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Sentiment alone does not send my thoughts back to the first meeting of the Association which I attended—that held in Washington in December, 1920, a quarter of a century ago. You will have no time for that, although, perhaps, entry into a guild and fellowship has its appropriate niche for each of us, and so in some measure plays a collective rôle. The times and circumstances then and now, however, have useful common elements; both meetings followed and follow a world war; both reflect an atmosphere of exhaustion and of worry, of unsettlement, and also of new challenges to effort in the reshaping of things.But lately I have been recalling particularly words spoken at that earlier meeting by the then Secretary of War, Newton Baker, when he addressed the assembled Associations. Some of you will remember how vividly he described an episode in an American offensive in France, when he stood beside the commanding officer in a small hut, the maps and charts before them, and messages poured in as the hour of assault arrived and the troops moved forward. After a time came an appeal from an advanced unit requesting the barrage to be lifted, as their objective was won. The commander studied the maps and charts. "Continue the barrage," he ordered; "we cannot yet have reached that point." Later, after the battle was over and prisoners were being questioned, the message was traced to an enemy officer who had thus tried to trick the Americans and had faked the appeal. Secretary Baker drove home his point.

There are probably few members of the learned professions who do not feel the urge to contribute, if they can, to the existing store of knowledge regarding their chosen field, or, more ambitious still, to advance yet further that body of thought constituting the fundamental principles by which it is sought to interpret the data dealt with, to trace relationships between cause and effect, to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, to evaluate action by results—in a word, to give philosophic coherence to what would otherwise be disconnected and unrelated thinking.In the case of many, this urge is supplemented by a positive obligation. Those holding academic positions calling for the direction of students engaged in advanced or postgraduate work, and those at the head of institutions of research, not only have the desire themselves to engage in work of original research, but are under the responsibility of encouraging, if not compelling, work of a like character by others.

Gerardo L. Munck. University of Southern California (USC)@GerardoMunckSocial scientists have not discovered laws similar to those in the physical sciences. But they undersell what their disciplines have accomplished. That is why I like Josep Colomer's claim that 30 important propositions in political science should be treated as "things we know."  Nov 25, 2022252. Retweets.       16. Quote Tweets.      1,043. LikesTo convey a sense of Colomer's claim, I copy verbatim the 30 propositions. Sources: Josep Colomer, The Science of Politics: An Introduction (2011), Oxford University Press, pp. xxi -xxv.  - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259760896_The_Science_of_Politics_An_IntroductionCiencia de la politica (2010, 2017), Editorial Ariel.  - https://www.amazon.com/-/es/Josep-Maria-Colomer/dp/8434425289?asin=B06WD4Z1N7&revisionId=d87f6ef8&format=1&depth=1·1.PUBLIC GOODS. In contrast to private goods, public goods are indivisible & cannot be satisfactorily provided by the market or other private initiatives. The provision of public goods requires cooperation or coercion, whether by means of collective action or effective government2. GOVERNMENT SIZE. The demand for public goods and the relative levels of public expenditure by governments tend to increase with economic prosperity, institutional stability, and democracy.3. COLLECTIVE ACTION. Members of small, concentrated, and homogeneous communities or interest groups have more incentives to cooperate and participate in collective action than members of large, dispersed, and heterogeneous groups. /13. COLLECTIVE ACTION. In the public arena, small groups tend to have relatively more access to public resources at the expense of large groups. /24. VOICE VERSUS EXIT. Collective action for the advancement of collective interests, or "voice," weakens and may fail if the rival action of "exit," in search for an alternative provider, is less costly and more likely to give access to public goods.5. PRISONER'S DILEMMA. The "Prisoner's Dilemma," which is the most famous model in game theory, can represent the basic structure of collective action problems for the provision of public goods. /15. PRISONER'S DILEMMA. In this game, each actor has incentives not to cooperate, which may lead to an inefficient outcome in which all the participants are worse off than if all cooperated. /26. SUSTAINED COOPERATION. In interactions of the Prisoner's Dilemma type, sustained cooperation can emerge if actors apply the strategy of cooperating and doing unto others as they do unto yourself—also called "Tit for Tat." /16. SUSTAINED COOPERATION. Mutual cooperation is more likely the greater the uncertainty as to the length of the collective relationship and the higher the number of interactions you may be involved in. /27. LEADERSHIP. Collective action of communities and interest groups can develop thanks to leadership. Leaders distribute the costs of action among group members to provide public and private goods, /17. LEADERSHIP. while, in exchange, followers give the leaders votes or support and allow them to enjoy the benefits of power, fame, income, and a political career. /28. SMALL IS DEMOCRATIC. Small communities, which tend to be relatively harmonious in economic and ethnic terms, are comparatively advantageous for soft, democratic forms of government. /18. SMALL IS DEMOCRATIC. In recent times, small independent countries and self-governed communities have proliferated, thus making the average country size decrease. /29. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE. Multiple levels of government, including local, state, and global, are necessary for an efficient provision of public goods at diverse territorial scales.10. FEDERATION NEEDS MANY UNITS. Local democratic self-government and large-scale provision of public goods can be compatible by means of federalism. Many-unit federations, in which no unit is sufficiently large to dominate, tend to survive and endure. /110. FEDERATION NEEDS MANY UNITS. In contrast, two-unit-only federations tend to fail, leading to either absorption of the smaller unit by the larger one or secession of the small, likely dominated unit. /211. DICTATORSHIPS FAIL AND FALL. Dictatorships have self-appointed rulers holding on to power by coercive and violent means. They can survive on the basis of repression and their "substantive" performance, whether economic or other. /111. DICTATORSHIPS FAIL AND FALL. But they also tend to fall as a consequence of their failures, including military defeats, economic crises, or the dictator's death. /212. DEVELOPMENT FAVORS DEMOCRACY. Democracy is based on freedom and regular elections of rulers. Economic development favors the viability of democratic regimes because it tends to reduce income and social polarization and lower the intensity of redistributive conflicts.13. DEMOCRACY FAVORS DEVELOPMENT. Democracy can favor economic development because it is strongly associated with the rule of law and is more competent in the provision of public goods.14. DEMOCRATIC PEACE. Democratic states are less likely to fight one another and engage in wars than dictatorships.15. PARTY OLIGARCHY. Political parties are organizations that present policy proposals and compete for political power. A political organization tends to become an "oligarchy," ie, it tends to be dominated by political leaders or professional politicians seeking votes & offices.16. EXTREME ACTIVISTS. Voluntary political activists hold more "extreme" policy or ideological positions than party voters and even party leadership.17.MEDIAN VOTER. In elections in which only 2 major parties compete, they may have incentives to approach each other and converge in their policy positions. Once they converge around the median voter's preference, neither party has electoral incentives to move away from the other party18. INCUMBENT ADVANTAGE. Electoral competition is asymmetric between the government and the opposition. The incumbent party in government can gain advantage in electoral competition by providing or hiding information on its record to obtain credibility.19. ISSUE OWNERSHIP. In spite of parties' convergence in their policy positions on some issues, a party can keep advantage and "own" an issue if its past record in government has given it credit for policy making on that issue.20. NON-DEBATE CAMPAIGNS. In electoral campaigns, rival parties and candidates tend to choose or emphasize different policy issues according to different issue ownership and the parties' or candidates' expected relative advantage.21. POLICY CONSENSUS. In the long term, broad policy consensus can be accumulated on an increasing number of issues. But in the short term, mediocre policies and incumbent parties with no good performance in government may survive for lack of a sufficiently popular alternative.22. CONSENSUAL PLURALISM. There is an inverse correlation between the number of political parties in a system and the degree of party polarization in electoral competition. /122. CONSENSUAL PLURALISM. High fragmentation of the party system is associated with a high number of issues on the policy agenda, which generates low polarization of political competition and more opportunities for consensus. /2123. MAJORITY BIPARTISM. Presidential and other one-office elections by plurality rule tend to be associated with single-party dominance or a balance between two parties.24. MORE SEATS, MORE PARTIES. In assembly and parliamentary elections, large size of the assembly and a high number of seats in each district and proportional representation are associated with a high number of political parties.25. MICRO-MEGA RULE. When choosing electoral rules, large parties prefer small assemblies and small districts by plurality rule, while small parties prefer large assemblies and large districts with proportional representation.26. SMALL ASSEMBLIES, LARGE DISTRICTS. The development of multiple parties favors the adoption of large multi-seat districts with proportional representation rules. In the long term, proportional representation rules have been increasingly adopted. /126. SMALL ASSEMBLIES, LARGE DISTRICTS. But in very large countries, a large federal assembly can be elected with different electoral rules, including small single-seat districts. /227.INSTITUTIONAL "DEADLOCK." Single-party government promotes a high concentration of power, which may foster effectiveness in decision-making. In contrast, separate elections for different offices & divisions of power may produce divided government, "deadlock," & policy stability.28.MINIMUMCOALITIONS.Parties in parliament tend to form minimum-size winning coalitions & prefer partners located in contiguous policy & ideology positions. The distribution of cabinet portfolios among coalition parties tends to be proportional to the N of seats controlled by each party.29. CABINET DURATION. Single-party majority cabinets tend to last longer than multiparty coalition or minority cabinets.30. TWO-PARTY STALEMATE. In a system with separation of powers between the presidency and the congress, policy change is relatively more viable if there are multiple parties or individual members of congress are not strongly tied to party votes.30. TWO-PARTY STALEMATE. In contrast, a two-party system with strong party discipline may prop up confrontation and inter-institutional stalemate. /2

Power & Choice offers an in-depth look into the nuances of politics through the analysis of collective choices for a group or state through the use of power. Using extended case examples from around the world, Power & Choice provides undergraduate students with a clear and engaging introduction to political science and comparative politics.

Scholars in comparative politics and international relations routinely evaluate causal hypotheses by referring tocounterfactual caseswhere a hypothesized causal factor is supposed to have been absent. The methodological status and the viability of this very common procedure are unclear and are worth examining. How does the strategy of counterfactual argument relate, if at all, to methods of hypothesis testing based on the comparison of actual cases, such as regression analysis or Mill's Method of Difference? Are counterfactual thought experiments a viable means of assessing hypotheses about national and international outcomes, or are they methodologically invalid in principle? The paper addresses the first question in some detail and begins discussion of the second. Examples from work on the causes of World War I, the nonoccurrence of World War III, social revolutions, the breakdown of democratic regimes in Latin America, and the origins of fascism and corporatism in Europe illustrate the use, problems and potential of counterfactual argument in small-N-oriented political science research.

Discusses subject matter and research methods of political science and describes ways in which political science research has aided policy makers nationally and internationally, brought benefits to humanity, and provided knowledge critical to other fields of study; 7 articles. Contents: Evaluating political science research: information for buyers and sellers, by Arthur Lupia; Strategies for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution: scholarship for policy making, by Alexander L. George; Government formation and public policy, by Michael Laver; Political science and fundamental research, by Michael C. Munger; The danger of self-evident truths, by Elinor Ostrom; Contributions of survey research to political science, by Henry E. Brady; The contributions of international politics research to policy, by Randolph M. Siverson.

Although men and women often differ in political attitudes and behavior, there is no widely accepted scientific explanation of such phenomena. After surveying evidence concerning gender differences in the fields of social psychology, ethology, neurology, cultural anthropology, and political science, five hypotheses concerning the way males and females respond to social cues are derived from the neo-Darwinian theory of natural selection. The predicted differences in the mode of political cognition are then shown to be consistent with findings from experimental studies of emotional and cognitive reactions to televised facial displays of political leaders.