Energy is considered as an important element to the economic and social development for the Modern Societies, because it is crucial for generating growth and employment. The proper use of the energy resources lets to develop different productive sectors, for making possible in that way to generate substantial improvements in the lives of the citizens. The signs of several energy agreements, as well as the creation agreement of the Expert Group on Energy (EGE), that works with OLADE advice and are responsible for making an analysis of the South America energy balance, are providing the tools needed to boost the creation of an energy action plan that involves all members of UNASUR. Other agreements were signed to ensure the defense of the resources of the region, by making up an ad-hoc expert group on legal and political matters, which aims to give a concrete regulatory content for the South America Energy Agreement`s structure. This group also is going to work with the Expert Group on Energy (EGE), both of these groups have to report to the South America Energy Council. Some oil companies in South America have conformed a group of national companies between countries of UNASUR, to develop gas production projects, refining oil, etc. This group maintains those regional agreements under the guidelines of the Energy Council, as in the case of Enarsa of Argentina; Petrobras in Brazil; Ecopetrol of Colombia; YPFB of Bolivia; Petroamazonas and Petroecuador of Ecuador; Petroperu and National Fuel, Alcohol and Portland (Ancap) from Uruguay, among others. It is noteworthy that the PDVSA, Venezuelan State Oil, has been which more has interacted with other state companies. This thesis aims to analyze the pattern of energy policy that Ecuador has implemented since 2007, with the government of President Rafael Correa and the Citizen Revolution, the transformation of the energy matrix; it means to change the actual hydrocarbons pattern used by a renewable energy sources pattern. This new pattern is really important to the growth and the development; also it could provide the energy sustainability for welfare of the people. Within the analysis, where there were compared several policies, programs and projects implemented by several countries in the region is remarkable to see the radical change that Ecuador has made to transform its energy sector, with policy changes, institutional reforms, by creating new administrative entities to control and regulation. Progress and significant changes that have been not only consistent with the guidelines established in the South American Energy Treaty, also these measures can be taken as a pattern in others countries. In this regard it is significant to point out that the Ecuadorian energy policy within its new vision, is aiming toward the generation of a new energy infrastructure through investment and better distribution of energy resources. Where the supply of energy to reach all citizens, and of course this new model can be consistent with the integration process, which involves the same two aspects that are complementary: Regulations and Infrastructure. ; La energía considerada como elemento central del desarrollo económico y social de las sociedades modernas, constituye una variable decisiva para la generación de crecimiento y empleo. El aprovechamiento y uso adecuado de los recursos energéticos pero se, permiten el crecimiento de los diferentes sectores productivos, posibilitando de esta manera generar sustanciales mejoras en las condiciones de vida de los pueblos. La firma de varios acuerdos políticos en materia de energía como por ejemplo el acuerdo de creación de un Grupo de Expertos en Energía (GEE), que junto con la asesoría de OLADE, se encarga de elaborar el análisis del balance energético de Suramérica, han proporcionado las herramientas necesarias para impulsar el desarrollo de un plan de acción energético que involucre a todos los miembros de UNASUR. (UNASUR, Declaración de la III Reunión del Consejo Energético de Suramérica, 2012).Se han firmado acuerdos para garantizar la defensa de los recursos de la región, por medio de la constitución de un grupo especializado ad hoc en materia jurídica y política, que pretende darle un contenido normativo concreto a la estructura del Tratado Energético Suramericano, el cual además trabajará en forma coordinada con el grupo de expertos enenergía y a su vez reportan al Consejo Energético de Suramérica. En esta línea varias petroleras suramericanas, han conformado una agrupación de empresas nacionales de países miembros de la UNASUR para desarrollar proyectos de producción de gas, refinación, etc. Manteniendo acuerdos regionales bajo los lineamientos del Consejo Energético, tal es el caso de Enarsa, de Argentina; Petrobras, de Brasil; Ecopetrol, de Colombia; YPFB, de Bolivia; Petroamazonas y Petroecuador, de Ecuador; Petroperú y Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcohol y Portland (Ancap), de Uruguay, entre otros. Cabe mencionar que la estatal venezolana PDVSA es la que más ha interactuado con otras empresas estatales. (SOLANO, 2014). La presente tesis tiene como objetivo analizar el modelo de política energética que el Ecuador ha implementado desde el año 2007, con el gobierno del Presidente Rafael Correa y la Revolución Ciudadana, orientado principalmente a la transformación de la matriz energética, es decir lograr la transición de un modelo altamente dependiente de los hidrocarburos, hacia un modelo que adopta fuentes renovables de energía, fundamentales en el desarrollo y el crecimiento económico de los pueblos, y que además proporcione la sustentabilidad energética para los pueblos. Dentro del análisis realizado, donde se comparó varias políticas, programas y proyectos aplicados por varios países de la región, es notable ver el cambio radical que Ecuador hizo en transformar su sector energético, con cambios normativos, reformas institucionales, creación de nuevos entes administrativos de control y regulación. Avances y cambios significativos que han sido no solo consecuentes con los lineamientos establecidos en el Tratado Energético Suramericano, sino además ejemplos a seguir para varios países. En este sentido es considerable resaltar que la política energética ecuatoriana, dentro de su nueva visión, esta direccionada hacia la generación de una nueva infraestructura energética, mediante la inversión y mejor distribución de los recursos energéticos. Donde el suministro de energía llegue a todos los ciudadanos, y este nuevo modelo sea consecuente con el Proceso de Integración, el mismo que involucra dos aspectos que son complementarios: Normativa e Infraestructura.
The module was administered as a post-election interview. The resulting data are provided along with voting, demographic, district and macro variables in a single dataset.
CSES Variable List The list of variables is being provided on the CSES Website to help in understanding what content is available from CSES, and to compare the content available in each module.
Themes:
MICRO-LEVEL DATA:
Identification and study administration variables: weighting factors; election type; date of election 1st and 2nd round; study timing (post-election study, pre-election and post-election study, between rounds of majoritarian election); mode of interview; gender of interviewer; date questionnaire administered; primary electoral district of respondent; number of days the interview was conducted after the election; language of questionnaire.
Demography: year and month of birth; gender; education; marital status; union membership; union membership of others in household; business association membership, farmers´ association membership; professional association membership; current employment status; main occupation; socio economic status; employment type - public or private; industrial sector; current employment status, occupation, socio economic status, employment type - public or private, and industrial sector of spouse; household income; number of persons in household; number of children in household under the age of 18; number of children in household under the age of 6; attendance at religious services; religiosity; religious denomination; language usually spoken at home; region of residence; race; ethnicity; rural or urban residence; primary electoral district; country of birth; year arrived in current country.
Survey variables: perception of public expenditure on health, education, unemployment benefits, defense, old-age pensions, business and industry, police and law enforcement, welfare benefits; perception of improving individual standard of living, state of economy, government's action on income inequality; respondent cast a ballot at the current and the previous election; vote choice (presidential, lower house and upper house elections) at the current and the previous election; respondent cast candidate preference vote at the current and the previous election; difference who is in power and who people vote for; sympathy scale for selected parties and political leaders; assessment of parties on the left-right-scale and/or an alternative scale; self-assessment on a left-right-scale and an optional scale; satisfaction with democracy; party identification; intensity of party identification, institutional and personal contact in the electoral campaigning, in person, by mail, phone, text message, email or social networks, institutional contact by whom; political information questions; expected development of household income in the next twelve month; ownership of residence, business or property or farm or livestock, stocks or bonds, savings; likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month; spouse likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month.
DISTRICT-LEVEL DATA: number of seats contested in electoral district; number of candidates; number of party lists; percent vote of different parties; official voter turnout in electoral district.
MACRO-LEVEL DATA: election outcomes by parties in current (lower house/upper house) legislative election; percent of seats in lower house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of seats in upper house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of votes received by presidential candidate of parties in current elections; electoral turnout; party of the president and the prime minister before and after the election; number of portfolios held by each party in cabinet, prior to and after the most recent election; size of the cabinet after the most recent election; number of parties participating in election; ideological families of parties; left-right position of parties assigned by experts and alternative dimensions; most salient factors in the election; fairness of the election; formal complaints against national level results; election irregularities reported; scheduled and held date of election; irregularities of election date; extent of election violence and post-election violence; geographic concentration of violence; post-election protest; electoral alliances permitted during the election campaign; existing electoral alliances; requirements for joint party lists; possibility of apparentement and types of apparentement agreements; multi-party endorsements on ballot; votes cast; voting procedure; voting rounds; party lists close, open, or flexible; transferable votes; cumulated votes if more than one can be cast; compulsory voting; party threshold; unit for the threshold; freedom house rating; democracy-autocracy polity IV rating; age of the current regime; regime: type of executive; number of months since last lower house and last presidential election; electoral formula for presidential elections; electoral formula in all electoral tiers (majoritarian, proportional or mixed); for lower and upper houses was coded: number of electoral segments; linked electoral segments; dependent formulae in mixed systems; subtypes of mixed electoral systems; district magnitude (number of members elected from each district); number of secondary and tertiary electoral districts; fused vote; size of the lower house; GDP growth (annual percent); GDP per capita; inflation, GDP Deflator (annual percent); Human development index; total population; total unemployment; TI corruption perception index; international migrant stock and net migration rate; general government final consumption expenditure; public spending on education; health expenditure; military expenditure; central government debt; Gini index; internet users per 100 inhabitants; mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants; fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants; daily newspapers; constitutional federal structure; number of legislative chambers; electoral results data available; effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties.
The module was administered as a post-election interview. The resulting data are provided along with voting, demographic, district and macro variables in a single dataset.
CSES Variable Table The list of variables is being provided on the CSES Website to help in understanding what content is available from CSES, and to compare the content available in each module.
Themes:
MICRO-LEVEL DATA:
Identification and study administration variables: weighting factors; election type; date of election 1st and 2nd round; study timing (post-election study, pre-election and post-election study, between rounds of majoritarian election); mode of interview; gender of interviewer; date questionnaire administered; primary electoral district of respondent; number of days the interview was conducted after the election; language of questionnaire.
Demography: year and month of birth; gender; education; marital status; union membership; union membership of others in household; business association membership, farmers´ association membership; professional association membership; current employment status; main occupation; socio economic status; employment type - public or private; industrial sector; current employment status, occupation, socio economic status, employment type - public or private, and industrial sector of spouse; household income; number of persons in household; number of children in household under the age of 18; number of children in household under the age of 6; attendance at religious services; religiosity; religious denomination; language usually spoken at home; region of residence; race; ethnicity; rural or urban residence; primary electoral district; country of birth; year arrived in current country.
Survey variables: perception of public expenditure on health, education, unemployment benefits, defense, old-age pensions, business and industry, police and law enforcement, welfare benefits; perception of improving individual standard of living, state of economy, government's action on income inequality; respondent cast a ballot at the current and the previous election; vote choice (presidential, lower house and upper house elections) at the current and the previous election; respondent cast candidate preference vote at the current and the previous election; difference who is in power and who people vote for; sympathy scale for selected parties and political leaders; assessment of parties on the left-right-scale and/or an alternative scale; self-assessment on a left-right-scale and an optional scale; satisfaction with democracy; party identification; intensity of party identification, institutional and personal contact in the electoral campaigning, in person, by mail, phone, text message, email or social networks, institutional contact by whom; political information questions; expected development of household income in the next twelve month; ownership of residence, business or property or farm or livestock, stocks or bonds, savings; likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month; spouse likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month.
DISTRICT-LEVEL DATA: number of seats contested in electoral district; number of candidates; number of party lists; percent vote of different parties; official voter turnout in electoral district.
MACRO-LEVEL DATA: election outcomes by parties in current (lower house/upper house) legislative election; percent of seats in lower house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of seats in upper house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of votes received by presidential candidate of parties in current elections; electoral turnout; party of the president and the prime minister before and after the election; number of portfolios held by each party in cabinet, prior to and after the most recent election; size of the cabinet after the most recent election; number of parties participating in election; ideological families of parties; left-right position of parties assigned by experts and alternative dimensions; most salient factors in the election; fairness of the election; formal complaints against national level results; election irregularities reported; scheduled and held date of election; irregularities of election date; extent of election violence and post-election violence; geographic concentration of violence; post-election protest; electoral alliances permitted during the election campaign; existing electoral alliances; requirements for joint party lists; possibility of apparentement and types of apparentement agreements; multi-party endorsements on ballot; votes cast; voting procedure; voting rounds; party lists close, open, or flexible; transferable votes; cumulated votes if more than one can be cast; compulsory voting; party threshold; unit for the threshold; freedom house rating; democracy-autocracy polity IV rating; age of the current regime; regime: type of executive; number of months since last lower house and last presidential election; electoral formula for presidential elections; electoral formula in all electoral tiers (majoritarian, proportional or mixed); for lower and upper houses was coded: number of electoral segments; linked electoral segments; dependent formulae in mixed systems; subtypes of mixed electoral systems; district magnitude (number of members elected from each district); number of secondary and tertiary electoral districts; fused vote; size of the lower house; GDP growth (annual percent); GDP per capita; inflation, GDP Deflator (annual percent); Human development index; total population; total unemployment; TI corruption perception index; international migrant stock and net migration rate; general government final consumption expenditure; public spending on education; health expenditure; military expenditure; central government debt; Gini index; internet users per 100 inhabitants; mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants; fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants; daily newspapers; constitutional federal structure; number of legislative chambers; electoral results data available; effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties.
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I have been wondering whether I should write about Michel Maisonneuve's op-ed, which is entirely about ... me. As I have long admitted to being a narcissist, I am, of course, flattered by the attention. But as a professor, when I see bad reading comprehension, ad hominen attacks, and wild analogies, I have a hard time refraining from commenting. To set this up, last fall, Michel Maisonneuve used his Vimy Gala award speech to rant about a variety of things that upset him--including a woke media and a government that apologizes too much. I wrote about it, which got much attention. This seemed to lead to Maisonneuve, who complained about cancel culture, getting a regular column or its equivalent at the National Post, and the attention of the Conservative Party of Canada. They then chose him to have a big platform at their convention. I suggested this was a bad idea in an op-ed as it would be putting the military into partisan fire (and I am not alone) not unlike how platforming Michael Flynn and John Allen in 2016 did so in the US, and it is that op-ed to which Maisonneuve is responding. With that out of the way, let's go through this piece and consider what kind of grade it should get.Before getting into the text, we should note that the picture that comes with the piece has MM with a chest full of medals. This belies any assertion that he is not trying to parlay his military credentials into influence. Yes, he has the right to wear them, but to use this picture is not random, it is about wrapping himself in the CAF. I would give good marks to a student who so clearly identifies the target of his essay at the start, but then grade down for random references. Why does he note that I am a dual citizen? That I am not Canadian enough to assess his abetting of the politicization of the CAF? Am I so foreign that my opinion should be devalued? A hint of xenophobia here."Saideman was a non-paying guest." True (it suggests he read my blog post way back when and it tasks him). But why mention it? I was the guest of an embassy. And? Maybe it is for him to identify with me since he didn't pay for his ticket that night either? I would be putting a red line though this if I were grading him (and if I were, say, an editor of an op-ed page)I "didn't possess the courage to speak" to him after the speech? To be honest, I didn't think of approaching him because I was too busy sharing my shock and confusion with a great group of super sharp women who found his speech to be most problematic. But calling someone a coward is often a good strategy for evading responsibility. Tis, of course, an ad hominen attack, not really something that buttresses his argument, so points off. Again, I do have to ask: who is editing the stuff over at the National Post? So, again, he loses some points on his grade.He says that I missed him speaking not just as a former member of the CAF but as a Canadian. Is this trying to defend himself against how "Americanized" his argument is? I don't know, but I never denied he is a Canadian. MM then writes about his wife who also spoke with him at the convention. How does this fit into an argument about why he has the right to speak? She has spoken out about MeToo going too far and has written a letter to Macleans basically telling those who faced harassment to trust in a military justice system that retired Supreme Court justices have found to be quite problematic. Other than that and that she was MM's subordinate, I really don't know much about her. Again, a red pen would strike this out for dubious relevance.The invocation of his wife then goes into a paragraph about decades of service to protect free speech. This is where his argument really missed the mark--I never said he didn't have a right to speak. My piece was about responsibility--that the Conservatives should not provide MM with a platform because that would be politicizing the CAF. Of course, the implication of my op-ed is that MM himself should responsibly refrain from being part of a partisan event.One of the problems with the contemporary right wing is that they conflate any suggestion of responsibility that comes along with freedoms as restraints or censorship. Much of the free speech stuff today is not about the government restricting people from speaking but people wanting to speak without any consequences. They want to say offensive stuff and then not get called out for being offensive. Mrs. MM in her speech I linked to above expresses umbrage at people being called racist for being critical. Well, that can happen if one says racist stuff or it can happen because people are using racist as an epithet. When one speaks on a stage with multiple totem poles after an Indigenous dance group performed after a summer of discoveries of unmarked graves at residential schools and says that we shouldn't be apologizing for stuff, then one should expect to be considered insensitive on Indigenous issues and even a racist. So, no, this essay here should not be about MM's freedom of speech, which was never in question, but should be about speaking responsibly. This by itself means that this essay could not get more than a B since it misses the target.MM insists that he is not politicizing the military as he is no longer in active service, that he has been out of uniform for ten years. Technically true that he is no longer a member of the military. But since he worked at a military school for quite some time, he is probably well aware of the dynamic where the retired senior officers are seen as speaking for those still in uniform who cannot engage in partisan speech. Plus there is the whole picture he chose to give to the NP with a chest full of medals. That is no accident. And, no, for my picture for the G&M op-ed, I didn't choose to wear my graduation chapeau (I have no idea what they are called) nor did I choose to have a bunch of framed degrees behind me nor did I choose to have a pile of the books I have authored in my lap. This is where MM wants to have it both ways: he wants to be seen as a representative of the silent and oppressed military but does not want to be criticized for dragging the CAF into partisan conflict. There is a distinction between criticizing the military and the government (which I do all the time) and doing so at a national convention of a political party using one's title. To be clear, he says he and his wife were apolitical when they were in the military and are only now getting involved "by helping to develop policies and by electing representatives who will listen to Canadians ..." The big question then is: what policies? To roll back the efforts to change the military's culture? That will come up again. The argument here is that the Conservatives are a pro-military party, and that the Liberals are anti-military. Which is an argument one can make unless one is trying to represent the military. Then it is politicizing the military."My wife and I have never criticized the men and women in uniform." This is false as he mocks those in the military who "wear nail polish and man-buns," so I have to grade him down for being internally inconsistent. Moreover, my focus is not on his criticism of the military, but on the Conservatives weaponizing his criticism."Has the current government politicized the military?" He then lists a bunch of stuff, some of which are decent criticisms, such as replacing Anita Anand as Minister of National Defence, dithering on buying the F-35, being slow to complete the defence review. But none of these are politicizing the military--that is, making the military to be a partisan actor. Everything involving the military is, of course, political, as I noted in my original piece (and he calls boilerplate), but politicizing refers to involving the military in the domestic political competition of parties.MM then applies this politicizing stuff reference to the sexual misconduct and abuse of power crisis, referring to the mistreatment of senior leaders after they were found not guilty or not charged. There is an irony here as the former Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan argued before Parliament that he didn't follow up on accusations of sexual misconduct and abuse of power levied against former Chief of the Defence Staff Jonathan Vance because that would be politicizing the issue. The irony is not that one of my more noteworthy op-eds where I called for the Liberal defense minister to be fired, but that both Sajjan and MM have a crappy understanding of what is and what is not politicizing. Maybe something former military officers share? Of course, one key problem for MM's argument is that Vance pled guilty to obstruction of justice, and what justice was Vance obstructing? An investigation into his affair with a subordinate that he conducted over many years.MM might be referring to the case of Art McDonald, who lost his role as CDS because of credible accusations that he engaged in sexual assault as a commodore of a NATO exercise. McDonald claimed to be exonerated when the military investigators essentially said that all the witnesses were too drunk to testify. Again, we have multiple Supreme Court justices finding significant problems with the military justice system, so a lack of charges may not be evidence of senior officers being treated poorly. MM might have a better claim when it comes to Danny Fortin, who had the misfortune of having his case come to light after Vance and McDonald, as Fortin was tried in civilian court and acquitted. This view about the sexual misconduct and abuse of power crisis does suggest that MM's preferred policy options are to reverse the culture change effort, but more on that below.MM then discusses the recent announcement of budget cuts--something that I also oppose. But it is not clear how this fits into his argument that he deserves to be heard at a national party convention. The really fun move is for MM to identify himself with Kennedy, Eisenhower, Churchill and Pearson as they were veterans who served higher office. I'd refer him to Michael Flynn and a bunch of other folks who brought shame to the uniform in their post-military public service. Again, my point was not that he could not run for office, but that standing on a national party convention stage to blast the government of the day would be politicizing the military. So, his analogy is a bad one, as he is no Jack Kennedy. Nor is he Eisenhower, who proved to be an incredibly talented diplomat who had to manage the competing egos of Montgomery, Patton, and De Gaulle. Churchill? Which part of Churchill's legacy is MM embracing? MM then addresses my concern that if one politicizes the military, it would exacerbate the existing personnel crisis. He then says: "by the statistics I have seen, allowing members to wear nail polish and man-buns, or to choose their pronouns, has had zero effect on increasing the numbers joining." He is referring to efforts to make the military more inclusive, and his disdain here is a combination of misogyn, racism, anti-Sikh-ism, and transphobia. And, as I mentioned above, he is mocking people who are currently in the CAF. Since these people are almost lower in rank than MM's former rank as LGen, this is also punching down. Of course, the academic violation here is that he does not cite his sources for these stats, so again, reduced marks. MM is right that more needs to be done to improve recruitment. I would point to fixing the larger culture of abuse of power and entitlement that drives out good people who see toxic leaders who prey upon their subordinates getting promoted to the highest levels.MM is right that the personnel crisis needs more money, but I don't think we need to bring the "Armed Forces back from the dead." This hyperbole undermines the argument here by denigrating the CAF as it exists now--things are not great, but they are not as dire as he suggests, in part because it has much better leadership than when MM was in uniform.His penultimate paragraph should start to sum up his argument, but instead we get a slight based on academics being nerds who just rely on books. It is kind of like the insults I see online about whether the academics like myself have served in the military. This is part of an arrogance that has festered in many modern militaries--that they think the only expertise that one can develop is via experience. While that is one form of expertise, one can also understand something through extensive, rigorous study. Oh, and how have I studied civil-military relations? By systematic comparison via talking with folks in and out of uniform, learning from their experiences. Again, this attempt at an insult does not really help his argument here.MM's conclusion is, of course, vague. He says the public has to change their views about the CAF and national security. To what? He says that the government should follow the public's lead. So far, the public has not voted out politicians for underspending on the military unless one counts Harper in 2015, and that would be a stretch.His last lines are that I need to recognize that veterans care about the CAF and they are not politicizing it by doing so. Maybe some veterans, but not these veterans--not MM and his wife. So, looking over this asssessment, I can't say that Maisonneuve would pass a class on civil-military relations--he loses a lot of points for unsupported claims, for ad hominen arguments, for tangents. Most importantly, it is a strawman argument since I did not argue that he didn't have a right to speak. I argued that he should not be platformed. That is a distinction with a difference. The essay does not reflect an adequate understanding of the situation in which he has placed himself--that Maisonneuve is putting himself out there to be Canada's Michael Flynn.* He didn't shout lock him up at the convention, to be fair. Finally, he also never articulates what policy he really wants to advocate besides more money for the military (again, something with which I agree). I could guess that he wants to return the military to some vaunted past where the senior officers were not held accountable for preying upon their subordinates, but he does not make his argument clear. Even though I am a generous grader (must be my American background), I don't think I could give more than a C- for Maisonneuve's op-ed before factoring in the aforementioned misogyny, transphobia, racism, and anti-Sikhism.* I am not referring to Flynn serving as a foreign agent while National Security Advisor. While MM and I see things differently, I would not accuse him of being disloyal to Canada.
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The arms control stability between Pakistan and India is currently on wobbly grounds due to the increasing development of modern weaponry in South Asia. The already tense situation is intensified by the arms race, as well as by the enforcement of provocative military strategies, actions and speeches.[1] In 2019, an attempted Indian surgical strike on Pakistan after the Pulwama attack[2] and annexation of Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union by annulling article 370 of the Indian constitution further heightened tensions between the two countries. There is a rising concern that issues such as Kashmir, cross-border terrorism and disputes over shared management of watercourses could escalate into a conventional or even a nuclear war.[3] The modernisation of militaries and expansion of nuclear weapons arsenals seem to be a distinguishing feature of both countries, which is arguably the result of the mutual and wider regional threats that they perceive.[4] The emerging realities of competition between the US and China, and China and India, have made the strategic environment very complex,[5] which has diminished dramatically the prospects of arms control.[6] Indeed, China's rise fuels Indian insecurity, while, in turn, India's hegemonic goals and dominance make Pakistan insecure.[7] Amidst these tensions, in 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh clearly stated that Indian No First Use nuclear policy can change into First Use.[8]National interests and arms control In the past, Pakistan offered many arms control proposals to India – for instance, the Regional Test Ban Agreement (1987) and a South Asia Zero Missile Zone (1994) – to halt the arms race in South Asia,[9] but New Delhi rejected them, mainly due to its quest for a regional and potentially global power status on an equal footing with China. The most significant proposals pertained to the non-deployment of ballistic missiles, the non-operationalisation of nuclear-capable missile systems and a suspension on the acquisition or deployment of anti-ballistic missiles systems. Islamabad endorses arms control agreements because it is in the country's interest due to its fragile economy, which poses a challenge to addressing national security threats.[10] However, arms control at the regional level cannot be achieved without New Delhi's involvement. Indeed, Pakistan has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) because India has not signed it either.[11] In a similar vein, Pakistan has not supported the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) because it does not include existing fissile material stockpiles,[12] and India has more stockpiles than Pakistan.[13] Without the inclusion of existing fissile material, FMCT would go to Pakistan's detriment because it would increase the asymmetry with India. In addition, due to great powers' strategic interests, India has been granted a unique position in the current nonproliferation regime,[14] having received a special waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008.[15] India is the only state in the world that is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is de facto recognised as a nuclear weapon state. India's special position arguably challenges the overall credibility of the nonproliferation regime.[16] As mentioned, wider strategic interests have a great bearing on this situation. Indeed, India is a strategic partner of the US and a member – along with the US, Australia and Japan – of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue against China in the Asia-Pacific region. Besides this, India signed many military modernisation agreements with the US, such as the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). In fact, India's plan is to involve Russia and the US to modernise its military, in order to balance the growing military power of China and establish hegemony in South Asia.[17] Consequently, Pakistan needs to adopt measures in order to maintain strategic parity with India and prevent war in the region.[18]The challenges of modern technologies There is a real risk of a nuclear-level escalation in South Asia due to the incorporation/inclusion of new and emerging technologies – including ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems and hypersonic missiles[19] – in the respective militaries of Pakistan and India. Recent developments in the domain of artificial intelligence (AI) may especially affect the strategic stability of the region. Pakistan and India, as well as China, are exploring the use of AI in areas of strategic importance, such as command and control, early-caution, BMD, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and electronic and cyber warfare. AI allows performing high-level computing tasks with speed and precision that cannot be accomplished through other sources.[20] A nontraditional attack in the form of a cyber-attack, or a conventional attack with AI integration in weapons, can damage the nuclear capabilities of a state by undermining the second-strike capability.[21] New technologies pose new threats: in 2019, for example, India's largest reactor Kudankulam faced a cyber-attack which led to the theft of data.[22] Since developments in emerging technologies are very fast and it is very difficult to regulate these technologies due to their speed and efficacy,[23] the militarisation of AI would ultimately enhance the position of powerful states, with weaker states being at pains to seek parity with them. Widespread application of AI to military affairs would thus increase the imbalance between Pakistan and India (due to Indian heavy investment in AI) and could also hinder the prospects of arms control. India – the third-largest military spender in the world, with an allocation of 72.6 billion US dollars for defence for 2023–24[24] – is indeed investing a considerable amount of financial resources in AI. For example, New Delhi has imported technologies such as 100 Heron TPUAVs from Israel Aerospace Industries for the promotion of indigenous production in 2020.[25] Against this backdrop, Pakistan is also expanding its own military to enhance its security.[26]Looking ahead Relations between Pakistan and India are currently characterised by mistrust, mutual threats, enmity and misperceptions. Therefore, there is an urgent need to find ways for arms control talks in order to regulate the nuclear behaviour of both countries. Both are developing countries and their economies are not as robust as those of the US and China; thus, arms control would play a vital role in reducing their defence budgets and enabling them to invest their financial resources in more pressing sectors, such as the energy one. In the current scenario, great powers are unlikely to be able to play a leading role in arms control in South Asia: Russia is engaged in the war against Ukraine, while the US is focused on containing the emerging power of China through QUAD and AUKUS in the Asia Pacific. Hence, there is a pressing need for the governments of Pakistan and India and their political leaders to take the initiative and resume the peace negotiation process to limit the development of weapons and new military technologies. What is ultimately at stake is the peace and stability of South Asia.Sonia Naz is a Visiting Lecturer at the International Relations Department of the Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi.[1] Sitara Noor, "Strategic Stability in South Asia: The Evolving Challenges and Potential Opportunities for India and Pakistan", in Strategic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2023), p. 64-94, https://doi.org/10.53532/ss.043.01.00272.[2] On 14 February 2019, a 19-year-old young Kashmiri resident from the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK) blew himself up killing more than 40 personnel of India's Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Within hours, India blamed Jaish-e-Muhammad, a militant group banned in Pakistan, and accused Pakistan of harbouring the terrorists. Pakistan denied its involvement and offered full cooperation to investigate the incident and bring to justice the perpetrators of the suicide attack. See Adil Sultan, "Pulwama' Crisis: Causes, Implications, and Lessons for the Future", in Strafasia, 10 April, 2019, https://strafasia.com/pulwama-crisis-causes-implications-and-lessons-for-the-future.[3] Mario E. Carranza, India Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy. Constructivism and the Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament in South Asia, London, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.[4] Abeer Iftikhar Tahirkheli, "India's Strategic Force Modernization and Its Implications on Strategic Environment of Pakistan", in Strategic Thought, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2022), p. 155-171, https://strategicthought.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/view/83; Mario E. Carranza, India Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy, cit.[5] Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia. New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace, London/New York, Routledge, 2020.[6] Aamna Rafiq, "Militarisation of Artificial Intelligence and Future of Arms Control in South Asia", in Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer 2021), p. 49-52, https://issi.org.pk/?p=30770.[7] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Strategic Risk Management in Southern Asia", in Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2022), p. 369-393, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2136878.[8] Sudhi Ranjan Sen and Rezaul H Laskar, "Rajnath Singh's Hint on 'No First Use' Change Is Message to Pakistan", in The Hindustan Times, 16 June 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/story-kzEZhswPwx0dnPefQTkZ3L.html.[9] Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Regime", in Naeem Salik (ed.), Nuclear Pakistan. Seeking Security and Stability, Lahore, University of Lahore Press, 2018, p. 152-153, https://ciss.org.pk/PDFs/Nuclear-Pakistan.pdf.[10] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Arms Control: Risk Reduction Measures Between India and Pakistan", in SASSU Research Papers, No. 1 (June 2005), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99910/RP%20No%2001.pdf; Iftikhar A. Qureshi and Hassan Jalil Shah, "Deteriorating Economic Conditions and Their Impact on National Security", in ISSRA Papers, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2019), p. 29-44, https://issrapapers.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/view/20.[11] Ibid.; Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Regime", cit., p. 153-154.[12] Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Regime", cit., p. 158-160.[13] Tom Z. Collina and Daniel Horner, "The South Asian Nuclear Balance: An Interview with Pakistani Ambassador to the CD Zamir Akram", in Arms Control Today, Vol. 41, No. 10 (December 2011), p. 8-13, https://www.armscontrol.org/node/5163.[14] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures", in Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2010), Article 8, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/8.[15] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Contemporary Nuclear Debates", in Naeem Salik (ed.), Nuclear Pakistan. Seeking Security and Stability, Lahore, University of Lahore Press, 2018, p. 229, https://ciss.org.pk/PDFs/Nuclear-Pakistan.pdf.[16] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control", cit., p. 13.[17] Mujib Mashal and Karan Deep Singh, "India and Russia Expand Defense Ties, Despite Prospect of U.S. Sanctions", in The New York Times, 6 December 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/world/asia/india-russia-missile-defense-deal.html.[18] Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia, cit.[19] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "The Missile Race Is Destabilizing South Asia's Strategic Environment", in Arab News, 6 November 2021, https://arab.news/bk48s.[20] Sam Guthrie, "Conventional and Nuclear Applications of Artificial Intelligence: A Brief Examination of India and Pakistan", in Sam Dudin and Chelsey Wiley (eds), The 2019 UK PONI Papers, London, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), December 2019, p. 39-42, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep37409.10.[21] Abdul Moiz Khan, "Emerging Technologies and the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach", in BASIC Analysis, 14 February 2022, https://wp.me/p9AKJD-3IE.[22] Palwasha Khan, "Building a Bilateral Framework for Cyber Security in South Asia", in South Asian Voices, 12 November 2021, https://www.stimson.org/?p=48238.[23] Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, Emerging Technologies and their Impact on Strategic Stability in South Asia, ISSI Seminar Report, 12 March 2020, https://issi.org.pk/?p=25819.[24] Sitara Noor, "Strategic Stability in South Asia", cit., p. 75.[25] Aamna Rafiq, "Militarisation of Artificial Intelligence and Future of Arms Control in South Asia", cit., p. 54.[26] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Strategic Risk Management in Southern Asia", cit., p. 379-382.
In: Decision analysis: a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 373-379
ISSN: 1545-8504
Ali E. Abbas (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is an associate professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. He received an M.S. in electrical engineering (1998), an M.S. in engineering economic systems and operations research (2001), a Ph.D. in management science and engineering (2003), and a Ph.D. (minor) in electrical engineering, all from Stanford University. He worked as a lecturer in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford and worked in Schlumberger Oilfield Services, where he held several international positions in wireline logging, operations management, and international training. He has also worked on several consulting projects for mergers and acquisitions in California, and cotaught several executive seminars on decision analysis at Strategic Decisions Group in Menlo Park, California. His research interests include utility theory, decision making with incomplete information and preferences, dynamic programming, and information theory. Dr. Abbas is a senior member of the IEEE and a member of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). He is also an associate editor for the Decision Analysis and Operations Research journals of INFORMS. Email: aliabbas@illinois.edu . Kash Barker (" Decision Trees with Single and Multiple Interval-Valued Objectives ") is an assistant professor in the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the University of Oklahoma. He holds a Ph.D. in systems engineering from the University of Virginia, where he was a research assistant in the Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems, and B.S. and M.S. degrees in industrial engineering from the University of Oklahoma. His primary research interests lie in modeling interdependent economic systems and decision making for large-scale system sustainment, with research funded by the National Science Foundation, the Federal Highway Administration, and the Army Research Office. Email: kashbarker@ou.edu . J. Eric Bickel (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus " and " A Simulation-Based Approach to Decision Making with Partial Information ") is an assistant professor in the Graduate Program in Operations Research (Department of Mechanical Engineering) at the University of Texas at Austin. In addition, Professor Bickel is a fellow in both the Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy (CIEEP) and the Center for Petroleum Asset Risk Management (CPARM). His research interests include the theory and practice of decision analysis and its application in the energy and climate-change arenas. His work has addressed the modeling of probabilistic dependence, value of information, scoring rules, calibration, risk preference, decision education, decision making in sports, and climate engineering as a response to climate change. Prior to returning to academia, Professor Bickel was a senior engagement manager for Strategic Decisions Group. He has consulted around the world in a range of industries, including oil and gas, electricity generation/transmission/delivery, energy trading and marketing, commodity and specialty chemicals, life sciences, financial services, and metals and mining. Professor Bickel is the vice president/president-elect of the Decision Analysis Society and an associate editor for Decision Analysis. He holds an M.S. and Ph.D. from the Department of Engineering–Economic Systems at Stanford University. Email: ebickel@mail.utexas.edu . Vicki M. Bier (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is a full professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where she is currently department chair and also directs the Center for Human Performance and Risk Analysis. She is also the past president of the Decision Analysis Society and is an associate editor for Decision Analysis. Her research interests include applications of operations research, risk analysis, and decision analysis to problems of homeland security and critical infrastructure protection. Email: bier@engr.wisc.edu . Samuel E. Bodily (" Multiplicative Utilities for Health and Consumption ") is the John Tyler Professor of Business Administration at the University of Virginia's Darden School. He has published textbooks and more than 40 articles in journals ranging from Harvard Business Review to Management Science. His publications relate to decision and risk analysis, multiattribute utility, forecasting, strategy modeling, revenue management, and eStrategy. Along with Casey Lichtendahl, he was runner-up for the 2012 Decision Analysis Publication Award. He has edited special issues of Interfaces on Decision and Risk Analysis, and Strategy Modeling and Analysis. Professor Bodily has published well over 120 cases, including a couple of the 10 best-selling cases at Darden. He received the Distinguished Casewriter Wachovia award from Darden in 2005 and three other best case or research Wachovia awards. Professor Bodily is faculty leader for the executive program Strategic Thinking and Action. He is the course-head of and teaches in a highly valued first-year M.B.A. course in decision analysis; has a successful second-year elective, Management Decision Models; and has taught eStrategy and Strategy. He is a past winner of the Decision Sciences International Instructional Award. He has served as chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. He has taught numerous executive education programs for Darden and private companies, has consulted widely for business and government entities, and has served as an expert witness. Professor Bodily was on the faculties of MIT Sloan School of Management and Boston University and has been a visiting professor at INSEAD Singapore, Stanford University, and the University of Washington. He has Ph.D. and S.M. degrees from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a B.S. in physics from Brigham Young University. Email: bodilys@virginia.edu . David V. Budescu (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is the Anne Anastasi Professor of Psychometrics and Quantitative Psychology at Fordham University. He held positions at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign and the University of Haifa, and visiting positions at Carnegie Mellon University, University of Gothenburg, the Kellogg School at Northwestern University, the Hebrew University, and the Israel Institute of Technology (Technion). His research is in the areas of human judgment, individual and group decision making under uncertainty and with incomplete and vague information, and statistics for the behavioral and social sciences. He is on the editorial boards of Applied Psychological Measurement, Decision Analysis (associate editor), Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition (2000–2003), Multivariate Behavioral Research, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (1992–2002), and Psychological Methods (1996–2000). He is past president of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (2000–2001), fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, and an elected member of the Society of Multivariate Experimental Psychologists. Email: budescu@fordham.edu . John C. Butler (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is a clinical associate professor of finance and the academic director of the Energy Management and Innovation Center in the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin, the outgoing secretary/treasurer of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society, and an associate editor for Decision Analysis. Professor Butler received his Ph.D. in management science and information systems from the University of Texas at Austin in 1998. His research interests involve the use of decision science models to support decision making, with a particular emphasis on decision and risk analysis models with multiple-performance criteria. Professor Butler has consulted with a number of organizations regarding the application of decision analysis tools to a variety of practical problems. Most of his consulting projects involve use of Visual Basic for Applications and Excel to implement complex decision science models in a user-friendly format. Email: john.butler2@mccombs.utexas.edu . Enrico Diecidue (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is an associate professor of Decision Sciences at INSEAD (France) and holds a Ph.D. from the CentER (Center for Economic Research), Tilburg University, the Netherlands. Since 2001 he has been a resident faculty member at INSEAD, except for 2008–2009 when he was a visiting professor at Wharton and 2010–2011 when he was on sabbatical at the Erasmus School of Economics (the Netherlands). His main research interests are in individual decision making under uncertainty, health decisions, and experimental economics. He is interested in the role of regret, aspiration levels, and time in individual decisions. His current research is also addressing the role of groups in complex and ambiguous decisions. Professor Diecidue's research has appeared in leading journals in economics and management. He is on the editorial board of Journal of Risk and Uncertainty and is an associate editor for Decision Analysis. He teaches M.B.A., executive M.B.A., and executive participants on topics such as uncertainty, data and judgment, decision making under uncertainty, risk management, and management decision making. He has won teaching awards at INSEAD and Wharton. Email: enrico.diecidue@insead.edu . Robin L. Dillon-Merrill (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is an associate professor in the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. Professor Dillon-Merrill seeks to understand and explain how and why people make the decisions that they do under conditions of uncertainty and risk. This research specifically examines critical decisions that people have made following near-miss events in situations with severe outcomes (i.e., hurricane evacuation, terrorism, NASA mission management, etc.). She has received research funding from the National Science Foundation, NASA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security through the University of Southern California's National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis for Terrorism Events. She has served as a risk analysis and project management expert on several National Academies Committees, including the review of the New Orleans regional hurricane protection projects and the application of risk-analysis techniques to securing the Department of Energy's special nuclear materials. She is an associate editor for Decision Analysis. Email: rld9@georgetown.edu . Raimo P. Hämäläinen (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is a professor of operations research and director of the Systems Analysis Laboratory at Aalto University, Finland. He received his M.Sc. and Dr. Tech. degrees in systems theory and applied mathematics from the Helsinki University of Technology. His research interests include decision analysis, risk and game theory, and experimental economics, as well as dynamic optimization with aerospace applications. He is widely known for his work in environmental decision making and energy policy. He is the designer of widely used decision analysis software, including the first Web-based value tree software, Web-HIPRE; Smart-Swaps; and the Joint Gains negotiation support system. He has recently introduced the concept of Systems Intelligence, which opens a new perspective to organizational learning and personal growth. He is on the editorial board of a number of journals, including Decision Analysis (associate editor), European Journal of Operational Research, Journal of Group Decision and Negotiation, and EURO Journal on Decision Processes. Dr. Hämäläinen has received the Edgeworth-Pareto Award of the International Society for Multiple Criteria Decision Making. He is also the honorary president of the Finnish Operations Research Society. Email: raimo.hamalainen@aalto.fi . Ralph L. Keeney (" Value-Focused Brainstorming ") is a research professor emeritus at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. His education includes a B.S. in engineering from the University of California, Los Angeles, and a Ph.D. in operations research from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His research interests are in the areas of decision making and risk analysis. He has applied such work to important personal decisions and as a consultant for private and public organizations addressing corporate management problems, environmental and risk studies, and decisions involving life-threatening risks. Prior to joining the Duke faculty, Professor Keeney was a faculty member in Management and Engineering at MIT and at the University of Southern California, a research scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria, and the founder of the decision and risk analysis group of a large geotechnical and environmental consulting firm. Professor Keeney is the author of many books and articles, including Value-Focused Thinking, Decisions with Multiple Objectives, coauthored with Howard Raiffa, and Smart Choices, coauthored with John S. Hammond and Howard Raiffa, which has been translated into 15 languages. Dr. Keeney was awarded the Ramsey Medal for distinguished contributions in decision analysis by the Decision Analysis Society and is a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering. Email: keeney@duke.edu . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is the outgoing Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. She has been appointed to the editorial board of the new EURO Journal on Decision Processes. Email: lrkeller@uci.edu . Anton Kühberger (" Explaining Risk Attitude in Framing Tasks by Regulatory Focus: A Verbal Protocol Analysis and a Simulation Using Fuzzy Logic ") is a professor of psychology at the University of Salzburg, Department of Cognition and Development, and a member of the Center of Neurocognitive Research at the University of Salzburg. His research interests include the following areas: judgment and decision making, in particular framing, and the role of risk, ambiguity, and uncertainty in decision making; thinking and reasoning, in particular counterfactual thinking and the notion of rationality; and social cognition, in particular the foundation of the understanding of oneself and others either by a theory of mind or by simulation. In addition, he is interested in the development of scientific methods such as verbal protocol analysis and in understanding the role statistics for the accumulation of knowledge. He is a member of the editorial board of several scholarly journals and currently is vice-dean of the Faculty of Natural Sciences at the University of Salzburg. Email: anton.kuehberger@sbg.ac.at . Kenneth C. Lichtendahl Jr. (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus " and " Multiplicative Utilities for Health and Consumption ") is an assistant professor of business administration at the Darden School of Business at the University of Virginia. He is an associate editor for Decision Analysis. He received his Ph.D. in decision sciences from the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. His research focuses on decision analysis, Bayesian statistics, game theory, and dynamic programming. Email: lichtendahlc@darden.virginia.edu . Jason R. W. Merrick (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is a professor in the Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations Research at Virginia Commonwealth University. He has a D.Sc. in operations research from George Washington University. He teaches courses in decision analysis, risk analysis, and simulation. His research is primarily in the area of decision analysis and Bayesian statistics. He has worked on projects ranging from assessing maritime oil transportation and ferry system safety, the environmental health of watersheds, and optimal replacement policies for rail tracks and machine tools. He has received grants from the National Science Foundation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the American Bureau of Shipping, British Petroleum, and Booz Allen Hamilton, among others. He has also performed training for Infineon Technologies, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, and Capital One Services. He is an associate editor for Decision Analysis and the EURO Journal on Decision Processes. Email: jrmerric@vcu.edu . Luis Vicente Montiel (" A Simulation-Based Approach to Decision Making with Partial Information ") is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Texas at Austin. His main research interest is mathematical modeling for optimization under uncertainty, with a special interest in decision analysis and simulation learning for optimization. His current research is dedicated to providing a theoretical and practical framework for approximating joint distributions under partial information. Luis has a Ph.D. in operations research from the University of Texas, an M.S. in financial engineering from Columbia University, and an M.S. in management science and engineering from Stanford University. Email: lvmontiel@utexas.edu . Jay R. Simon (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") is an assistant professor in the Defense Resources Management Institute of the Naval Postgraduate School. He holds a Ph.D. in operations and decision technologies from the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine, an M.S. in management science and engineering, and a B.S. in mathematical and computational science from Stanford University. His primary research interest is multiattribute preference modeling, particularly involving outcomes that occur over time, space, or groups of people. His current and recent work includes a prostate cancer decision model, preference models for health decisions, preferences over geographical data, altruistic utility modeling, and multiattribute procurement. He is an associate editor for Decision Analysis and is the webmaster and social media officer for the Decision Analysis Society of INFORMS. Email: jrsimon@nps.edu . Christian Wiener (" Explaining Risk Attitude in Framing Tasks by Regulatory Focus: A Verbal Protocol Analysis and a Simulation Using Fuzzy Logic ") received his doctorate from the University of Salzburg, Austria. His first research area was the application of the EEG in connection with dyslexia. Later he moved to the area of social cognition, where his research was focused on framing and especially the simulation of decision-making behavior using a fuzzy-logic expert system. Since the completion of his dissertation, he has been working as a clinical psychologist with developmentally delayed children. Email: christian.wiener@gmx.at . Kaycee J. Wilson (" Decision Trees with Single and Multiple Interval-Valued Objectives ") completed M.S. and B.S. degrees in the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the University of Oklahoma in 2012 and 2010, respectively. Her primary interests lie in healthcare operations and reliability-based decision making, and she holds a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. Email: kaycee.j.wilson-1@ou.edu . George Wu (" From the Editors: Brainstorming, Multiplicative Utilities, Partial Information on Probabilities or Outcomes, and Regulatory Focus ") has been on the faculty of the University of Chicago's Booth School of Business since September 1997. His degrees include an A.B. (applied mathematics, 1985), an S.M. (applied mathematics, 1987), and a Ph.D. (decision sciences, 1991), all from Harvard University. Prior to joining the faculty at the University of Chicago, Professor Wu was on the faculty at Harvard Business School. Professor Wu worked as a decision analyst at Procter & Gamble prior to starting graduate school. His research interests include descriptive and prescriptive aspects of decision making, in particular decision making involving risk; cognitive biases in bargaining and negotiation; and managerial and organizational decision making. Professor Wu is a coordinating editor for Theory and Decision, an advisory editor for Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, on the editorial boards of Decision Analysis (associate editor) and the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, and a former department editor of Management Science. Email: wu@chicagobooth.edu .
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Bayerns Wissenschaftsminister Markus Blume kritisiert die BAföG-Reform von BMBF-Chefin Stark-Watzinger, fordert eine Zeitenwende auch in der Wissenschaftspolitik – und sagt, warum die Hochschulen im Krisenfall zur Kooperation mit der Bundeswehr verpflichtet werden sollen.
Markus Blume, 49, ist studierter Politikwissenschaftler und war von 2018 bis 2022 CSU-Generalsekretär. Seit Februar 2022 ist er bayerischer Staatsminister für Wissenschaft und Kunst. Außerdem fungiert er als länderseitiger Vorsitzender der Gemeinsamen Wissenschaftskonferenz von Bund und Ländern (GWK). Foto: Axel König.
Herr Blume, das Bundeskabinett beschließt heute den nächsten Schritt der BAföG-Reform von Bundesforschungsministerin Bettina Stark-Watzinger (FDP). Damit sollen weitere strukturelle und finanzielle Verbesserungen "noch in diesem Jahr" erreicht werden, sagt das BMBF. Was sagen Sie?
Ich bin sehr enttäuscht von diesem Entwurf. Und ich bin mir sicher, dass Millionen von Studierenden in Deutschland auch enttäuscht sind. Denn dieser groß angekündigte Beschluss geht am Notwendigsten vorbei: der zwingend erforderlichen Anhebung der Bedarfssätze. Die Bundesregierung setzt hier die falschen Prioritäten. Auf der einen Seite beim Bürgergeld großzügig sein, aber den Studierenden mit einer Nullrunde kommen. Das passt nicht zusammen und verfehlt die Lebensrealität der Studierenden.
Ein wenig wohlfeil ist Ihre Entrüstung schon angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Bundesländer seit 2016 den Bund allein das BAföG finanzieren lassen, oder?
Dadurch wird die Kritik nicht weniger relevant, zumal der Bund auch die steigenden Mietkosten der Studierenden nicht berücksichtigt und die immerhin vorgesehene Erhöhung der Freibeträge viel zu gering ausfällt. Anstatt bei den bewährten Instrumenten für alle großzügiger zu sein, will die Koalition mit einem Teil des eingesparten Geldes ein neues Programm starten, die Studienstarthilfe. Die aber im Kern zunächst vor allem eines bedeutet: noch mehr Bürokratie bei der Antragstellung und Bewilligung. Mir fehlt hier die Sinnhaftigkeit. Wir wissen doch, unter welchem Druck die Studierenden und Auszubildenden heute stehen. Wenn wir gerade vor dem Hintergrund des Fachkräftemangels Interesse daran haben, unsere jungen Menschen hier im Land auszubilden, dann braucht es für unsere Talente die bestmögliche Startrampe. Diese wirksame Startrampe war über Jahrzehnte das BAföG. Daher klare Botschaft: die Bedarfssätze deutlich anheben, aber auf bürokratische Monster wie die Studienstarthilfe verzichten.
"Das macht mich zunehmend unruhig, und ich spüre dieselbe Unruhe bei meinen Ministerkolleginnen und -kollegen."
Ihre öffentliche Enttäuschung passt nicht zu dem Eindruck, dass zuletzt Tauwetter zwischen Bundesministerin Stark-Watzinger und ihren Länderkollegen herrschte. Das vertrauliche Kamingespräch vergangene Woche am Vorabend der Gemeinsamen Wissenschaftskonferenz (GWK) soll fast schon harmonisch verlaufen sein.
Was nichts daran ändert, dass die entscheidende wissenschaftspolitische Frage noch unbeantwortet bleibt: Wann kommt die Zeitenwende, die der Bundeskanzler vor zwei Jahren ausgerufen hat, bei Wissenschaft und Forschung an? Das macht mich zunehmend unruhig, und ich spüre dieselbe Unruhe bei meinen Ministerkolleginnen und -kollegen aus den Ländern. Wir müssten viel mehr tun. Es braucht mehr Missionsorientierung – und zwar kooperativ gedacht, in der Gemeinschaft von Bund und Ländern. Eine Zeitenwende bedeutet ja nicht nur mehr Geld, sondern vor allem bedeutet sie mehr Fokus – und eine bessere Koordination zwischen Bund und Ländern und den unterschiedlichen beteiligten Ressorts. Bei den Schüsselmissionen für unsere Zukunft von der Künstlichen Intelligenz über das Quantenrechnen bis hin zu neuen Energieformen wie der Kernfusion geht es nur gemeinsam mit Bund und Ländern.
Bei der neuen Wissenschaftsministerkonferenz, auf die Sie und Ihre Kollegen sich gerade geeinigt haben, nehmen Sie den Bund auch nicht mit ins Boot.
Nochmal, das Gebot der Stunde ist: Fokus, Fokus, Fokus. Die uns zur Verfügung stehenden Ressourcen sind in erkennbarer Weise endlich – im Bund und in den Ländern. Weshalb wir uns auch auf Länderseite besser konzentrieren und koordinieren müssen. Dazu brauchen wir einen geschützten Raum, wo wir uns austauschen können. Die WissenschaftsMK wird dieser Raum sein.
Wie passt die Gründung einer neuen Ministerkonferenz innerhalb der bestehenden Kultusministerkonferenz eigentlich zu der Kernkritik an der KMK, diese bestehe schon jetzt aus viel zu vielen und oft genug nur schlecht miteinander abgestimmten Gremien?
Die KMK hat schon einen Bereich Hochschule. Doch die aktuellen Strukturen sind nicht geeignet, um den Herausforderungen der Zeitenwende zu begegnen. Das ist das übereinstimmende Ergebnis aller Kommissionen und Gutachter. Insofern passt die neue WissenschaftsMK sehr wohl zu der gemeinsamen Grundüberzeugung von Schul- und Wissenschaftsministern, dass wir in der KMK schlanker, handlungsfähiger und agiler werden wollen – und müssen. Wir werden getrennt marschieren, trotzdem aber an den gemeinsamen Themen weiter gemeinsam arbeiten. Ich halte es für klug, dass sich die Wissenschaftsseite kraftvoll verselbständigt. Wissenschaft und Forschung sind kein Anhängsel, sondern eine Lebensader für die Zukunftsfähigkeit unseres Landes. Es ist sinnvoll, dass jährlich eine Sitzung der WissenschaftsMK zusammen mit der Schulseite stattfinden soll. Unsere wichtigste Mission als Wissenschaftsminister wird aber sein, miteinander Strategien zu entwickeln, um im Wettrennen der Welt um die Zukunftstechnologien mithalten zu können – als Deutsche und als Europäer. Dazu müssen wir als Länder für die Verhandlungen mit dem Bund in der GWK gut abgestimmt sein. Und wir müssen im globalen Wettbewerb um die Talente die Weichen dafür stellen, dass wir unser wichtigstes Gut, die klügsten Köpfe, in Deutschland halten und nach Deutschland zurückbringen.
"Die Wissenschaft muss sich auf die neue Zeit einstellen und ihren Beitrag leisten können."
Neben dem internationalen Wettbewerb um die klügsten Köpfe befinden wir uns mittlerweile auch in einem Wettbewerb der Systeme, der zunehmend aggressiv ausgetragen wird. Die bayerische Staatsregierung hat Ende Januar ein "Gesetz zur Förderung der Bundeswehr in Bayern" beschlossen, das unter anderem Zivilklauseln an Hochschulen untersagen und "aus Gründen der nationalen Sicherheit" die Wissenschaft sogar zur Kooperation mit der Bundeswehr verpflichten soll. Verstoßen solche Regelungen nicht gegen die im Grundgesetz verankerte Wissenschaftsfreiheit?
Die Wissenschaftsfreiheit ist ein hohes Gut. Unsere Sicherheit aber auch. Eine freie Wissenschaft kann es nicht geben, wenn wir nicht in Freiheit leben. Deshalb müssen wir alles tun, um unsere nationale Sicherheit zu gewährleisten. Die Zeiten, in denen wir ohne eigene Anstrengungen die Friedensdividende einsammeln konnten, sind leider vorbei. Unsere Sicherheit als Gesellschaft, aber auch unsere militärische Stärke hängen ab von unserer Stärke in den Feldern von Technologie und Innovation. Deshalb wirken Zivilklauseln, die Forschung zu militärischen Zwecken verbieten, derart aus der Zeit gefallen. Nochmal: Wir erleben gerade eine Zeitenwende. In diesen Zeiten müssen wir auch Entwicklungen ins Auge sehen, die auf den ersten Blick unbequem erscheinen mögen.
Es gibt aber gar keine Zivilklauseln an einer bayerischen Hochschule.
Und das ist auch gut so! Wir müssen dort zusammenarbeiten, wo es die nationale Sicherheit erfordert. Die Wissenschaft muss sich auf die neue Zeit einstellen und ihren Beitrag leisten können. Es kann keine Sicherheit geben ohne technologische Stärke. Führend in Wissenschaft und Forschung zu sein, ist am Ende auch eine Souveränitätsfrage. Ich möchte, dass wir in Deutschland und Europa technologiepolitisch souverän bleiben.
Ein "Kooperationsgebot" mit der Wissenschaft, wann immer es die "nationale Sicherheit" erfordert: Sind nicht schon die Begrifflichkeiten viel zu schwammig, um einer Verfassungsklage standzuhalten?
Wir halten den Gesetzentwurf für verfassungsrechtlich gut abgewogen. Im Übrigen ist es doch so: In anderen Teilen der Welt, in den Vereinigten Staaten zum Beispiel, stehen Militärforschung und Dual Use wie selbstverständlich auf der Tagesordnung. Egal, welche wissenschaftliche Einrichtung ich bei meinem letzten Aufenthalt an der Ostküste besucht habe, überall waren das Department of Energy oder das Department of Defense massiv an der Forschungsförderung beteiligt. Das sind Mittel, die der Wissenschaft in Deutschland fehlen. Darum würde ich mir wünschen, dass sich die Forschungs- und Technologieförderung auch bei uns künftig nicht nur aus den Haushalten von BMBF und BMWK speist, sondern dass zusätzlich diejenigen Ministerien einen größeren Beitrag leisten, die von unserer technologischen Stärke sicherheits- und militärpolitisch profitieren.
Debatten über die Freiheit von Lehre und Forschung hat Ministerpräsident Markus Söder (CSU) auch durch seine Ankündigung ausgelöst, das Gendern in Schulen und Verwaltungen untersagen zu wollen. Sie selbst wollen zu diesem Zweck eine Klarstellung ins Bayerische Hochschulinnovationsgesetz einbauen. Was genau gilt es denn da klarzustellen?
Die generelle Leitplanke wird sein: Geschlechtersensible Sprache: Ja. Sprachliche Künstlichkeit und erzieherische Tendenzen: Nein. Man könnte auch sagen: Genderfreiheit statt Genderzwang. Mich erreichen immer wieder Zuschriften von Studierenden, die sich einem gefühlten Druck oder tatsächlichen Vorgaben ausgesetzt sehen, in einer Art und Weise zu formulieren, wie es von der amtlichen deutschen Rechtschreibung eben gerade nicht gedeckt ist.
"Forschende können formulieren, wie sie wollen. Wir werden aber klarstellen, dass keine Dinge von Studierenden gefordert oder bewertungsrelevant sein dürfen, die nicht der amtlichen deutschen Rechtschreibung entsprechen."
Mit Sonderzeichen wie dem Binnen-I oder dem Genderstern?
So ist es. Selbstverständlich kann jeder so reden und schreiben, wie er möchte. Zumal die deutsche Sprache reichlich Möglichkeiten bereithält, gendersensibel so zu formulieren – und zwar im Einklang mit den Empfehlungen des Rats für deutsche Rechtschreibung. Auch Forschende können in ihren Arbeiten formulieren, wie sie wollen. Wir werden aber klarstellen, dass keine Dinge von Studierenden gefordert oder bewertungsrelevant sein dürfen, die nicht der amtlichen deutschen Rechtschreibung entsprechen. Und dort, wo eine Hochschule als staatliche Einrichtung auftritt, bei amtlichen Bescheiden, Zeugnissen und Formularen etwa, werden wir festhalten, dass die amtlichen Vorgaben zur Rechtschreibung eingehalten werden müssen. Ansonsten beschränken wir uns darauf, die Studierenden vor Übergriffigkeit zu schützen. Vielen geht dieser gefühlte Zwang auf die Nerven.
Kritiker werfen Ihnen vor, aus politischem Kalkül ein Problem aufzublasen, das keines sei. "Uns haben als Studierendenvertretungen noch nie Beschwerden zu einem "Genderzwang" erreicht, auch zu schlechteren Bewertungen durch ein "Nicht-Gendern" ist an allen Hochschulen, die an diesem Schreiben beteiligt sind, kein Fall bekannt", steht in einer Erklärung der Studierendenvertretungen unter anderem der Universitäten Erlangen-Nürnberg und Würzburg, der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität und der TU München.
Wir führen keine Statistiken über solche Fälle, und die meisten Konflikte werden schon an den Hochschulen gelöst. Aber ich kann Ihnen gern konkrete Beispiele nennen, die bei uns aufschlagen und inzwischen gelöst sind. Jüngst meldete sich die Promovendin, der die Verleihung des Doktorgrades verwehrt wurde, solange sie sich weigerte, auf dem Titelblatt das Gendersternchen zu verwenden. Was sogar in der Promotionsordnung so vorgeschrieben ist. Das ist ein klarer Fall von sprachlicher Übergriffigkeit.
Wissenschaftsfreiheit erfordert zudem eine auskömmliche Hochschulfinanzierung. Angesichts von Inflation und Wirtschaftsflaute sorgen sich allerdings auch bayerische Hochschulen um ihr Auskommen. Neulich sagte zum Beispiel die Pressesprecherin der Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg bei Forschung & Lehre, an ihrer Hochschule gehe man von einem stabilen Haushalt aus, erwarte aber keine wesentlichen Steigerungen. Weiter erklärte die Sprecherin: "Selbstverständlich betrachten auch wir Inflation und Tarifsteigerungen mit Sorge, besonders auch die massiven Steigerungen bei den Energie- und Bewirtschaftungskosten" und, speziell in Erlangen-Nürnberg, den steigenden Sanierungsstau bei den in die Jahre gekommenen Unigebäuden. Regiert an Bayerns Hochschulen künftig der Schmalhans, Herr Blume?
Wir befinden uns gerade in der Aufstellung für den Doppelhaushalt 2024/25, und ich kann nur sagen: Er wird ein echter Gegenentwurf zum Bund. Auch in schwierigen Zeiten sparen wir nicht an Forschung und Wissenschaft – ganz im Gegenteil. Wir legen noch eine deutliche Schippe drauf, allein 2024 einen dreistelligen Millionenbetrag, und werden über sieben Milliarden Euro pro Jahr ausgeben. Über die vergangenen Jahre haben wir über unser Aufbauprogramm, die Hightech Agenda Bayern, mehr als 1000 neue Professuren geschaffen und verstetigt und die Rahmendaten der Hochschulfinanzierung schon bis 2027 vereinbart. Wir geben Planungssicherheit und Verlässlichkeit. Bei Wissenschaft und Forschung wird in Bayern nicht gespart, sondern weiter investiert.
Mehr Professoren bedeuten auch mehr Kostensteigerungen, wenn die Gehälter angehoben werden.
Aber nicht für die Hochschulen, weil der Großteil des Personals der Hochschulen direkt vom Freistaat bezahlt wird. Wenn also überhaupt, dann können sich die Sorgen über Preis- und Tarifsteigerungen nur auf jene Personalstellen beziehen, die bislang aus staatlichen Programm-Mitteln finanziert worden sind, und zwar ohne Inflationsausgleich. Da lautet meine Botschaft an die Hochschulen: Wir sehen die Entwicklung und werden auch das lösen durch eine Umsetzung dieser Stellen bis zum Jahr 2026.
Änderung am 11. März: Auf Bitten des Wissenschaftsministeriums wurde die Antwort von Markus Blume zu Konflikten um die Verwendung des Gendersternchens um den Satzteil "und inzwischen gelöst sind" ergänzt.
El sentir ciudadano en defensa de la calidad de vida es ya de preocupación e indignación global. Siguiendo a Mónica Araya (1), podemos decir que a menor contaminación, más espacios verdes y mayor energía limpia, y a medida que estas aspiraciones entran en el imaginario ciudadano, van creándose condiciones favorables para el reclamo masivo y uso global de energía renovable. La reconocida economista costarricense y negociadora en cambio climático por su país, destaca que la petición en línea planteada por los ciudadanos este año ha exigido a los gobiernos optar por la energía limpia al cien por ciento, reclamo apoyado por 2,2 millones de personas en el mundo, y que la Marcha Popular por el Clima del 21 de septiembre de 2014 ha marcado un hito. Más de 400 000 ciudadanos caminaron pacíficamente por las calles de Manhattan apoyados por 3 000 actos que iban desde Bogotá hasta Sydney. Hubo marchas en 166 países con lúcidas expresiones ciudadanas a favor de una economía que no dañe la salud de las personas, que crezca a través del uso de energía renovable y sea justa (1).Según una encuesta del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), al ciudadano latinoamericano le preocupa el cambio climático (2). Sabe que es un problema real y que puede llegar a impactar su entorno. Ya el 2 de noviembre oímos a la comunidad científica internacional a través del Panel Intergubernamental de Cambio Climático (IPCC), al publicar su Quinto Informe –el más reciente-, en el que la realidad y urgencia de atender el fenómeno del cambio climático es impostergable (1).Establecida en la Cumbre de Río en 1992, la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (CMNUCC) entra en vigor en 1994 con el objetivo de reducir las concentraciones de gases de efecto invernadero (GEI) en la atmósfera, y en 1995 impulsa la Conferencia de las Partes (COP, por sus siglas en inglés) como órgano supremo de toma de decisiones. Los 195 países conformantes, que han presentado sus instrumentos de ratificación, se reúnen una vez al año, por dos semanas, para examinar la aplicación de la Convención y desarrollar el proceso de negociación entre las Partes ante nuevos compromisos.En virtud de la Convención, todas las Partes tienen responsabilidades comunes, aunque diferenciadas. Para el accionar diferenciado, toman en consideración, entre otros aspectos, el carácter específico de sus prioridades nacionales y regionales de desarrollo, de sus objetivos y circunstancias. Sus responsabilidades comunes, sin embargo, son: 1) recabar y compartir información sobre las emisiones de GEI, las políticas nacionales y las prácticas óptimas; 2) poner en marcha estrategias nacionales para abordar el problema de las emisiones de GEI y adaptarse a los impactos del cambio climático previstos, así como determinar la prestación de apoyo financiero y tecnológico a los países en desarrollo; y 3) cooperar para prepararse y adaptarse a los efectos del cambio climático.El Perú es miembro de la Convención y también forma parte del Protocolo de Kioto desde el 2002. Como tal, participa de las negociaciones internacionales y apoya decididamente el esfuerzo multilateral para alcanzar un resultado vinculante, ambicioso y eficaz mediante la búsqueda de consensos en el proceso negociador. Como país comprometido con el desarrollo nacional sostenible en un contexto global, promueve una dinámica económica baja en carbono y contribuye con el esfuerzo mundial de reducir las emisiones de GEI.El territorio peruano es altamente vulnerable a los efectos adversos del cambio climático y, por lo tanto, también su población, las actividades productivas y los ecosistemas naturales (3).La COP20, celebrada en Lima del 1 al 12 de diciembre del 2014, convocó a 195 países con la presencia de 14 mil representantes. Recibió la visita de siete jefes de Estado. "Voces por el Clima", un espacio para la población en general, acogió a más de 80 mil visitantes. Se organizaron más de 400 conferencias en las que fueron presentadas diversas iniciativas. "Pon de tu Parte", la campaña de movilización ciudadana, generó 330 mil compromisos a nivel nacional (4).La presencia de la COP20 en el nuestro país y las campañas de movilización en torno a ella, hará que el cambio climático, que no es tomado en cuenta como merece y solo es destacado en forma declarativa, hoy tenga otra prioridad en todo plan y discusión en las mesas de diálogo. La COP20 significa para muchos en el país un punto de inflexión en las agendas por la incorporación de la variable de cambio climático; de una parte, porque somos conscientes de la necesidad de insertar este tema en las agendas de desarrollo, y por otra, porque constituye una oportunidad para difundir los planes de acción frente al cambio climático desde cada sector y organización.El mayor logro de la COP20 es el entendimiento de todos los Estados participantes plasmado en el "Llamado de Lima para la acción climática" y en los grandes acuerdos como la incorporación del mecanismo "pérdidas y daños"; la aceptación de la estrategia de adaptación frente al cambio climático sobre todo para países en desarrollo; y el incremento del Fondo Verde del clima, que superó la cifra de 10 mil 200 millones de dólares, con el que fueron aprobadas nueve decisiones sobre finanzas climáticas para lograr la meta de los 10 mil millones de dólares al 2020.El secretario de Estado norteamericano, John Kerry, sostuvo que los emisores más grandes de GEI, incluyendo a Estados Unidos, tienen que contribuir mayormente a la solución, pero cada país tiene que poner su parte y resolver estos cambios también para llegar a la próxima generación con un planeta limpio. Manifestó que "nada más aquellas naciones que respondan podrán decir que son líderes en la responsabilidad global" y advirtió a los delegados de los países presentes que de fracasar en esta lucha, las generaciones no nos perdonarán y juzgarán nuestra acción como un "fracaso moral" (5).El secretario general de la ONU, Ban Ki-moon, valoró la elaboración de un nuevo tratado internacional en la materia, que entraría en vigor en el 2020, y mostró su esperanza que el acuerdo final sea adoptado en París en el 2015. Instó a todos los países de la COP20, en particular a las grandes economías, a que presenten compromisos nacionales ambiciosos para reducir los gases que dañan la atmósfera, con suficiente antelación a la Conferencia en París (6). ; The citizens´ reaction in defense of the quality of life is a global concern and indignation. Following Monica Araya (1), we can say that the aspiration for a lower pollution rate and greener and cleaner energy space, are becoming more prevalent among the citizens, thereby creating favorable conditions for mass claims and global use of renewable energy. The renowned Costa Rican economist and climate change negotiator for his country notes that the online petition raised by citizens this year has required governments to opt for one hundred percent clean energy, a claim supported by 2,2 million people around the world, and that the People's March for Climate September 21, 2014 was a milestone. More than 400 000 citizens marched peacefully through the streets of Manhattan supported by 3 000 events ranging from Bogota to Sydney. There were marches in 166 countries with well-informed citizens in favor of a fair economy that does not damage peoples´ health through the use of renewable energy.According to a survey by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Latin American citizen is concerned about climate change (2). He knows this is a real problem that can impact your environment. On November 2, the international scientific community through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had its Fifth Report published, where it addresses the urgency to care about the climate change issue (1).Established at the Rio Summit in 1992, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force in 1994 with the aim to reduce concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, and in 1995 urged the Conference of the Parties (COP, by its acronym in English) as the supreme decision-making body. Participants of 195 countries, which have submitted their instruments of ratification, meet once a year for two weeks to review the implementation of the Convention and to develop the negotiation process between the parties before making new commitments.Under the rules of the Convention, all Parties have common responsibilities, but differentiated. These differentiated actions, take into account, inter alia, the specific character of their national and regional development, objectives and priorities circumstances. Their common responsibilities, however, are: 1) to collect and share information on GHG emissions, national policies and best practices; 2) to launch national strategies for addressing GHG emissions and adapting to expected impacts of climate change and determining the provision of financial and technological support to developing countries support; and 3) to cooperate to prepare for and adapt to the effects of climate change.Peru is a member of the Convention and also part of the Kyoto Protocol since 2002. As such, it participates in international negotiations and strongly supports the multilateral effort to reach a binding, ambitious and effective result by the search for consensus in the process negotiator. As a country committed to sustainable national development in a global context, it promotes low-carbon economic dynamics and contributes to the global effort to reduce GHG emissions.The Peruvian territory is highly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and, therefore, so is its population, productive activities and its natural ecosystems (3).In the COP20, held in Lima from 1 to December 12, 2014, 195 countries convened with the presence of 14 000 representatives. It was visited by seven Heads of State. "Voices for Climate", a space for the population in general, welcomed over 80 000 visitors. More than 400 conferences were presented and several initiatives were organized. "Put your Party" citizen mobilization campaign generated 330 000 commitments at the national level (4).Thanks to the COP20 meeting carried out in our country and mobilization campaigns about it, climate change issues will get the priority they deserve in the dialogue table. The COP20 means a turning point in the agenda for the integration of climate change variable; on one hand, because we are aware of the need to include this issue in the development agenda, and secondly, because an opportunity to disseminate the plans of action on climate change from each sector and organization.The greatest achievement of the COP20 is the understanding of all participating States expressed in the "Lima Appeal for climate action" and major agreements such as the incorporation of the mechanism "losses and damages", and the acceptance of the adaptation strategy to climate change especially for developing countries. The Green Climate Fund, which exceeded the figure of 10 billion 200 million dollars, was a result of nine decisions on climate finance which aimed to achieve the target of 10 billion dollars by 2020.US Secretary of State John Kerry said that the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases, including the United States, have largely contribute to the solution, but each country has to do its part to address these changes in order to leave the next generation with a clean planet. He said that "only those nations that step up and respond to this threat can legitimately lay claim to any mantle of leadership and global responsibility." And warned delegates of the participating countries that should we fail in this struggle, future generations will not forgive us and judge our actions as a "moral failure" (5).Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, praised the development of a new international treaty on the subject, which would take effect in 2020, and expressed hope that the final agreement is adopted in Paris in 2015. He urged all countries in the COP20, especially the major economies, to submit ambitious national commitments to reduce the gases that damage the atmosphere, well in advance of the Conference in Paris (6).
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The anti-Soviet and anti-communist hysteria that typified the Cold War period is to a certain extent alive and well today with the rise of China. This is particularly true regarding prevalent sentiment among the U.S. strategic class about Latin America.Take for example U.S. Southern Command head Laura Richardson's testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee in March, which invoked the word "malign" no less than 24 times: "malign actor," "malign influence," "malign effort," "malign activities," "malign intent," "malign narratives," "malign conduct," "malign action," and "malign agenda." Often, she was referring to suspected Chinese actors, and in some cases Russian ones. This echo of the Cold War brings to mind University of California San Diego scholar Peter Smith's argument about the core of the relations between the United States and Latin America: the crucial, historical factor of U.S.-Latin America politics has been the role and activity of extra-continental actors.According to a 2022 study by the RAND Corporation, "competition with China is qualitatively and quantitively different from competition with Russia and Iran in Latin America and the Caribbean." Moscow and Tehran may be opportunistic and provocative, but they lack the attributes to ensure an effective power projection in the area. China, however, has the resources, will, and opportunity to extend and sustain its influence. Hence, it is logical for Washington to be attentive to Beijing's messages, measures, and maneuvers.Still, the massive size of the U.S.'s own security presence in the region — and how small China's is in comparison — is often undiscussed in Washington. A look at the numbers suggests the idea of an imminent Chinese military threat is both exaggerated and misguided.We could start by examining what some have called the "iron river" of arms flowing into the region. According to the latest report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on arms transfers, the ranking of the largest arms suppliers to South America between 2019 and 2023 was: France (23%), the United States (14%), and the United Kingdom (12%). During those years, Russia did not supply arms to South America.An analysis of SIPRI data for 2000-2022 by Ryan Berg and Rubi Bledsoe of the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows that the United States is the source of 94.9% of Argentina's arms acquisitions, 93.4% of those acquired by Colombia, 90.7% of those acquired by Mexico, and 82.7% of those acquired by Brazil. This means that the four largest economies in Latin America have the United States as their main arms supplier.During that same timeframe, Russia was by far the largest arms supplier to Venezuela: Caracas's purchases amounted to $4.5 billion. China was the largest supplier (66.2%) of the $77 million in arms purchased by Bolivia. Just last month, President Javier Milei confirmed Argentina's commitment to buy 24 F-16s from Denmark with authorization from Washington.When it comes to geographic presence, the United States maintains a large military footprint in the region through the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba and the Soto Cano Base in Honduras. U.S. Southern Command is responsible for three "cooperative security locations" in El Salvador, Aruba, and Curacao. For decades, SOUTHCOM has regularly conducted various types of multi-nation (such as UNITAS, Tradewinds, PANAMAX, and Southern Cross) and bilateral military (for example, Southern Vanguard with Brazil and Relámpago with Colombia) exercises on land, sea, and air. Russia has occasionally conducted military exercises with Venezuela and Nicaragua. China participated in a sniper test in Venezuela in 2022, and Beijing has increased its offering of courses and educational programs for military officials from Latin America.The United States, for its part, maintains its Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, which replaced the controversial School of the Americas that trained anti-communist military forces during the Cold War. According to a Congressional Research Service report, Security Force Assistance Brigades were established in 2018 and distributed across six commands, including the U.S. Southern Command: "the first SFAB maintains a persistent presence in Colombia, Honduras, and Panama, while also expanding episodically to Peru, Ecuador, and Uruguay." Also, the National Guards of 18 states plus Puerto Rico and Washington D.C. have agreements with 24 nations in Latin America. Meanwhile, Washington has designated Argentina (1998), Brazil (2019), and Colombia (2022) as non-NATO allies. Nothing similar occurs with China or Russia in Latin America.China agreed with Argentina during the center left government of Cristina Fernández (2007-2015) to establish a Deep Space Station in the province of Neuquén. The arrangement meant the construction of a facility for tracking, command, and data acquisition, facilitated by a deep space antenna. The next government of the center right Mauricio Macri completed its construction by 2017 and in 2018 it swung security relations back toward the United States, securing Southern Command financing for an Emergency Operations and Coordination Center in Neuquén. This is part of SOUTHCOM's humanitarian assistance programs and exercises. In fact, several radar stations throughout Latin America are operated by SOUTHCOM.Another data point is security ties through their total dollar flows. The latest Congressional Research Service report on U.S. aid to the region reveals the extent of Washington's support for anti-drug efforts in the area over the years. Between 2000 and 2022, U.S. assistance to Plan Colombia exceeded $13 billion, while for the 2008-2021 period, aid for Mexico's Mérida Initiative amounted to $3.5 billion. From 2010 to 2022, funding for the Caribbean initiative totaled $832 million, while from 2008-2020, the Central American initiative received $2.9 billion. While not all of that assistance has been military in nature, out of the total U.S. assistance to Latin America for 2024, security-related funding amounts to 26.6% or $658.3 million. In no way has China shown the willingness to provide such extensive assistance on security issues, nor get involved in aiding anti-narcotics initiatives in the region.We can also view the U.S. regional footprint through its influence on the high seas. In 2020, the U.S. Navy announced that the U.S. Fleet Forces Command would be renamed the Atlantic Fleet to focus on closer regional threats. And in 2008, the Navy re-established the 4th Fleet with a purview over the Caribbean and Central and South America. Moreover, three of the last six commanders of Southern Command have been from the Navy.Meanwhile, since 2020, the U.S. Coast Guard has expanded its activities in Central and South America. Washington has turbocharged its naval deployment as part of efforts to combat Chinese illegal fishing. While Beijing aims to be a naval power with global reach, its presence in Latin America is limited. The U.S. strategy of denial of space and anti-access in the maritime domain shows clear signs of strength. If understood as a design to limit (denial) or prevent (anti-access) an enemy force from advancing in its operational area, the United States has boosted its position.The total U.S. military footprint in the region is much broader and includes cooperation deals surrounding ports, aerospace, and inland rivers. No Chinese analogues to these agreements exist. What becomes clear, when looking at this portrait, is that it appears that China is highly cautious about extending its military reach in Latin America likely because it knows that could cause tensions with Washington. Instead, it has focused, to considerable success, on economic engagement in the area, with trade, investment, and finance.Beijing's regional economic engagement has not stopped Washington from sounding the alarm about supposed Chinese malefic military projection. It is no secret that doing so bolsters the justification for Washington's own military spending. Indeed, SOUTHCOM has requested a near 50% budget increase for 2025. In a Latin America awash with sky-high homicide rates and firearms among the leading causes of death, rightsizing the Chinese military presence leaves us with a provocative question: what good is U.S. arms racing with a nowhere-near-peer competitor doing for the region?In short, the military preeminence of the United States in Latin America is undeniable. In practice, in defense and security matters, Washington has been reaffirming and strengthening its presence in the area. China's pragmatic projection of economic power has made undeniable progress. But the preponderance of the United States in the military realm has not weakened nor is it close to being replaced. What is evident is that the notion of an imminent Chinese military threat is exaggerated and misguided, especially when the material projection of the United States in the region is less significant and more rhetorical. By now it is obvious that the U.S has militarily outcompeted China in Latin America and Beijing is very far from displacing Washington on regional defense and security matters.
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For the United States to commit itself in advance to take the side of some other country that becomes involved in an international conflict is an extraordinary step that is justified only under extraordinary circumstances. There needs to be a credible external threat to the country being protected. And there must be enough commonality of interests and values between the United States and the protected state that the difference between that state falling or not falling to external aggression is highly significant for U.S. interests.A possible standard for measuring the appropriateness of security commitments is the grandest such U.S. commitment, under the North Atlantic Treaty. Whatever one may think of NATO's later expansion and out-of-area activities, the circumstances justifying a U.S. security commitment were present when the alliance was created in the late 1940s. The Soviet Union's military had overrun Eastern Europe and converted its states into satellite communist dictatorships. If the then-fragile democracies of Western Europe experienced the same fate, the result would have been disastrous for U.S. interests.Nothing remotely resembling those circumstances exists today in the Persian Gulf region. No Red Army is poised to take over the region. No would-be regional hegemon exists. Certainly not Iran, weakened by sanctions, preoccupied with internal divisions, and facing the disadvantage of being an ethnic and religious minority in a region that is largely Arab and Sunni.Saudi Arabia is the state that has had the most recent go at something approaching regional hegemony. It has employed military force outside its borders to prop up an unpopular regime in Bahrain and, on a much larger scale, to try to impose its will on Yemen through a highly destructive air war. That attempt failed, and Riyadh evidently has come to realize that its security is better served through accommodation rather than a quest for domination.Nor is there anything in the region like the difference, in terms of values and interests, that there was in 1940s Europe between Western democracies and Soviet satellite dictatorships. The Gulf Arab states are absolute monarchies. The only thing in those states that sounds close to democracy is a mostly elected National Assembly in Kuwait, but whenever that body gets too noisy and difficult to suit the ruling regime, the emir simply dissolves it.Despite these circumstances, the Biden administration is extending security guarantees to Gulf states, most recently by signing a Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement with Bahrain. The agreement commits the United States, "in the event of external aggression or the threat of external aggression" against Bahrain, to "immediately meet at the most senior levels to determine additional defense needs and to develop and implement appropriate defense and deterrent responses as decided upon by the Parties, including in the economic, military, and/or political realms."An anonymous administration official took pains to point out that the agreement is not a treaty and therefore does not need approval by the U.S. Senate. But apparently seeking to have it both ways, the official also stated that the agreement is "legally binding."No effort was made to identify what external aggression the parties have in mind. Iran, of course, is the state that automatically gets mentioned as a supposed threat. But the image of Iran mustering a D-Day-like invasion fleet and crossing the gulf to conduct an amphibious invasion of Bahrain is so fanciful as to be absurd (whether or not U.S. warships were in the gulf).Bahrain certainly has had its differences with Iran, probably at least as much as does any other member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Historical baggage in the relationship includes an old Iranian claim to Bahrain as the "14th province" of Iran, but in recent decades Iran has not tried to act on any such claim. The situation is quite unlike, say, the one involving Taiwan, in which China constantly declares to the world that it considers the island a part of China and periodically uses military saber-rattling to advertise the possibility of an invasion.To the extent the regime in Bahrain faces a security threat, it involves not external aggression but instead internal strife stemming from an unpopular Sunni regime repressing a largely Shia population. The Saudi military intervention in Bahrain in 2011 was intended to help the Bahraini regime suppress an Arab Spring-era popular uprising.The regime oppression and popular discontent continue. This year, Bahraini prisoners conducted a months-long hunger strike to protest harsh conditions in the prison. The hunger strike was suspended when the regime, on the eve of crown prince's trip to Washington to sign the new security agreement, eased some of the conditions. But Bahrain remains a serious violator of human rights.The unlikelihood of any external aggression against Bahrain means the clause in the new agreement that dictates the response to such aggression probably will not be invoked. The disadvantages of the agreement lie principally in two other areas. One involves getting more deeply in bed with an oppressive regime, with everything that implies regarding the U.S. image among, and relations with, the Bahraini population and Shia generally, among others. Many external and internal critics of Bahrain are reportedly angered and disappointed by the agreement. The director of the Britain-based Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy said that Bahraini authorities would interpret the agreement as a "green light" to increase political repression.The other main ill consequence of the agreement is that it runs counter to and undercuts a beneficial trend toward reducing international tensions in the Persian Gulf region. Bahrain's fellow GCC members have all been moving in the direction of warmer, less confrontational, relations with Iran. Kuwait and Oman have long had businesslike relations with Tehran and have at times served as diplomatic intermediaries for others. Similarly with Qatar, which shares with Iran exploitation of a huge gas field. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has been improving its relations with Tehran, and this month Saudi Arabia and Iran exchanged ambassadors as implementation of their agreement earlier this year to restore diplomatic relations.The issue of confrontation versus rapprochement with Iran gets into the larger game that the Biden administration is playing and of which the Bahrain agreement is only a part. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during the signing ceremony, "We're looking forward to using this agreement as a framework for additional countries that may wish to join us in strengthening regional stability, economic cooperation and technological innovation."The additional country the administration clearly has most in mind is Saudi Arabia, which has identified a security pact with the United States as part of the price it is demanding in return for upgrading its already significant relationship with Israel to full diplomatic relations. The administration evidently hopes the agreement with Bahrain can be a model for the kind of pact that would satisfy the Saudi demand while bypassing likely opposition on Capitol Hill.Despite the effort the administration is putting into brokering an agreement to upgrade relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, it still has not explained how any such agreement would serve either U.S. interests or the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East. In fact, it would do neither, and instead would only prolong and even increase confrontation and instability in the region. To understand why, note the principal Israeli objectives in seeking exchanges of embassies and ambassadors with the Persian Gulf Arab states, with which it is not at war.One objective is to intensify and institutionalize confrontation with, and fear and loathing of, Iran, thereby keeping it as a bête noire that can be blamed for all problems in the region and divert international attention from any problems that involve Israel's conduct. This means more, not less, tension and risk of escalation in the Persian Gulf region. And that is even before considering more of the Saudi regime's price for upgrading relations with the Israelis, including more unrestricted arms sales and help with a Saudi nuclear program.The other Israeli objective is to demonstrate that Israel can enjoy normal relations with regional states while continuing its occupation of Palestinian-inhabited territory. Far from being a "peace" agreement, an upgrading of relations with Saudi Arabia — like the earlier upgrading with Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE — would be about Israel not making peace with the Palestinians.Given the extreme right-wing nature of the Israeli government, led by a prime minister determined to keep his coalition intact and keep himself away from prosecution for corruption, any gesture toward the Palestinians that Riyadh and Washington could wring out of Israel would be little more than that — a gesture. It is inconceivable that the current Israeli government would do anything substantial that would bring closer a Palestinian state or any other resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.In short, the administration's project of buying an upgrade of Arab relations with Israel is not justified. And thus, neither is the agreement with Bahrain that is one part of that project.
Assessing threats to the air littoral, the airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters and bombers, requires a paradigm change in American military thinking about verticality. This article explores the consequences of domain convergence, specifically for the Army and Air Force's different concepts of control. It will assist US military and policy practitioners in conceptualizing the air littoral and in thinking more vertically about the air and land domains and the challenges of domain convergence.
The United Nations peacekeeping operations in the context of reviewing the UN's peacebuilding architecture (Carmen Parra, PhD, lecturer in international law, Universidad Abat Oliba CEU, Barcelona, Spain) -- Peacekeeping and conflict prevention : an old principle and a new responsibility (M. Esther Slamanca, MD, associate professor of public international law, Department of Public Law, University of Valladolid, Spain) -- Preventive deployment and early warning in the UN's agenda : the West African region as a scenario for international security ( (Jara Cuadrado, PhD candidate in international security, Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado, National University of Distance Learning, Madrid, Spain) -- The future support of the armed forces in peacekeeping operations (Roberto Pereyra-Bordón, PhD, senior professor and faculty coordinator, Inter-American Defense College, Washington, DC, US) -- The attribution of wrongful acts to member states and/or international organizations in peacekeeping operations (Teresa Russo, PhD, aggregate professor of international organization, Department of Legal Science (School of Law), University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy) -- Is robust peacekeeping an answer to the spoiler problem? the case of the expanded UNIFIL (Javier Lion-Bustillo, PhD, part-time lecturer, Department of History of Thought and Political Movements, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain) -- The age of outsourcing : UN peacekeeping operations (Diego Badell-Sánchez, researcher at Esade Center for Public Governance, Esade Business and Law School, Ramon Llull University, Barcelona, Spain) -- The new legal challenges facing peacekeeping operations : the role of the ICC (Anna Oriolo, PhD, associate professor of international law, aggregate professor of international criminal law, Department of Legal Sciences, School of Law, University of Salerno, Salerno Italy) -- Cordons sanitaires as instruments for peacekeeping operations (Ana Cristina Gallego-Hernández, PhD, associate professor of public international law, University Centre San Isidoro, Attached University of Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain, and others) -- Peacekeeping and food security : agreements, clashes and challenges (Adriana Fillol, MD, and Gustavo González Geraldino, MD, researcher and assistant professor of public international law and international relations, Public International Law and International Relations Department, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain) -- The EU comprehensive approach to crisis management missions and operations (Carmen Márquez Carrasco, PhD, full tenured professor, Department of Public International Law and International Relations, Universidad de Sevilla, Seville, Spain) -- Multilevel operations in the management of asymmetric conflicts : from growing cooperation to a strategic partnership : reflections around the integrated stabilization operations in Mali and Central African Republic (Francisco Jiménez García, PhD, professor of public international law and international relations, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain) -- The role of regional organizations in peacekeeping : shared responsibilities, new roles, and old uncertainties (Lucas J. Ruiz-Díaz, PhD, Universidad de Granada, Grenada, Spain) -- NATO peace support operations : a brief institutional view (Andrés B. Muñoz-Mosquera and Nikoleta P. Chalanouli, legal advisor, director, of the Nato Supreme Headquarters Allied Power, Europe (SHAPE), and others) -- The protection and respect of the cultural heritage and diversity of host countries by United Nations peacekeeping operations : lessons learnt from Mali (Félix Vacas Fernández, associate professor of public international law and international relations, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid, Spain) -- World bank and post-conflict activities (Francesco Seatzu, JD, PhD, full tenured professor of international and European law, University of Cagliari, Sardinia, Italy) -- Portugal and peacekeeping : a new foreign policy strategy? (Pedro Ponte E Sous, Department of Political Studies, New University of Lisbon, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities (FCSH-UNL), Lisbon, Portugal, and others) -- Peacekeeping and the global war on terrorism (Michel Liegeois, PhD and Murat Caliskan, MD, professor, Faculty of Economic, Social, and Political Sciences and Communication, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgic, Belgium, and others) -- Women in peacekeeping : challenges ahead and adopted measures (Alfonso J. Iglesias-Velasco, PhD, senior lecture of public international law, Department of Public Law and Legal Philosophy, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain) -- Gender mainstreaming in NATO peace support : impacts and challenges of gender in international peace and security policies (Iker Zirion-Landaluze, PhD, assistant professor of public international law and international relations, Department of Public International Law and International Relations, University of the Basque Country, UPV/EHU, Spain) -- Peacekeeping and sexual violence : a complex mandate of limited effectiveness(Isabel Lirola-Delgado, PhD, professor of public international law, University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago, Spain) -- Should we share? the United Nations and troop-contributing states facing international responsibility for the sexual crimes committed by peacekeepers (Raquel Regueiro, PhD, Department of Public International Law and Private International Law, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain) -- EU international crisis management and human rights (Pablo Aantonio Fernández-Sánchez, PhD, full tenured professor of public international law and international relations, Universidad de Sevilla, Seville, Spain) -- Operation Sophia : a point of inflection in the migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea (María Isabel Nieto-Fernández, PhD, UNISCI/adjunct professor in political science and international relations, Social Science Departament, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spain) -- Child protection in peacekeeping operations (Rocío Alamillos Sánchez, MD, and Laura García Martín, MD, PhD candidate, International Public Law Department, Universidad de Sevilla, Seville, Spain, and others) -- Peacekeeping operations challenges and economic impacts : a Nigerian perspective (Sani Safiyanu, Roy Anthony Rogers, PhD and Muhammad Danial Azman, PhD, Department of International and Strategic Studies , University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia)
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Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where he tried, and failed, to sell the Biden administration's spin that it is delivering for the American people by being tough on China. The reality is that the Biden administration's China policy is a disaster for U.S. security and prosperity. President Biden seems content to sacrifice peaceful relations and the benefits of trade with China for short-term political advantages that come with insisting that China be an enemy of the United States. Unfortunately, Secretary Blinken's testimony left little hope that change is coming anytime soon.In April, Secretary Blinken traveled to Beijing to rebuke China's President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. America's top diplomat proceeded to take China to task for supporting Russia's war effort in Ukraine, claiming that China's sale to Russia of various dual-use items—those that can be utilized for commercial or military purposes—such as semiconductors, machine tools, and telecommunication equipment, was the reason for the continuation of the war in Ukraine.Talk about hypocrisy. While the United States accuses China of prolonging the war, Washington obstructed a potential peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine in March 2022. The United States has perpetuated the war by arming Ukraine with tens of billions of dollars' worth of weapons and equipment, all while admitting China is not sending any weapons to Russia. The Biden administration also refuses to define what victory looks like. Ukraine's stated war aims, which includes the expulsion of all Russian troops and the reclamation of all territory, is increasingly questioned by European leaders. Czech President Petr Pavel, the leader of a fellow NATO member and the former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, recently went as far as calling those war aims naïve.Nevertheless, if Washington truly wanted to halt Beijing's commercial relationship with Russia, do we really think our sanctimony, including scolding Chinese officials in their own capital, is going to prompt them to alter their behavior in any manner favorable to U.S. interests? Effective diplomacy requires give and take, yet the Biden administration simply demands China comply with our directives and threatens to impose sanctions and tariffs if they don't.But America's top diplomat is willfully blind to opportunities to improve relations with China. I asked Secretary Blinken if he believes more lectures, sanctions, and tariffs will get China to change its behavior. His answer was telling: "If they don't engage in the conduct that we object to, then we're not going to be using those tariffs or using those sanctions." China largely approaches its foreign policy in a transactional manner, which should present us with chances to genuinely negotiate with Beijing to achieve our objectives. One can easily imagine removing sanctions and tariffs in exchange for a reduction in Chinese dual-use exports to Russia. The Biden administration has indicated no desire to entertain such an offer. Instead, the president is content to allow politics to drive policy.Just look to his reversal on the issue of tariffs. In June 2019, then-presidential candidate Joe Biden tweeted, "Trump doesn't get the basics. He thinks his tariffs are being paid by China. Any freshman econ student could tell you that the American people are paying his tariffs." This statement was true in 2019, and it remains true in 2024. Tariffs are simply a tax on the American consumer, and their imposition is estimated to increase costs for the average American household by over $830 per year. President Biden not only kept Trump's tariffs in place, but recently raised tariffs on an additional $18 billion worth of Chinese imports. So much for not knowing the basics.On the issue of Taiwan, the most sensitive matter in the U.S.-China relationship, President Biden falsely stated on four separate occasions that the United States is obligated to defend the island. For over four decades, the official policy of the United States, codified into law by the Taiwan Relations Act, has been one of "strategic ambiguity" in which the United States is not committed to the defense of Taiwan but maintains the capacity to do so. President Biden's reckless bellicosity demonstrates his willingness to abandon a policy that has kept the peace with China for his own political benefit.The American people should be aware of the costs they might have to pay for President Biden's tough guy act. A recent wargame estimates that the first three weeks of a U.S. intervention on Taiwan's behalf would cost the lives of some 3,000 American troops, two aircraft carriers, 10-20 warships, and 200-400 warplanes. In just three weeks, the United States would suffer about half as many casualties as it did in 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. President Biden's total disregard for long-held U.S. policy, and his repeated claims that the United States fight a war against another nuclear power without bothering to ask the American people through their elected representatives in Congress whether they think it is worth the costs, is inexcusable.The president must prioritize the national interest above political expediency. China is poised to remain a formidable economic and military power. If we want to ensure our children and grandchildren inherit a secure America abound with economic opportunity, then a stable, working relationship with China, guided by mutual respect and good faith diplomacy, must be pursued.