Over the course of the twentieth century curriculum differentiation became a mainstay in education, particularly in secondary schools. Much has been written on how this is a purposeful selection process often tied to larger social and political status and relationships. Moreover, knowledge is largely deemed appropriate based upon whose knowledge it is and for what student it is appropriate. Also, within the past two decades, there has been an increase in neoliberal school choice policies and neoconservative standardization policies in public education largely in the form of charter schools and high-stakes testing. These market policies aim to increase innovation and academic achievement via increased competition among schools and students. Nevertheless, many scholars argue that these policies only serve to exacerbate educational inequality. Standardization policies also claim to increase educational equality by holding all students to the same standards, though they have been critiqued for their potential biases against disadvantaged population, their one-dimensional measure of success, and their effect of narrowing the curricula to testing skills only. These two themes in educational research and reform raise questions concerning how curricula content is affected by choice and accountability policies. As a result, this study finds that overall, even among different institutional options within Chicago's school choice policy, low-performing, low-status schools are increasingly similar in stated course plans which emphasize test preparation and skills specifically for standardized tests, particularly in the test taking year. Also, schools that have the highest achievement scores, ironically, also have the most authority to deviate from a test preparation focused curricula with the ability to focus on developing abstract skills in students, such as critical thinking and cultural awareness.
A theory of group solidarity / by Michael Hechter -- Determinants of group cohesion in contemporary Japan / by Mary C. Brinton -- Normative and rational explanations of a classic case / by Debra Friedman -- A French political regionalism, 1849-1978 / by William Brustein -- Karl Polanyi's social theory / by Michael Hechter -- A theory of institutional change and the economic history of the Western world / by Douglass C. North -- The predatory theory of rule / by Margaret Levi -- Why workers strike / by Debra Friedman
Games Real Actors Play provides a persuasive argument for the use of basic concepts of game theory in understanding public policy conflicts. Fritz Scharpf criticizes public choice theory as too narrow in its examination of actor motives and discursive democracy as too blind to the institutional incentives of political parties. With the nonspecialist in mind, the author presents a coherent actor-centered model of institutional rational choice that integrates a wide variety of theoretical contributions, such as game theory, negotiation theory, transaction cost economics, international relations, and democratic theory.Games Real Actors Play offers a framework for linking positive theory to the normative issues that necessarily arise in policy research and employs many cross-national examples, including a comparative use of game theory to understand the differing reactions of Great Britain, Sweden, Austria, and the Federal Republic of Germany to the economic stagflation of the 1970s.
It is a central claim of the national competitiveness literature that firms exploit the comparative advantages of their environment by choosing to pursue the product market strategy that is facilitated by national financial- and labour-market institutions. Otherwise, so goes the argument, firms are punished in that strategies receiving no institutional support are less successful and therefore not sustainable in the long run. My analyses of pharmaceutical firms in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom challenge these arguments on the choice and success of competitive strategies. Given that different measures of strategy success do not indicate that the latter is in line with national institutional advantages, I develop an alternative explanation for the strategy choices of firms. On the basis of my qualitative interviews with managers, I argue that technological opportunities to transform inventions or imitations into marketable products are a primary concern when entrepreneurs choose their firm's strategy.
The growing field of collaborative governance has long sought to explain processes of collective decision making. Insights from institutional analysis highlight the influence of rules in shaping collective decisions. Yet, less is known about how such rules are created; in other words, how collaborative organizations decide how to decide. By drawing on concepts from Cultural Theory, we examine the connections between worldviews and decision rules across four collaborative watershed organizations in Ohio, United States. Results from this comparative case analysis indicate correlations between the group dimension of worldview and decision rules about choice, as well as between the grid dimension of worldview and two different types of decision rules, choice and aggregation. These results highlight the explanatory value of integrating aspects of Cultural Theory with the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. Results also suggest how governments might more effectively engage with collaborative organizations.
This paper presents a model allowing to analyze voting, welfare institutions and economic performance. We consider a political economy framework with three classes of agents: entrepreneurs, employed workers and unemployed workers. Agents vote on alternative institutional options: the degree of labour market flexibility and the intensity of redistribution. We show that the welfare state configuration depends on the nature of the political system ? majoritarian, coalition, two-party. Because internationalization reduces the possibility for national government to effectively tax profits, the existing political coalition is fragilized by the process of globalization. The model generates results concerning the macroeconomic equilibrium employment level. Hence we can assess the effects of internationalization on macroeconomic performance. The impact of internalization depends on the nature of the political system (majoritarian versus coalition government) and on the institutional configuration (positive flexibility versus positive redistribution).
This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Two politicoeconomic equilibria arise from our model, one with little protection of insiders on capital and labor markets, and another one with an institutional bias toward favoring insiders on both markets. Coherent and relatively homogeneous societies, where binding commitments enjoy greater feasability, are more likely to be found in the latter, corporatist equilibrium, whereas fragmented, heterogeneous Anglo-Saxon societies fit better into the former category. These predictions of the model receive considerable support in our cross-country empirical analysis, thus being potentially important for the current debates concerning the reforms of labor markets and of corporate governance systems.
This paper analyzes the influence of financial integration on institutional quality. We construct a dynamic political-economic model of an autocracy in which a ruling elite uses its political power to expropriate the general population. Although financial integration reduces capital costs for entrepreneurs and thereby raises gross incomes in the private sector, the elite may counteract this effect by increasing the level of expropriation. Since de facto political power is linked to economic resources, financial integration also has long-run consequences for the distribution of power and for the rise of an entrepreneurial class.
Economic growth and poverty reduction require for a country to establish efficient rules for economic and political transactions. Poor countries suffer from inadequate, inefficient transaction rules. Formal rules (e.g., laws, policies) must be nested in hospitable behavioural norms and values. Cultural collectivism in many of these countries and consequent group-oriented values, factionalism, and discretionary rule implementation have adverse implications for their efforts to establish well-defined property rights and other rules. Over time, these countries must establish rules for government-enforced, widespread impersonal transactions. To this end, efficient economic and political transactions should be promoted as repeated games. Institutional reform efforts should be aimed at expanding transactions, initially among small, voluntary groups, capitalizing on economic agents' group-oriented values for intragroup governance; at entrusting important rule implementing functions to autonomous, nonpoliticized agencies; and at inducing competing political groups to align their goals more with societal than factional interests. – growth ; poverty ; rules ; institutions ; human behaviour
Research Methods in Deliberative Democracy is the first book that brings together a wide range of methods used in the study of deliberative democracy. It offers thirty-one different methods that scholars use for theorizing, measuring, exploring, or applying deliberative democracy. Each chapter presents one method by explaining its utility in deliberative democracy research and providing guidance on its application by drawing on examples from previous studies. The book hopes to inspire scholars to undertake methodologically robust, intellectually creative, and politically relevant research. It fills a significant gap in a rapidly growing field of research by assembling diverse methods and thereby expanding the range of methodological choices available to students, scholars, and practitioners of deliberative democracy.
Interview article with Andrei Yakovlev, professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and head of the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies on recent tendecies. Yakovlev, a leading Russian economist, has a deepknowledge of the transformation of Russian enterprise throughout the post-Soviet time. In this interview, he puts the microeconomic perspective within a broad political economic context and evaluates the policy choices made by Russia's political elites after the Arab Spring in 2011. Although he is quite pessimistic about Russia's prospects, Yakovlev suggests that the new geopolitical situation and sanctions have created promising opportunities for the Russian economy. However, these opportunities can be used only if Russian elites achieve a new consensus regarding redistribution of economic rent.
The search for a new democratic order in Europe after World War II was marked by the creation of a system of human rights protection based on the rule of law and a guarantee for every person under their jurisdiction human rights and fundamental freedoms. A system based on the effective cooperation of Member States of the international community should, in practice, become the one that determines the capacity of a particular entity, a particular institution, working alone or in collaboration with others. In the scientific literature, the idea of human rights, reflected in studies of European state building and public administration, has been developed into a theoretical concept that has become the basis of a social institute of human rights legitimized as a result of institutional processes at all levels of global and European governance. Given the current geopolitical changes, the migration crisis, environmental problems, armed conflicts and terrorist attacks, human rights are constantly being violated; public authorities, both national and integrational, face the challenge of finding effective mechanisms for ensuring the survival and development of human society. That is why the purpose of the article is to identify the particularities of the functioning of the EU's institutional human rights protection system in the context of finding an effective model of the human rights protection system. The EU's main institution is the Council of Europe, which has proven itself to be the most effective object of the system during its existence.The tasks of the countries which have acceded to the Council of Europe indicate the need to create a common ground for understanding the rule of law, as well as freedom and human rights. In this context, it should be emphasized that the effectiveness of the institutional system created to protect human rights is linked to certain standards, including the decision-making process legally enshrined in both international and national law. The Council of Europe and its Member States, in the interests of respect for and protection of liberties and human rights, should make every effort to ensure that all mechanisms, including political monitoring and control by the European Court of Human Rights, are used.It is argued that the effectiveness of human rights protection systems in the EU depends largely on the effectiveness of the procedures for implementing and monitoring the implementation of commitments made by individual countries. Attention is drawn to the fact that no state can ignore the values that are fundamental to the democratic identity of the entire international community, which they are bound to uphold. This also applies to Ukraine, which has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and has to implement its requirements in domestic law. The main instruments and mechanisms of the European Union are being considered to help address human rights issues in the Member States. The functions of the main actors in the human rights protection system, in particular the European Court of Human Rights, are analyzed. An important condition for the effective functioning of the system is interinstitutional cooperation betweenSecretary General of the Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights and the Tribunal of the European Court of Human Rights.It has been identified that one of the standard sets is to achieve a high level of human rights protection,which depends on the effectivenessof the procedures for fulfilling and controlling the commitments undertaken by member states of the Council of Europe. The effectiveness of the control procedure and the specific control mechanism increases only when a complaint is submitted to a competent, independent body, preferably a law enforcement one. This depends on the legal education of the population, which should be aware of the choice of instruments and mechanisms to protect their rights in a particular situation. Similarly, the issues of regulation of the sphere of official competence, which enable them to perform their function without any external pressure, also need legal justification.The choice of specific action methods by the state to ensure the protection of human rights, remains free, however, as a rule, it is limited and determined by the purpose or result set out in aparticular international agreement. The current activity of the Council of Europe proves that one of the main areas of its work is the creation of constitutional standards oriented towards the democratic development of Member States' political systems based on the values associated with freedom and human rights, which form its fundamental basis. These standards are transposed into the internal legal systems of the Member States.Thus, the theoretical foundations that characterize the human rights protection system indicate that in the process of creating human rights standards, the Council of Europe's «soft instruments», including, above all, recommendations, occupy an extremely important place. A very important incentive for Member States to fulfill their obligations before the Council of Europe is not only the quality of its specific monitoring and control procedures, but also the fact that the European Union itself clearly states that a country which does not comply with the principles and standards of the CoE does not have a chance of EU membership.It is noted that, regardless of levels, the process of European integration is based on broadening the sphere of democratic values and standards in order to better protect human rights and ensure the successful development of European communities. Respect for human rights is first and foremost the task of national authorities. This also applies to Ukraine which is seeking to become a full member of the EU. ; Пошук нового демократичного порядку в Європі після Другої світової війни ознаменувався створенням системи захисту прав людини, яка базується на засадах верховенства права та гарантій кожній особі, яка перебуває під їх юрисдикцією, прав людини та основних свобод.Доводиться, що ефективність систем захисту прав людини у ЄС багато в чому залежить від того, наскільки ефективними є процедури щодо здійснення та контролю за виконанням зобов'язань, взятих окремими країнами. Звертається увага на те, що жодна держава не може ігнорувати цінності, які є основними для демократичної ідентичності всієї міжнародної спільноти, якої вони зобов'язані дотримуватися. Розглядаються основні інструменти та механізми Європейського Союзу, які допомагають вирішувати питання захисту прав людини у країнах-членах. Аналізується функції основних суб'єктів системи захисту прав людини, зокрема Європейського Суду з прав людини. Важливою умовою ефективної діяльності системи є міжінституціональна співпраця між Генеральним секретарем Ради Європи, Уповноваженим Ради з прав людини та Трибуналом Європейського суду з прав людини.Визначено, що одним із стандартних нормативних наборів є досягнення високого рівня захисту прав людини, тим більше, чим ефективніші процедури виконання та контролю зобов'язань, взятих на себе державами-членами Ради Європи. Таким чином, теоретичні основи, що характеризують систему захисту прав людини, свідчать про те, що в процесі створення стандартів прав людини «м'які інструменти» Ради Європи, включаючи насамперед рекомендації, займають надзвичайно важливе місце. Дуже важливим стимулом для держав-членів виконувати свої зобов'язання перед Радою Європи є не лише якість його конкретні процедури моніторингу та контролю, а й той факт, що сам Європейський Союз чітко зазначає, що країна, яка не відповідає принципам та стандартам РЄ, не має шансів на членство в ЄС.Відзначається, що процес європейської інтеграції, незалежно від рівнів, базується на розширенні сфери демократичних цінностей та стандартів для більш ефективного захисту прав людини та забезпечення успішного розвитку європейських спільнот. А повага до прав людини є перш за все завданням національних органів влади. Це стосується і України, яка прагне стати повноправним членом ЄС.
The search for a new democratic order in Europe after World War II was marked by the creation of a system of human rights protection based on the rule of law and a guarantee for every person under their jurisdiction human rights and fundamental freedoms. A system based on the effective cooperation of Member States of the international community should, in practice, become the one that determines the capacity of a particular entity, a particular institution, working alone or in collaboration with others. In the scientific literature, the idea of human rights, reflected in studies of European state building and public administration, has been developed into a theoretical concept that has become the basis of a social institute of human rights legitimized as a result of institutional processes at all levels of global and European governance. Given the current geopolitical changes, the migration crisis, environmental problems, armed conflicts and terrorist attacks, human rights are constantly being violated; public authorities, both national and integrational, face the challenge of finding effective mechanisms for ensuring the survival and development of human society. That is why the purpose of the article is to identify the particularities of the functioning of the EU's institutional human rights protection system in the context of finding an effective model of the human rights protection system. The EU's main institution is the Council of Europe, which has proven itself to be the most effective object of the system during its existence.The tasks of the countries which have acceded to the Council of Europe indicate the need to create a common ground for understanding the rule of law, as well as freedom and human rights. In this context, it should be emphasized that the effectiveness of the institutional system created to protect human rights is linked to certain standards, including the decision-making process legally enshrined in both international and national law. The Council of Europe and its Member States, in the interests of respect for and protection of liberties and human rights, should make every effort to ensure that all mechanisms, including political monitoring and control by the European Court of Human Rights, are used.It is argued that the effectiveness of human rights protection systems in the EU depends largely on the effectiveness of the procedures for implementing and monitoring the implementation of commitments made by individual countries. Attention is drawn to the fact that no state can ignore the values that are fundamental to the democratic identity of the entire international community, which they are bound to uphold. This also applies to Ukraine, which has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and has to implement its requirements in domestic law. The main instruments and mechanisms of the European Union are being considered to help address human rights issues in the Member States. The functions of the main actors in the human rights protection system, in particular the European Court of Human Rights, are analyzed. An important condition for the effective functioning of the system is interinstitutional cooperation betweenSecretary General of the Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights and the Tribunal of the European Court of Human Rights.It has been identified that one of the standard sets is to achieve a high level of human rights protection,which depends on the effectivenessof the procedures for fulfilling and controlling the commitments undertaken by member states of the Council of Europe. The effectiveness of the control procedure and the specific control mechanism increases only when a complaint is submitted to a competent, independent body, preferably a law enforcement one. This depends on the legal education of the population, which should be aware of the choice of instruments and mechanisms to protect their rights in a particular situation. Similarly, the issues of regulation of the sphere of official competence, which enable them to perform their function without any external pressure, also need legal justification.The choice of specific action methods by the state to ensure the protection of human rights, remains free, however, as a rule, it is limited and determined by the purpose or result set out in aparticular international agreement. The current activity of the Council of Europe proves that one of the main areas of its work is the creation of constitutional standards oriented towards the democratic development of Member States' political systems based on the values associated with freedom and human rights, which form its fundamental basis. These standards are transposed into the internal legal systems of the Member States.Thus, the theoretical foundations that characterize the human rights protection system indicate that in the process of creating human rights standards, the Council of Europe's «soft instruments», including, above all, recommendations, occupy an extremely important place. A very important incentive for Member States to fulfill their obligations before the Council of Europe is not only the quality of its specific monitoring and control procedures, but also the fact that the European Union itself clearly states that a country which does not comply with the principles and standards of the CoE does not have a chance of EU membership.It is noted that, regardless of levels, the process of European integration is based on broadening the sphere of democratic values and standards in order to better protect human rights and ensure the successful development of European communities. Respect for human rights is first and foremost the task of national authorities. This also applies to Ukraine which is seeking to become a full member of the EU. ; Пошук нового демократичного порядку в Європі після Другої світової війни ознаменувався створенням системи захисту прав людини, яка базується на засадах верховенства права та гарантій кожній особі, яка перебуває під їх юрисдикцією, прав людини та основних свобод.Доводиться, що ефективність систем захисту прав людини у ЄС багато в чому залежить від того, наскільки ефективними є процедури щодо здійснення та контролю за виконанням зобов'язань, взятих окремими країнами. Звертається увага на те, що жодна держава не може ігнорувати цінності, які є основними для демократичної ідентичності всієї міжнародної спільноти, якої вони зобов'язані дотримуватися. Розглядаються основні інструменти та механізми Європейського Союзу, які допомагають вирішувати питання захисту прав людини у країнах-членах. Аналізується функції основних суб'єктів системи захисту прав людини, зокрема Європейського Суду з прав людини. Важливою умовою ефективної діяльності системи є міжінституціональна співпраця між Генеральним секретарем Ради Європи, Уповноваженим Ради з прав людини та Трибуналом Європейського суду з прав людини.Визначено, що одним із стандартних нормативних наборів є досягнення високого рівня захисту прав людини, тим більше, чим ефективніші процедури виконання та контролю зобов'язань, взятих на себе державами-членами Ради Європи. Таким чином, теоретичні основи, що характеризують систему захисту прав людини, свідчать про те, що в процесі створення стандартів прав людини «м'які інструменти» Ради Європи, включаючи насамперед рекомендації, займають надзвичайно важливе місце. Дуже важливим стимулом для держав-членів виконувати свої зобов'язання перед Радою Європи є не лише якість його конкретні процедури моніторингу та контролю, а й той факт, що сам Європейський Союз чітко зазначає, що країна, яка не відповідає принципам та стандартам РЄ, не має шансів на членство в ЄС.Відзначається, що процес європейської інтеграції, незалежно від рівнів, базується на розширенні сфери демократичних цінностей та стандартів для більш ефективного захисту прав людини та забезпечення успішного розвитку європейських спільнот. А повага до прав людини є перш за все завданням національних органів влади. Це стосується і України, яка прагне стати повноправним членом ЄС.
Metadata only record ; Common property rights are distinct from open access, where there are no laws regulating individual grazing; it is the breakdown of common property rights which has resulted in overgrazing in the Sahel, which in turn has given rise to call for land to be privatized. Others have argued that the solution to overgrazing is to internalize its costs by making the public aspects of the range private, thus creating a market in private grazing rights. By failing to differentiate between common property and open access, this assumes the inevitability of overgrazing, and also takes it for granted that each individual's choices are independent of the rest of the groups, and it ignores each persons uncertainty about how the rest of the group will behave. Problems of unrestricted entry are not identical to problems of common property which pertain to the use-rights by a group of a given size. Comparing grazing opportunities to the prisoners dilemma, each individual herder finds it rational to defect on any agreement made, although this ends in ruin for all. This means that all are led to a non-cooperative equilibrium, not least because there is no external enforcement of agreements. However, allowing no possibility of co-operatively enforced rules undermines the credibility of this argument. The implied inseparability further weakens it; dropping to ability to separate implies the interdependence of individual choice, as each herders grazing decisions are based on the expectation of the actions of others. This will have the effect of changing the marginal cost to each individual caused by the actions of others, and the game structure of the prisoners dilemma is no longer appropriate. The assurance problem (Sen) throws a different light, as it is essentially co-operative; still strategic in nature, it has two equilibrium points as there is no incentive to defect once an agreement has been made. Thus institutional rules providing complete assurance are self-reinforcing. Sub-optimal outcomes such as overgrazing do not arise from the dominance of individual strategy but from the inability of interdependent individuals to co-ordinate their actions. Co-operative solutions are most likely to succeed in small cohesive groups as assurance is largely a matter of information and communication.
