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AbstractBased on direct observation over a five‐year period, the article paints an intimate picture of how the police in Britain are governed. It analyses the complexity of the economic and political environment in which the police have to work: the insecure funding platform; the stream of initiatives, targets and official guidelines; the delicacy of handling community sensitivities; the inherent opaqueness of the national 'tripartite' system of governance; and the constant challenge of making balanced judgements under conflicting pressures. The central theme that runs through the article (which follows on logically from two previous articles published in Political Quarterly) is that of a 'managerialist' political class, with a distinctive ideology and mode of control, trying to get a policy grip on the real world of service delivery: in this instance, policing. Unlike the previous two articles, which had a top‐down focus, the emphasis here is primarily on how the thicket looks to those who have to navigate their way through it.

AbstractThis article sets out the concept of a technical system and explores its ability to explain why some transnational regulatory domains are governed by a single transnational business governance (TBG) scheme, while in others there are many such schemes. By linking the numbers of TBG schemes that govern any particular transnational regulatory domain to technical systems in this way, important insights are provided into TBG interactions. Where technical systems are present, the TBG schemes that govern them will be specialized and complementary, rather than competitive. More generally, a technical systems approach illuminates the set of extended relationships that connect TBG schemes to the industry they seek to regulate. By tracing out these relationships we can reveal indirect interactions between TBG schemes that may be mediated through firms or market infrastructures. These indirect interactions can be obscured by approaches that only focus on the direct interactions among TBG schemes. The article analyzes two cases of TBG schemes in global finance. The first, derivatives, has a single overall TBG scheme. The second case, professional financial designations, has multiple competing TBG schemes.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueWe explore how the combinations of firm‐level corporate governance (CG) practices embedded in different national governance systems lead to high firm performance.Research Findings/InsightsUsing fuzzy set/qualitative comparative analysis, we uncover a variety of findings. First, we show that within each of the stylized nationalCGmodels, there are multiple bundles of firm‐level governance practices leading to high firm performance (i.e., equifinality). Second, we provide evidence of complementarity as well as functional equivalence betweenCGpractices. Finally, we demonstrate that there can be heterogeneity ("differences in kind") in firm governance practices within each stylized model ofCG.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe build on the configurational and complementarity‐based approaches to make the following theoretical claims. First, governance practices within firm bundles do not always relate to each other in a monotonic and cumulative fashion as this entails higher costs and possibly over‐governance. Second, practices in bundles do not need to be aligned toward the insider or the outsider model ("similar in kind"). We argue that non‐aligned practices can also be complementary, creating hybrid governance forms. Third, we predict functional equivalence across bundles ofCGpractices which grants firms agency on which of the practices to implement in order to achieve high performance.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsWe contribute to comparativeCGresearch by demonstrating that there are multiple governance paths leading to high firm performance, and that these practices do not always belong to the same national governance tradition. Therefore, our findings alert of the perils of "one size fits all" governance solutions when designing and implementingCGpolicies.

The debate about post-2012 global climate governance has been framed largely by proponents and opponents of the policymaking process established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In light of the proliferation of institutions governing some aspects of climate change, analysts have asked whether a centralized or a polycentric climate governance architecture will be more effective, efficient, equitable, or viable. While these are valid questions, they obscure the fact that global climate governance is already polycentric, or rather: fragmented. This article argues that the more pertinent questions are how to sensibly link the different elements of global climate governance, and what the role of the UNFCCC could be in this regard. We examine these two questions for three aspects of global climate governance: international climate technology initiatives, emerging emissions trading systems, and unilateral trade measures. The article shows that there are strong arguments for coordination in all of these cases, and illustrates the possible role of the UNFCCC. It concludes, however, that possibilities for coordination will eventually be limited by underlying tensions that will plague any future climate governance architecture.