Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn a common-law jurisdiction, "Supreme Court" is not always the name of a court of final appeal. There are 41 Supreme Courts and Supreme Courts of Judicature with general original jurisdiction. They cover 60 political units. In addition to general original jurisdiction, some of those courts have general appellate jurisdiction. There is a number of political units in which a second appellate consideration is possible.This article provides information about Supreme Courts and Supreme Courts of Judicature with general original jurisdiction. It includes a list with the names of the political units served by Supreme Courts or by Supreme Courts of Judicature with general original jurisdiction; a statement whether a Supreme Court or a Supreme Court of Judicature of a political unit has both general original jurisdiction and general appellate jurisdiction, or only general original jurisdiction; and further information.The goal of this article is to inform librarians, lawyers, solicitors, and barristers about the many court systems in the common-law world, in which the court of general original jurisdiction is named "Supreme Court" or "Supreme Court of Judicature." Those courts are found in diverse political units, including Australian states and territories, Belize, Brunei, Canadian provinces and territories, Gibraltar, and Samoa. The oldest among them is the Supreme Court of New York, founded more than 300 years ago.

Every Justice, save perhaps Justice Breyer, has recently subscribed to an opinion raising questions in one or another context about whether federal courts can appropriately exercise common law law-making functions that had, until these questions began to appear, been characteristic of all American courts. To invoke a special class of "federal tribunal" whose actions are not to be confused with those of common law courts suggests broader implications than the long-familiar debates about Erie RR. Co. v. Tompkins, or more recent contentions over when, if ever, it is appropriate to infer privately enforceable judicial remedies in aid of federal statutes; this seems to be about the nature of the institutions, not elements of their jurisdiction or prudential rules for the exercise of their powers. The paper, given as the Daniel Meador Lecture at Alabama Law School this fall, finds no historical or constitutional basis for these doubts, insofar as they concern interstitial law-making on subjects within Congress's legislative competence. Indeed, it argues, drawing on extensive analysis of several settings and cases, such functions have particular importance where state court common law judgments can impair the implementation of federal law. The doubts, it suggests, are more properly understood as reflecting a certain discomfort with the changing character of the judicial function in modern times. High court judges today choose the questions they will decide, in a framework that encourages them to favor the legal system's need for definition over party claims for justice as the basis for choice; and from an enormous volume of potential targets for decision that puts the discipline of common law processes in question. The discomfort is widespread, and it is perhaps more instinctual than intellectual, a realization that the ground has shifted without yet quite knowing what to do about it. In repeated arguments about precedent, and perhaps unexpected adherence to it, one can find expression of the tensions between the prior model of litigant-required judging, and the new powers of policy-directed choice. The certiorari function brings forward the law-making side of judging, and at the same time reflects a weakening of the possibilities for hierarchical control within the judiciary. Our common-law premises cannot explain either development. In groping for an understanding and accommodation, the Justices appear often enough to be behaving in the familiar, unconscious mode. In the unspoken battle between agenda-setting and judging, we should all hope judging wins.

AbstractThe achievements of the European Court of Justice in instilling the rule of law within the domain of economic integration is to witness to what extent public international law can be dynamic. For the Court of Justice, which attempted to slip its international law origins by characterizing European Community law as belonging to a 'new legal order'; the post-Maastricht era has been a rude awakening. So effective was the European Court, during its first four decades, that Community law was seen as being set apart from traditional international law; as being sui generis. However, with the Maastricht Treaty and again with the Amsterdam Treaty, it has become evident that the creation of what is today termed the 'European Union' is governed by international law and that, ultimately, it is the States and not the European institutions – foremost among them the Court of Justice – which are the 'Herren der Verträge'.Yet, within the domain of economic integration, the European Court has acted in a truly revolutionary manner for an international court. Barring witness to the achievements of the Luxembourg Court in this domain is to realize to what extent international law can be moulded to achieve results. The lesson to be learnt from the function of the European Court within the field of economic integration is that if there is State consensus, an international court can promote and actively ensure the rule of law. While the uniqueness of the European experience and that of the European Court of Justice may not be able to be grafted onto other areas of the international relations, what the evolution of the European Court does provide is a new way of thinking about international law. The supranational elements, those 'constitutional' areas of European law demonstrate the avenues that public international law can travel, if States are willing to allow it.

Practicing politicians as well as students of politics have long recognized the check on presidential power imposed by the federal administrative machinery. High policy must be interpreted; it can sometimes be changed or even frustrated by the bureaucrats who apply laws and executive orders. Officials down the line have interests, loyalties, and ambitions which go beyond and often clash with the allegiance accorded a given tenant of the White House. Each bureaucrat has his own ideas about proper public policy, particularly in his field of special competence. If a career civil servant, he may identify only partially, if at all, the good of the governmental service, not to say the good of the public, with the ends sought by the Administration. And if he owes his appointment or promotion to other sources than the merit system, he may find a positive conflict between his loyalties to the President and to other politicians or political groups.This conflict can occur at all administrative levels. Cabinet members may make up the President's official family, but some of them are at times his chief rivals for power within his own political party, or, more often, representatives of those rivals. Or the department heads may be so split with sibling political rivalry among themselves that common loyalty to their nominal leader may be subordinated to other values. An observer has lately written: "The conditions which a system of fragmented power sets for the success and the survival of a Cabinet officer encourage him to consolidate his own nexus of power and compel him to operate with a degree of independence from the President."

AbstractMany legal systems have specialist labour courts with jurisdiction over individual employment disputes or collective labour disputes or both. The literature identifies a number of possible justifications for the use of specialist labour courts. This chapter will engage in a critical examination of this literature in order to develop a framework for analysing the performance of courts (whether specialist or otherwise) in deciding labour law cases. We shall then apply that framework to some of the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.