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The Danish parliament is renowned for its influence over Danish European Union (EU) policy. Contrary to popular belief, this strength is now in question. The most central feature of the Danish EU decision‐making model is parliamentary control over the executive expressed in political mandates before Council meetings. In 1973, this was a perfectly reasonable way for the Danish parliament to influence EU policy. Today, the status of the Council has changed, severely challenging the ability of the Danish parliament to secure influence over EU policy. This article demonstrates that the Danish European Affairs Committee is aware of the changes in European decision‐making, and that the lack of adaptation, despite this knowledge, is due to structural and cultural barriers to learning in the Danish Folketing. This study reveals that our understanding of particular responses to the pressure of Europeanization is enhanced when the conditions for learning and 'non‐learning' are spelled out.

On 17th May 2006 the European Parliament voted for the agreement on the Financial Framework 2007-2013. The EU has decided that in that period a total of Euro 49.463 million will be spent on its external policy, which constitutes an average increase of 29%. This development is in line with public opinion, as according to the Eurobarometer the support amongst Europeans for an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is remarkably high. However, the new budget presents the EU and the Member States with several challenges: firstly, a lack of transparency in the allocation of funds; secondly, too little possibility for democratic control by the European Parliament; and finally, a still insufficient amount of funding. One way to diminish these deficits would be the introduction of a CFSP Fund in 2009, out of which all EU missions would be financed. If it were established, this Fund ought to be subject to scrutiny by the European Parliament, as well as being equipped with adequate financial means. (SWP Comments / SWP)

This paper argues that Canadian democratic practices as evidenced in both pre-UN Charter and post-UN Charter regimes support the view that Canada has hardly participated in an international conflict without parliamentary debate, approval and/or ratification. In other words, Canadian participation in armed conflicts is often a function of parliamentary approval. The question raised by this practice or convention is whether such parliamentary approval is a legal obligation on the part of the government. The short answer is that it is primarily a political obligation with implications for governmental legitimacy. More importantly, Parliament has an undeniable role in reviewing the government's decision concerning Canadian participation in the use of force in international relations. Therefore the question of Canadian participation cannot be a function of executive discretion. Canadian vigilance cannot be guaranteed unless Parliament is a potent and vibrant institution for the articulation of public concerns and interests. In this context, the chronic impotence of both the ruling party caucus and opposition parties in Parliament give reason for concern.

Research has shown that interest organizations seeking influence on public decision making pay increasing attention to parliamentary actors. No distinction has, however, been made between attempts to affect law‐making directly and attempts to gain influence on other parliamentary activities such as agenda setting and control of bureaucracy. Drawing on data about organizational approaches to the Danish parliament, this article demonstrates that interest organizations' influence strategies in relation to different parliamentary activities show dissimilar patterns. Strategies in regard to law‐making fluctuate with the strength of parliament vis‐à‐vis the government, while strategies concerned with more general parliamentary activities depend more on the level of these activities and secondarily on increases in parliamentary resources. The analysis thus confirms that organizations react to changes in the political role of parliament, but takes the understanding of this a step further by emphasizing that changes in direct parliamentary influence on law‐making and in more general parliamentary activities affect different aspects of organizations' influence strategies.

This Article posits that the British Constitution is changing by incorporating written principles that restrain Parliament through judicial review. The Author asserts that this constitutional model has basis in the common law and the orthodox theories of Blackstone and Dicey. In addition, the "ultra vires" doctrine supports the model and provides a basis for judicial review of Parliament. As constitutions may accommodate written and unwritten elements of law, as well as various means of enforcement and change, the Author posits that constitutions are defined by how strongly they reflect underlying legal norms. With a shift in the rule of recognition endorsing judicial review, this expressive function of constitutions democratically legitimizes constitutional texts as positivist expressions of popular will that bind Parliament. Therefore, courts may constitutionalize statutes or treaties coming over time to represent shifting norms through common-law adjudication. Furthermore, the Author illustrates that such a "quasi-written," common-law constitution is already emerging in the United Kingdom by examining cases based upon the Human Rights Act and the European Communities Act.

This article deals with the consequences of an increased number of levels of political decision-making, on the way in which political careers are built. In the traditional bottomup perspective, political careers started at the municipal level. The best were chosen to represent the party in regional assemblies, first, and eventually in the national parliament. In this perspective, a mandate of Member of European Parliament was the highest obtainable office. Evidence from the 1979-99 period shows that the importance of 'local political experience' in recruiting MPs is decreasing. However still, the Belgian figure remains high in comparative perspective : in 1999 no less than 70 % ofthe members of the federal House of Representatives and of the regional Flemish Parliament have previously been local councillor. Moreover, still 60 % combines a mandate as local councillor with their parliamentary mandate. Only a limited number ofpreviously regional Flemish MPs became federal MPs in 1999, so that one could not speak of frequent level-hopping, nor of a hierarchy among these offices.

This article deals with the consequences of an increased number of levels of political decision making on the way in which political careers are built. In the traditional bottom-up perspective, political careers started at the municipal level. The best were chosen to represent the party in regional assemblies, first, & eventually in the national parliament. In this perspective, a mandate of Member of European Parliament was the highest obtainable office. Evidence from the 1979-99 period shows that the importance of local political experience in recruiting MPs is decreasing. However, the Belgian figure remains high in comparative perspective: in 1999 no fewer than 70% of the members of the federal House of Representatives & of the regional Flemish Parliament had previously been local councillors. Moreover, still 60% combine a mandate as local councillor with their parliamentary mandate. Only a limited number of previously regional Flemish MPs became federal MPs in 1999, so that one could not speak of frequent level hopping, or of a hierarchy among these offices. 8 Tables, 2 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe need for a comprehensive reform of Finland's four laws of constitution has been discussed since the late 1960s. As a consequence of several substantial changes to the old constitutional laws and the political consensus to move the system of governance in a more parliamentary direction, a new Constitution was drafted during the 1990s and adopted by the Parliament in 1999. Finland's new Constitution integrates constitutional provisions into a single Constitution, and reduces the constitutional powers of the president of the republic. The new Constitution increases parliamentary control in foreign policy. It requires the president to co-operate with the government when directing Finland's foreign policy. It also requires acceptance by the Parliament of a wider range of international obligations. The system for the national organisation of matters concerning the European Union adopted in connection with Finland's accession to the Union in 1995 has also been confirmed by the Constitution, with the government and the Parliament being the main actors in that field.