Suchergebnisse

This study examines public management challenges faced by educational agencies that are required to set up a market for providing choice in supplemental educational services (SES) for students in underperforming schools and to hold nongovernmental providers accountable for their performance in increasing student achievement. The operations and performance of SES providers in a large urban school district, as well as how their performance in increasing student achievement relates to their market shares, are examined empirically and through qualitative information gathered through focus groups, interviews, and student surveys. The study finds that SES provider market shares were not highly correlated with estimates of provider performance or other relevant vendor characteristics, and local educational agencies were not satisfied with their level of control over service quality and educational outcomes. Control over the flow of funds, which improved over time, was their primary lever for managing these third-party relationships. Adapted from the source document.

Most research on global governance has focused either on theoretical accounts of the overall phenomenon or on empirical studies of distinct institutions that serve to solve particular governance challenges. In this article we analyze instead "governance architectures," defined as the overarching system of public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making procedures and organizations that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics. We focus on one aspect that is turning into a major source of concern for scholars and policy-makers alike: the "fragmentation" of governance architectures in important policy domains. The article offers a typology of different degrees of fragmentation, which we describe as synergistic, cooperative, and conflictive fragmentation. We then systematically assess alternative hypotheses over the relative advantages and disadvantages of different degrees of fragmentation. We argue that moderate degrees of fragmentation may entail both significant costs and benefits, while higher degrees of fragmentation are likely to decrease the overall performance of a governance architecture. The article concludes with policy options on how high degrees of fragmentation could be reduced. Fragmentation is prevalent in particular in the current governance of climate change, which we have hence chosen as illustration for our discussion. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. Health expenditure is influenced by health system efficiency, but it is also the result of societal decisions and preferences. Existing cross-national efficiency evaluations often do not fully take this into account, misinterpreting differences in preferences as differences in efficiency. This article estimates health system efficiency by taking preferences fully into account. The empirical findings confirm the theoretical argument, that omitting preferences leads to biased efficiency estimates. Countries and health systems differ with regard to health expenditure not so much because their institutional setting affects their efficiency, but because preferences and demands of their "customers" differ.Résumé. L'efficacité du système de santé influe, certes, sur les dépenses de soins de santé, mais celles-ci sont également le résultat des décisions et des préférences de la société. Souvent, les évaluations transnationales existantes de l'efficacité du système de santé ne tiennent pas pleinement compte de ce facteur et prennent des différences de préférences pour des différences d'efficacité. Cet article évalue l'efficacité des systèmes de santé en tenant pleinement compte des préférences. Les données empiriques confirment l'argument théorique voulant que l'omission des préférences mène à des estimations d'efficacité déformées. Les dépenses de soins de santé varient d'un pays et d'un système à l'autre, non pas tant parce que leur cadre institutionnel influe sur l'efficacité, mais plutôt parce que les préférences et les demandes de leurs «clientèles» varient.

A comment on "Scale of Operations and Locus of Control in Market- Versus Mission-Oriented Charter Schools" by Heath Brown et al (2004) focuses on how the authors examine "decision making." Methodological issues are raised in relation to their claim that the locus of decision making is different for charter schools funded by for-profit education management organizations (EMOs) than for non-EMO charter schools, especially in terms of how the authors constructed the comparison group & why they focused on who founded the schools instead of what organizations manage them. Special attention is given to questions raised by their research on how best to disaggregate & categorize charter schools for both research & policy purposes. Other issues discussed include why some schools experience shared control while others maintain internal control; the implications of shared control; & why some charter school boards agree to be managed by EMOs. Emphasis is placed on the need for policymakers to decide upon the proper role for external organizations & to provide the resources to support their choices. 6 References. J. Lindroth

Thus far, political science has failed to answer a rather simple question: Why do some states provide high levels of airport security, while others fail to do so? Drawing on a rational choice institutionalist framework, we compare airport security regimes in the US & Europe (in particular Germany) & show that the performance gap before September 11 (2001) can be largely attributed to institutional factors. In the US, responsibility was assigned to airlines, whose cost-cutting efforts resulted in lax controls. In Germany, the government shielded the provision of airport security from market pressures. We claim that delegation of responsibility for airport security to the government is a necessary, yet not a sufficient condition for a high security performance. Systems in which responsibility lies with private airlines are doomed to fail, since private markets are ill-equipped to provide a high security performance. While airlines have a long-term interest in safeguarding civil aviation, there exists both a time inconsistency & a collective cost problem that prevents sufficient investment in security in the short run. Thus, US policymakers are well advised to resist the growing pressures for re-privatization & cost-cutting as well as to eliminate remaining flaws in the current federalized system. 4 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Healthcare, as it is currently organized, is not sustainable. Healthcare systems in the developed world are encountering increased demand for high quality healthcare but facing societal resource limits. Healthcare managers, professionals and academics worldwide are debating how to redesign its current organizational configurations and delivery paradigms to deliver more with less, amidst profound changes in demographics, increased cost of new technology and changing healthcare priorities. Healthcare is inextricably linked to the overall sustainability of society and it is critical that solutions are found. The chapters in this volume examine healthcare systems that are building the foundations for sustainable, high quality healthcare. Case-based analyses discuss substantive organizing changes aimed at operating within resource limitations, while taking advantage of new knowledge and medical advances that could have an unprecedented positive impact on the health of individuals and societies. The volume also explores the change capabilities and learning mechanisms that healthcare systems need in order to implement fundamental change and continue to improve over time.