo XXI. Argentina Global. Nº 11. Octubre – Diciembre de 2002. Recuperado el 15 de enero de 2004 dehttp://www.geocities.com/globargentina/Batt02.htm.Brahimi Report. Recuperado el 9 de agosto de 2010 dehttp://www.un.org/spanish/peace/operations_report/Carlos Gutiérrez (2001) Concepto de seguridad: más que fronteras, un tema de supervivencia global. Recuperado el 9 de agosto de 2010 dehttp://www.cee-chile.org/publicaciones/revista/rev02/rev2-1.pdfRabimov, Stephan. Threats of Weak, Fragile, Mailing States and Mitigation Strategies. Global Political Risk Consulting, LLC. Recuperado el 27 de febrero de 2005 en www.grprisk.comRojas Aravena, Francisco (1999). América Latina y la seguridad internacional. Contribuciones y desafíos para el siglo XXI. OEA Foro El futuro de la seguridad internacional en el Hemisferio, CP/CSH-INF 2/00 Recuperado el 9 de agosto de 2010 dehttp://www.oas.org/csh/docs/Francisco%20Rojas%20Aravena.pdf

In diesem Beitrag stellt Lisa Schindler folgenden Text vor: Birkenkötter, Hannah / Heemann, Lisa (2020): Menschenrechte und 75 Jahre Vereinte Nationen; in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 20/2020, online unter: https://www.bpb.de/apuz/309082/menschenrechte-und-75-jahre-vereinte-nationen.Der Aufsatz ist in der Zeitschrift "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte" (APuZ) erschienen, die von der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb) herausgegeben wird. Das Erscheinungsjahr 2020 ist insofern besonders, als es das 75-jährige Bestehen der Vereinten Nationen markiert. Inhaltlich wird entsprechend ein Rückblick vorgenommen – und zwar auf die Entwicklung eines der bedeutendsten Pfeilers der Weltorganisation: Menschenrechte.Der Artikel untergliedert sich in mehrere Abschnitte. Diese werden in leicht veränderter Form auch im Folgenden zur Strukturierung genutzt, wobei zuerst der zeitliche Verlauf der Entwicklung der Menschenrechte skizziert und anschließend die zum Zeitpunkt des Erscheinens des Artikels aktuellen Problematiken sowie die angebotenen Lösungsvorschläge vorgestellt werden.1950er JahreNeben Frieden und Entwicklung sind die Menschenrechte die entscheidende Größe in der UN-Charta und werden in Artikel 1 und 3 genannt. Allerdings fehlt ein eigener Rechtskatalog. Ein entsprechender Vorschlag wurde 1945 zugunsten der Gründung der UN-Menschenrechtskommission nicht weiter verfolgt. Ihrer Aufgabe, ein verbindliches Regelwerk und Maßnahmen zu dessen Umsetzung zu erarbeiten, kam die UN-Menschenrechtskommission 1948 nach, indem sie die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte (AEMR) verabschiedete, die bis heute Bestand hat.Fast zwei Jahrzehnte später folgten der Internationale Menschenrechtspakt über politische Rechte, auch Zivilpakt genannt, und der Internationale Menschenrechtspakt über wirtschaftliche, kulturelle und soziale Rechte, kurz Sozialpakt. Die Verzögerung beruht auf den Schwierigkeiten im Zusammenhang mit dem Ost-West-Konflikt. Außerdem in den 1950er Jahren etabliert wurde der sogenannte advisory services in the field of human rights, wobei seine Umsetzung in Form der Entsendung von Menschenrechtsexpert*innen, Stipendienprogrammen und regelmäßigen Seminaren der Zustimmung der tangierten Mitgliedstaaten bedurfte und entsprechend eingeschränkt war.1960er bis 1980er JahreWesentliche Fortschritte brachten die 1960er Jahre. Neben der Einrichtung der bis heute bestehenden Möglichkeit von Sonderverfahren, die sowohl die Berichterstattung durch unabhängige Expert*innen zulassen als auch über die Befugnis verfügen, die Beschwerden von Einzelpersonen zu verwerten, wurde die erste Weltmenschenrechtskonferenz durchgeführt (1966) und ein Übereinkommen gegen Rassendiskriminierung geschlossen (1965).Gemeinsam mit den beiden Menschenrechtspakten führte dieses zu der Bildung der ersten Vertragsausschüsse, die, besetzt mit weisungsungebundenen Expert*innen, für spezifische Empfehlungen zur Umsetzung der entsprechenden Verträge, zur Untersuchung von Beschwerden und zur Herausgabe allgemeiner Empfehlungen und Kommentare zusammenkommen.Im Lauf der Zeit folgten weitere Vertragsausschüsse: zur Frauenrechtskonvention 1979, zur Anti-Folterkonvention 1984, zur Kinderrechtskonvention 1989, zur Wanderarbeiterrechtskonvention 1990, zur Behindertenrechtskonvention und zur Konvention gegen das Verschwindenlassen 2006. Außerdem gegründet wurden nationale Menschenrechtsinstitutionen. Die Idee war bereits 1946 durch den Wirtschafts- und Sozialrat eingebracht worden, umgesetzt wurde sie 1978 allerdings nur in 29 Staaten. Erst nach einer Aufforderung an alle Staaten im Jahr 1993 kam es dazu, dass sich weitere nationale Menschenrechtsinstitutionen etablierten. Im Jahr 2020 waren es 114.Nach Ende des Kalten KriegsDie Zeit nach Ende des Kalten Kriegs war von "Enthusiasmus" und "Ernüchterung" geprägt, wie es die Autorinnen ausdrücken. Zu ersterem zählen die zweite Weltmenschenrechtskonferenz 1993 in Wien, die erste Reform des damaligen Generalsekretärs Kofi Annan, durch welche die Menschenrechte ab 1997 zu einem Querschnittsthema in allen Arbeitsbereichen der Vereinten Nationen wurden, sowie die Verabschiedung des Romstatuts mit dem Beschluss der Errichtung eines Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs 1998.Ernüchternd war auf der anderen Seite die Ohnmacht der Vereinten Nationen in Bezug auf die Kriegsverbrechen auf dem Balkan, insbesondere dem Völkermord von Srebrenica. Das in Folge entwickelte Schutzprogramm 'Responsibility to protect' wurde zwar 2005 durch alle Staaten anerkannt, institutionelle Durchsetzungsmechanismen waren und sind allerdings nicht ausreichend vorhanden.Deutlich sichtbar wurde dies den Autorinnen nach im Zusammenhang mit dem Syrienkrieg und der Libanon-Intervention 2011. In den 1990er Jahren ebenfalls starker Kritik ausgesetzt war auch die UN-Menschenrechtskommission, insbesondere aufgrund ihrer zunehmenden Unfähigkeit, mit einem auf 53 Vertreter*innen angewachsenen Umfang zeitnah auf Menschenrechtsverletzungen reagieren zu können.In der Folge ersetzte man das Organ durch den neugegründeten UN-Menschenrechtsrat, der nicht nur mehr Befugnisse besitzt, beispielsweise die sehr bedeutsame, regelmäßige Allgemeine Periodische Prüfung aller Mitgliedstaaten, sondern auch ein Unterorgan der UN-Generalversammlung ist. Weitere Vorwürfe befassten sich mit der über lange Zeit fortbestehenden mangelnden Einhaltung der durch die Vereinten Nationen selbst propangierten Standards, den Blockaden im UN-Sicherheitsrat sowie der unklaren Bindung von Wirtschaftsunternehmen an internationale Menschenrechte.Aktuelle EntwicklungenDie Autorinnen sprechen von einer "Krise des Multilateralismus", die in jüngster Zeit aus vier Problemen der Vereinten Nationen bestehe. Das erste seien die nationalistischen Töne einzelner Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Nationen und, wie im Fall der USA unter Donald Trump, ihr daraus hervorgehendes Verhalten.Hinzu kämen die noch immer erfolgenden Brüche der eigenen Regeln, beispielweise in Bezug auf die Annexion der Krim durch Russland 2014 oder die Ermordung des iranischen Generals Qasem Soleimani durch die USA 2020. Darüber hinaus seien die Vereinten Nationen zwar unverzichtbar, aber in ihrer Fähigkeit zur Problemlösung durch das Veto-Recht im UN-Sicherheitsrat oft deutlich eingeschränkt.Schlussendlich problematisch sei die Unterfinanzierung, die durch unpünktliche oder unvollständige Zahlungen der Mitgliedstaaten zustande käme und dazu führe, dass die Vereinten Nationen kurzfristig ihren Aufgaben nicht nachkommen könnten oder zum Jahreswechsel Sitzungen entfielen oder Gehälter nicht gezahlt werden könnten.Durch die Probleme der Vereinten Nationen bereits in ihrer Glaubwürdigkeit gefährdet, stehen den Autorinnen zufolge auch die Menschenrechte selbst "unter Druck". In vielen Staaten würden diejenigen, die die Menschenrechte verteidigen, angegriffen und Menschenrechtsorganisationen in ihrer Arbeit behindert. Außerdem forderten einige Staaten die Minimierung der Beteiligung menschenrechtlicher NGOs. Inhaltlich betroffen sei vor allem die Geschlechtergerechtigkeit, die durch rechtspopulistische Regierungen infrage gestellt würde und nicht nur auf globaler, sondern auch auf EU-Ebene zu unlösbaren Debatten führe. Insgesamt besonders besorgniserregend verhielten sich USA, China und Russland.AusblickDie Vereinten Nationen verfügen über ein "umfassendes Netz" an menschenrechtlichen Normen. Dazu zählen: die International Bill of Human Rights (Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte, Internationaler Pakt über politische Rechte, Internationaler Pakt über wirtschaftliche, kulturelle und soziale Rechte), sieben weitere Menschenrechtsverträge mit Zusatzprotokollen und eine Vielzahl an Erklärungen, Resolutionen, Mindeststandards und Grundprinzipien sowie ein dazugehöriges institutionelles Gefüge.Obwohl laut den Autorinnen die Mehrheit der Mitgliedstaaten die Menschenrechte unterstützt und fördert und viel erreicht worden ist, was vor 75 Jahren zur Gründung der Vereinten Nationen noch undenkbar gewesen wäre, halten Birkenkötter und Heemann es für zentral, eine Vision für die kommenden 25 oder besser 50 Jahre zu entwickeln. Diese sähe international die stärkere Bündelung von institutionellen Prozessen sowie die bessere Kooperation innerhalb der Vereinten Nationen und national die entschiedenere Unterstützung der Menschenrechtsvertreter*innen vor.

Preface.- PART I: GOVERNANCE TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.- 1. Myanmar's Worsening Rohingya Crisis: A Call for Responsibility to Protect and ASEAN's Response; A.Trihartono, The University of Jember -- Center for Research in Social Sciences and Humanities (C-RiSSH), Keywords: Rohingya, ethnic violence, atrocity crimes, RtoP, Myanmar, ASEAN -- 2. Village Government Capacity in the Implementation of Village Law No. 6 of 2015; Novri Susan, MA. Dr. Tuti Budirahayu, Airlangga University, Keywords: Village government, Governance, Corruption, Political capacity -- 3. Surviving in the Globalized World through Local Perspectives: Pesantrens and Sustainable Development; Himawan Bayu Patriadi, The University of Jember -- Center for Research in Social Sciences and Humanities (C-RiSSH), Keywords: sustainable development, globalization, pesantren -- 4. The Concerns and Sustainability of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR); Abubakar Eby Hara, The University of Jember -- Center for Research in Social Sciences and Humanities (C-RiSSH), Keywords: ASEAN; AICHR; human rights; role of NGOs; sustainability -- 5. Development of the Photovoltaic Industry and Its Technology in Indonesia: A Multi-Level Perspective. ; Anugerah Yuka Asmara, Pappiptek LIPI, Keywords: photovoltaic, industry, multi-level perspective, Indonesia.- 6. The West Papua Imagined Community: A Bondless Plural Society; Nino Viartasiwi, A.Trihartono, Hary Yuswadi , Ritsumeikan University, The University of Jember -- Center for Research in Social Sciences and Humanities (C-RiSSH), The University of Jember, Keywords: West Papua; plural society; ethnicity.- PART II: URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND MORPHOLOGY.- 7. Structural Model of Formation Factors of Tourism Policy in Nganjuk Regency: Tourists` Perspective; Ismu Rini Dwi Ari, Kartika Eka Sari, Achmad Wicaksono, Lupi Harisanti, Brawijaya University, Keywords: tourism; formation factors -- 8. Good or Bad of Greening Effects on High-Density Urban Housing Air Quality; Chairul Maulidi, A. Wahid Hasyim, Brawijaya University, Keywords: photosynthesis; urban structure; air quality; testing; modelling -- 9. The Framework of Sustainable Temporary Public Open Space Concept (Case study: Paseban Kampong, Jakarta, Indonesia); Siti Sujatini, Tresna P Soemardi, Abimanyu T.Alamsyah, Linda Darmajanti , University of Indonesia, Keywords: concept, public open space, function, temporary -- 10. Ethnic differences in satisfaction with the attractiveness of tropical urban parks.- Huda Farhana Mohamad Muslim, Noor Azlin Yahya, Shinya Numata, and Tetsuro Hosaka; Tokyo Metropolitan University, Forest Research Institute Malaysia, FRIM, Keywords: urban parks, attractiveness, ethnicity, tropical, environmental -- 11. Identifying Slum Area Spread Based on Multi-temporal Imagery Data; A. Wahid Hasyim, Chairul Maulidi, Eko Armando Maha, Brawijaya University, Keywords: Slum spreading, multi-temporal imagery, paser regency -- 12. Sustainable Well-being Objective Indicators: Basic Necessities, Complementary Needs and Desired Opportunities; Aisyah Abu Bakar, Mariana Mohamed Osman, Syahriah Bachok, Mansor Ibrahim, Alias Abdullah, International Islamic University Malaysia, Keywords: Subjective Sustainable Well-being, Human Interdependency -- 13. Assessing Disparities in the Urban-Rural Service: A case of Public Bus Services in Peninsular Malaysia; Zakiah Ponrahono, Syahriah Bachok, Mansor Ibrahim, Mariana Mohamed Osman, Universiti Putra Malaysia, Serdang, Malaysia, International Islamic University Malaysia, Keywords: urban; rural; public transport; level-of-service.- PART III: BUILDING SCIENCE.- 14. The Effect of Supplementary Cementitious Material using Thermal Methods; Suharman Hamzah, Evi Aprianti, Hasanuddin University, Keywords: Cementitious Material, Palm oil fuel ash (POFA), Thermal, Curing -- 15. Optimizing the Use of Rainwater Harvesting at Flats as Effort to Realize Energy-Efficient Buildings: Case Study at Rental Flats in Yogyakarta Jarwa Prasetya Sih Handoko, Indonesia Islamic University, Keywords: Rainwater Harvesting, Flats, Energy Efficient Buildings -- 16. Thermo Adaptive Psychological Thermal Comfort Index of PMVtapsem: Development of a PMVtap Index Based on the SEM Approach; Sugini, Jaka Nugraha, UII Yogyakarta, Keywords: Thermal Comfort of Thermo-Adaptive-Psychological Para-digms; PMVtapsem Index; Thermal Lifestyle; Temporary Room Comfort; Social Conditions -- 17. A Review on the Values of the Islamic Garden in response to a Garden Design in Malaysia.- Haza Hanurhaza Binti Md Jani, Nor Zalina Harun, Mazlina Mansor, Ismawi Zen, International Islamic University Malaysia, Keywords: garden design; values; religion.- PART IV: SOCIO ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING.- 18. The Potential of Cacao Pod Rind Waste (Theobroma Cacao) to Adsorb Heavy Metal (Pb and Cd) in Water; Anita Dewi Moelyaningrum, The University of Jember, Keywords: Theobroma cacao, pod rinds waste, heavy metals, lead (Pb), cadmium (Cd), water -- 19. Mechanical Properties of Composites Based on Poly (Lactic Acid) and Soda-Treated Sugarcane Bagasse Pulp; Lisman Suryanegara , Yudhi Dwi Kurniawan, Firda Aulya Syamani, Yeyen Nurhamiyah, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Bogor Agricultural University, Keywords: sugarcane; bagasse; composite materials -- 20. Modeling indoor PM2.5 air pollution, estimating exposure, and problems associated with rural Indonesian households using wood fuel; Haryono S Huboyo, Puji Lestari, Susumu Tohno, Diponegoro University, Keywords: biomass fuel, cooking, rural household, relative risk, ventilation -- 21. Sustainable Well-being Subjective Indicators: Human Interdependence with other Humans and with the Environment; Aisyah Abu Bakar, Mariana Mohamed Osman, Syahriah Bachok, Mansor Ibrahim, International Islamic University Malaysia, Keywords: Subjective Sustainable Well-being, Human Interdependency -- 22. Low resource use-high yield concept in climate-smart community empowerment; Santoso, Arzyana Sunkar , Bogor Agricultural University, Keywords: Climate-smart community; empowerment; livelihood strategy; resource use efficiency; social capital.- PART V: SUSTAINABLE DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION.- 23. Preference for Information during Flood Disasters: A Study of Thailand and Indonesia; Natt Leelawat, Abdul Mahari, Mongkonkorn Srivichai, Anawat Suppasri, Fumihiko Imamura, Jeremy D. Bricker, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Rajamangala University of Technology Lanna, Tohoku University, Keywords: 2011 Thailand flood; 2013 Jakarta flood; disaster management; in-formation needs; Southeast Asia; survey -- 24. Socio-ecological aspects informing community resilience in a disaster-prone area: a case study of the traditional Koa community, in the East Nusa Tenggara Province of Indonesia; Dame Manalu, Tri Budhi Soesilo, Francisia SSE Seda, University of Indonesia, Keywords: Socio-ecological; community resilience; disaster risk; volcanic hazard -- 25. Tsunami Resilient Preparedness Index (TRPI) as a Key Step for Effective Disaster Reduction Intervention; Wignyo Adiyoso, Hidehiko Kanegae, National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), Ritsumeikan University, Keywords: tsunami, disaster, preparedness, index, measurement.

Article in U.S. News and World Report based on excerpts from Hays' book A Southern Moderate Speaks ; Inside Story of Little Rock . "Brownell seemed to have blocked a definite commitment to work for delays in further court action" which would permit a court determination of the validity of State statutes on segregation at Newport, where the conditions for a settlement were generally favorable. We were about to say good-by [sic] when Sherman asked me to tell the President about "the Alabama horse deal," a story Congressman Grant had related. Here it is: A farmer approached his neighbor and asked: "How much do you want for that horse?" "$100." "Sold." And he laid out the cash. After the buyer left he thought: "That fella wanted the horse mighty bad-didn't argue about the price-just grabbed it up-must know more about the horse than I do." So he went over to his friend and repurchased him for $150. Then the other one thought: "He wanted that horse back pretty bad-must be a better horse than I thought." So he went back around to buy him for $200. So it went till they had the bid up to $1,500, when a dealer from another county came in and paid $2,000 for the animal. When he heard about it, the original owner went over to his friend's house and confirmed it-"Well, what did you do that for-we were both making a good living off of him." I added, "That's the way some people think we operate government finances." This was the only light touch of the meeting. We agreed that the horde of newsmen outside were entitled to some information on conference results and that Hagerty should promise them a statement later. When we got back to the hotel in Providence, not much time was left for preparing the release which we had promised for 2 o'clock. But the Governor was apparently wrapped in thought. Finally, I asked if he would like for me to draft something for him to look at, and he said, "I wish you would." I quickly wrote out the substance of the Governor's position as outlined to the President that morning. He made only a minor change. "That's all right," he said, so I called Newport and read it to Adams. He read the text of what the President would say and I relayed it to the Governor. I believe both he and Adams made minor suggestions for change which were quickly agreed to. Here are the statements: STATEMENT BY GOVERNOR FAUBUS: "The President and I have had a friendly and constructive discussion of the problem of compliance with court orders respecting the high schools of Little Rock. This trip to Newport has been worthwhile from my point of view. I recognize that the situation called for clarification and I assured the President of my desire to co-operate with him in carrying out the duties resting upon both of us under the Federal Constitution. In addition I must harmonize my actions under the Federal Constitution with the requirements of the constitution of Arkansas. "I have never expressed any personal opinion regarding the Supreme Court decision of 1954 which ordered integration. That is not relevant. That decision is the law of the land and must be obeyed. "At the same time, it is evident even from the language of the decision itself that changes necessitated by court orders cannot be accomplished overnight. "The people of Little Rock are law-abiding, and I know that they expect to obey valid court orders. In this they shall have my support. In so doing it is my responsibility to protect the people from violence in any form. "As I interpret the President's public statement, the National Administration has no thought of challenging this fact. In meeting this obligation, it is essential in proceeding to implement the orders of the court that the complexities of integration be patiently understood by all those in federal authority as well as others. "When I assure the President, as I have already done, that I expect to accept the decisions of the court, I entertain the hope that the Department of Justice and the federal judiciary will act with understanding and patience in discharging their duties." STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER: "At the request of Governor Faubus of Arkansas I met with him this morning in a constructive discussion regarding the carrying out of the order of the federal court in the matter of the high schools of Little Rock. "The Governor stated his intention to respect the decisions of the United States District Court and to give his full co-operation in carrying out his responsibilities in respect to these decisions. In doing so, I recognize the inescapable re­sponsibility resting upon the Governor to preserve law and order in his State. I am gratified by his constructive and co-operative attitude at our meeting. "I have assured the Governor of the co-operation of federal officials. I was pleased to hear from the Governor of this progress already made in the elimination of segregation in other activities in the State of Arkansas. "I am sure it is the desire of the Governor not only to observe the supreme law of the land but to use the influence of his office in orderly progress of the plans which are already the subject of the order of the Court." I attribute the Governor's pensiveness that day to the fact that Brownell seemed to have blocked a definite commitment to work for delays in further court action, thus permitting a court determination of the validity of State statutes on interposition and the sovereignty commission. What courses of action would then be available would be clarified by such court rulings. If the State laws were upheld, the situation would be eased, because then the Governor could say, "I am following State law." If they were invalidated, then he would have an answer to the cry that one heard in parts of Arkansas, "You are under a mandate of the people to prevent any degree of integration." My assumption is based not so much on what was said at Newport but what was not said. The Governor held a press conference before we left, handling himself very well, I thought, particularly when unfriendly questioning took place. I left the party at La Guardia [Airport, New York City] and took a night plane for Fort Worth. We encountered severe weather, which made it difficult to sleep, and, at Dallas, radio and newspaper men met me at 3 a.m. They asked for a radio interview. "At this hour?" I exclaimed. "Couldn't turn us down, could you? We've waited two hours for your late plane." I tried to comply but was too exhausted to present U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 23, 1959 125