Suchergebnisse

Is there a significant relationship between military structure & political liberalization? If so, can military structure & organization be manipulated to influence the process of democratization for the purpose of enhancing interstate peace? To test the implications of these questions, I will investigate a decidedly contentious premise. Military factors traditionally considered destabilizing in the international environment (to include large, well-trained armed forces organized for offensive or out-of-country operations) have, at critical junctions in the Western experience, had a distinctly positive impact on the emergence & maintenance of the liberal democratic state. If this is indeed the case, & liberal democracy can be shown structurally & normatively to produce interstate peace, then the preferred policy of peace-desiring states should be to promote & implement military reform at home & abroad that most efficiently generates democratic structures & values, regardless of intuitive fears of international instability. In short, I will argue that if liberal democratic states do not go to war with each other, then the size, proficiency, & strength of their military forces should not be a security dilemma issue. 1 Table, 1 Figure, 165 References. Adapted from the source document.

Assesses reform policies of the administration of South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung from his Feb 1998 inauguration to the Apr 2000 legislative election. The focus is on similarities & differences between Dae-Jung's government & that of his predecessors, as well as the implications of current policies for the democratization process. It is argued that reports about the radical nature of Dae-Jung's reforms are exaggerated, maintaining that he has steered a course between local sensitivities & major international trends. Areas of his administration examined include attempts to reform the constitution, government business relations, & labor relations that are in line with a more market-oriented/accountable type of capitalism. However, Dae-Jung's regional base is smaller than that of his predecessors, necessitating the forming of pan-regional alliances. Government strategies used to deal with the top chaebol largely responsible for the 1997/98 crisis are described, along with the government's pursuit of economic pluralism & internationalization, Dae-Jung's association with progressive activists, & his failure to bring about significant constitutional reform. Future prospects are discussed. 1 Table. J. Lindroth

The purpose of this piece is to explore how we might go about understanding the political conditions for poverty alleviation via agrarian reform. It argues that the traditional conceptualizations of agrarian reform & its politics are too limiting. The traditional economic focus on the intersection of landed rights, agriculture, & poverty needs to be broadened to incorporate technological change enabled by the biological revolution & the importance of ecological systems that support both agriculture & survival strategies of the poor. The traditional political focus on agrarian classes needs to incorporate new social forces interested in the correlates of agrarian inequality & the social correlates of land-based inequality -- "new social movements" & their domestic & international allies. A policy agenda for pro-poor reform must retain elements of the venerable core of the agrarian project & yet recognize the potential of larger coalitions for the poor. These elements include environmental integrity & regeneration, women's rights, human rights, cultural survival, & democratization. This analysis is not meant to replace class with postmodernist identity politics, but rather, to emphasize the reality of new coalitional possibilities. 135 References. Adapted from the source document.

The central question this article will attempt to answer is why a transition from authoritarian rule in Serbia in the early 1990s proved to be much more difficult than in most other formerly communist Central & Eastern European countries. The essential component of the answer will deal with the role of nationalist political culture as a surrogate for democratization in a state in which, between 1945 & 1987/88, both nationalism & the liberal democracy were deprived of their political & social legitimacy. The Serbian authorities averted an imminent collapse of communism in the late eighties by adopting nationalism, instead of democratic reforms, as the legitimating principle of their rule. To give a satisfactory explanation for the fact that Serbia & a number of other republics in the erstwhile, Yugoslav federation turned to nationalism & war, instead of following a path to democracy, it is essential to understand the interaction between politics & culture, that is, the relation between the power maximizing strategies of political elites & the role of the culture of nationalism. I will therefore treat both political actors & culture as the relevant independent variables that can explain the outcome of my interest. 24 References. Adapted from the source document.

The Security Council in the 1990's: Boom and Bust?, by David Malone
In this article, David Malone reviews key cross-cutting issues in Security Council decision-making throughout the 1990s. These include the growing focus on internai conflicts, a related increase in recourse to coercive measures (sanctions, naval blockades, authorization of the use of force) and often difficult partnership with regional organizations in addressing challenges to the peace. He examines humanitarian concerns, human right violations and democratization as an instrument for stabilization of war-torn sociaties as factors driving many Council decisions. The article also addresses institutional issues, including the CounciFs creation of international criminal tribunals, its relationship with the international criminal court (the Statute of which was agreed in Rome in 1998) and the slow-moving debate over Security Council reform. The author argues that Council decisions in the 1990s undermined fundamentally absolute conceptions of State sovereignty, but identifies several major challenges facing the Council (relations between the UN and the USA; Russia's role within the Council; and the UN's poor record at grappling effectively with African conflicts) at the turn of the millenium.

Under what conditions will politicians strengthen state capabilities through bureaucratic reform? This article presents a principal–agent model of state capacity that shows that unless competition to influence policy is largely confined to a single dimension, politicians have no incentive or 'political will' to adopt bureaucratic reform. The validity of this model is tested using the experience of the Philippines in the period 1946–72. It is found that politically relevant groups in the Philippines were competing to influence policy over issues of social welfare, economic nationalism and control over public spending, and that groups' demands over these issues failed to align along a single dominant dimension. Consistent with expectations derived from the principal–agent model, there were numerous calls for and attempts to improve bureaucratic performance, but the calls went unheeded and the attempts failed miserably. The study highlights a lesson of potential use to countries currently undergoing democratization. It argues that state capacity is not a function of insulating the state from societal forces, but rather of clarifying lines of authority and accountability in the hierarchy of principal–agent relationships between society, politicians and bureaucrats.

What are the consequences of internationalization for the democratic legitimacy of governance? The argument developed in this article claims that de-democratization will take place as long as intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms offer national governments the opportunity to reassert state autonomy vis-a-vis increasingly assertive domestic and transnational societal pressures. Applied to the context of an emerging world society, the concept of raison d'état is employed in order to classify the concurrence of mutual self-commitment and dedemocratization as a predictable result of strategic interaction among national governments. The article argues that in order to overcome this serious, yet surmountable, obstacle to democratic governance beyond the state, the future architecture of global public policy will have to transcend the traditional frame of intergovernmentalism. Reflecting upon institutional designs to overcome the shortcomings of international governance, the author postulates that solutions cannot be based on the territorial-state majority-democracy model. Instead, a de-governmentalized polity for governance beyond the state is suggested which would be composed of functionally differentiated political arenas with different roles, participants and forms of representation.

▪ Abstract  Prominent scholars engaged in comparative research on democratic regimes are in sharp disagreement over the choice between a dichotomous or graded approach to the distinction between democracy and nondemocracy. This choice is substantively important because it affects the findings of empirical research. It is methodologically important because it raises basic issues, faced by both qualitative and quantitative analysts, concerning appropriate standards for justifying choices about concepts. In our view, generic claims that the concept of democracy should inherently be treated as dichotomous or graded are incomplete. The burden of demonstration should instead rest on more specific arguments linked to the goals of research. We thus take the pragmatic position that how scholars understand and operationalize a concept can and should depend in part on what they are going to do with it. We consider justifications focused on the conceptualization of democratization as an event, the conceptual requirements for analyzing subtypes of democracy, the empirical distribution of cases, normative evaluation, the idea of regimes as bounded wholes, and the goal of achieving sharper analytic differentiation.

Discussion among three leading figures -- Wang Dan, Wang Chaohua, & Li Minqi -- of the June 4th Movement in China of various issues ranging from the future & historical political significance of the June 4th Movement, whether the fatal outcome of 1989 was inevitable or not, the future & potential & of the current regime in China, the best methods for democratizing China, the possibility of an emergent middle class to promote democratization, the extent to which Chinese dissidents should cooperate with foreign governments or focus solely on Chinese topics, preferences for democratic governmental styles & economic systems for China, recommendations for bankrupt industries & unemployment policies in China, attitudes toward privatization, questions on equality & social structure, the growth of mass commercialization, the relative strength of popular nationalism, the appropriateness of categories of political or ideological position for understanding China, Taiwanese independence, the Chinese War with Viet Nam in 1976, preferences for China's United Nations' votes in relation to the United States, Chinese attitudes regarding the influence of American culture, & views of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the United States. R. Rodriguez

Inspired by a seminal essay of Albert O. Hirschman, as well as by the ongoing debate on the empirical foundations of social science, this article "revisits" (1) the paradigm concept popularized by T. S. Kuhn in the 1960s and (2) the relationship between probabilistic and "possibilistic" modes of theorizing that has acquired renewed relevance in comparative politics mainly with respect to recent theories of democratization and development. It does so by reviewing three major paradigm crises in modern political science: the shift from the Aristotelianpollsto the social "system," the refocusing of political explanations from the social to the global environment, and the contemporary attempts to reevaluate the role of technology in political change. The review takes stock of the record of the discipline of comparative politics, of opportunities provided by paradigm shifts, seized upon or missed by the discipline. It also allows one to seek a more even balance between the potential utility and limitations of the paradigm concept, while at the same time pointing to the perils of divorcing the art of the possible from the laws of probability.

This article examines different explanations for the cross–national diffusion of three recent innovations in bureaucratic accountability—the institution of the ombudsman, freedom of information legislation and data protection (information privacy) law. The first two explanations are based on the assumption that these innovations are by–products of modernization, either the growth of the state or democratization. The third assumes that policy is shaped through processes of international communication. A combination of methodologies is employed to conclude that while the growth of government and liberal democratic values are necessary conditions for the adoption of all three policy instruments, they are not sufficient conditions. The pattern of adoption observed is best explained by examining how evidence about these respective policies flows from adopting states to non–adopters. In the case of the ombudsman, this process can be characterized as one of lesson–drawing; for freedom of information, evidence is used for legitimation purposes; for data protection, the diffusion is attributable to harmonization through international organizations. Policy transfer is hence a multi–faceted concept that embraces a number of distinct processes of transnational learning and communication.

Conflicts between the industrialized countries ("the West") and East and Southeast Asia on questions like democratization, human rights and value concepts increased in the last decade. This is due to the processes of globalization, especially after the end of the East-West conflict. A relatively successful economic development process in East Asia is accompanied by growing pride and self-consciousness of the East Asian countries not only in economic questions, but in political and cultural questions as well. This raises the question whether East Asia will be integrated into the process of worldwide globalization or rather looks for stronger regionalization. This article discusses common as well as different perceptions of globalization, the question if there exists the phenomenon of an "Asiatization" and common "Asian values". It analyzes the discussion on different human rights concepts, the Western reaction on East Asian development and self-consciousness and the background of the discussion on Asiatization and Asian values in East Asia. Finally, it tries to mark the trends towards regionalization and globalization and to point to possible ways of a better understanding between the East and the West. (Asien/DÜI)

Traces the judicialization of Italian politics in the contemporary period, focusing on the status & organization of the judiciary, the framework of the judicial system, & the evolution of the political environment in the context of democratic regimes. It is found that the judiciary has been radically altered to make it as independent as possible from various political factions. Part of this alteration has been a reform of the criminal process toward the adversarial system of Anglo-American courts. Though this new criminal process is predicated on the assumption that judges act neutrally, it is shown that there is wide latitude for judicial discretion, & the structural & cultural ties among judges & public prosecutors have provided the judiciary with a remarkable concentration of power. When compared to other cases of judicialization in Latin Europe such as in France, Spain, & Portugal, it is argued that Italy stands out as an extreme case, largely because of the authoritarian legacy of fascism. This fascist past makes judicialization a hindrance to further democratization efforts. 2 Tables, 2 Photographs, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

The crises characteristic of the political & social situation in Peru for the past 30 years stem from the fundamental difficulty experienced by Peruvians in their attempts to gain political & institutional representation, which, in turn, has enabled regressive authoritarian control to flourish & allowed civil society to suffer economic distress & generalized violence. Peru's historical failure to provide citizens with social representation produced the concomitant inability to provide them with political representation, both of which are responsible for Peru's current democratization difficulties. Citizenship & citizens' rights in a civil society are fundamental to the processes of representation & participation in a political system. The fragmentation of Peruvian civil society, begun in the 1970s, & erosion of citizen rights, occurring in the 1980s, precipitated the formation of fundamentalist grassroots political & social self-help groups. These have failed to engender publicly accountable political representation, setting the stage for the rise of Ricardo Belmont, President Alberto Fujimori, & others. It is shown how Fujimori employs Peru's worst traits in his misguided attempts to solve the country's crises of representation & participation by labeling them obsolete & replacing them with mass identification with political leadership. B. Wolfe