Suchergebnisse

Die NATO, die institutionelle Verkörperung des transatlantischen Bündnisses, dernoch unlängst die Totenglocken geläutet wurden, ist heute bemerkenswert aktiv. Doch die Allianz, so Constanze Stelzenmüller, Redakteurin der Hamburger Wochenzeiung Die Zeit, steht jetzt vor größeren Herausforderungen als jemals zuvor. Zwar sei der alte Feind verschwunden, doch sehe sich die NATO einem breiten Spektrum diffuser Risiken und Gefahren gegenüber, von Netzwerken der Organisierten Kriminalität über Terrorismus bis hin zur Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen. Die Allianz scheint an die Grenzen ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit gelant zu sein. An ihren Mitgliedstaaten ist es, auf drängende Fragen bald eine Antwort zu finden. (DGAP-IP)

As former Palestinian Authority information minister, Yasser Abed Rabbo was among those who best knew Yasser Arafat. For 35 years he accompanied him everywhere & joined him in all negotiations. He & Israeli Yossi Beilin were behind the Geneva accord, an "unofficial" peace agreement that became public in October 2003. Unlike the roadmap -- which has run into a dead end -- this "model" agreement addressed all the issues in dispute -- Jerusalem, the right of return, dividing of land, etc -- & proposed concrete solutions. Neither Ariel Sharon nor Yasser Arafat followed up on these proposals at the time. But as new Palestinian leadership open to dialogue with Israel takes over at the Muqataa compound, it is not impossible that the Geneva initiative might again be a subject of discussion. Adapted from the source document.

Does the level of democracy of a country incline it toward participation in post-cold war era, United Nations (UN) peace operations? The link between democracy and multilateral peace operations in liberal theory is explored, and the expanding UN global presence and its in debtedness to democracies are examined. Hypotheses drawn from liberal and realist theory are tested on a global set of countries in the period between 1993 and 2001, using cross-sectional, time-series data and a Heckman selection model. The descriptive evidence and robust model results provide strong support for the proposition that the UN peace operations of the post-cold war era relied on democratic contributions. A country's level of democracy accounts for why and how much countries contributed to these operations when competing with a host of alternative explanations derived from a realist and liberal perspective.

Scholars argue that third parties make rational calculations and intervene to influence interstate dispute outcomes in favor of their own objectives. Third parties affect not only conflict outcomes but also escalation and duration. Theories of third-party involvement are applied to understand the dynamics of intrastate war. An analysis of event data for three Central American conflicts (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua) from 1984 to 2001 is used to examine transnational actors' influence on the dynamics of civil war. Findings show that transnational third parties often alter levels of cooperation among domestic adversaries, and that consistency affects the strength and direction of third-party influence.

This study argues that a subtle shift in the primary independent variable of the commercial peace literature—from trade to free trade—provides an opportunity to respond to the some of the strongest criticisms of this research program. Free trade, and not just trade, promotes peace by removing an important foundation of domestic privilege—protective barriers to international commerce—that enhances the domestic power of societal groups likely to support war, reduces the capacity of free-trading interests to limit aggression in foreign policy, and simultaneously generates political support for the state often used to build its war machine. A series of statistical tests demonstrates that higher levels of free trade, rather than trade alone, reduce military conflict between states. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, these arguments suggest how the puzzling case of World War I may confirm, rather than contradict, the central claims of commercial liberalism.

The effectiveness of partition as a tool for achieving peace is examined in order to determine whether dividing Kosovo would stabilize the Balkans. Partition has historically created huge humanitarian problems & enduring interstate conflicts. In addition, separation has often bolstered authoritarian rulers that use a "divide & rule" approach to maintain power instead of attempting to develop a consensus. No leader from the Albanian majority in Kosovo has tried to unite the various communities. Tens of thousands of Kosovar Serbs have been displaced since 1999, & the UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) has been unable to guarantee their safety. Other issues addressed include the determination of Albanian extremists to "cleanse" Kosovo of Serbs; the critical need for UNMIK to maintain law/order; & the possibility of establishing a protectorate as an alternative to a partition based on ethnic intolerance. Once law & order are established, the international community must increase aid in order to allow Kosovo to enjoy the economic progress needed for peace & an inclusive democracy capable of accommodating diversity. J. Lindroth