Suchergebnisse

This article examines the most pertinent questions relating to the applicability of the right of self-defense to attacks conducted by non-State armed groups (NSAGs) acting independently of State control from the territory of one or more States against the territory of another State. These questions are approached from the perspective of legality (does the right of self-defense apply to attacks not mounted by or under the control of a State) and modality (assuming the applicability of self-defense to such attacks; how do the principles of necessity, proportionality and immediacy affect its application)? Starting with an assessment of the place of self-defense in international law at the time the U.N. Charter was adopted, it proceeds with an examination of State practice before and after the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 attacks triggered not only increased reliance upon self-defense in relation to attacks by NSAGs, but also an ongoing debate to which this article is intended as a constructive contribution. After concluding that there is substantial and increasing, albeit not universal support for the applicability of self-defense to attacks by NSAGs, the modality of its application is discussed. In that context, the principle of necessity in the context of self-defense is presented as being of paramount importance in answering the question of under which circumstances self-defense against NSAGs can be exercised on the territory of another State and how such action relates to the rights of the State where the NSAG is located and conducting operations from.

This article aims to analyze and provide a state-of-the-art conceptualization of the notion of self-defense within international law and the cyber realm. In the first section, the paper explores the concepts of self-defense, attack, and the use of force in international law, followed by their application in the cyberspace. The subsequent section, specifically applies the concept of self-defense in the event of a cyber-attack perpetrated by a non-state actors. The conclusion highlights that the cyber realm context introduces the possibility that aggressions from non-state actors can yield consequences even more severe than traditional kinetic attacks. This article serves as a foundation for future discussions in the defense sector and international law.

Part of a symposium on David Rodin's War and Self-Defense (New York: Oxford U Press, 2003) argues, contra Rodin, that ordinary soldiers should often be seen as innocent attackers, but there exists a moral right to kill them in individual & national self-defense when they fight an unjust war. It is contended that Rodin's moral fault justification is too narrow & his perspective on the moral responsibility of individuals for becoming soldiers is too demanding to warrant the kind of actions that are deemed morally permissible in war. Rodin's theory on the justification for soldier's rights of self-defense is seen to be a mirror image of Michael Walzer's (1977), despite the former's disagreement with the latter over the subjective innocence of soldiers. The pacifist implications of the moral fault justification can be avoided by adopting an objectively unjust danger justification, whereby soldiers have a moral right to kill subjectively guilty & innocent unjust combatants. Attention turns to the relationship of the right of self-defense to a state's legitimacy or illegitimacy, along with the rights of individuals conscripted by legitimate or illegitimate states. It is asserted that it can be just to kill innocent attackers, thus, it is possible to justify a right of national defense for morally legitimate states. J. Zendejas