Suchergebnisse

The Spanish constitution establishes the right of all Spaniards to have a suitable and decent house, but today many citizens of my country might be asking themselves these questions: are the public institutions promoting the necessary conditions and establishing the corresponding policies that will enable the enforcement of the right to have a decent house?, is the use of the land being regulated according to the public interest and to avoid speculation? the text can only show the consequences that certain ways of making economic policies can have for a government. Such policies may be all too necessary but if they lack stabilizing factors, they may bring along strong imbalances to society - favoring other sectors - in such basic aspects as having a roof. Consequently, the need for a balance between such fundamental aspects as the enterprises sector, the economic power and their relationship with social policies, must be defined by public administrations through agreements stated in a temporary protection planning, designed for those families which due to several reasons are excluded from the housing market. Along those lines the experience of housing planes developed for Andalucía and the agreement signed in the new Plan Andaluz de Vivienda y suelo 20003-2007 (Andalusian Housing and Land Plan 2003-2007) are here presented. ; La Constitución Española, establece el precepto de que todos los españoles tienen derecho a disfrutar de una vivienda digna y adecuada, pero en estos momentos en mi país, más de un ciudadano se puede estar haciendo estas preguntas: ¿estarán los poderes públicos promoviendo las condiciones necesarias y estableciendo las normas pertinentes para hacer efectivo el derecho a una vivienda digna? ¿se estará regulando la utilización del suelo de acuerdo con el interés general para impedir la especulación? El texto solo pretende evidenciar las consecuencias que para un gobierno le puede significar determinadas formas de hacer políticas económicas, por otra parte muy necesarias, pero que, si no ...

This study begins with striking the geopolitical balance in Europe of the French Indochinese war within the framework of the Cold War. On one side, France needs an independent expeditionary force to remain a World power during the 1950's. On the other side, ECD or NATO require to keep important French field forces on the European soil, since the EDC Agreements and then the London Agreements assign 12 divisions to West Germany.

Therefore, each theatre of operations is ambiguous and source of misunderstandings with the Atlantic allies of France, especially United States and Great Britain. On one end, the Indochinese conflict is as much a colonial struggle (inconsistent with American liberalism), as a primary Cold War issue in which however the United States subsidize the French overseas forces ($ 1,1 billion for 1953-1954). In Europe, the main threat remains of course the USSR whereas the French skeptical opinion still watches over Germany with anxiety. That explains the basic indecision of the legislative branch (Assemblée nationale ), and of the shaky governments of the IVth Republic.
Just after Diên Biên Phu (Laniel Government), the Mendès France Government fails to obtain the ratification of ECD. It means very difficult relations between France and the other members of NATO about the French taking part in the common effort. The financial strain on French budget (because of Vietnam), chronic inflation, and now the Algerian crisis (11/1/1954) imperil the national outlay on armaments. Moreover, Algeria absorbs at least the two thirds of the home army with its NATO equipment, also subsidized by the United States (1952-1955). This material deficit and strategical breach in the integrated Atlantic command provoke growing tensions.

We will analyze the reactions of the French high command, and its attempts to define a military disposition in harmony with the overseas needs, the heavy budget deficits and the NATO requirements. We will especially concentrate on the chaotic fate of the Yellow Plan (1954-1955) and of the Orange Plan (1956-1958), proposed by the general staff and the French Minister of Defence in order to reorganize the land forces.

International audience ; Since the lst of April 1997 date of the implementation of the third package of the liberalization, air transport, within the european Union has become totally liberalized. In the United States the deregulation of domestic air traffic was earlier and faster since it took place in October 1978 after the adoption of the only act of deregulation. This paper, in its first part, deals with the liberalization of the industry of air traffic in the european union. After a comparison with US system based on market demand, fare policy and network restrictions, we present our descriptive results coming from treatments on the OAG data. These results present several aspects such as the evolution of the competitive structure of the intra-european routes, the level of airport dominance and the growth of hub structure. The second part of the paper presents models of entry in the airline industry. As profitability of route flown explains correctly decisions taken by airlines to serve or not a route, the paper focuses on the specification and the estimation of the determinants of city, pair profitability in the european union. Treatments done on the OAG data show a rapid development of leasing space agreement (partial and total) and code sharing practices between 1995 and 2000 in Europe that's why we differentiate first between the two type of competitive strategy of entry(direct entry and leasing space agreement) and second between the competitive strategy of entry and the alliance strategy of code sharing. So the estimation of model will be able to answer the question if the european air transport market is contestable and in case not to see if the decision of entry is more directed by the level of airport dominance (as in the domestic United States market)or essentially by the competitive structure of the routes. We try to explain the nature of entry(directleasing or code sharing) by the different levels of these two determinants.

Personal attitudes were a determining factor in the position of Spanish Republican exiles regarding the question of restoring democracy in Spain at the beginning of the Cold War. After the Second World War had ended, many exiles came cherish a hope that such a development might be possible with the help of the victorious democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. They failed, however, to reach agreement as to which tactic to use in order to enlist this help, with some arguing in favour of giving the leading role to the government in exile, while others felt it was preferable to strike an agreement between all Spanish anti-Francoist groups in order to present a united democratic front to the new international institutions which had emerged in the post-war climate. The subtleties of both positions may be examined through a study of influential figures such as Indalecio Prieto, Carlos Esplá, Rodolfo Llopis and Luis Araquistán, of whom we now have a greater knowledge thanks to recent biographies, which form the basis of this work. ; Las actitudes personales es un factor determinante de la posición del exilio republicano español ante el problema de la restauración de la democracia en España en la coyuntura del inicio de la Guerra Fría. Finalizada la Segunda Guerra Mundial, en los medios del exilio se generalizó la esperanza de que tal cosa era posible gracias a la ayuda de las democracias vencedoras, en particular de Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido. Sin embargo, no hubo unanimidad sobre la táctica a seguir para recabar esa ayuda, pues mientras unos abogaron por conceder el máximo protagonismo al gobierno en el exilio, otros consideraron más oportuno establecer un acuerdo entre las fuerzas antifranquistas españolas para presentar un frente democrático unido ante las nuevas instituciones internacionales surgidas del conflicto mundial. Ambas posturas presentan matices que pueden ser examinados a partir del talante de algunas personas relevantes por su influencia, como Indalecio Prieto, Carlos ...

International audience ; Since the lst of April 1997 date of the implementation of the third package of the liberalization, air transport, within the european Union has become totally liberalized. In the United States the deregulation of domestic air traffic was earlier and faster since it took place in October 1978 after the adoption of the only act of deregulation. This paper, in its first part, deals with the liberalization of the industry of air traffic in the european union. After a comparison with US system based on market demand, fare policy and network restrictions, we present our descriptive results coming from treatments on the OAG data. These results present several aspects such as the evolution of the competitive structure of the intra-european routes, the level of airport dominance and the growth of hub structure. The second part of the paper presents models of entry in the airline industry. As profitability of route flown explains correctly decisions taken by airlines to serve or not a route, the paper focuses on the specification and the estimation of the determinants of city, pair profitability in the european union. Treatments done on the OAG data show a rapid development of leasing space agreement (partial and total) and code sharing practices between 1995 and 2000 in Europe that's why we differentiate first between the two type of competitive strategy of entry(direct entry and leasing space agreement) and second between the competitive strategy of entry and the alliance strategy of code sharing. So the estimation of model will be able to answer the question if the european air transport market is contestable and in case not to see if the decision of entry is more directed by the level of airport dominance (as in the domestic United States market)or essentially by the competitive structure of the routes. We try to explain the nature of entry(directleasing or code sharing) by the different levels of these two determinants.

Las actitudes personales es un factor determinante de la posición del exilio republicano español ante el problema de la restauración de la democracia en España en la coyuntura del inicio de la Guerra Fría. Finalizada la Segunda Guerra Mundial, en los medios del exilio se generalizó la esperanza de que tal cosa era posible gracias a la ayuda de las democracias vencedoras, en particular de Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido. Sin embargo, no hubo unanimidad sobre la táctica a seguir para recabar esa ayuda, pues mientras unos abogaron por conceder el máximo protagonismo al gobierno en el exilio, otros consideraron más oportuno establecer un acuerdo entre las fuerzas antifranquistas españolas para presentar un frente democrático unido ante las nuevas instituciones internacionales surgidas del conflicto mundial. Ambas posturas presentan matices que pueden ser examinados a partir del talante de algunas personas relevantes por su influencia, como Indalecio Prieto, Carlos Esplá, Rodolfo Llopis y Luis Araquistán, sobre quienes se ha incrementado nuestro conocimiento gracias a recientes biografías, que constituyen la base de este trabajo. ; Personal attitudes were a determining factor in the position of Spanish Republican exiles regarding the question of restoring democracy in Spain at the beginning of the Cold War. After the Second World War had ended, many exiles came cherish a hope that such a development might be possible with the help of the victorious democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. They failed, however, to reach agreement as to which tactic to use in order to enlist this help, with some arguing in favour of giving the leading role to the government in exile, while others felt it was preferable to strike an agreement between all Spanish anti-Francoist groups in order to present a united democratic front to the new international institutions which had emerged in the post-war climate. The subtleties of both positions may be examined through a study of influential figures such as Indalecio Prieto, Carlos Esplá, Rodolfo Llopis and Luis Araquistán, of whom we now have a greater knowledge thanks to recent biographies, which form the basis of this work.

The question of how to share the costs of the measures to be taken against global warming is one of the most controversial questions in the international climate policy debate, and is, as yet, unsettled. The burden sharing agreement (BSA) reached by EU Member States is a rare example of a successful (regional) burden sharing scheme. The agreement was reached in two stages in March 1997 (pre-Kyoto) and in the Spring of 1998 (post-Kyoto). This paper analyses, from a political economy perspective, the factors which facilitated burden sharing within the EU and which determined the particular sharing rule adopted. Three "stylised facts" emerge from the study. First, countries with high national targets, which were assigned relatively large shares in the pre-Kyoto BSA, had their shares reduced significantly in the post-Kyoto BSA. Second, the country presiding over the negotiations was assigned a disproportionate large share. Third, attempts were made to relax political constraints by singling out the abatement requirements of specific sectors. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to explain these facts. We show how the share of the total burden that a country has to shoulder in equilibrium depends on what national targets it adopts, the fall-back positions of the other countries, and on who chairs the negotiations ; Zu den am heftigsten umstrittenen Themenfeldern in der internationalen Klimapolitik zählt die Frage, wie die aus Klimaschutzmaßnahmen resultierenden Lasten zu verteilen sind. Ein seltenes Beispiel für eine erfolgreiche und nachvollziehbare Aufteilung von Reduktionsverpflichtungen stellt das zwischen den EU-Staaten ausgehandelte Lastenverteilungsabkommen dar. Dieses wurde in zwei Stufen, im März 1997 und im Frühjahr 1998 erreicht. Während das erste Abkommen im Vorfeld der internationalen Klimaverhandlungen von Kyoto zustande kam und einen nicht rechtsverbindlichen Charakter aufweist, wurde im zweiten, bindenden Abkommen das in Kyoto akzeptierte Gemeinschaftsziel zwischen den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten aufgeteilt. Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Faktoren, die eine Einigung innerhalb der EU ermöglicht haben und das Verhandlungsergebnis beeinflussten. Aus der Analyse des Verhandlungsprozesses ergeben sich drei stilisierte Fakten: Staaten, die ein ehrgeiziges nationales Emissionsziel aufweisen, erhielten ein hohes Reduktionsziel in der ersten Verhandlungsrunde, konnten sich in der zweiten Runde aber signifikant verbessern. Das Land, das in der jeweiligen Verhandlungsrunde die Ratspräsidentschaft innehatte, wurde mit einem höheren Lastenanteil bestraft. Über Ausnahmeregelungen für bestimmte Sektoren konnten Widerstände einflussreicher Gruppen gegen die geplante Verteilung gemildert werden. Diese Beobachtungen lassen sich anhand eines einfachen Verhandlungsspiels rationalisieren. Wir zeigen, wie der Lastenanteil, den ein Land im Gleichgewicht trägt, von seinem nationalen Ziel, der Rückfallposition anderer Länder sowie von der Frage, wer die Verhandlungen präsidiert, abhängig ist.

A review article on five documents, Documents diplomatiques francais. 1961, Vol. I, 1 janvier-20 juin; 1961, Vol. II, 1 juillet-31 decembre; 1962, Vol. I, 1 janvier-30 juin; 1962, Vol. II, 1 juillet-31 decembre; 1963, Vol. I, 1 janvier-30 juin (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997-2000). Based upon recently published volumes of French diplomatic documents, this review article examines the course of the negotiations for British entry into the European Economic Community, 1961-1963, & the reasons why France vetoed GB's application. It is clear that even before the British government launched its application, the French government was aware of the threat it posed to the cohesion of the community & to French interests. It therefore pursued tactics of delay. The British, who were in a hurry to join, vainly sought to convince the French of their conversion to the Gaullist conception of a confederal Europe that would be independent of both the Soviet Union & the US, even dangling the prospect of nuclear cooperation before President de Gaulle. The latter's position inside France was relatively weak until he won a referendum on the direct election of the president in October 1962 & his party triumphed in the legislative elections the following month. De Gaulle then felt secure enough to tell Prime Minister Macmillan quite bluntly at their Rambouillet meeting on 15-16 Dec 1962 that he did not believe that GB was ready for EEC membership. He had thus already made up his mind to exclude GB before the Nassau agreement between President Kennedy & Mr. Macmillan in which the former agreed to supply with Polaris nuclear missiles, although gbthis agreement confirmed his belief that GB was excessively dependent upon the US. Although economic questions -- particularly those relating to the system of agricultural support & to GB's request for special concessions to Australia, Canada, & New Zealand -- did play an important part in de Gaulle's decision, it is clear that political factors were uppermost in his mind. He did not want either a diluted community or one in which there was a possible rival to French leadership. Adapted from the source document.

'If A Majority Of People In Northern Ireland Ever Voted To become part of a United Ireland what would you do?' At first sight the question may seem plucked from the realms of constitutional fantasy. A united Ireland seems an unlikely prospect, at least in anything but the long term. Even proponents of unity predict a 15–20 year wait. Yet the 1998 Good Friday Agreement empowers the people of Northern Ireland to decide their own constitutional future. As a result questions on Northern Ireland's future constitutional status, and public reactions to possible changes in that status, are relevant to current political debate.It is important to note that the principle of consent is not a new constitutional invention. It has had a long association with Northern Ireland. It is argued that the peace process and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement have refocused attention on the long-standing consent principle. While consent was part of the constitutional furniture it was often overlooked during the Troubles.This article re-examines consent in the light of the peace process. It draws on evidence from the 1998 and 1999/2000Northern Ireland Life and Timessurveys, as well as a number of in-depth interviews with senior politicians and policy-makers involved in the peace process and the negotiations on a political settlement. First it considers the changing significance of the consent principle to Northern Ireland's constitutional status, arguing that the principle has assumed a renewed immediacy. Secondly, the article reports the findings of the two most recentNorthern Ireland Life and Timessurveys in relation to constitutional preferences. While public attitudes towards a unitary Ireland or continued Union within the United Kingdom have been surveyed regularly, as far as the authors are aware no previous survey has asked whether people would accept or oppose constitutional change if it was supported by a majority of Northern Ireland's citizens. In other words, no survey has gauged the level of public acceptance of the consent principle. The key question is: would unionists be prepared to come quietly if a majority of Northern Ireland's citizens voted to accept a united Ireland?

As well as in the Atlantic Charter (1941) as well as in the Beveridge Report (1942) an extension of the social security to the whole population had been requested with the end of the limitation to the sole workers. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) took over the majority of the ideas written down in the Beveridge Report at the International Labour Conference in Philadelphia (1944) and tried to make the governments sensitive to this problem by adopting the Recommandations n°67 and 69. After World War II, the ILO committed herself to a quick implementation of the principles of universality and extension to new risks but the European reconstruction did not allow her to play a leading role in this field. Nevertheless, she managed to conclude some internetional agreements at the begining of the 1950s, like the International Agreement concerning the social security for the Rhine boatmen or the European Social Security Convention for Migrant Workers. The creation of strong regional entities like the ESCC and the EEC, the national character of each social security system, the traditions' "weight", the influence of the East-West-conflict and the adhesion of a increasing number of Third World countries at the ILO lead to a quick decline of her role in the field of the European social security. No country was really interested in the harmonization of social norms. This is why the ILO had to satisfy herself with the Convention concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security (Convention n°102) and to give up the project of superior standards. But the ILO made the error to look upon the European regional organisations as competitors and not as allies. Another problem, wich was nearly insurmontable, was the lack of international vision by nearly all experts ; Aussi bien la Charte atlantique (1941) que le rapport Beveridge (1942) avaient plaidé pour un élargissement de la protection sociale à l'ensemble de la population et de ne pas la limiter aux seuls travailleurs. L'Organisation internationale du Travail (O.I.T.) ...

As well as in the Atlantic Charter (1941) as well as in the Beveridge Report (1942) an extension of the social security to the whole population had been requested with the end of the limitation to the sole workers. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) took over the majority of the ideas written down in the Beveridge Report at the International Labour Conference in Philadelphia (1944) and tried to make the governments sensitive to this problem by adopting the Recommandations n°67 and 69. After World War II, the ILO committed herself to a quick implementation of the principles of universality and extension to new risks but the European reconstruction did not allow her to play a leading role in this field. Nevertheless, she managed to conclude some internetional agreements at the begining of the 1950s, like the International Agreement concerning the social security for the Rhine boatmen or the European Social Security Convention for Migrant Workers. The creation of strong regional entities like the ESCC and the EEC, the national character of each social security system, the traditions' "weight", the influence of the East-West-conflict and the adhesion of a increasing number of Third World countries at the ILO lead to a quick decline of her role in the field of the European social security. No country was really interested in the harmonization of social norms. This is why the ILO had to satisfy herself with the Convention concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security (Convention n°102) and to give up the project of superior standards. But the ILO made the error to look upon the European regional organisations as competitors and not as allies. Another problem, wich was nearly insurmontable, was the lack of international vision by nearly all experts ; Aussi bien la Charte atlantique (1941) que le rapport Beveridge (1942) avaient plaidé pour un élargissement de la protection sociale à l'ensemble de la population et de ne pas la limiter aux seuls travailleurs. L'Organisation internationale du Travail (O.I.T.) ...

152Arbitration — Jurisdiction — ICSID arbitration clauses in agreements between government and company — Whether superseded by later agreement — Jurisdiction ratione materiae — Doctrine of forum prorogatum — Written submissions — Whether sufficient evidence of acceptance of tribunals' jurisdictionArbitration — Annulment — Grounds for annulment — Excess of jurisdiction — Requirement that excess must be manifest — Uncertainty to be resolved in favorem validitatis sententiae — Distinction between non-application of applicable law and mistaken application of applicable law — Alleged absence of deliberation and other irregularities — Alleged lack of impartiality — Whether constituting failure of tribunal to adhere to fundamental rules of procedure — Contradiction of reasons — Dubious or hypothetical reasons — Sufficiently relevant reasons — Alleged failure of tribunal to deal with questions submitted to it — Challenge to award of arbitral tribunal — ICSID — Reference to ad hoc Committee — Powers of Committee — Whether limited to annulment for manifest excess of jurisdiction — Whether error of law constituting manifest excess of jurisdiction — Consequences of annulment — Whether award to be annulled in whole or in partArbitration — Applicable law — ICSID arbitration — Absence of express choice of law — Law of Contracting State to apply — Inclusion of Contracting State's rules on conflict of laws — Part of Contracting State applying common law while other part applying civil law — Geographical location of project — Applicability of civil lawClaims — For breach of contract — Effect of non-disclosure of circumstances adversely affecting profitability of project — Deductions from claim as result of failure adequately to perform contractual obligations — Exceptio non adimpleti contractus — Release of one party from obligations by virtue of non-performance by other party — Whether principle of international lawClaims — Counterclaim — For damages — Claim by State for losses attributable to participation in failed joint venture project — Capital contribution to joint venture company — Government-guaranteed loans — Non-financial damages — Alleged failure of company to perform duty of disclosure — 153Effect of denial of company's claim for contract price on government's counterclaimTreaties — Interpretation — Annulment provisions of ICSID Convention — Interpretation of provisions relating to applicable law — Whether interpreted in accordance with general principles of treaty interpretation

Organizational learning, like individual learning, involves the development of new and diverse interpretations of events and situations. Unlike individual learning, however, collective learning also involves developing enough consensus around those diverse interpretations for organized action to result. Traditional measures of organizational consensus are unable to capture the multiplex nature of collective agreement that encompasses both unity and diversity. Traditional wisdom thus suggests that to achieve unity in groups, one must sacrifice diversity. This study breaks the notion of consensus into two component parts: consensus around interpretations embedded in the content and in the framing of communications. Communicated content consists of the labels people use to convey their "pictures" of reality, e.g., pictures of issues as threats or as opportunities. The framing of communications refers to the form people use to construct a picture, regardless of its content, e.g., rigid or flexible perceptions of an issue. People may hold very different pictures of reality and still agree on the way they frame them. It is thus possible for groups to simultaneously agree and disagree, an essential component of collective learning. Simultaneous agreement and disagreement is especially important in corporate innovative efforts. Successful corporate innovation requires that decision makers develop a collective understanding that incorporates the new and the different. This paper describes the changing pictures and frames communicated in a new-venture development process in a large financial institution over a two-year period. Several linguistic analyses show how the venture team members developed unified ways of framing their arguments, while at the same time maintaining diversity through differences in the content of team members' interpretations. The results reveal one way that organizations manage to combine the unity and diversity needed for collective learning. The managerial implications present a challenge for anyone wishing to promote learning as a community: managers must actively encourage the development of different and conflicting views of what is thought to be true, while striving for a shared framing of the issues that is broad enough to encompass those differences.

AbstractThis paper examines the impact on shareholder wealth of a sample of 56 private agreements exempt from takeover bid provisions of the Ontario Securities Act, during the period from 1980 to 1989. The results indicate that during the period from five days before to five days after the announcement of the agreements, outside shareholders experienced a cumulative abnormal return of ‐4.48%. On the announcement day, outside shareholders' wealth decreased by 1.62%. Thus, unlike most takeover transactions, outside target shareholders did not gain in exempt offer transactions. Furthermore, the sellers of controlling blocks of shares, using the exempt offer provision, received premiums averaging 7.28% over pre‐announcement share price. The losses to outside shareholders were higher if there was information in the press concerning an impending takeover before the announcement of the exempt offer, or if the government was the bidder. Neither the percentage of shares acquired nor the actual price premiums paid had a significant impact on outside shareholder wealth.RésuméCet article examine l'impact financier encouru par l'actionnaire, d'un groupe de 56 accords privés exempts des clauses d'offre de rachat del' "Ontario Securities Act" durant la période de 1980 à 1989. Les résultats indiquent que durant la période de 5 jours précédant l'accord et 5 jours suivant l'annonce de l'accord, les actionnaires extérieurs expérimentent un retour cumulatif anormal de ‐4.42%. Le jour de l'annonce, les avoirs financiers des actionnaires extérieurs diminuent de 1.62%. Ainsi, contrairement à la plupart des transactions de rachat, les actionnaires extérieurs visés ne bénéficient pas des transactions d'offres exemptes. Deplus, les vendeurs de tranches d'actions déterminantes, utilisant la provision d'offre exempte, reçoivent des primes moyennes de 7.28% par action au‐dessus du prix pré‐annoncé. Les pertes encourues par les actionnaires extérieurs sont plus importantes quand il y a de l'information dans les journaux concernant un rachat prochain avant l'annonce de l'offre exempte, ou quand le gouvernement est l'offrant. Nile pourcentage des actions acquises ni le prix réel des actions payé n'a un impact significatif sur l'avoir financier de l'actionnaire extérieur.

After Maastricht: Which economic policies in Europe? The Maastricht Treaty presents Europe with the difficult problem of economic policy organization in Europe in a transitory stage as well as in the working of a single currency zone. Two points of view conflict: some argue that the construction of Europe should help foster an active economic policy towards growth. By contrast, the Maastricht agreement opts for a « virtuous » economic policy in Europe by adopting rigorous criteria for public debt and deficits and also by setting up an independent central bank. Agreements plan a transitory stage that will dictate economic policy for the European countries. This stage appears in a context of weak growth. By now, 1 0 of the 1 2 EC countries do not fulfill the Maastricht criteria and must apply restrictive economic policy. This is difficult to justify for some countries, that despite a large public debt, have a balance with the rest of the World. The fiscal adjustment required is extremely strong for some countries: 7.5 points in GDP for Italy, 7 points for Belgium and Greece, 2 points for Ireland. A simulation carried out with the MIMOSA model, shows that, if those countries applied a policy which represents half of what is needed to achieve the Treaty's criteria, the rate of growth of Europe would be 0,3 % lower during the first three years and its level 1 .5 % lower than its baseline in 1999. This economic policy would have a very recessive impact on the countries, but the aim of a public debt lower than 60% of GDP would not be achieved. That does not augur well for economic policy organization in the European Union. The treaty plans that an independent central bank be put in charge of price stability above all. Countries won't have any influence on monetary policy but let it to rigorous policy advocate. By contrast, countries won't have to be careful to their external balance neither to fear unfavourable expectations of exchange rate. This freedom could be useful but also risky if each country undertakes a boom. ...