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The rise of social network analyses in the social sciences has allowed empirical work to better account for interdependencies among actors and among their actions. However, this work has been, to a large extent, descriptive: it has treated these actions as exogenous and immutable. In many cases these networks describe actions like alliance formation or trade – phenomena that are the outcome variables for programs of social scientific research. In this article, I attempt to account for both interdependencies and the endogenous nature of networks by incorporating formal theory, helping answer the question of how these networks arise by looking at the incentives of actors to form links with each other. I discuss the appropriate solution concept for a network formation game, and present an algorithm for finding the equilibrium of these networks computationally as well as ways to compare the theoretical networks to observed networks in order to evaluate the fit of the theory. I apply these methods to the study of international cooperation – a subject where both the interdependencies and purposive nature of actors must be accounted for. The theoretical network is able to reproduce a number of important observed characteristics. Still, there are more factors that must be accounted for if we want to understand how the network of international cooperation is formed.

This study investigates whether and under which conditions certain forms of cooperation
that are characterised by a degree of structural asymmetry among partners may nonetheless
be considered legitimate. In investigating this question, the study will operate in three
theory-driven sections borrowing from critical theory, post-structuralism and postcolonialism. Each section will provide a brief presentation of the main theoretical arguments
developed by one philosopher, illustrated with extensive direct quotes from relevant original works. This presentation will then be followed by a critical summary. For the sake of illustration, theoretical arguments will then be confronted with empirical observations based on my own participation in the 'Tunisia in Transition' project. Section one
will argue in favour of the possibility of genuinely horizontal argumentative engagement on the basis of Habermas' discourse 'ethics' and theory of communicative action. By contrast, section two will introduce Foucault's genealogical account of the power/knowledge interplay to reject the possibility of discursive spaces that would be in a position of exteriority
to power relations. Section three will then bring in the writings of Spivak on the
double aporia of representation in order to highlight the practical obstacles to a subversive
use of the Master's knowledge by the subaltern for genuinely emancipatory purposes.

Intro -- INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION: ACTIVITIES AND ANALYSES -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1: INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION: AGENCY EFFORTS COULD BENEFIT FROM INCREASED COLLABORATION AND INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- ABBREVIATIONS -- BACKGROUND -- U.S. AGENCIES ENGAGE IN SIX PRIMARY CATEGORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES -- AGENCIES CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVENESS DURING RULEMAKING IN DIFFERENT WAYS -- KEY FACTORS CAN POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE OUTCOMES OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES -- CONCLUSION -- RECOMMENDATION FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION -- AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION -- APPENDIX I. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY -- APPENDIX II. EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES -- STRENGTHENING CAPACITY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES -- Chapter 2: TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- U.S.-EU REGULATORY BARRIERS -- RATIONALE FOR TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION -- U.S.-EU DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY APPROACHES -- FORMS OF TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION -- RESULTS OF PAST INITIATIVES AT REGULATORY COOPERATION -- THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC COUNCIL -- ROLE OF CONGRESS -- APPENDIX A. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION -- APPENDIX B. U.S.-EU REGULATORY COOPERATION BYSECTOR, U.S. REGULATORY AGENCY, ANDCOMMITTEE OVERSIGHT -- Chapter 3: EXECUTIVE ORDER 13609 - PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION -- INDEX.

Neorealist theories of international relations, particularly when formalized as noncooperative games, have difficulty accounting for substantial cooperation between nation-states, perhaps because neorealists have underestimated the role of communication between states. To address this issue, the authors developed an experiment in which nation-states, represented as groups, can communicate. Two groups of three human subjects interacted for 10 iterations of a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game and an altered version of the game. The authors conducted 79 of these 10 iteration trials and tested the effects of communication and a withdrawal option on groups' ability to cooperate. Results indicate that groups cooperate more and defect less when they can communicate. Most groups appear to be motivated by fear of the opponent; communication appears to be a good mechanism for alleviating fear. However, a small but significant number of groups are motivated by greed; communication is not very effective in these situations.

How does the hawkish or dovish nature of the domestic opposition in one state influence its own, as well as an international opponent's, negotiating behavior? I show that doves, when negotiating in the presence of a hawkish opposition, have more bargaining leverage in international negotiations. The key is to understand an international opponent's preference to deal with a dove rather than a hawk in future negotiations. I argue that adversaries have an incentive to concede more in negotiations to doves in order to sustain them in office, because failing to give concessions may lead to their replacement by less conciliatory (more hawkish) governments in the future. For this reason, doves are more likely than hawks to extract critical concessions from adversaries. The empirical results support this argument, which altogether suggests that doves are more successful in international negotiations not because they are more conciliatory, but rather because, for domestic reasons, they have greater bargaining leverage to extract counter-concessions from adversaries.

A discussion of the need for international archive cooperation addresses problems related to which documents & how many of them should be preserved; the best way to organize them; key motives for international archive cooperation; & unique aspects of the archives of new states that contain documents of shared histories with their mother countries. The International Council on Archives (ICA), a nongovernmental organization formed in 1948, is responsible for directing archive cooperation by bringing together the national archive administrations of different countries. The ICA's complex structure & their organization of special congresses & roundtable discussions are described. Distinctions between Russian archivists & those in Western countries are pointed out. Special attention is given to problems stemming from archives shipped to Russia after WWII & archive-related conflicts between Russia & Germany. Relations between Russian archivists & those from Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, & Canada are explored, along with hopeful signs of recent archive cooperation between Russia & the countries of China, Vietnam, South Korea, Iran, & Turkey. J. Lindroth

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