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The article studies the influence of left-wing the ideologies on the youth movement of Great Britain in 1960‑s. The article analyzes the role of the left-wing organizations and parties in strengthening of youth protest activity in the 1960‑s. The article dwells on external (Vietnam War, USSR actions) and internal (the actions of the Communist Party of Great Britain, growing number of pupils and students) factors, that affected the growing number of supporters of lefts among youth. The reason is to find the answer why there were no mass left-wing organizations in Great Britain attractive for the youth. The article concludes that one of the reasons of recession in protest activity and rejection of radical ideology was the Labour Party activity. Socialist orientation of Labour Party deprived the other left-wing parties of mass support. It is determined that youth movements of Great Britain and Continental Western Europe were very different. The difference lies in the fact that there was no mass discontent by political system and legislation among the youth in Great Britain. In contrast to the countries of Western Europe (mainly Western Germany and France), all of the mass youth protests were caused by external factors, such as Vietnam War.DOI 10.14258/izvasu(2016)2-23 ; Анализируется влияние левых идеологий на молодежное движение Великобритании 1960‑х гг., роль левых организаций и партий в усилении протестной активности молодежи. Исследуются внешние (война во Вьетнаме, действия СССР на международной арене) и внутренние (действия Коммунистической партии Великобритании, рост числа учащихся и студентов) факторы, оказавшие влияние на рост числа сторонников левых взглядов среди молодежи. Выясняется причина, по которой в Великобритании так и не сложилось ни одной организации левого толка, способной массово увлечь молодежь. Сделан вывод о том, что снижению протестной активности и неприятию радикальной левой идеологии способствовало наличие в Великобритании партии лейбористов. Социалистическая направленность лейбористов лишала остальные левые партии большей части электората. Установлено принципиальное различие молодежного движения Великобритании и стран Западной Европы, заключающееся в отсутствии массового недовольства имеющимися законодательством и политической системой среди молодежи. В отличие от стран Западной Европы (прежде всего ФРГ и Франции), все массовые акции протеста среди молодежи Великобритании проходили исключительно под действием внешнеполитических обстоятельств (война во Вьетнаме). DOI 10.14258/izvasu(2016)2-23

Статья посвящена исследованию генезиса понятия fitnah в контексте арабской политической культуры. Феномен fitnah исследуется с помощью бинарной исследовательской парадигмы: fitnah рассматривается как понятие, имеющее значительное смысловое разнообразие; fitnah рассматривается как реальное историческое явление, широко распространенное в арабо-исламском мире. В статье анализируется факт того, что в Сирию под влиянием призыва к джихаду, который звучал из уст влиятельных саудовских религиозных деятелей, отправились добровольцы. Некоторые из них возвращаются назад, узнав, что на самом деле они участвует вовсе не в джихаде, а в смуте - fitnah. ; The article is devoted to the genesis of the term fitnah within the Arab political culture. The fitnah is studied through the binary research paradigm: fitnah as a multi-meaning term and fitnah as a real historical widely spread form of the public activities in the Arab countries. The historical roots of fitnah date back to the Preislamic period. The general meaning of fitnah in the Koran has mainly negative connotation. However, the historical realities show us fitnah as a very common event within the whole Islamic period. In the beginning of 20th century the events that are called " fitnah " in the Arab Islamic historiography were unexpectedly bounded with the early electoral process. The top rank specialists of Islamic law still do not have a common attitude towards the Arab spring mass protests of 2011-2012, whether they are allowed or forbidden from the Shariat point of view. The contemporary life of this old form of the public protest demonstrates some new unexpected features. First, the protest events looked like fitnah drifted far from the pure religious activities and got almost the civil character. Second, they accumulated not only marginal social elements and demoralized soldiers, but also students and even a significant part of the local intellectuals. Contemporary means of communications like Internet, mobile devices, as well as TV and radio networks, make fitnah a powerful and rapid weapon of the opposition movement. In this article, one can also find an analysis of a remarkable fact: some participants who take part in war of jihad in Syria are thinking of retreat under the influence of the announcement that Syria is "the land of fitnah ".

"We started the 2011 revolution and the rest of Egypt followed," say Egyptian workers with strong conviction. Egyptian independent workers' continuous claims of contention and repertoires of protest were one of several main factors leading to the January 25, 2011 uprising. After thirty-two years of a Mubarak-led authoritarian regime, massive protests began in January 2011 and forced President Mubarak to step down from his position. The first question of this research endeavor is: how did Egyptian workers challenge the regime and how they became one of the factors leading to the January 2011 uprising? These workers were organized into loose networks of different independent groups that had been protesting for a decade and longer prior to January 2011. However, their regular protests for over a decade before 2011 challenged the authoritarian regime. This dissertation examines the combative role of Egyptian independent workers' formal and informal organizations as a contentious social movement to challenge the regime. It will examine the evolving role of workers as socio-economic actors and then as political actors in political transitions. Social Movement Theory (SMT) and its mechanisms and Social Movement Unionism (SMU) will be the lenses through which this research will be presented. The methodology will be the comparative case studies of two different movements where workers who advocated for their rights for a decade prior to January 2011 experienced significantly differing outcomes. One case study showcases the municipal real estate tax collection workers who were able to establish a successful social movement and then create an independent trade union. The second case study examines an influential group of garment and textile workers, who also developed an effective social movement, yet were not able to take it to the next step to establish an independent union. I will explore within this research a second question: why one group of workers was able to establish an independent union while the other arguably more influential group of workers, the garment and textile workers, was not able to do so. This had an impact on the influence they were able to exercise over the regime in addition to their effectiveness as a social movement for change. ; Ph. D.

The piquetero (picketer) movement of unemployed workers developed in a region of Argentina whose socioeconomic structure was profoundly transformed in the 1990s by the changes brought about by neoliberalism. The development of the movement revealed both continuity and change with regard to organizational traditions among the region's working class, including organizational forms, methods of protest, and relationships among different groups of workers. In 2001 the working class's potential for protest produced a rupture in the formerly dominant bloc, but this potential had its limits: there was no capacity for formulating an alternative program. The employed working class did not take on the role that would have been necessary, and without its participation the tasks at hand were too great. In the context of economic recovery, the majority of the working class opted to improve their personal situations rather than question the fundamental elements of the social order. However, a new level of consciousness was expressed through the increasing importance of union opposition and the continuity of protest strategies with elements of strong social confrontation. El movimiento piquetero de trabajadores desempleados se desarrolló en una región de Argentina cuya estructura socioeconómica fue profundamente transformada en los años 90 por los cambios provocados por el neoliberalismo. El desarrollo del movimiento revela tanto la continuidad y el cambio con respecto a las tradiciones de organización en la clase obrera de la región, incluyendo las formas de organización, métodos de protesta, y las relaciones entre los diferentes grupos de trabajadores. En 2001 el potencial de la clase obrera para la protesta había producido una ruptura en el bloque anteriormente dominante, pero este potencial tenía sus límites: no había capacidad para formular un programa alternativo. La clase obrera empleada no asumía el rol que habría sido necesario, y sin su participación las tareas a mano eran demasiado grandes. En el contexto de la recuperación económica, la mayoría de la clase obrera optó por mejorar su situación personal en lugar de cuestionar los elementos fundamentales del orden social. Sin embargo, un nuevo nivel de conciencia se expresó a través de la creciente importancia de la oposición de los sindicatos y la continuidad de las estrategias de protesta con elementos de fuerte confrontación social.

Актуальность и цели. Актуальность данного исследования определяется тем, что особенности политического протестного движения в современной России, вызванного причинами, имеющими социально-экономический характер, изучены недостаточно. В связи с этим целью работы является выявление специфики социально-экономических причин политического протеста в России. Материалы и методы. Методология работы основана на анализе результатов социологических исследований, проведенных в России Институтом социологии Российской академии наук и аналитическим центром Юрия Левады. Полученные данные обсуждаются в контексте теории относительной депривации Р. Т. Гарра. Выводы. При различии непосредственных поводов для протеста у разных слоев населения можно утверждать, что одной из основных причин массовых антиправительственных акций в современной России является недовольство социальной несправедливостью. После непродолжительного периода восстановления доверия населения государству последнее не смогло по разным причинам оправдать возрастающие ожидания граждан. В результате властные структуры столкнулись с протестами, в основе которых лежат не экономические, а морально-этические требования. Их условно можно разделить на личные переживания человека относительно происходящей вокруг него несправедливости и на недовольство морально-этическим состоянием власти. ; Background. Relevance of this research is defined by that the features of the political protest movement in the modern Russia, caused by the reasons of social and economic character, are studied insufficiently. In this regard the purpose of the article is to detect the specifics of the social and economic reasons of a political protest in Russia. Materials and methods. The methodology of the article is based on the analysis of results of the sociological researches conducted in Russia by the Institute of sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the analytical center of Levada Center. The retrieved data are discussed in a context of the theory of the relative deprivation by R. T. Garr. Conclusions. With differences in the immediate reasons for a protest in different segments of population, it can be argued that one of the main causes of mass anti-government actions in modern Russia was discontent with social injustice. After a brief period of recovery of public confidence, the government failed by various reasons to justify the rising expectations of citizens. As a result power structures faced a cornerstone at the heart of which are not economic, but moral and ethical requirements. It is conditionally possible to divide them into personal experiences of a man concerning injustice occurring around and dissatisfaction with a moral and ethical status of the power.

Am 27. Juli 1999 verstarb König Hassan II. von Marokko nach 38 Jahren Regentschaft. Drei Tage später erfolgte die Inthronisierung des 36-jährigen Kronprinzen als König Mohammed VI. In seiner ersten Thronrede am 30. Juli 1999 kündigte der neue König politische Reformen an. Der Ankündigung folgten verschiedene Maßnahmen, die nach Beginn der Protestbewegungen des sogenannten "Arabischen Frühlings" Anfang 2011 ausgeweitet und beschleunigt wurden. Ein konkretes Ergebnis der Proteste, die in Marokko hauptsächlich von der Bewegung des 20. Februar getragen wurden, war die Überarbeitung der Verfassung, die im Juli 2011 per Referendum angenommen wurde. Diese Verfassungsmodifikation brachte weitere Verbesserungen in den Bereichen Menschenrechte und Justiz und eröffnete neue Möglichkeiten für eine allmähliche Stärkung des Parlaments. Die politischen Reformen werden seit 1999 von Reformen im Sicherheitsbereich flankiert, deren Zielrichtung jedoch primär die Effizienzsteigerung der königlichen Streitkräfte, der Polizei, der Gendarmerie und des Nachrichtendienstes bei der Stärkung der Landesverteidigung und der Bekämpfung von Terrorismus und Kriminalität ist. Eine Neuregelung der Verantwortlichkeit und Rechenschaftspflicht des Sicherheitsbereiches zugunsten von Regierung und Parlament ist in der aktuellen politischen Umbauphase Marokkos und vor dem Hintergrund der gegenwärtigen sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen in der Maghrebregion durch islamistische terroristische Gruppen (noch) nicht intendiert und folglich auch in absehbarer Zeit nicht zu erwarten. ; On 27 July 1999, King Hassan II of Morocco died after a 38-year reign. Three days later, the 36-year-old crown prince was enthroned as King Mohammed VI. In his first throne speech on 30 July 1999, the new king announced political reforms. This proclamation was followed by various measures, which were then expanded and accelerated following the beginning of the so-called "Arab Spring" protest movement. One concrete result of the protests, which in Morocco were mainly carried out by the 20th of February Movement, was the revision of the constitution, which was approved by referendum in July 2011. These constitutional modifications meant further improvements in the areas of human rights and justice and opened up new possibilities for the gradual strengthening of the parliament. The political reforms have been accompanied since 1999 by reforms in the area of security, the goal of which, however, is primarily to increase the efficiency of the royal army, the police, the gendarmerie, and the secret service in strengthening national defense and fighting terrorism and crime. In Morocco's current phase of political restructuring and against the background of the security-policy challenges in the Maghreb Region due to Islamist terror groups, a revision of the security sector's responsibility and accountability to the benefit of government and parliament is not (yet) intended and thus not to be expected in the near future. ; Hanspeter Mattes ; Zsfassung in engl. Sprache

This article relies on a corpus of newspapers and Egyptian scientist writings dealing with this issue. It proposes a classification of Egyptian political parties under the regime of Mubarak, based upon their degree of integration in the political system. This degree of integration depends on the combination of two elements: the amount of resources of each party which are dependent on the political power (legalization, money, and chairs in Parliament), and the quantity of independent means (money, estates, activists, candidates, and so on). Combining these two criteria, I constructed three types of Egyptian political parties : those which are excluded from the political system, those which are integrated, and lastly those which are co-opted. These latter didn't have any means but from the government, and consequently supported the regime. Integrated parties had independent resources, but the political power gave them some advantages. They didn't try to confront the regime during the last years, and stayed away from protest movements. Lastly, excluded parties had interest to end the regime. Consequently, they took part into the protest movements of the last decade. This classification explains the positions of the Egyptian political parties during the revolution, giving their immediate interests, and their links with protest movements. ; Cet article propose une classification des partis politiques dans l'Égypte de Moubarak, reposant sur le degré d'intégration des organisations partisanes égyptiennes à l'ancien régime, et qui dépend de la combinatoire de deux éléments : les ressources octroyées directement ou indirectement par le pouvoir exécutif, et les différentes ressources indépendantes du centre étatique. La combinaison de ces deux variables nous permet de classer les partis égyptiens en trois catégories: les partis exclus du système, les partis cooptés, intégrés à ce dernier, et enfin les partis artificiels, qui ne disposent de quasiment aucune ressource propre et sont en conséquence extrêmement dépendants du pouvoir. Cette typologie offre une grille de lecture expliquant les positions prises par les différents partis égyptiens durant la révolution, en tenant compte non seulement de leurs intérêts immédiats, mais également des répertoire d'actions à leur disposition et de leur proximité avec les mouvements protestataires, ces deux derniers éléments étant hérités de leurs conduites passées.

This article relies on a corpus of newspapers and Egyptian scientist writings dealing with this issue. It proposes a classification of Egyptian political parties under the regime of Mubarak, based upon their degree of integration in the political system. This degree of integration depends on the combination of two elements: the amount of resources of each party which are dependent on the political power (legalization, money, and chairs in Parliament), and the quantity of independent means (money, estates, activists, candidates, and so on). Combining these two criteria, I constructed three types of Egyptian political parties : those which are excluded from the political system, those which are integrated, and lastly those which are co-opted. These latter didn't have any means but from the government, and consequently supported the regime. Integrated parties had independent resources, but the political power gave them some advantages. They didn't try to confront the regime during the last years, and stayed away from protest movements. Lastly, excluded parties had interest to end the regime. Consequently, they took part into the protest movements of the last decade. This classification explains the positions of the Egyptian political parties during the revolution, giving their immediate interests, and their links with protest movements. ; Cet article propose une classification des partis politiques dans l'Égypte de Moubarak, reposant sur le degré d'intégration des organisations partisanes égyptiennes à l'ancien régime, et qui dépend de la combinatoire de deux éléments : les ressources octroyées directement ou indirectement par le pouvoir exécutif, et les différentes ressources indépendantes du centre étatique. La combinaison de ces deux variables nous permet de classer les partis égyptiens en trois catégories: les partis exclus du système, les partis cooptés, intégrés à ce dernier, et enfin les partis artificiels, qui ne disposent de quasiment aucune ressource propre et sont en conséquence extrêmement dépendants du pouvoir. Cette typologie offre une grille de lecture expliquant les positions prises par les différents partis égyptiens durant la révolution, en tenant compte non seulement de leurs intérêts immédiats, mais également des répertoire d'actions à leur disposition et de leur proximité avec les mouvements protestataires, ces deux derniers éléments étant hérités de leurs conduites passées.

This article relies on a corpus of newspapers and Egyptian scientist writings dealing with this issue. It proposes a classification of Egyptian political parties under the regime of Mubarak, based upon their degree of integration in the political system. This degree of integration depends on the combination of two elements: the amount of resources of each party which are dependent on the political power (legalization, money, and chairs in Parliament), and the quantity of independent means (money, estates, activists, candidates, and so on). Combining these two criteria, I constructed three types of Egyptian political parties : those which are excluded from the political system, those which are integrated, and lastly those which are co-opted. These latter didn't have any means but from the government, and consequently supported the regime. Integrated parties had independent resources, but the political power gave them some advantages. They didn't try to confront the regime during the last years, and stayed away from protest movements. Lastly, excluded parties had interest to end the regime. Consequently, they took part into the protest movements of the last decade. This classification explains the positions of the Egyptian political parties during the revolution, giving their immediate interests, and their links with protest movements. ; Cet article propose une classification des partis politiques dans l'Égypte de Moubarak, reposant sur le degré d'intégration des organisations partisanes égyptiennes à l'ancien régime, et qui dépend de la combinatoire de deux éléments : les ressources octroyées directement ou indirectement par le pouvoir exécutif, et les différentes ressources indépendantes du centre étatique. La combinaison de ces deux variables nous permet de classer les partis égyptiens en trois catégories: les partis exclus du système, les partis cooptés, intégrés à ce dernier, et enfin les partis artificiels, qui ne disposent de quasiment aucune ressource propre et sont en conséquence extrêmement dépendants du pouvoir. Cette typologie offre une grille de lecture expliquant les positions prises par les différents partis égyptiens durant la révolution, en tenant compte non seulement de leurs intérêts immédiats, mais également des répertoire d'actions à leur disposition et de leur proximité avec les mouvements protestataires, ces deux derniers éléments étant hérités de leurs conduites passées.

Social forestry emerged amidst important changes in thinking about the role of forestry in rural development and a growing need for fuelwood. In an attempt to alleviate the fuelwood crisis, the World Bank encouraged the planting of Eucalyptus species in its social forestry programs in the 1980s. Eucalypts were the chosen tree species for the majority of social forestry projects because they survive on difficult sites and out-perform indigenous species and most other exotics in height and girth increment, producing wood for poles, pulp and fuel more rapidly. But, despite the benefits that eucalypts can bring to developing countries, the introduction of the species in social forestry projects has not been without controversy. This paper reviews two controversial social forestry projects—one in Karnataka, South India, and the other in Tung Kula Ronghai, North-east Thailand—based on Eucalyptus species that resulted in social protest. In doing so, this paper aims to determine why these projects failed to bring benefits to the communities involved and what it was that caused these communities to protest. In both cases, it was found that criticisms levelled against eucalypts were expressed in ecological terms. Eucalypts do have some adverse ecological impacts on soil nutrients, water hydrology, biodiversity and wildlife, but protests against the tree conceal the real reasons for anxieties about the planting of eucalypts—inappropriate use without due consideration for community needs. Both projects resulted in social concerns such as the loss of agricultural land for food production, reductions in rural employment, diversion of forest products from local markets to larger industrial users, and the transfer of public or common land to private corporations. The failure of eucalypts to meet the social objectives of social forestry policies were found to outweigh any of the technical and ecological criticisms against the tree and Eucalyptus became a symbol and rallying point of grass roots resistance to government meddling, poor project planning and management. Lessons to be learned from the failings of the Karnataka and Tung Kula Ronghai social forestry projects will be drawn and couched within the framework of ecologically sustainable development. Whilst both projects caused unnecessary hardship to those communities involved, much can be learnt from the failings of these projects and these lessons will minimise the risks of similar controversies arising in future social forestry projects.

Social forestry emerged amidst important changes in thinking about the role of forestry in rural development and a growing need for fuelwood. In an attempt to alleviate the fuelwood crisis, the World Bank encouraged the planting of Eucalyptus species in its social forestry programs in the 1980s. Eucalypts were the chosen tree species for the majority of social forestry projects because they survive on difficult sites and out-perform indigenous species and most other exotics in height and girth increment, producing wood for poles, pulp and fuel more rapidly. But, despite the benefits that eucalypts can bring to developing countries, the introduction of the species in social forestry projects has not been without controversy. This paper reviews two controversial social forestry projects—one in Karnataka, South India, and the other in Tung Kula Ronghai, North-east Thailand—based on Eucalyptus species that resulted in social protest. In doing so, this paper aims to determine why these projects failed to bring benefits to the communities involved and what it was that caused these communities to protest. In both cases, it was found that criticisms levelled against eucalypts were expressed in ecological terms. Eucalypts do have some adverse ecological impacts on soil nutrients, water hydrology, biodiversity and wildlife, but protests against the tree conceal the real reasons for anxieties about the planting of eucalypts—inappropriate use without due consideration for community needs. Both projects resulted in social concerns such as the loss of agricultural land for food production, reductions in rural employment, diversion of forest products from local markets to larger industrial users, and the transfer of public or common land to private corporations. The failure of eucalypts to meet the social objectives of social forestry policies were found to outweigh any of the technical and ecological criticisms against the tree and Eucalyptus became a symbol and rallying point of grass roots resistance to government meddling, poor project planning and management. Lessons to be learned from the failings of the Karnataka and Tung Kula Ronghai social forestry projects will be drawn and couched within the framework of ecologically sustainable development. Whilst both projects caused unnecessary hardship to those communities involved, much can be learnt from the failings of these projects and these lessons will minimise the risks of similar controversies arising in future social forestry projects.

Rufus Browning, Dale Marshall, and David Tabb present some straightforward and convincing theses in their admirable work Protest Is Not Enough. Urban policy responsiveness to minority interests, they argue, depends not so much on the direct impact of protest as on the advent of a dominant liberal coalition in which blacks and Hispanics have some role. Where such coalitions have not succeeded, racial exclusion and policy resistance tend to hold sway. Where blacks or Hispanics have played a leading role in bringing such a coalition to power, or in Browning, Marshall and Tabb's terms where political incorporation has been greatest, then policy results favor minority interests. Political incorporation depends on protest and electoral mobilization among blacks and Hispanics combined with favorable white attitudes toward minority interests. The size of the minority community and its leadership capacity in turn explain minority political mobilization.By these propositions, New York City should be characterized by substantial black and Hispanic political incorporation and the resulting targeting of policy outputs on minority interests. In the 1980 Census, New York's population was 23.9% black and 19.9% Hispanic; these numbers may have been substantially undercounted. In any case, two-thirds of a decade later New York is clearly a majority minority city. Black political participation dates from Adam Clayton Powell and Benjamin Davis' election to the city council in 1941 and 1943. The first Puerto Rican assemblyman was elected on the Republican and American Labor Party lines in 1938. Subsequently, both groups have had a long and sophisticated history of political participation. From the 1960s onward, a new generation of leadership led both groups to assert their political demands more strongly. The Lindsay administration afforded a national model of how a new liberal coalition could experiment with new forms of political incorporation. Voting in state and national elections would suggest the city is on the liberal end of the urban political spectrum. In short, by Western lights New York should be a model of strong minority incorporation and the consequent targeting of city policies toward minority interests. The problem, however, is that New York City has not incorporated minorities and, depending on what indicators are chosen, has not produced policies that are especially aimed toward minorities.

"Im Juli 2002 fiel die Entscheidung von Präsident Luis González Macchi, die Privatisierung der staatlichen Unternehmen Paraguays abzubrechen. Die Regierung hatte angesichts der extremen Situation des Landes klein beigeben müssen, nachdem es durch eine massive Opposition der Bevölkerung, zu einer wahren Welle des Protestes und zu Zusammenstößen zwischen Landwirten und Arbeitern mit der Polizei gekommen war. Ganz nach dem Motto "ist nichts, wird nichts" war auch der Privatisierungsprozess in Paraguay 2001 nur schwer ins Laufen gekommen, während die Kritiken an der undurchsichtigen Handhabung dermaßen zunahmen, dass er schließlich abgebrochen werden musste. Gleichzeitig wurden die Stimmen, die den Rücktritt Macchis forderten, immer lauter, denn er ist nicht vom Volk in sein Amt gewählt. Der Präsident ist in skandalöse Korruptionsfälle verwickelt und schafft es weder, die 35% Arbeitslosigkeit und Unterbeschäftigung noch die 25% extremer Armut in ländlichen Gebieten zu reduzieren. Um dem die Krone aufzusetzen, rechnet man dieses Jahr mit einem Rückgang der Wirtschaft um 4%. Die nächsten Präsidentschaftswahlen werden im April 2003 stattfinden, und die Paraguayer werden eine wichtige Entscheidung für die Zukunft ihres Landes treffen müssen." (Brennpkt. Lat.am/DÜI)

自2003年始,反坝运动席卷中国,被誉为"第一次公众参与开始影响中国工程决策"。相关研究多将之归功于中国近年来迅猛发展的公民社会与NGO力量。但在金沙江边村落,却出乎意料地形成可持续的、无(正式)组织及去精英化、本土民众自主广泛参与的反坝集体行动,并成功令当地水坝建设中止至今。本个案的独特性,无法单独通过社会运动或底层抗争理论对中国集体抗争的分析,而得到解释。 ; 在中国特殊政治环境下,尤其在严重缺乏自组织空间的底层乡土社会,农民广泛参与的集体抗争如何得以成为可能?带着这一问题,本研究整合社会运动研究和底层抗争研究两种理论框架,以实践论引领下的拓展个案研究法为研究方法论,对金沙江-虎跳峡流域的反坝集体行动展开深入研究。 ; 论文首先还原当地反坝抗争的真实经历以及底层行动者的实践逻辑,并通过对抗争的政治机会空间拓展、组织动员、框架与意义建构等三个关键过程深入分析,探讨集体行动的内在特征及发生机制。 ; 本论文发现:在全国反坝热潮背后,金沙江边逐渐形成一类独特的、既由本土社区主导又与全国性的反坝社会运动接壤的、多元去中心化的新型底层抗争生成机制/模式。三种结构性生成力量在背后起到关键作用:一是本土性社会文化因素;二是介入本土社区并与之发生紧密互动的外界公民社会力量;三是国家力量(包括"抽象国家"与"具体国家")的影响及其与本土的互动。 ; 以上因素在型塑独特的本土集体抗争模式的同时,也在底层乡村社区催生一批本土中层集体行动者骨干,推动广泛、具有潜在秩序的草根民众的"公民性"参与,孕育出更富于弹性、更多元异质的社会力以及本土化的公民社会行动空间,由此产生的底层自下而上的变革动力,有可能超越此前公民社会组织主导的社会运动与封闭乡村社区内相对无组织无序的底层抗争的两分,为中国底层变迁乃至公民社会发展预示新的路向。 ; Recent anti-dam movements in quasi-authoritarian China have triggered unprecedented public debate. Most existing researches focus on professional NGOs, intellectuals, media and other high-profile civil society forces, and propose an exogenous elite-driven model for understanding the movement and ensued social changes. ; However, the Jinsha River anti-dam protest revealed a different picture: endogenously grown and widely participated activism is blooming in the local communities, in the absence of formal movement organizations and without the leadership of outside NGOs. It is such local activism, working together with civil society forces from outside, that successfully blocked the dam construction. ; How could such indigenous activism with broad participation emerge within the highly restricted political space of contemporary China? To answer this question, I propose an integrated approach combining the perspectives of the social movement literature and the resistance studies. The major research methodology is the Extended Case Method (ECM) based on the Theory of Practice. ; This thesis firstly attempts to describe the generative process of local anti-dam protest activism and the practical logic of indigenous activists from a bottom-up perspective. It ...