Suchergebnisse

В статье рассматривается позиция донского казачества в ходе Февральских и Октябрьских революционных событий 1917. По мнению авторов, Февральская и Октябрьская революции были этапами Великой Российской революции 1917 г. Одним из аргументов в пользу этой концепции является, наш взгляд, позиция донского казачества. Февральскую революцию и свержение самодержавия казаки восприняли с пониманием задачи формирования новой демократии и в целом поддержали ее своим неучастием в борьбе. В условиях июльского революционного кризиса армейское казачество было использовано новыми республиканскими властями для разгона протестующих масс трудящихся, что вызвало протест со стороны казачьих масс. В период корниловского выступления основные массы казачества не вошли в праворадикальное течение в армии, так как в самой казачьей среде ослабевали консервативные силы. Во время Октябрьского переворота командиры всех донских полков довели до сведения правительства, что казаки отказываются выступать на защиту правительства без поддержки пехотных армейских частей, броневых автомобилей и пулеметов. Для казаков «пехота», состоявшая из крестьян и рабочих, являлась выразителем доминирующих политических взглядов и настроений большинства населения страны. Говоря о возможности каких-либо действий в поддержку правительства только совместно с пехотой, казаки присоединялись к воле народа, выразителем которой, по их мнению, могли служить солдаты столичного гарнизона. Ситуация повторилась во время неудачного похода Краснова на Петроград. Казаки в это время не желали принимать какое-либо участие в разгоравшемся противоборстве противников и сторонников Советской власти, стремились уклониться от выполнения приказов своего командования, поскорей отправиться по домам. По мере прибытия на Дон они практически явочным порядком расходились по родным станицам. Из-за социального расслоения казачество не было едино в борьбе за сохранение прежней системы землепользования и землевладения. Социально-классовая война на Дону из-за особенностей исторического развития приобрела сословную окраску. На всех основных этапах революции 1917 г. от Февраля к Октябрю донское казачество в силу объективных причин проявляло значительные колебания по вопросу определения своей политической позиции, вплоть до саботажа и даже отказа в поддержке властей. Это свидетельствует об определенном стихийном понимании казачеством естественности хода развития событий и, на наш взгляд, о целостности и внутреннем единстве революционного процесса 1917 года. В ходе последовавшей гражданской войны ситуация изменилась радикальным образом. ; The article discusses the position of the don Cossacks during the February and October revolutionary events of 1917. According to the authors of the February and October revolutions were the stages of the Great Russian revolution of 1917. One of the arguments in favor of this concept is, in our opinion, the position of the don Cossacks. The February revolution and the overthrow of the autocracy, the Cossacks were received with understanding the task of shaping the new democracies, and generally supportive of their participation in the struggle. In terms of the July crisis of the revolutionary army, the Cossacks were used by the new Republican authorities to disperse the protesters, the masses of workers, which caused the protest of the Cossack masses. In the period of the Kornilov revolt the majority of the Cossacks were not included in the rightwing for the army in the Cossack environment weakened conservative forces. During the October revolution, the commanders of all regiments of the don was brought to the attention of the government that the Cossacks refuse to come to the defense of the government without the support of infantry army units, armored cars and machine guns. For the Cossacks "infantry", consisting of peasants and workers, were the dominant expression of political views and moods of the majority of the population. Speaking about the possibility of any action in support of the government only in conjunction with the infantry, Cossacks joined with the will of the people, the voice of which, in their opinion, could serve as the soldiers of the garrison. The situation was repeated during the unsuccessful campaign Krasnov on Petrograd. The Cossacks at this time were unwilling to take any part in the confrontation erupted opponents and supporters of the Soviet regime, sought to evade the orders of their commanders, I can't wait to go home. With the arrival of the don, they almost spur of the moment went to the native villages. Because of social stratification, the Cossacks were not united in the struggle to preserve the former system of land tenure and property rights. Social-class war-on-don due to the peculiarities of historical development has acquired a caste color. At all critical stages of the revolution of 1917 from February to October the don Cossacks in the objective reasons showed significant fluctuations on defining its political position up to sabotage and even failure in the support of the authorities. It testifies to a certain natural understanding of the Cossacks of the natural course of events, and, in our opinion, on the integrity and internal unity of the revolutionary process in 1917. In the ensuing civil war, the situation changed radically.

[spa] Ésta es una tesis doctoral antropológica e histórica sobre la cultura política del caciquismo durante el periodo comprendido entre 1915 y 2014 en el distrito Mixe, del estado de Oaxaca, México. El objetivo principal es validar un nuevo modelo teórico que se propone a partir de Oligarquía y caciquismo de Joaquín Costa con el material empírico que se ha recopilado en el campo a través de múltiples fuentes etnográficas e históricas. Se emplea un método hipotético-deductivo para explorar en profundidad de tres cacicazgos de la unidad de geográfica y étnica de análisis. A partir de estos resultados, se han refinado las hipótesis propuestas para ayudar, a fin de cuentas, a definir y detectar el fenómeno socio-político del caciquismo y para conectarlo con el concepto más amplio del patronazgo informal y el de partido político. El caciquismo se define como una fórmula muy concreta de intermediación que conecta y sujeta poblaciones humanas. Establece un triple mecanismo de control sobre los sujetos, un encadenamiento mediante favores, sujeciones y transmisiones entre los grupos local y nacional. La articulación entre estas tres cadenas funciona de la siguiente manera: el caciquismo crea un monopolio político y económico que manipula los vínculos de la comunidad con la nación, desviando recursos y patronazgo hasta convirtiéndolas en cadenas de transmisión; con estos últimos el cacique entreteje las cadenas de favor con las que subordina a su clientela local y con ello reemplaza la jerarquía de responsabilidades de las instituciones locales por deudas de lealtad; finalmente, mediante el poder absoluto y los recursos económicos, el caciquismo contribuye a cercar a la población para mantenerla cautiva y subordinada a su dominio. El caciquismo establece un triple monopolio: 1) el económico, a través de la dominación de las relaciones externas y los intercambios comerciales (transmisión); 2) el de la violencia, mediante la creación de grupos parapoliciales y el control de las armas de fuego (sujeción); 3) el político, al concentrar en la persona del cacique los tres poderes por medio de la reciprocidad asimétrica de las relaciones patrón-cliente (favor). En conclusión, tres cadenas, tres monopolios, tres poderes y una sola persona. El resultado es que el caciquismo integra en una única cadena de mando a los municipios y distritos con el Estado. Los caciques se demuestran así como un eslabón esencial que preservar la hegemonía de una élite que gobierna como una oligarquía. Y, finalmente, la autocracia de los pueblos bajo el yugo del caciquismo sirve a la dinámica más general de la centralización estatal del poder. ; [eng] This is an anthropological and historical PhD thesis about the political culture of caciquismo –a special kind of power patronage– between 1915 and 2014 in the Mixe district of Oaxaca, Mexico. The main research objective is to validate a new theoretical model – based on Joaquín Costa's theory Oligarquía y caciquismo– using empirical data gathered through fieldwork using multiple ethnographic and historical sources. A hypothetical-deductive method is applied to explore three cases of caciquismo from the geographical and ethnic unit of analysis. The hypothesis are refined based on this analysis in order to help define and identify the socio-political phenomenon of caciquismo and to connect it to the wider concept of informal and party patronage. Caciquismo is defined as a very specific formula for intermediation that both connects and restrains human communities. It establishes a triple control mechanism over individuals through favours, subjugation, and transmission between local and national groups. The three chains of Caciquismo are articulated in the following way: by creating an economic and political monopoly that affects the community's ties to the nation, the resources and patronage provided are diverted internally; with these, the cacique establishes his patronage through favours, which he uses to subordinate his local clientele, replacing the local institutions' hierarchies of responsibilities with what it is defined here as debts of loyalty; finally, caciquismo uses both absolute power and economic resources to keep people subordinated and captive to its domination. Caciquismo establishes a triple monopoly: 1) economic monopoly, through the domination of external political and commercial relations (transmission); 2) monopoly of violence, through control of firearms and creating community police groups (subjugation); 3) political monopoly, concentrating all three powers in the cacique through the asymmetric reciprocity of patron-client relationships (favours). In conclusion, there are three chains of control, three monopolies, three powers but only one person. Caciquismo integrates communities, districts and the central state into a single chain of command. Caciques are an essential cog in the wheel that preserves the hegemony for an elite that rules government as an oligarchy. The autocracy of caciquismo also contributes to the more general dynamics of state centralization of power.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw much of the nation-making and museum creation discussed in this paper, Austria underwent a whole spectrum of constitutions: monarchy, republic, autocracy and part of a totalitarian state and then again, since the ten years spanning 1945-1955, a republic. This dramatic history is also reflected in the changing borders of Austria – from a geographically extensive mosaic of the Habsburg Monarchy (as a Vielvölkerstaat; a multinational realm) to today's Austria that is made up by nine federal states with approximately 8,4 million inhabitants in total. Thus, an important question concerns what the term 'national' may refer to in the specific case of Austria. Turning to developments in the museum sphere, the period of the Austrian Empire (1804- 1867) and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918) – especially in the Vormärz - was marked by royal initiatives regarding existing collections. A process of centralizing and ordering collections, that hitherto had been dispersed, began and thus it was only now that these began to be regarded as entities. In the imperial city of Vienna, splendid buildings were constructed to host these collections during the second half of the century, e.g. the "twin museums" Kunsthistorisches Museum (KM, Museum of Art History) and Naturhistorisches Museum (NM, Museum of Natural History), emerging from the imperial collections. However, the two museums were never described as 'national', since the Vielvölkerstaat had to represent all peoples. The same can be said about the Austrian Museum für Volkskunde (The Austrian Museum of Folk Life and Art), inaugurated in 1894. Outside Vienna, a number of regional/provincial museums were founded; the Joanneum in Graz/Styria (1811) being perhaps the most prominent example. The Joanneum serves as a case study, highlighting topics such as the development of a national and regional identity and private initiatives in the museum sphere. The question of the relation between region and nation, what is centre and what is periphery is important in this context. According to Raffler, these museums were Janus-faced, being both cosmopolitan and regional as the museums presented both history of humanity and nationally specific knowledge (Raffler 2007: 344f). With the disintegration of the Habsburgian monarchy, museums became state-owned. Often characterized as a time of crisis, a new self-image and identity had to be invented. The term 'Austria' was however, regarded with scepticism since it hitherto primarily had been associated with the dynasty of the Habsburgs. Rituals and festivities rooted in the empire had to be replaced and attempts were made to promote music as the factor that made the geographically highlyshrunken Austria into a world nation (Mattl 1995). The period also included art restoration claims, posed by former members of the multinational realm. During NS-rule, megalomaniac projects included new museums, here exemplified with plans for (but never completed) Fuehrer-museums in Linz and Vienna. Austria's role during this period of fascism has been much disputed, affecting later plans and discussions for museum projects dealing with this period: Austria as a victim vs. Austria as willing partner? Further post-war discussions on identity include the status assigned with the signing of the state treaty in 1955 that has been endlessly celebrated; and the constructing of a tale of new beginnings forming a unifying national symbol and stepping stone for new national myths. In this paper, the question of the existence of an Austrian national museum, focusing on twentieth century history, is addressed by highlighting recent discussions surrounding the plans for a Haus der Geschichte (House of History). Until today, it is – interestingly enough – the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum (The Museum of Military History) that presents the most complete history of Austria, although ending with the end of WWII. Since the late 1990s, various proposals for a new museum have been made and the project has been intensely debated among politicians and historians. Still today, no consensus exists regarding exactly what to exhibit and why; neither is the question of where (in Vienna) such a museum should be located settled. The debates are interesting since they reveal the still-existing tensions regarding how to tackle and present central topics such as the Ständestaat (authoritarian rule 1934-38), the Austrian civil war, the Anschluß and Austria's role during the NS-reign. Many historians fear a political instrumentalization and a toosmooth version of the violent past that constitutes one aspect of Austrian twentieth century history. Finally, Marlies Raffler has put forward an interesting thought: could it be that an Austrian national museum is equal to the sum of existing Landesmuseen (i.e. museums located in the federal states of Austria), together making up a kind of 'disloziertes Nationalmuseum' (dislocated Nationalmuseum) today? ; Eunamus

Whether the results of fiscal transfers have positive or negative implications depends upon the incentives that transfer systems create for both central and local governments. The complexity and ambiguity of the relationship between fiscal transfers and tax revenues of local governments is one of the main causes why research projects, even in the same country, come to different results. This investigation is seriously questioning the often stated substitution effect based only on an analysis of aggregated data and finally rejects in the qualitative part of this research (using survey techniques) a substitution effect in the majority of the assessed municipalities. While most theories are modeling governments as tax-maximizers (Leviathan) or as being prone to fiscal laziness, this investigation shows that mayors react to a whole set of incentives. Most mayors react rational and rather pragmatically in respect to the incentives and constraints which are established by the particular context of a municipality, the central government and their own personality/identity/interests. While the yield on property tax in Peru is low, there are no signs that increases in transfers have had, on average, a negative impact on their revenue generation. On an individual basis there exist mayors who are revenue maximizers, others who are substituting revenues and others who show apathy. Many engage in property tax. While rural or small municipalities have limited potential, property taxes are the main revenue sources for the Peruvian urban municipalities, rising on average 10% during the last five years. The property tax in Peru accounts for less than 0.2% of GDP, which compared to the Latin American average, is extremely low. In 2002, property tax was collecting nationwide about 10% of the overall budget of local governments. In 2006, the share was closer to 6% due to windfall transfers. The property tax can enhance accountability at the local level and has important impacts on urban spatial development. It is also important considering that most charges or transfers are earmarked such that property tax yields can cover discretionary finances. The intergovernmental fiscal transfers can be described as a patchwork of political liabilities of the past rather than connected with thorough compensation or service improvement functions. The fiscal base of local governments in Peru remains small for the municipalities and the incentive structure to enhance property tax revenues is far from optimal. The central government and sector institutions, which are in the Peruvian institutional design of the property tax responsible for the enablement environment, can reinforce local tax efforts. In the past the central government permanently changed the rules of the game, giving municipalities reduced predictability of policy choices. There are no relevant signs that a stronger property tax is captured by Peruvian interest groups. Since the central government has responsibility for tax regulation and partly valuation there has been little debate about financial issues on the local political agenda. Most council members are therefore not familiar with tax issues. If the central government did not set the tax rate and valuation then there would probably be a more vigorous public debate and an electorate that was better informed about local politics. Elected mayors (as political and administrative leaders) are not counterbalanced and held in check by an active council and/or by vigorous local political parties. Local politics are concentrated on the mayor, electoral rules, the institutional design and political culture – all of which are not helpful in increasing the degree of influence that citizens and associations have upon collective decision-making at the local level. The many alternations between democracy and autocracy have not been helpful in building strong institutions at the local level. Property tax revenues react slowly and the institutional context matters because an effective tax system as a public good can only be created if actors have long time horizons. The property tax has a substantial revenue potential, however, since municipalities are going through a transfer bonanza, it is especially difficult to make a plea for increasing their own revenue base. Local governments should be the proponents of property tax reform, but they have, in Peru, little policy clout because the municipal associations are dispersed and there exists little relevant information concerning important local policy issues. ; Ob die Auswirkungen von Fiskaltransfers auf die Generierung von lokalen Steuereinnahmen positiv oder negativ sind, wird in der akademischen Literatur weiterhin offen diskutiert. Die Komplexität und Ambivalenz der Fiskalbeziehungen zwischen Gebietsköperschaften und Zentralregierung führt manchmal selbst innerhalb eines gleichen Landes zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen. Die hier vorliegende Untersuchung hinterfragt kritisch den oft postulierten Effekt in dem Eigeneinahmen durch Transferzahlungen substituiert werden. Während die meisten wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten Regierungen entweder als tax-maximizers (Leviathan) oder als fiscal lazy darstellen, zeigt diese Untersuchung, dass die meisten Bürgermeister spezifisch auf eine Vielzahl von Anreizen rational und pragmatisch reagieren. Obwohl die Eigeneinnahmen der Lokalregierungen in Peru generell niedrig sind, kann ein direkter Zusammenhang zwischen kontinuierlich ansteigenden Grundsteuereinnahmen und Fiskalzuweisungen eher verneint werden. Die Anreizstruktur in Peru zur Generierung von lokalen Steuereinnahmen ist hinderlich und teilweise sogar kontraproduktiv. Die Zentralregierung und gewisse Spezialinstitutionen spielen in Peru wichtige Funktionen hinsichtlich lokaler Steuergenerierung und sind mitverantwortlich für die positive Gestaltung der Anreizstruktur.

Why do some civil wars end in successfully implemented peace settlements while others are fought to the finish? Numerous competing theories address this question. Yet not until now has a study combined the historical sweep, empirical richness, and conceptual rigor necessary to put them thoroughly to the test and draw lessons invaluable to students, scholars, and policymakers. Using data on every civil war fought between 1940 and 1992, Barbara Walter details the conditions that lead combatants to partake in what she defines as a three-step process--the decision on whether to initiate negotiations, to compromise, and, finally, to implement any resulting terms. Her key finding: rarely are such conflicts resolved without active third-party intervention.Walter argues that for negotiations to succeed it is not enough for the opposing sides to resolve the underlying issues behind a civil war. Instead the combatants must clear the much higher hurdle of designing credible guarantees on the terms of agreement--something that is difficult without outside assistance. Examining conflicts from Greece to Laos, China to Columbia, Bosnia to Rwanda, Walter confirms just how crucial the prospect of third-party security guarantees and effective power-sharing pacts can be--and that adversaries do, in fact, consider such factors in deciding whether to negotiate or fight. While taking many other variables into account and acknowledging that third parties must also weigh the costs and benefits of involvement in civil war resolution, this study reveals not only how peace is possible, but probable...

Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers Can heroes legitimize strongly-proscribed and repugnant political behaviors? We exploit the purposefully arbitrary rotation of French regiments to measure the legitimizing effects of heroic credentials. 53% of French line regiments happened to rotate under a specific general, Philippe Pétain, during the pivotal WWI battle of Verdun (1916). Using recently declassified intelligence data on 95,314 individuals, we find the home municipalities of regiments serving under Pétain at Verdun raised 7% more Nazi collaborators during the Pétain led Vichy regime (1940-44). The effects are similar across joining Fascist parties, German forces, paramilitaries that hunted Jews and the Resistance, and collaborating economically. These municipalities also increasingly vote for right-wing parties between the wars. The voting effects persist after WWII, becoming particularly salient during social crises. We argue these results reflect the complementary role of the heroes of Verdun in legitimizing and diffusing the authoritarian values of their former leader.

Die politische Landkarte im Nahen und Mittleren Osten löst sich auf. Syrien, Irak, Libyen, Jemen, Ägypten - die Liste der zerfallenden Staaten ist lang. Dafür entstehen konfessionell legitimierte Ordnungen oder neue Entitäten, die durch lokale Milizen und Warlords beherrscht werden. (IP)

I. From Autocracy to Democracy: Political Institutions at the End of the Ch'ing Dynasty -- 1. Transformation from Absolute to Constitutional Monarchy -- 2. Causes of the Constitutional Movement -- 3. Preparation for Constitutionalism -- 4. The Principles of Constitution, September 22, 1908 -- 5. The National Legislative Council (Tse-cheng Yuan) -- 6. The Provincial Assembly (Tse-I Chu) -- 7. The Beginning of Local Self-Government -- 8. The Revolution and the Nineteen Articles of November 3, 1911 -- II. Democracy in Experiment: Political Institutions During the Early Republican Period -- 1. Preparations for a Provisional Government -- 2. Analysis of the Organic Law of the Provisional Government -- 3. Inauguration of the Provisional Government at Nanking -- 4. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, March 11, 1912 -- 5. The Change of the Provisional Presidency and the Seat of Government -- 6. The Establishment of Parliament -- 7. The Drafting of the Constitution and the Election of President -- 8. The Judicial System of the New Republic -- 9. The Local Government System -- III. Monarchism vs. Republicanism: Political institutions Under the Dictatorship of Yüan Shih-K'ai -- 1. Yüan Shih-k'ai vs. Constitutional Democracy -- 2. Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Constitutional Compact of 1914 -- 3. The Reorganized National Government Under Yüan Shih-k'ai -- 4. The Local Government System Under Yüan Shih-k'ai -- 5. The Rise and Fall of Yüan's Monarchial Movement -- IV. Split Between the North and the South: Political Institutions During the Period of Internal Dissensions -- 1. Developments under the Regime in Peking -- 2. The New Parliament and the New Constitutional Draft -- 3. Parliament's Second Restoration and its Adoption of the 1923 Constitution -- 4. The Constitution-Protecting Government in the Southwest -- 5. The Peking Government Under Provisional Chief Executive Tuan -- 6. The Local Government System -- V. The Nationalist Party in Power: Unification of China Under Kuomintang Programs -- 1. The Reorganization of the Nationalist Party in 1924 -- 2. Basic Principles and Programs of the Nationalist Party -- 3. The Northern Expedition and the Unification of China -- 4. The Beginning of Political Tutelage -- VI. The Five-Power Constitution at Work: Political Institutions During the Period of Political Tutelage -- 1. The National Government Before 1928 -- 2. The National Government Since 1928 -- 3. The National People's Convention and the Promulgation of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China for the Period of Political Tutelage -- 4. Nationalist Efforts to Carry out Party Principles and Programs -- 5. The Preparation for Constitutional Rule in China -- 6. The Local Government System During the Period of Political Tutelage -- VII. Communism Versus Nationalism: The Chinese Communist Party and Soviet Regimes (1921–1945) -- 1. The Formation of Communist Organizations in China -- 2. The First United Front of the Nationalists and Communists -- 3. Armed Uprisings and the Change of Leadership -- 4. The Establishment of Soviet Regimes in China -- 5. The Second United Front and Expansion of the Communist Regimes -- VIII. China at War: Political Institutions During the Period of the Sino-Japanese War -- 1. The Hostilities Between China and Japan -- 2. The Formal Establishment of Chiang Kai-shek's Leadership -- 3. Wartime Party Alignments -- 4. The Supreme National Defense Council — The Highest Organ of Wartime China -- 5. The Triple-linked Administrative System -- 6. The Wartime National Government -- 7. The People's Political Council -- 8. The Wartime Local Government -- 9. The Local Representative Bodies -- IX. From the Mainland to Taiwan (Formosa): Political Institutions during the Postwar Period -- 1. Peace Negotiations Through the Political Consultative Conference -- 2. The Convocation of the National Assembly and the Constitution of 1946 -- 3. The Central and Local Governments Under the Constitution of 1946 -- 4. The First Session of the First National Assembly -- 5. The Nationalist Debacle and Retreat to Taiwan -- 6. The National Government in Taiwan -- 7. The Local Government System in Taiwan -- 8. Taiwan Today -- X. The Communist Party in Power: Mao's Political Thought and the Party Organization -- 1. On the Road to Victory -- 2. The Political Thought and Strategy of Mao Tse-tung -- 3. The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party and its Guiding Principles -- 4. The Organization and Functions of the Communist Party -- 5. The Communist Youth League -- 6. The Communist Relationship with Minor Political Parties and Mass Organizations -- XI. Fundamental Laws of the People's Republic: From the Common Program to the Constitution of 1954 -- 1. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) -- 2. The Common Program of 1949 in the Nature of a Provisional Constitution -- 3. The Central Government System, 1949–1954 -- 4. The Local Government System, 1949–1954 -- 5. The Adoption of the Constitution by the National People's Congress -- 6. General Principles of the Constitution of 1954 -- XII. The Government of "Democratic Centralism": Political Institutions under the Constitution of 1954 -- 1. The Present System of Government -- 2. The National People's Congress -- 3. The Head of the State -- 4. The State Council -- 5. The People's Courts and Procuratorates -- 6. Local People's Congresses and Councils -- 7. Self-Government Organs of National Autonomous Areas -- 8. The Communist Government in Action -- Appendices.

 I looked back at my post three years ago, the day after Jan 6th.  With so many people revising their views, hey, it was not an insurrection, just a rambunctious group of FBI-led rioters, I thought I would see where I stand now after investigations, trials, and finally the application of the 14th amendment to he who can't be held accountable.Before getting into this, one key difference between learning and bad faith is that while both can cause someone to take a difference stance three years later, the former is about learning new information and revising beliefs, and the latter is about taking whatever is a convenient stance no matter the previous one.  A bit of a subtweet in all of that.Anyhow, looking back, I was the most wrong about the capitol cops.  They were far from complicit, as many paid a huge cost, including the ultimate price, for doing their jobs.  Not much shirking that day.  What we saw initially where cops cleverly misdirecting the insurrectionists away from the vulnerable Senators and Congresspeople.  I am less certain of my second stance--people referred to this as a manifestation of fascism.  I pushed back because I didn't think and I still don't think Trump has a coherent ideology.  Not all racist autocrats are fascists, with fascism having broader implications for how to organize society.  There are enough people around Trump and enough forces in the US who are not just pushing for autocracy and for white supremacy but also reordering institutions to support, yes, the master race and master religion, that it is close enough to count.  To be clear, to me, Trump is still not thinking about putting the nation over individual interests, but rather himself over everything.  The ultimate expression and empowering of narcissism does not make Trump a Nazi.  But he is changing permission structures to allow Nazis to flourish.  So, there is a fascist movement complete, yes, with swatiskas and Nazi flags.  When they tell us who they are, we probably should be believe them (applies to occupiers of Ottawa as well).The third stance got the most heat--that it was not a coup.  Folks were upset because it seemed like I was not taking the event seriously... as if a coup is far more serious than an insurrection.   But I also underestimated how much of a role Trump and his team played in inciting the insurrection--that it was part of a sustained effort, a conspiracy out in the public eye for the most part, to keep Trump in power despite losing the election.  Which made it an autogolpe.  Which, yes, is a kind of a coup--a self-coup--an effort by those in power to usurp the powers of other institutions so they can perpetuate their reign, their regime.  All of the investigations, all of the incriminating stuff Trump has said, has made it clear that he caused the insurrection--it would not have happened without his sustained efforts.  I am sure we will learn more once the trial starts.  But, yes, I will resist using "coup" without modifications because of two key parts of general definition: coups are usually focused on changing who is in power--hence the need for autogolpe or self-coup--and they involve some component of the security services.  In this case, the military was not involved.  It is still not entirely clear whether we dodged literal bullets by not bringing the National Guard in earlier.  But the point remains--the danger, the threat, the violence, the effort to prevent the transfer of power were not coming from the uniformed armed folks.  A significant number of veterans involved in the insurrection is disturbing but do not make it a coup.Folks have and will accuse me of pedantry on this.  I tend to speak loosely and am not a definitions-enforcer, but on this hill, I (along with many folks who study civil-military relations) remain.  Again, it shifts attention in the wrong direction, and it does not mean the event itself was not serious.My post also called for accountability--that folks had to go to trial and to lose their jobs.  We have had a fair amount of that, but the wheels of justice has been grinding too slowly when it comes to Trump and his minions.  There is very much a deadline.... especially as the GOP seeks to game the institutions governing the next election.We should remain outraged--that something unprecedented happened and it was caused by a sore loser who should never have become president in the first place.  But those seeking power didn't care about personal responsibility or values, so they supported a candidate who was so very disqualified then and then proved it through how he governed and then again with his refusal to accept losing.  So, yes, the 14th amendment should be applied to Trump, but will it stick?  Damned if I know.

ResumenEn este artículo que titulamos La dictadura como dominaciónpolítica, explicamos en qué consiste y cómo se organiza eluso arbitrario del poder a través de la forma de gobierno queel constitucionalista y politólogo alemán Karl Loëwenstaindenomina con el nombre genérico de autocracias. Serefiere al autoritarismo y al totalitarismo que comúnmentellamamos dictadura y que los griegos llamaron tiranía. Enotros términos, ambos son dos modalidades de autocracia.Cuando estudiamos esta forma de dominación política nosencontramos con una gran diversidad, pese a que hay algunosrasgos comunes. Esta diversidad se advierte en la monarquía,la autocracia que más ha durado a lo largo de la historia,pero que ahora se encuentra confinada en pocos países decultura musulmana. También consideramos a las dictadurasindividualizadas cuando un individuo, sin pertenecer auna aristocracia, concentra todo el poder como si fuera unmonarca absoluto. Este sujeto puede ser civil o militar. Luegoexplicamos en qué consisten las dictaduras militares, cívicomilitaresy el poder militar. En estos regímenes, igualmente,encontramos diversas expresiones políticas e ideológicas.Finalmente tratamos sobre las dictaduras institucionalizadascuya máxima expresión es el totalitarismo, una forma políticade dominación que se inició en el siglo XX y continúa enalgunos países como China, Corea del Norte y Cuba. Enesta categoría, aunque con una concepción ideológicadistinta, están el nacional socialismo alemán y el fascismoitaliano. A las dictaduras de inspiración marxista leninistay maoísta se les llama comunistas; a nuestro modo de ver,un concepto equivocado porque el comunismo es la fasefinal del socialismo, una sociedad sin clases y sin Estadoporque desaparece la dominación, y como esto no existe,en la práctica deberían denominarse dictaduras socialistas, odictaduras socializantes; también podrían llamarse dictadurasen el socialismo realmente existente.No solo el totalitarismo es una dictadura institucionalizada,también hay formas institucionalizadas autoritarias,como el caso del Partido Revolucionario Institucional(PRI) mexicano. Cabe notar que en el caso de los paísesasiáticos, sobre todo en China, se ha acentuado el culto ala personalidad, fenómeno que había disminuido luego dela reforma de Deng Xiaoping; en cambio, esto ha sido unatendencia constante en Corea del Norte. Ello determinaque predomine la voluntad del líder sobre la institución,como ha sucedido en diversos casos en donde las dictadurasburocratizadas de partido único han sucumbido ante elpoder de un líder máximo. Un hecho que no sucedió enMéxico porque estaba prohibida la reelección presidencialque duraba siete años.Concluimos afirmando que muchas de estas formas dedominación política, que predominaron durante largosperíodos de la historia, como por ejemplo las monarquías,sucumbieron por diversos movimientos de liberación queoptaron por formas democráticas de gobierno. Pero tambiéndecimos al final del artículo que existe la dominaciónal interior de la democracia en un régimen económicocapitalista que predomina en la globalización y que imperapor medio del neoliberalismo.Palabras clave: Dominación, dictadura, autoritarismo,totalitarismo, liberación. AbstractIn this article, titled "The dictatorship as a political domination",we explain what the arbitrary use of power consists of andhow it is organized through the form of government, namedby the German constitutionalist and political scientist KarlLoëwenstain with the generic term of "autocracies". It refers tothe authoritarianism and totalitarianism that we commonlycall dictatorship and that the Greeks called tyranny. In otherwords, both are two modalities of autocracy.When we study this form of political domination, we find agreat diversity, despite some common features. This diversityis evident in the monarchy, the autocracy that has lasted thelongest throughout history but which is now confined to a fewcountries with a Muslim culture. We also consider individualdictatorships when an individual, without belonging to anaristocracy, concentrates all power as if he were an absolutemonarch. This person can be civil or military. Then, we explainwhat military dictatorship, civic-military dictatorship andmilitary power consist of. In these regimes, we also find diversepolitical and ideological expressions.Finally, we discussed the institutionalized dictatorships whoseultimate expression is totalitarianism, a political form ofdomination that began in the twentieth century and continuesin some countries like China, North Korea and Cuba. In thiscategory, although with a different ideological conception, arepresent the German National Socialism and Italian Fascism.Dictatorships with Marxist, Leninist and Maoist inspirationare called communists. In our point of view, this concept iswrong given the fact that communism is the final phase ofsocialism, a classless and stateless society due to the disappearanceof domination. Hence, as this does not exist, they should becalled socialist dictatorships, or socializing dictatorships. Theycould also be called dictatorships in the actual existing socialism.Totalitarianism is not the only institutionalized dictatorship;there are also other authoritarian institutionalized dictatorshipssuch as the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).It is worth mentioning that in the case of Asian countries,especially in China, the cult of personality has been accentuated,a phenomenon that had decreased after the reform of Deng-Xiao-Pin, but which has been a constant trend in North Korea.This determines that the will of the leader predominates overthe institution, as has happened in several cases where thebureaucratized one-party dictatorships have succumbed tothe power of a maximum leader. This case did not happen inMexico because of the prohibition of presidential re-election,which lasted seven years.In conclusion, we can agree that many of these forms of politicaldomination, which predominated during long periods of history,such as monarchies, succumbed to various liberation movementsthat chose democratic forms of government. Nevertheless, we alsomention at the end of the article that domination exists withindemocracy in the capitalist economic regime that predominatesin globalization, and that prevails through neoliberalism.Keywords: Domination, Dictatorship, Autoritarisms,Tatalitarism, Liberation

Abstract: The tendency to apply sharia to the state or government by some Muslims is a very interesting new phenomenon in many Muslim countries. Several Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, Sudan, Egypt, Morocco, Kuwait and Iran are examples of countries where "Islamist" groups want to implement sharia into government. Of course this desire raises different views from Islamic figures, some support and some oppose it. This paper seeks to find answers to the problems that arise from the views of supporters and opponents of the Islamic state, with the core of the problem are: (1) seeking and knowing the concept of Islam and Caliphate in the Islamic political system; (2) explaining the government system according to historical perspective; namely in the era of the Prophet Muhammad and Khulafa ar-Rasyidin; and (3) explaining the relationship between religion and state in the concept of siyasa fiqh. The conceptual framework used in this paper is that there are two important things to be achieved in politics, namely (1) politics as anything related to state administration; and (2) politics as all activities directed to seek and maintain power in society. In relation to this, there is often a "tension" between groups that want to implement the Shari'ah into the rules of government with groups that oppose it. If the desires of the two groups cannot be met, then there is no possibility of various acts of violence in a country, and can even lead to a coup against the current government. Some findings from this study are that (1) System of government in an Islamic perspective is not clearly stated in the Quran and Sunnah so that Islamic political thinkers disagree over what government system must be applied in a nation state; (2) In a historical perspective, the system of government in the time of the Prophet Muhammad was more concerned with the substance of Islamic values into the system of state government. This can be seen rules of the Madina Constitution, while the government of the Khulafa ar-Rasyidin used a system of power of autocracy and monarchic dynasty; (3) Islamic political thinkers differ in their views on the relation between religion and state in the concept of siyasa fiqh into three groups, namely (1) religion and state must be integrated and cannot be separated because the state is a political and religious institution; (2) religion and state are not related at all because the Prophet Muhammad was only an ordinary prophet like the previous prophet with the single task of inviting people back to noble life; (3) religions and state relate reciprocally and need each other. Abstrak: Kecenderungan untuk menerapkan syariah Islam ke dalam negara atau pemerintahan oleh sebagian orang Islam merupakan gejala baru yang sangat menarik di banyak negara Muslim. Beberapa negara muslim, seperti Indonesia, Pakistan, Yordania, Sudan, Mesir, Maroko, Kuwait dan Iran merupakan contoh negara-negara di mana kelompok-kelompok "Islamis"-nya ingin menerapkan syariah ke dalam pemerintahan. Tentu saja keinginan tersebut menimbulkan pandangan yang berbeda-beda dari tokoh-tokoh Islam, sebagian ada yang mendukung dan sebagian lagi menentangnya. Tulisan ini berusaha untuk mencari jawaban terhadap permasalahan-permasalahan yang muncul dari pandangan para pendukung dan penentang negara syariah, dengan inti permasalahannya adalah : (1) mencari dan mengetahui konsep Islam dan Kekhalifahan dalam sistem politik Islam; (2) menjelaskan sistem pemerintahan dalam perspektif historis, terutama pada masa Nabi Muhammad dan Khulafa ar-Rasyidin, dan (3) menjelaskan hubungan agama dan negara dalam konsep fiqh siyasah. Kerangka konseptual yang dipergunakan dalam tulisan ini adalah bahwa terdapat dua hal penting yang hendak dicapai dalam politik, yaitu (1) politik sebagai segala yang berkaitan dengan penyelenggaraan negara; dan (2) politik sebagai segala kegiatan yang diarahkan untuk mencari dan mempertahankan kekuasaan dalam masyarakat. Dalam kaitannya dengan hal tersebut, seringkali terjadi "ketegangan" antara kelompok yang ingin menerapkan syari'ah ke dalam aturan-aturan pemerintahan dengan kelompok yang menentangnya. Apabila keinginan dari kedua kelompok tersebut tidak dapat dipertemukan, maka tidak menutup kemungkinan akan terjadi berbagai tindak kekerasan dalam suatu negara, dan bahkan dapat menimbulkan kudeta terhadap pemerintahan yang sedang berjalan. Beberapa temuan dari peneletian ini adalah (1) Sistem pemerintahan dalam perspektif Islam tidak disebutkan secara jelas dalam al-Quran dan Sunnah sehingga para pemikir politik Islam berbeda pendapat tentang sistem pemerintahan apa yang harus diterapkan ke dalam sebuah negara-bangsa (nation-state); (2) Dalam perspektif historis, sistem pemerintahan pada masa Nabi Muhammad lebih mementingkan substansi nilai-nilai Islam ke dalam sistem pemerintahan negara. Hal ini dapat dilihat pada aturan-aturan yang tertuang dalam Piagam Madinah, sedangkan pemerintahan pada masa Khulafa' ar-Rasyidin menggunakan sistem "autocratic power" (kekuatan autokrasi) dan a dynastic monarchy" (dinasti monarkhi); (3) Para pemikir politik Islam berbeda pandangan dalam menyikapi relasi agama dan negara dalam konsep fiqh siyasah menjadi tiga kelompok, yaitu pertama, agama dan negara harus terintegrasi dan tidak dapat dipisahkan sebab negara merupakan lembaga politik dan sekaligus keagamaan, kedua, antara agama dan negara tidak berhubungan sama sekali (terpisah) karena Nabi Muhammad hanyalah seorang Rasul biasa seperti halnya rasul-rasul sebelumnya, dengan tugas tunggal mengajak manusia kembali kepada kehidupan yang mulia, ketiga, agama dan negara berhubungan secara timbal balik dan saling membutuhkan.

The competitive environment encourages organizations to find ways to increase the efficiency of their activities. A new approach to A. Comte sociocracy paradigm, which was oriented towards the creation of a new type of state governance, has been transformed and adapted to the practice of improving organizational management. The article analyses the paradigm of sociocracy as a comprehensive management system that enables employees to be involved in the decision-making process to work together. To identify and formulate the nature of sociocracy as a new paradigm for management of organization, the fundamental principles were supported by theoretical research based on scientific literature sources and publications of management practices. The methods of collecting, analysing, comparing and summarising of information as well as logical generation of conclusions were used for the research. The benefit of new management paradigm for organization and its employees, confirming the effectiveness of the practical application of sociocracy was found in the course of the research. The concept of sociocracy was created by the philosopher A. Comte (Auguste Comte 1798–1857) in the context of a new model of state governance (John-Stuart Mill, 2005). On the basis of sociocrasy a new concept holocracy was created in the US, which exaggerates the "benefits" of the organization and calls to forget personal needs and to devote to a higher goal in the US (Hallas, 2013). The Dutch pacifist and educator Kees Bioke (Boeke) (Hall, 2013) has practically implemented a sociocracy management model at the Bilthoven School in the Netherlands, which has existed till nowadays. Beginning around 1970, Gerard Endenburg developed a management and governance method called Sociocracy while managing his electrical engineering corporation, Endenburg Electrotechnik, in the Netherlands. G. Endenberg developed a management system as an alternative to the classical hierarchical management system. The sociocracy decision-making method has grown in cybernetics, systemic thinking organizations that have had a tremendous impact on commercial activity in America (Mirzagitova, 2014). In Lithuania, the developers of the websites "Meetings", "Talent Safari", and "Primum Esse" disseminate the ideas of sociocracy and teach company leaders about the new paradigm of management that enables employees to be involved in the decision-making process. The essence of sociocracy is to allow people to delegate decisions to expert groups. As all groups of professionals have to report to the whole community, and are selected with the consent of each member, the decision-making process takes place both from the bottom to the top and from the top to the bottom. This creates feedback circles, and thus ensures good communication throughout the organization. The groups of experts act as partly independent in discussing all issues in the meetings of their members, in which each member has equal rights. The groups (referred to as small circles, called Endenberg's rings) have frequent meetings for tactical issues. The decisions made in the group must be in line with the general organization policy. Big groups (big rings) rarely meet and deal with only very important issues. The group leader usually organizes decision-making process by taking operational decisions unilaterally. The method of sociocracy enables all members of an organization to be involved in the organization's management process, where everyone can express their opinion. One of the essential aspects of sociocracy is its dynamism, and therefore sociocracy can be called dynamic management, as it emphasizes the abundance of challenges in today's business environment, where the need for quick and just solutions is necessary. The demand for dynamic management creates some important general constraints on any techniques used: speed and coordination. One of the most important tasks of the company is to organize teamwork and decision making in accordance with the principles of dynamic management. Dynamic management logic considers human power to be an essential element of progress, and effective human collaboration is necessary for the results of the organization. Dynamic management is needed in order to be able to respond flexibly and act in each situation (for example, when it comes to changing opinions because new information is received or previous solutions failed) to enable people to act on their own, quickly and independently, in the same harmonious manner with others. The goal of dynamic management is to combine the paradox: to operate in a harmoniously changing environment, while moving forward quickly and dynamically; to save what works and change what does not work immediately as soon as the "voltage" is identified. The following are demonstrated by the dynamic management of the organization: the decentralization of individual areas of activity; human resources realize their potential freely; setting priorities for action; the involvement of members of the organization in decisionmaking. The introduction of sociocracy as a new organizational management paradigm in the business sector would provide the following benefits: improving decision-making quality throughout the organization, problem solving and teamwork communication, enhancing leadership quality, and increasing the efficiency of meetings. The content analysis revealed the fact that autocracy is not suitable for collective bargaining, and voting as a way of democracy does not allow to make good decisions; therefore, the new organizational management paradigm – sociocracy of practical application helps to improve company management and improve effectiveness.

The competitive environment encourages organizations to find ways to increase the efficiency of their activities. A new approach to A. Comte sociocracy paradigm, which was oriented towards the creation of a new type of state governance, has been transformed and adapted to the practice of improving organizational management. The article analyses the paradigm of sociocracy as a comprehensive management system that enables employees to be involved in the decision-making process to work together. To identify and formulate the nature of sociocracy as a new paradigm for management of organization, the fundamental principles were supported by theoretical research based on scientific literature sources and publications of management practices. The methods of collecting, analysing, comparing and summarising of information as well as logical generation of conclusions were used for the research. The benefit of new management paradigm for organization and its employees, confirming the effectiveness of the practical application of sociocracy was found in the course of the research. The concept of sociocracy was created by the philosopher A. Comte (Auguste Comte 1798–1857) in the context of a new model of state governance (John-Stuart Mill, 2005). On the basis of sociocrasy a new concept holocracy was created in the US, which exaggerates the "benefits" of the organization and calls to forget personal needs and to devote to a higher goal in the US (Hallas, 2013). The Dutch pacifist and educator Kees Bioke (Boeke) (Hall, 2013) has practically implemented a sociocracy management model at the Bilthoven School in the Netherlands, which has existed till nowadays. Beginning around 1970, Gerard Endenburg developed a management and governance method called Sociocracy while managing his electrical engineering corporation, Endenburg Electrotechnik, in the Netherlands. G. Endenberg developed a management system as an alternative to the classical hierarchical management system. The sociocracy decision-making method has grown in cybernetics, systemic thinking organizations that have had a tremendous impact on commercial activity in America (Mirzagitova, 2014). In Lithuania, the developers of the websites "Meetings", "Talent Safari", and "Primum Esse" disseminate the ideas of sociocracy and teach company leaders about the new paradigm of management that enables employees to be involved in the decision-making process. The essence of sociocracy is to allow people to delegate decisions to expert groups. As all groups of professionals have to report to the whole community, and are selected with the consent of each member, the decision-making process takes place both from the bottom to the top and from the top to the bottom. This creates feedback circles, and thus ensures good communication throughout the organization. The groups of experts act as partly independent in discussing all issues in the meetings of their members, in which each member has equal rights. The groups (referred to as small circles, called Endenberg's rings) have frequent meetings for tactical issues. The decisions made in the group must be in line with the general organization policy. Big groups (big rings) rarely meet and deal with only very important issues. The group leader usually organizes decision-making process by taking operational decisions unilaterally. The method of sociocracy enables all members of an organization to be involved in the organization's management process, where everyone can express their opinion. One of the essential aspects of sociocracy is its dynamism, and therefore sociocracy can be called dynamic management, as it emphasizes the abundance of challenges in today's business environment, where the need for quick and just solutions is necessary. The demand for dynamic management creates some important general constraints on any techniques used: speed and coordination. One of the most important tasks of the company is to organize teamwork and decision making in accordance with the principles of dynamic management. Dynamic management logic considers human power to be an essential element of progress, and effective human collaboration is necessary for the results of the organization. Dynamic management is needed in order to be able to respond flexibly and act in each situation (for example, when it comes to changing opinions because new information is received or previous solutions failed) to enable people to act on their own, quickly and independently, in the same harmonious manner with others. The goal of dynamic management is to combine the paradox: to operate in a harmoniously changing environment, while moving forward quickly and dynamically; to save what works and change what does not work immediately as soon as the "voltage" is identified. The following are demonstrated by the dynamic management of the organization: the decentralization of individual areas of activity; human resources realize their potential freely; setting priorities for action; the involvement of members of the organization in decisionmaking. The introduction of sociocracy as a new organizational management paradigm in the business sector would provide the following benefits: improving decision-making quality throughout the organization, problem solving and teamwork communication, enhancing leadership quality, and increasing the efficiency of meetings. The content analysis revealed the fact that autocracy is not suitable for collective bargaining, and voting as a way of democracy does not allow to make good decisions; therefore, the new organizational management paradigm – sociocracy of practical application helps to improve company management and improve effectiveness.

The module was administered as a post-election interview. The resulting data are provided along with voting, demographic, district and macro variables in a single dataset.

CSES Variable Table
The list of variables is being provided on the CSES Website to help in understanding what content is available from CSES, and to compare the content available in each module.

Themes:

MICRO-LEVEL DATA:

Identification and study administration variables:
weighting factors; election type; date of election 1st and 2nd round; study timing (post-election study, pre-election and post-election study, between rounds of majoritarian election); mode of interview; gender of interviewer; date questionnaire administered; primary electoral district of respondent; number of days the interview was conducted after the election; language of questionnaire.

Demography:
year and month of birth; gender; education; marital status; union membership; union membership of others in household; business association membership, farmers´ association membership; professional association membership; current employment status; main occupation; socio economic status; employment type - public or private; industrial sector; current employment status, occupation, socio economic status, employment type - public or private, and industrial sector of spouse; household income; number of persons in household; number of children in household under the age of 18; number of children in household under the age of 6; attendance at religious services; religiosity; religious denomination; language usually spoken at home; region of residence; race; ethnicity; rural or urban residence; primary electoral district; country of birth; year arrived in current country.

Survey variables:
perception of public expenditure on health, education, unemployment benefits, defense, old-age pensions, business and industry, police and law enforcement, welfare benefits; perception of improving individual standard of living, state of economy, government's action on income inequality; respondent cast a ballot at the current and the previous election; vote choice (presidential, lower house and upper house elections) at the current and the previous election; respondent cast candidate preference vote at the current and the previous election; difference who is in power and who people vote for; sympathy scale for selected parties and political leaders; assessment of parties on the left-right-scale and/or an alternative scale; self-assessment on a left-right-scale and an optional scale; satisfaction with democracy; party identification; intensity of party identification, institutional and personal contact in the electoral campaigning, in person, by mail, phone, text message, email or social networks, institutional contact by whom; political information questions; expected development of household income in the next twelve month; ownership of residence, business or property or farm or livestock, stocks or bonds, savings; likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month; spouse likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month.

DISTRICT-LEVEL DATA:
number of seats contested in electoral district; number of candidates; number of party lists; percent vote of different parties; official voter turnout in electoral district.

MACRO-LEVEL DATA:
election outcomes by parties in current (lower house/upper house) legislative election; percent of seats in lower house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of seats in upper house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of votes received by presidential candidate of parties in current elections; electoral turnout; party of the president and the prime minister before and after the election; number of portfolios held by each party in cabinet, prior to and after the most recent election; size of the cabinet after the most recent election; number of parties participating in election; ideological families of parties; left-right position of parties assigned by experts and alternative dimensions; most salient factors in the election; fairness of the election; formal complaints against national level results; election irregularities reported; scheduled and held date of election; irregularities of election date; extent of election violence and post-election violence; geographic concentration of violence; post-election protest; electoral alliances permitted during the election campaign; existing electoral alliances; requirements for joint party lists; possibility of apparentement and types of apparentement agreements; multi-party endorsements on ballot; votes cast; voting procedure; voting rounds; party lists close, open, or flexible; transferable votes; cumulated votes if more than one can be cast; compulsory voting; party threshold; unit for the threshold; freedom house rating; democracy-autocracy polity IV rating; age of the current regime; regime: type of executive; number of months since last lower house and last presidential election; electoral formula for presidential elections; electoral formula in all electoral tiers (majoritarian, proportional or mixed); for lower and upper houses was coded: number of electoral segments; linked electoral segments; dependent formulae in mixed systems; subtypes of mixed electoral systems; district magnitude (number of members elected from each district); number of secondary and tertiary electoral districts; fused vote; size of the lower house; GDP growth (annual percent); GDP per capita; inflation, GDP Deflator (annual percent); Human development index; total population; total unemployment; TI corruption perception index; international migrant stock and net migration rate; general government final consumption expenditure; public spending on education; health expenditure; military expenditure; central government debt; Gini index; internet users per 100 inhabitants; mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants; fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants; daily newspapers; constitutional federal structure; number of legislative chambers; electoral results data available; effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties.

The module was administered as a post-election interview. The resulting data are provided along with voting, demographic, district and macro variables in a single dataset.

CSES Variable Table
The list of variables is being provided on the CSES Website to help in understanding what content is available from CSES, and to compare the content available in each module.

Themes:

MICRO-LEVEL DATA:

Identification and study administration variables:
weighting factors; election type; date of election 1st and 2nd round; study timing (post-election study, pre-election and post-election study, between rounds of majoritarian election); mode of interview; gender of interviewer; date questionnaire administered; primary electoral district of respondent; number of days the interview was conducted after the election; language of questionnaire.

Demography:
year and month of birth; gender; education; marital status; union membership; union membership of others in household; business association membership, farmers´ association membership; professional association membership; current employment status; main occupation; socio economic status; employment type - public or private; industrial sector; current employment status, occupation, socio economic status, employment type - public or private, and industrial sector of spouse; household income; number of persons in household; number of children in household under the age of 18; number of children in household under the age of 6; attendance at religious services; religiosity; religious denomination; language usually spoken at home; region of residence; race; ethnicity; rural or urban residence; primary electoral district; country of birth; year arrived in current country.

Survey variables:
perception of public expenditure on health, education, unemployment benefits, defense, old-age pensions, business and industry, police and law enforcement, welfare benefits; perception of improving individual standard of living, state of economy, government's action on income inequality; respondent cast a ballot at the current and the previous election; vote choice (presidential, lower house and upper house elections) at the current and the previous election; respondent cast candidate preference vote at the current and the previous election; difference who is in power and who people vote for; sympathy scale for selected parties and political leaders; assessment of parties on the left-right-scale and/or an alternative scale; self-assessment on a left-right-scale and an optional scale; satisfaction with democracy; party identification; intensity of party identification, institutional and personal contact in the electoral campaigning, in person, by mail, phone, text message, email or social networks, institutional contact by whom; political information questions; expected development of household income in the next twelve month; ownership of residence, business or property or farm or livestock, stocks or bonds, savings; likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month; spouse likelihood to find another job within the next twelve month.

DISTRICT-LEVEL DATA:
number of seats contested in electoral district; number of candidates; number of party lists; percent vote of different parties; official voter turnout in electoral district.

MACRO-LEVEL DATA:
election outcomes by parties in current (lower house/upper house) legislative election; percent of seats in lower house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of seats in upper house received by parties in current lower house/upper house election; percent of votes received by presidential candidate of parties in current elections; electoral turnout; party of the president and the prime minister before and after the election; number of portfolios held by each party in cabinet, prior to and after the most recent election; size of the cabinet after the most recent election; number of parties participating in election; ideological families of parties; left-right position of parties assigned by experts and alternative dimensions; most salient factors in the election; fairness of the election; formal complaints against national level results; election irregularities reported; scheduled and held date of election; irregularities of election date; extent of election violence and post-election violence; geographic concentration of violence; post-election protest; electoral alliances permitted during the election campaign; existing electoral alliances; requirements for joint party lists; possibility of apparentement and types of apparentement agreements; multi-party endorsements on ballot; votes cast; voting procedure; voting rounds; party lists close, open, or flexible; transferable votes; cumulated votes if more than one can be cast; compulsory voting; party threshold; unit for the threshold; freedom house rating; democracy-autocracy polity IV rating; age of the current regime; regime: type of executive; number of months since last lower house and last presidential election; electoral formula for presidential elections; electoral formula in all electoral tiers (majoritarian, proportional or mixed); for lower and upper houses was coded: number of electoral segments; linked electoral segments; dependent formulae in mixed systems; subtypes of mixed electoral systems; district magnitude (number of members elected from each district); number of secondary and tertiary electoral districts; fused vote; size of the lower house; GDP growth (annual percent); GDP per capita; inflation, GDP Deflator (annual percent); Human development index; total population; total unemployment; TI corruption perception index; international migrant stock and net migration rate; general government final consumption expenditure; public spending on education; health expenditure; military expenditure; central government debt; Gini index; internet users per 100 inhabitants; mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants; fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants; daily newspapers; constitutional federal structure; number of legislative chambers; electoral results data available; effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties.