Suchergebnisse

La energía ha estado presente en el seno de la Unión Europea (UE) desde sus orígenes - con la firma del Tratado CECA en 1951 se comunitarizó el carbón, entonces principal fuente de energía, y en 1957, con la creación de Euratom, entró en el escenario la energía nuclear. A lo largo del tiempo la energía se ha ido convirtiendo en una de las principales preocupaciones, pero también en uno de los principales ámbitos de actuación y en una de las prioridades comunitarias. Y es que la situación energética a la que hacemos frente actualmente, es preocupante - el consumo de energía está en niveles muy altos, la producción autóctona de fuentes de energía fósiles es mínima, las importaciones energéticas y la consiguiente dependencia energética exterior están en aumento, y el uso de los combustibles fósiles genera emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero. El camino recorrido fue largo y difícil, pero finalmente, con la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Lisboa en 2009, se creó la Política Energética Europea (art. 194 TFUE), se definió la energía como una de las competencias compartidas (art. 4 TFUE), y se elaboró una legislación energética sólida. Todo esto con tres objetivos principales: competitividad (liberalización e integración del mercado energético), seguridad (suministro ininterrumpido y a precios razonables) y sostenibilidad (protección del medioambiente). Para conseguir dichos objetivos y para poder disfrutar del actual nivel de vida también en el futuro, se han fijado unas metas energéticas y medioambientales ambiciosas, relativas a la eficiencia energética, al uso de las energías renovables y a la reducción de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero. En 2015 se ha creado la Unión de la Energía y Clima - una estrategia marco cohesiva que une todas las iniciativas y que pone en marcha una auténtica transición energética europea. La energía, entonces, cobra un especial protagonismo en nuestra sociedad - sin ella es difícil de imaginarnos la vida al día de hoy. Dado que se considera como un bien extremadamente necesario, se ha creado una regulación europea (y nacional) que establece las reglas para su explotación y uso, con el fin de asegurar a los consumidores un suministro seguro, sostenible y a precios más bajos posibles. Se considera que, para lograr dichos objetivos, es necesario instaurar un mercado interior energético al nivel de la UE e introducir una competencia efectiva en dicho mercado. La creación del mercado interior del carbón es un hecho que data de los años 50, pero la puesta en marcha del mercado interior de la electricidad y del gas natural resultó ser bastante más complicada. Para su instauración se han adoptado tres paquetes sucesivos de medidas liberalizadoras, que comprenden una serie de Directivas y Reglamentos. La aplicación de dichas normas, junto con la observancia de la normativa europea de competencia, debe garantizar el correcto funcionamiento del mercado interior energético en la UE. La finalidad última de estos esfuerzos, es la de asegurar a los consumidores europeos una energía asequible, segura y limpia - ahora y en el futuro. ; The energy has been present in the European Union (EU) since its inception - with the signing of the ECSC Treaty in 1951, coal, which was the main source of energy, was communitarized, and in 1957, with the creation of Euratom, the nuclear power entered the scenario. Over time, energy has become one of the main concerns, but also one of the main areas of action and one of the Community priorities. The thing is that the energy situation we are currently facing is worrisome - the energy consumption is at very high levels, the autochthonous production of fossil energy sources is minimal, the energy imports and the consequent Energy Import Dependency are increasing and the use of fossil fuels generates emissions of greenhouse gases. The way was long and difficult, but finally, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Energy Policy has been created (Article 194 TFEU), the energy has been defined as one of the shared competences (Article 4 TFEU), and sound energy legislation has been elaborated. All of this with three main objectives: competitiveness (liberalization and integration of the energy market), security (uninterrupted supply at reasonable prices) and sustainability (environmental protection). In order to achieve these objectives and to enjoy the current standards of living also in the future, ambitious energy and environmental targets have been set, relating to the energy efficiency, to the use of renewable energies and to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In 2015 the Energy Union and Climate has been created - a cohesive framework strategy that unites all the initiatives and sets in motion a real European energy transition. The energy, therefore, takes on a special importance in our society - without it is difficult to imagine the life nowadays. Given that it is considered to be an extremely necessary commodity, a European (and national) regulation that sets out the rules for its exploitation and use has been established, in order to ensure to the consumers a supply which is safe, sustainable and at lowest possible prices. To achieve these objectives, it is considered necessary to establish an internal energy market at EU level and to introduce an effective competition in this market. The creation of the internal market for coal is a fact dating back to the 1950s, but the start-up of the internal market for electricity and natural gas turned to be much more complicated. Three successive packages of liberalizing measures have been adopted to implement the electricity and natural gas internal market, including a number of Directives and Regulations. The application of these rules, together with the observance of European competition law, is to guarantee the proper functioning of the internal energy market in the EU. The ultimate aim of these efforts is to ensure that European consumers have affordable, safe and clean energy - now and in the future.

Актуальність теми дослідження пояснюється тими завданнями, які сьогодні поставлено перед таким потужним засобом впливу на свідомість людей як засоби масової інформації. Новий етап еволюції людства спричиняє нові умови існування. І саме інформаційно-комунікативні технології є рушійною силою науково-соціального прогресу суспільства. ХХІ століття стає епохою значних змін у техніці, економічних галузях, гуманітарній сфері, соціальному житті людей. Інформація, знання, освіта дають поштовх суспільному розвитку. Мета статті – дослідити наукову думку щодо сутності нової – інформаційної – епохи, ролі ЗМІ у формуванні суспільної думки. Автор прагне визначити проблематику сучасних засобів масової комунікації на прикладі наукових та практичних напрацювань відомих вчених. Дослідження теорії комунікації перетинаються з іншими дисциплінами: історією, політологією, правознавством, економічними науками, соціологією, психологією, педагогікою, літературознавством та мовознавством, кіно та наукою про телебачення, медіа-інформатикою. У теорії комунікації та її часткових областях застосовуються такі методи та техніки досліджень: історичний метод, кількісні та якісні емпірично-аналітичні методи, герменевтично-інтерпретаційні методи досліджень. Методологія – системний, структурно-функціональний, історичного і логічного, порівняльний Сьогодні медіа перебувають в центрі уваги держави і суспільства, вони пронизують усі сфери суспільного життя та пропонують кожному стартовий майданчик для участі в соціальній комунікації від місцевого та світового масштабу. Результат. Таким чином спостерігаємо процес злиття, інтеграції інформаційних і комунікативних технологій в єдиний інформаційний ресурс. Відбувається конвергенція, тобто «взаємний вплив явищ, а й взаємопроникнення технологій, стирання меж між ними. Щоб захистити український інформаційний простір серед першочергових кроків є: експертне середовище, державна підтримка наукових розробок у сфері інформаційних технологій, інформаційної політики та інформаційної безпеки, зокрема, стимулювання меді-досліджень і моніторингу інформаційного простору; побудова нової комунікаційної стратегії влади, обов'язковими складовими якої мають бути комунікація з населенням, неконфліктна комунікація всередині влади; комунікація з зовнішнім світом; впровадження системи медіа-грамотності в школах і в ВНЗ; перехід від політики заборони до політики стимулювання суспільно-корисної діяльності в медіа-сфері ; Актуальность темы исследования объясняется теми заданиями, которые сегодня поставлены перед таким мощным способом влияния на сознание людей как средства массовой информации. Новый этап эволюции вызывает новые условия существования. И только информационно-коммуникативные технологии есть движущей силой научно-социального прогресса общества.ХХІ столетие становится эпохой значительных перемен в технике, экономических отраслях, гуманитарной сфере, социальной жизни людей. Информация, знания, образование дают толчок общественному развитию.Цель статьи – исследовать научное мнение относительно сущности новой –информационной эпохи, роли СМИ в формировании общественной мысли. Автор стремится определить проблематику современных средств массовой информации на примере научных и практических наработок известных ученых.Исследования теории коммуникации пересекаются с другими дисциплинами: историей, политологией, правоведением, экономическими науками, социологией, психологией, педагогикой, литературоведением и языкознанием, кино и наукой о телевидении, медиа-информатикой.В теории коммуникации и других ее областях применяются такие методы и техники исследований: исторический метод, количественные и качественные эмпирико-аналитические методы, герменевтико-интерпретационные методы исследований.Методология – системный, структурно-функциональный, исторического и логического, сравнительный. Сегодня медиа пребывают в центре внимания государства и общества, они пронизывают все сферы общественной жизни и предлагают каждому стартовую площадку для участия в социальной коммуникации местного и мирового масштаба. Результат. Таким образом, наблюдаем процесс соединения, интеграции информационных и коммуникационных технологий в единый информцаионный ресурс. Происходит конверегенция, то есть не только взаимное переплетение явлений, но и взаимопроникновение технологий, стирание границ между ними.Чтобы защитить украинское информационное пространство среди первоочередных шагов следует выделить: экспертную среду, государственную поддержку научных разработок в сфере информационных технологий, информационной политики и информационной безопасности, в частности, стимулирование медиа-исследований и мониторинга информационного пространства; формирование новой коммуникационной стратегии власти, обязательными составляющими которой должны быть: коммуникация с населением, неконфликтная коммуникация всредине структуры власти; коммуникация с внешним миром; внедрение системы медиа-грамотности в школах и высших учебных заведениях; переход от политики запрета к политике стимулирования общественно-полезной деятельности в медиа-сфере ; The urgency of the topic of research is explained by the tasks that today are faced with such a powerful means of influencing people's minds as the media. A new stage in the evolution of humanity leads to new conditions of existence. And the information and communication technologies themselves are the driving force behind the scientific and social progress of society.XXI century is the era of significant changes in technology, economic sectors, the humanitarian sphere, social life of people. Information, knowledge, education give impetus to social development The purpose of the article is to investigate the scientific idea about the essence of the new information era and the role of the media in shaping public opinion. The author seeks to identify the problems of modern media communication on the example of scientific and practical developments of well-known scholars.Research in the theory of communication intersect with other disciplines: history, political science, jurisprudence, economics, sociology, psychology, pedagogy, literary studies and linguistics, cinema and the science of television, media informatics.The following methods and techniques of research are used in the theory of communication and its partial fields: historical method, quantitative and qualitative empirical-analytical methods, hermeneutic-interpretation methods of research. Methodology - Systemic, Structural-Functional, Historical and Logical, Comparative Today, the media are at the center of state and society's attention, they penetrate all spheres of public life and offer each starting point for participation in social communication from the local and world scale Result. Thus, we observe the process of merger, integration of information and communication technologies into a single information resource.There is convergence, that is, "the mutual influence of phenomena, but also interpenetration of technologies, erasing the boundaries between them. Among the top steps to protect the Ukrainian information space are:: expert environment, state support for scientific developments in the field of information technologies, information policy and information security, in particular, promotion of copper research and monitoring of information space; the construction of a new communications strategy of power, the mandatory components of which should be communication with the population, non-conflict communication within the authorities; communication with the outside world; introduction of a system of media literacy in schools and universities; the transition from a policy of prohibition to a policy of stimulation of socially useful activity in the media sphere

Tras el 11 de septiembre, el problema del "colapso" del estado aparece una vez más en la agenda como una cuestión importante de seguridad global. Sinembargo, la discusión académica no ha ido mucho más allá de la injerencia en las dinámicas postconflicto de varios "órdenes" nuevos que sobrepasan las capacidades tradicionales de los estados. La discusión sobre el colapso del estado parece situarse cada vez más en un callejón sin salida entre las clásicas proximaciones estatocéntricas —que siguen apuntando los problemas funcionales— y lasperspectivas más orientadas a la sociedad que buscan explicar las otras lealtadespolíticas y económicas que emergen en el contexto del débil rendimiento delestado. Sin embargo ambos enfoques, vienen gradualmente revelando suincapacidad de definir y delimitar la noción de orden político en ausencia de unmarco estatal primordial. Aunque hay explicaciones a menudo contradictorias sobrepor qué los estados colapsan, se ofrecen pocas razones de lo que hay de hecho másallá del desmoronamiento constatado de la autoridad pública testificado por todos. Además de la guerra global contra el terror, estas razones son más necesarias que nunca si tenemos en cuenta la persistente problemática naturaleza de la estatalidad en muchas partes de África subsahariana; un continente acosado hasta el día de hoy por guerras endémicas. En vez de una transición hacia la paz y la democracia, muchas de las regiones hostigadas por los conflictos en África más bien parecen evolucionar hacia una situación de "ni paz ni guerra", pero en la que la evolucióndel (des)orden político se escapa cada vez más de nuestras capacidades analíticas y de intervención. Este artículo es un primer intento de rellenar estos espacios vacíos en el mapa analítico. Lo hace explicando, en primer lugar, los obstáculos que parecen estar impidiendo una aproximación integrada al problema de la implosión del estado. En segundo lugar, da un primer paso hacia el desarrollo de un marco alternativo para el estudio del orden político en las situaciones de post-colapso estatal. El argumento que se presenta en este artículo no es novedoso: se construye fundamentalmente a partir de perspectivas teóricas y empíricas anteriores sobre los límites de las capacidades estatales (en particular, del Tercer Mundo). Sin embargo lo novedoso es que intenta integrar estas visiones al análisisde las situaciones post-colapso. La noción de poder político (o control social) es central en esta aproximación: tomando como punto de partida "las áreas de dominación y oposición" que existen en el seno de las relaciones sociedad-estado, mira en particular las diferentes fuerzas en la sociedad que intentan monopolizar los tres mbitos que se asocian tradicionalmente al rendimiento estado moderno: el monopolio sobre la violencia, la asignación de recursos económicos y la representación de una población más o menos "fija". Aunque claramente más afín a perspectivas más orientadas a la sociedad, la visión presentada intenta sin embargo combinarlas con un modelo más integrador de las relaciones estado-sociedad, que sirve para analizar cómo los estados y las sociedades siguen constituyéndose y transformándose el uno al otro, en un contexto de debilitamiento de las capacidades estatales ; In the aftermath of 9/11, the problem of state 'collapse' appears again on he agenda as an important question of global security. Nevertheless, the academic discussion has not come much further than post conflict dynamics of interference of various new 'orders' that move beyond traditional state capacities. The discussion on state collapse thus seems to be placed in a growing deadlock between classical state-centrist approaches —which keep pointing at functional problems— and more society-oriented insights that try to explain other political and economic loyalties that have emerged in the context of weak state performance. Both approaches nonetheless appear increasingly incapable of defining and delimiting the notion of political order absent of an overarching state framework. While often contradictory xplanations exist about what may lead states to collapse, little grounding is provided as to what actually lays beyond this witnessed breakdown of public authority. Besides the global war on terror, such grounding appears more necessary than ever if we look at the continuing problematic nature of statehood in many parts of sub-Sahara Africa, a continent hitherto beset with endemic warfare. Instead of a transition to peace and democracy, many conflict-ridden regions in Africa seem to evolve rather towards a situation of "neither-war-nor-peace", but in which the evolution of political (dis)order increasingly escapes our analytical and intervention capacities. This paper makes a first attempt to fill these blank spaces on the analytical map. It does so by explaining, first, the obstacles that appear to be blocking an integrative approach towards the problem of state implosion. Second, it offers a first step into developing an alternative framework for studying political order in ituations of post state collapse'. The argument provided in this paper is not new: it builds extensively on earlier theoretical and empirical insights into the limits of particularly Third World) state capacities. What is new though, is that it tries to integrate these views into the analysis of post-collapse situations. Central to this approach is the notion of political power (or social control): taking as an entry point the "areas of domination and opposition" that exist in the midst of state-society relations, it specifically looks at the different forces in society that try to monopolize the three domains that are traditionally connected to modern state performance: the monopoly over violence, the allocation of economic resources and the representation of a more or less 'fixed' population. Although obviously more sympathetic to more society-oriented approaches, the presented view nonetheless tries to combine these with a more integrative model of state-society relations, which serves to analyze how states and societies continue to constitute and transform one another in a context of withering of state capacities

Over the first weekend of August 2023, Saudi Arabia convened an international summit on the war in Ukraine. Held in Jeddah and attended by representatives from 40 countries As was widely expected, the meeting did not produce any breakthroughs. Still, it provided a golden opportunity for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) to position himself as a leader of what might be called a second "Non-Aligned Movement." This movement's growing influence owes much to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. For while Moscow's assault had the unintended effect of revitalizing—and expanding—NATO, it also created an opening for many countries to leverage a multipolar international system in ways that have limited Washington's global power, not to mention its regional clout in the Middle East.


But these "balancing" efforts come with a high cost, as rising grain prices have threatened the stability of many of the very states that have thus far refused to condemn Russia's invasion, much less support Ukraine. For these states, the status quo is increasingly precarious, hence the wider logic of inviting China and the United States to sit a few short whispers away from their Saudi hosts at a meeting to which Russia was not invited.


China's Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy


From the outset, China has tried to advance a position of "neutrality" while echoing Russian President Vladimir Putin's justification for his unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Beyond rhetoric, Beijing has provided economic support via its purchase of price-discounted Russian oil and, some experts argue, limited military assistance as well (a claim Beijing denies).


China's efforts to maintain these two tracks reflect structural tensions at the heart of China's global engagement. On the one hand, China is closely tied to a global economic order that is dominated by Western states and multilateral institutions. On the other hand, President Xi Jinping is seeking to counter U.S. military, economic, and even cultural power, and has done so in multiple ways, thus inviting conflict with the United States even as Beijing needs to cooperate with Washington and its Western allies. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which reportedly took Chinese leaders by surprise, created opportunities for China to flex its "counter-hegemonic" muscles, but also opened the door to economic and strategic threats that were likely to intensify absent a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine conflict.


The tension between China's ideological and global economic interests extends well beyond the China-West arena. Many middle-sized regional powers such as India, Brazil, and South Africa share Beijing's desire to counter U.S. global dominance. But their policies are also rooted in the principle of state sovereignty and the rejection of the use of force to solve international conflicts. Beijing has long advocated these very norms and has given them pride of place in the charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, not to mention China's 12-point Ukraine peace proposal.


Thus its support for Russia has raised legitimate questions from many leaders about the rising humanitarian and economic costs of the war and Beijing's readiness to take credible steps to show that its Ukraine plan is not a mere diplomatic feint. The most important of these steps would be for Beijing to reduce its diplomatic support for Moscow.


Beijing's Jeddah Dance


From the outset of the Jeddah meeting China's delegate avoided suggesting that Beijing would endorse any particular proposal other than its own. Indeed, Special Representative Li Hui seemed to emphasize the limited goals of the meeting—and the conflicts animating its leading participants—when he declared, "We have many disagreements and we have heard different positions, but it is important that our principles be shared."


Putting a more positive spin, a spokesperson for the Chinese government noted that, "China is willing to work with the international community to continue to play a constructive role in promoting a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine."


But what kind of solution? The outcome that China has outlined in its own 12-point proposal calls for respecting "the independence and territorial integrity of all countries" but also for a negotiated "political settlement" that could fudge or violate these principles. Thus, China is not ready to accept Ukraine's 10-point peace plan, which would require Russia's total withdrawal from all Ukrainian lands, including Crimea.


That Moscow has totally rejected this idea is not surprising; any hint by Putin that he might accept Ukraine's terms could undermine his rule. Moreover, as one expert has noted, "Ukraine's best-case scenario for the end of this war is also China's worst-case scenario," because Beijing wants Putin to remain in power while sustaining Russia's occupation until it is Ukraine that makes the key compromises.


It is inconceivable that China's envoy came to the Jeddah meeting believing that these various circles could be squared. Still, with the Ukraine conflict settling into what could be a prolonged war of attrition, and with Russia's suspension of its grain deal and its attacks on shipping in the Black Sea, China had to demonstrate concern for those states suffering from Moscow's policy of global blackmail.


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy exploited China's unease when he noted that, "On issues such as food security, the fate of millions of people in Africa, Asia and other parts of the world directly depends on how fast the world moves to implement the peace formula." He was, of course, talking about Ukraine's own proposal, which China certainly did not back. Still, China's active presence in Jeddah presumably showed that it was ready to assume its responsibilities as a major global power that, in the words of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, had helped "to consolidate international consensus" on Ukraine.


Whatever the veracity of this claim, it is worth noting that on the second day of the Jeddah conference, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov insisted that the meeting was "a reflection of the West's attempt to continue futile, doomed efforts," but added that China could nevertheless "convey common sense to the Western patrons of Kyiv."


China did its best to avoid taking on the role of Moscow's messenger. Still, days after the Jeddah summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a phone call with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, reassured him that Beijing was committed to being an "objective and rational voice." That the week before the summit China had joined Russia in a naval exercise off the coast of Alaska that prompted the deployment of four U.S. Navy destroyers underscored the risky juggling act that is at the heart of Beijing's foreign policy.


A Win for MBS and Zelenskyy


The key participants in the Jeddah conference made good use of the multiple balls that Beijing has thus far kept in the air. Ukrainian officials declared that the meeting "completely destroys the narrative of Russia" that Ukraine was only backed by "countries of the collective West." Such hyperbole was as necessary as they were predictable. Indeed, while in the lead up to the meeting Ukrainian officials insisted that "our goal in Saudi Arabia is to develop a unified vision" ahead of a future global peace summit, the fact that no such vision emerged in Jeddah was almost irrelevant. What counted most was that the summit was held and that it ended, as the Ukrainian ambassador to Saudi Arabia pitched it, with "constructive" talks and "a broad vision." Jeddah was thus a win for Zelenskyy.


The same, of course, can be said for MBS. He may have not fully agreed when the Ukrainian ambassador thanked Saudi Arabia "for being so committed and hospitable to Ukraine in moving forward our peace formula plan." But the meeting signaled that the crown prince is on his way to rehabilitating his international reputation.


More broadly, as one leading Saudi journalist noted, the conference underscored Saudi Arabia's growing clout as a "neutral" mediator in a diverse group of states that constitute a kind of second Non-Aligned Movement whose members are leveraging the US-Russia-China triangle of conflict to advance their interests while maintaining good relations with all three countries.


For Riyadh, a key element in this juggling act is its unhappiness with being replaced by Russia as China's chief supplier of crude oil. This represents a real economic and political cost for MBS, who to the frustration of the Biden White House, has sustained the oil production cuts he initiated in Spring 2023.


In short, the Jeddah meeting gave Riyadh a practically risk-free opportunity to direct multiple signals in multiple directions. Thus, while the conference ended without any final declaration, Saudi officials held that the meeting contributed to "building common grounds that pave the way for peace." As for China, it has signaled its readiness to attend a follow-up meeting.


The Biden Administration (and China) Navigate Choppy Waters


While U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan went to the Jeddah conference, the administration's best bet was to let other participants, most importantly Ukraine's president, make their case and test China's intentions. That in the words of one unnamed U.S. official, the administration was "glad" that China attended and participated in the meeting "in a constructive way"— highlights the challenges that the administration faces as it navigates choppy diplomatic waters.


Those waters got a little rougher as the BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — held a summit on summit on August 22 during which Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia were invited to join. If the decision shows that Russia and China are advancing their efforts to create an alternative to the International Monetary Fund and other Western dominated multi-lateral financial powerhouses, the expanded BRICS club includes not a few members who have concerns about the agenda of Moscow and China on a host of issues, including the Ukraine war.


That Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that Moscow looked forward to "an exchange of views" with the BRICS countries that attended the Jeddah meeting could suggest some unease in the Kremlin. For however determined to foster a multi-polar global system, major regional players such as Brazil and South Africa have no interest letting Moscow or China become the new arbiters of a counter hegemonic agenda. Speaking to the point, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has warned, "We have resisted pressure to align ourselves with any one of the global powers or with influential blocs of nations."


Vladimir Putin might ignore such sentiments, but Beijing's leaders cannot. Afterall, precisely because China is a real world economic and military power in ways that Russia will never be, it needs to find a path to engaging across the global spectrum. This balancing act has become harder with a struggling domestic economy, not to mention the efforts of the Biden White House to foster greater security cooperation in Asia — amply demonstrated by the recent US/South Korea/Japan Camp David summit.


Biden wisely insisted that the meeting was not "anti-China." Still, it is far from clear that this statement shows that the White House has forged a policy that fully takes into account the tensions that are at the heart of China's foreign relations — and that brought Beijing's emissary to Jeddah in the first place.


A version of this piece was published by Arab Center Washington DC. The views expressed in this publication are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.

Introduction: Tradition and Change: Many of the well established Western European pharmaceutical wholesalers are companies with strong local traditions and roots dating back for several decades and more. GEHE Pharma Handel GmbH, one of the top pharmaceutical wholesalers in Germany, was celebrating its 175th birthday in 2010. AAH Pharmaceuticals Ltd., the UK's leading distributor of pharmaceutical and healthcare products, was established in 1923, and Herba Chemosan Apotheker-AG, Austria's largest pharmaceutical service and trading company, was established in 1916 as a cooperative from pharmacists for pharmacists. But having years to add does not equal getting old, as we will see in the course of this study. The times of transformation free eras have long gone, stability is not the norm anymore and the challenges being faced today are completely different. The globalisation of markets and competition has forced and still 'is forcing firms to make dramatic improvements not only to compete and prosper but also to merely survive'. For many reasons, which will be detailed throughout this study, pharmaceutical wholesalers across Europe have been facing the need for improvements to secure sustainability and growth. In addition, 'there has been significant consolidation of pharmaceutical wholesalers in Europe … affecting not only the distribution of market share but also the strategic orientation of the surviving firms'. Healthcare in Transition: Not only within the European Union but also across the entire OECD countries, healthcare is one of the largest industries with a dominant position in terms of job creation and a dynamic force in terms of innovation. Despite significant achievements in the health status of populations, concerns prevail on how resources are used in healthcare and how to guarantee an efficient and effective use of modern medicine. The weight of healthcare expenses in relation to GDP has increased the demand to harmonise internationally different definitions and improve the cross-national comparability of data on healthcare expenses. Consequently, the OECD has developed the 'System of Health Accounts'. This manual provides a common framework and supports the international comparison of healthcare data across countries and over time. A combination of medical progress, demographic changes and shifting social expectations are the major drivers of increasing health expenditures in developed countries. Within the EU-15, spending for healthcare has a significant share in percent of GDP. In 2005, the average healthcare spending in the EU-15 was 8.3% of GDP, leading to an increased dominance of expense controls (Figure 1:Total spending on healthcare in % of GDP (2006)). The pharmaceutical market is an integrated part of the overall healthcare market and driven by innovation and milestone improvements as is the overall healthcare market. The pharmaceutical market is the major reference market for the pharmaceutical wholesale industry. The standing and weight of the pharmaceutical market is expressed in the pharmaceutical quota. The pharmaceutical quota reflects the ratio of pharmaceutical expenses in comparison to the overall expenses for healthcare (Figure 2: Pharmaceutical expenditure in % of total health expenditure (2006)). Pharmaceutical expenditure varies significantly across Europe with a record share of 31.9% of total health expenditure in Hungary. The focus on pharmaceutical spending has become of growing importance, as governments are increasingly facing budget problems in financing healthcare activities for their citizens. The prices of established medicines are generally declining over their life cycle but pharmaceutical spending is triggered by non-cyclical trends, such as increasing life expectancy in industrialised nations and the introduction of new and innovative medicines at increased costs. The global pharmaceutical market will continue to grow and drugs will still be perceived as an efficient method of treatment compared with other types of medical care (Figure 3: Life expectancy in years at birth (2008)). Total spending on healthcare in relation to GDP and life expectancy is still relatively low in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). However, the higher share of spending in pharmaceuticals can be interpreted as reduced spending on other forms of treatment and thereby increasing the importance of pharmaceuticals. Reduced average life expectancy in CEE shows that there is still a need to draw level with the rest of Europe. These trends will ultimately support the growth of pharmaceutical markets but further increase the pressure on local governments to finance additional healthcare. Research Objectives: Pharmaceutical wholesale distribution is an unknown area for the general public, and very often for other players in the healthcare market and politicians too. Little is known about this vital business-to-business link between pharmaceutical production at the beginning and dispensing of drugs at the end of the supply chain. Pharmaceutical wholesale distribution has a long-history in Europe and repeatedly proved to be the most efficient bridge between production and point of sale (PoS) or point of dispensing (PoD). Within the last years, the topic of changes in European healthcare has become of ever growing importance. The pace of change has increased exponentially in some countries. In a functioning healthcare system, pharmaceutical wholesalers are fully embedded and thus significantly affected by a changing environment. Risks and opportunities go hand in hand while governments are changing their policies in healthcare spending, pharmaceutical manufacturers are changing their mode of operating and patients and consumers are changing their ways of receiving or buying pharmaceuticals. The aim of this master thesis is to highlight the role of pharmaceutical full-line wholesalers, to give detailed analyses of an ever-changing healthcare world and map out the most relevant threats and opportunities for European full-line pharmaceutical wholesalers. Structure: This master thesis comprises of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to European healthcare and explains the purpose of this thesis. Chapter 2 focuses on the definition of full-line pharmaceutical wholesalers, the specific functions they hold within the pharmaceutical supply chain, and the value added they provide. Chapter 3 investigates the major trends leading to a changing healthcare environment, evaluating the effects of changing demographic compositions, governments' needs to restrict healthcare spending and the consequences on pharmaceutical wholesalers. Chapter 4 deals with opportunities of growth to sustain the success of European pharmaceutical wholesalers in the long run: strategies for liberalising markets, the creation of value added services, vertical integration and the need to grow outside Europe are on display. Chapter 5, finally, summarises the findings of the master thesis. Data Source: Data for the analysis is mainly based on European drivers of healthcare systems. Analysis on national and corporate level has been included where applicable. Global research data, with a special focus on Brazil, Russia, China and India, has been analysed for the purpose of evaluating growth strategies for pharmaceutical wholesalers outside Europe. The reviewed literature has been published by first-in-class experts in healthcare such as IMS Health, the world's leading provider of market intelligence to the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries, GIRP, the umbrella organisation of pharmaceutical full-line wholesalers in Europe, OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and high-ranking consulting corporations such as Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants and The Boston Consulting Group. A diverse set of sources was used to provide a comprehensive analysis on changing healthcare markets and the threats and opportunities for pharmaceutical wholesalers.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: 1.INTRODUCTION9 1.1TRADITION AND CHANGE9 1.2HEALTHCARE IN TRANSITION10 1.3RESEARCH OBJECTIVES14 1.4STRUCTURE15 1.5DATA SOURCE15 2.PHARMACEUTICAL WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION17 2.1PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN17 2.2FULL-LINE PHARMACEUTICAL WHOLESALERS18 2.3SHORT-LINE PHARMACEUTICAL WHOLESALERS19 2.4FUNCTIONS OF PHARMACEUTICAL WHOLESALERS20 2.4.1Bridging of Distances21 2.4.2Bridging of Time22 2.4.3Quantity Function22 2.4.4Quality Function24 2.4.5Services creating Added Value26 2.4.6Coverage27 3.HEALTHCARE IN TRANSITION29 3.1CHANGINGDEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION29 3.2CHALLENGES IN HEALTHCARE FUNDING33 3.3COST-DRIVEN CHANGES34 3.3.1Generic Market Penetration34 3.3.2Price Erosion38 3.4STRUCTURAL ALTERATIONS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN41 3.4.1Direct Deliveries42 3.4.2Public Service Obligation46 3.4.3Certified Supply Chain47 3.5TRANSFORMING HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS IN CEE49 3.5.1The Post-Semaskho Era49 3.5.2Informal Payments and Corruption51 4.SUSTAINABLE GROWTH55 4.1OUTSOURCING55 4.2VALUE ADDED SERVICES58 4.3VERTICAL INTEGRATION59 4.3.1Sweden Abolishes Pharmacy Monopoly60 4.3.2Legislation61 4.4COOPERATION MODELS66 4.5PHARMERGING MARKETS69 5.CONCLUSION73Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 2.1, Pharmaceutical Supply Chain: Although the pharmaceutical supply chain has different peculiarities depending on national legislations and market structures, a general supply chain organisation exists and is to a large extent valid across Europe. Figure 4 shows that the origins of the pharmaceutical supply chain are at the manufacturing level. Pre-wholesaling is a preliminary stage of wholesaling and usually covers the logistics processes that have been outsourced by manufacturers. Phoenix, one of the three large pan-European pharmaceutical trading companies, explains the growing importance of pre-wholesale activities: 'Today, there is not a single country in Europe where it is not in manufacturers' interests to outsource their entire distribution and logistics requirements, whether for drugs, medical products or veterinary pharmaceuticals, to a specialist company operating within an efficient pharmaceutical logistical system. This logistics partner takes over responsibility for distribution to all wholesalers.' In addition to basic logistical services, such as the professional storage and transportation in accordance with legislation and special requirements for handling drugs, pre-wholesalers offer tailor-made solutions to the pharmaceutical industry. Tailor-made solutions include among others the tracking of medicine deliveries, monitoring of temperature, humidity and exposure to light, and country specific packaging and labelling. 2.2, Full-line Pharmaceutical Wholesalers: Distribution of pharmaceuticals is the core business of full-line pharmaceutical wholesalers. They provide the most important link between pharmaceutical manufacturing and the point of sale (PoS) and point of dispensing (PoD). 'The activity of pharmaceutical full-line wholesaling consists of the purchase, warehousing, storage, order preparation and delivery of medicines. Pharmaceutical full-line wholesalers carry and distribute the complete assortment of products in range and depth within the framework set by the authorities and the market to meet the needs of those with whom they have normal business relations. In addition to delivering all medicines in their geographical area of activity on the same day/within less than 24 hours, pharmaceutical full-line wholesalers provide working capital and extended financing services, funding of stock and receivables of pharmacies and health care professionals'. Pharmaceutical wholesalers provide not only state-of-the-art logistics services but also a wide range of value added services to various stakeholders in healthcare. Tailor-made solutions for the pharmaceutical industry are becoming increasingly important and full-service support beyond logistics competencies has long been established for pharmacy customers. Value added services are no longer mere add-ons to the logistics services but are vital competitive assets. Wholesalers are not only creating benefits down-stream in the supply chain but also across the healthcare market including the final consumers of medicines. 2.3, Short-line Pharmaceutical Wholesalers: Another mode of wholesaling is provided by short-line wholesalers, which are the cherry pickers of pharmaceutical wholesaling. Short-liners restrain their product portfolio to a specific range of pharmaceuticals only. Consequently, they benefit significantly from a narrow financially driven product portfolio and slim cost structures. By contrast, full-line wholesalers offer the entire spectrum of medicines in order to guarantee supply and to support the health of the population. Service offers from short-line wholesalers are either minimal or not existing. National governments usually strive to achieve three targets concerning the pharmaceutical supply chain: drug safety, security of supply and quality of supply. Short-line wholesalers cannot guarantee the security of supply as they only provide a narrow range of medicines. Their focus on highly profitable products negatively affects the product portfolio of full-line wholesalers, which need the profitable products to be able to stock and distribute unprofitable medicines. Hybrid costing has been the economic baseline to guarantee the security of supply. To ensure that supply of medicines is guaranteed, several European countries have legally obliged wholesalers to provide the full range of medicines to pharmacies. France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain and some of the new EU member states have implemented these public service obligations.

Crisis en ZimbabweTras varias semanas de violencia política, el líder de la oposición en Zimbabwe, Morgan Tsvangirai, anunció que no se presentará a la segunda vuelta electoral, prevista para el 27 de junio, por considerar que las condiciones actuales imposibilitan la celebración de comicios libres y transparentes. La decisión prácticamente garantiza la reelección del presidente Robert Mugabe, de 84 años, que gobierna el país desde 1980.Con este escenario de fondo, Tsvangirai pidió ayer la intervención de la ONU para que restablezca la paz y cree las condiciones necesarias para la celebración de un proceso electoral libre. Refugiado en la embajada holandesa ubicada en la capital de Zimbabwe, Morgan Tsvangirai, aseguró que el presidente de ese país, Robert Mugabe, "declaró la guerra" y no unas elecciones. El mundo entero presionan para que se ponga fin a la "campaña de violencia" y permita elecciones libres.Tres meses después de que la oposición certificara su victoria en primera vuelta, y a cuatro días de la celebración de la segunda ronda, el Consejo de Seguridad condenó sin paliativos a Mugabe Más de 90 opositores han sido asesinados y centenares están presos desde que el régimen desencadenó su violenta campaña para aferrarse al poder tras perder los comicios de marzo pasado. Varios medios informan al respecto:"New York Times" : " Zimbabwe Opposition Leader Pulls Out of Runoff":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/world/africa/23zimbabwe.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin"El País" de Madrid: "El acoso de Mugabe fuerza la renuncia del líder de la oposición de Zimbabwe, Morgan Tsvangirai rechaza presentarse a la segunda vuelta de las presidenciales tras haber ganado la primera y las legislativas":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/acoso/Mugabe/fuerza/renuncia/lider/oposicion/Zimbabue/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_6/Tes"CNN": "Mugabe rival seeks refuge in embassy":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/23/zimbabwe.main/index.html"Time": "Robert Mugabe: A Despot's Cruel Resolve":http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1815715,00.html"Time": "Tsvangirai Seeks Dutch Refuge":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817207,00.html"La Nación": "Zimbabwe: la oposición se retira: Dijo que no se presentará al ballottage por la ola de violencia":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1023873 "The Economist": "Zimbabwe's tragedy and farce: "What next after the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, pulls out of the run-off election?":http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11609190&source=features_box_main "The Economist": "Zimbabwe: Robert Mugabe seems determined to steal the presidential run-off but Africa may be slowly turning against him and talk of a unity government has intensified":http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11585249"El País" de Madrid: "Los líderes africanos aumentan su presión sobre Zimbabwe: La comunidad internacional se inclina por no reconocer las elecciones de Zimbabue.- La Comisión Electoral confirma la segunda vuelta": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/lideres/africanos/aumentan/presion/Zimbabue/elpepuint/20080625elpepuint_13/Tes"El País" de Madrid: "El mundo acorrala a Robert Mugabe":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/mundo/acorrala/Robert/Mugabe/elpepuint/20080625elpepiint_2/Tes"MSNBC": "Mugabe rival calls for negotiations to end crisis: Opposition supporters seek refuge at South African Embassy":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25361747/"MSNBC": "U.N. declares fair Zimbabwe vote impossible. Council accuses Mugabe's government of waging a 'campaign of violence'":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25341813/"Newsweek": "Living on Pennies: An undercover visit to Zimbabwe reveals a deeply troubled land full of disenchanted people.":http://www.newsweek.com/id/143122"El Tiempo" de Colombia: "Zimbabue ignora a la ONU y mantiene fecha de elecciones":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/otrasregiones/home/zimbabue-ignora-a-la-onu-y-mantiene-fecha-de-elecciones-_4344649-1"Le Monde": "Zimbabwe : Morgan Tsvangirai demande l'aide des dirigeants africains":http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2008/06/25/l-opposition-tente-d-internationaliser-la-crise-au-zimbabwe_1062455_3212.html#ens_id=1009994"New York Times": "Queen Strips Mugabe of Knighthood":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/world/africa/26zimbabwe.html?ref=world"New York Times": "Ally Warns Outsiders Not to Push Zimbabwe":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/world/africa/25zimbabwe.html?ref=africa"CNN": "Mandela weighs in on Zimbabwe crisis":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/25/zimbabwe.main/index.html"La Nación": "Zimbabwe: duras declaraciones de la oposición":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024581"CNN": "Official: Mugabe wins re-election after opposition pulls out":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/22/zimbabwe.main/index.html"Time": "Zimbabwe Opposition Lacks Leverage":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1730726,00.html?iid=sphere-inline-bottomAMERICA LATINA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Las FARC entregan una prueba de vida de un diputado secuestrado hace ocho años: Sigifredo López es el único sobreviviente del grupo de 12 políticos que la guerrilla capturó en la ciudad colombiana de Cali en 2002":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/FARC/entregan/prueba/vida/diputado/secuestrado/hace/anos/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_1/Tes"La Nación" informa: "El conflicto armado en Colombia, Crece la presión por un canje humanitario: Fuerte reclamo al gobierno y las FARC, tras la difusión de pruebas de vida de un rehén secuestrado en 2002": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1023971"The Economist" analiza: "The unstoppable crop: A big rise in coca in Colombia":http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11585224"El País" de Madrid publica: "26 detenidos en una gran operación anticorrupción en Brasil":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/26/detenidos/gran/operacion/anticorrupcion/Brasil/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_2/Tes"La Nación" publica: "Presentó su renuncia el presidente de Paraguay. Duarte Frutos elevó su dimisión al Congreso a casi dos meses de finalizar su mandato; intenta asumir como senador":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024051"El País" de Madrid informa: "Fidel Castro niega que haya pugnas internas en el Partido Comunista: "Escribo porque sigo luchando, y lo hago en nombre de las convicciones que defendí toda mi vida", indica Castro en un artículo publicado en la página web 'Cubadebate'":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Fidel/Castro/niega/haya/pugnas/internas/Partido/Comunista/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_4/Tes"La Nación" informa: "Fidel: "En Cuba no se torturó a nadie": El líder cubano apuntó contra Bush y los medios que no reprodujeron el reconocimento de la Unesco al sistema educativo de la isla":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024016"The Economist" analiza: "Venezuela's economy: A funny way to beat inflation, Hugo Chávez invites the private sector to help him build socialism": http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11585215"El Tiempo" de Colombia informa:"Presidente de Venezuela anunció que su país continuará fortaleciendo su poderío militar":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/home/presidente-de-venezuela-anuncio-que-su-pais-continuara-fortaleciendo-su-poderio-militar_4345052-1"La Nación" publica: "A poco de terminar la nueva Constitución: Ecuador: renuncia el presidente de la Asamblea": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024041"El Mercurio" de Chile publica: "Partidarios de Cristina Fernández instalados frente al Congreso en apoyo a su postura frente al agro: Gobierno argentino y alcaldía de Buenos Aires se enfrentan por las "carpas kirchneristas"": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/06/25/internacional/_portada/noticias/B3478E1C-36FA-4B14-BF0A-0BD3961BAD96.htm?id={B3478E1C-36FA-4B14-BF0A-0BD3961BAD96}"The Economist" analiza: "Argentina's farm dispute: Cristina's climbdown": http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11586057"El País" de Madrid informa:"Tarija cierra el ciclo de referendos autonómicos contra la Constitución de Evo Morales. Los colegios abren para el cuarto plebiscito para aprobar un estatuto considerado ilegal por el Gobierno boliviano":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Tarija/cierra/ciclo/referendos/autonomicos/Constitucion/Evo/Morales/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_7/TesESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"CNN" informa: "Flood zone residents watch levees as river crests":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/weather/06/23/midwest.flooding.ap/index.html"MSNBC" publica: "MEXICAN DRUG WAR 'ALARMING' U.S. OFFICIALS":http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/06/25/1166487.aspx"The Economist" analiza:; "Political segregation : Americans are increasingly choosing to live among like-minded neighbours. This makes the culture war more bitter and politics harder":http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11581447"CNN" informa: "Obama, McCain gear up for race-based attacks":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/23/obama.ads.ap/index.html"El Tiempo" de Colombia informa: "Bill Clinton ofrece su apoyo a Barack Obama":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/euycanada/home/bill-clinton-ofrece-su-apoyo-a-barack-obama_4344496-1EUROPA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Berlusconi gobierna para Berlusconi, Il Cavaliere desata la guerra contra los jueces para intentar librarse de los juicios": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Berlusconi/gobierna/Berlusconi/elpepuint/20080622elpepiint_1/Tes"El País" de Madrid informa: "Sarkozy apuesta en Jerusalén por la creación de un Estado palestino, El mandatario francés dice que es la mejor solución para la seguridad de Israel": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Sarkozy/apuesta/Jerusalen/creacion/Estado/palestino/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_9/Tes"La Nación" informa: "Fuerte respaldo de Sarkozy a Israel: El presidente de Francia aseguró que "un Irán nuclear es inaceptable"; además, condicionó un acuerdo de paz al cese de la colonización en los territorios palestinos":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024028"El País" de Madrid publica: "Sarkozy gana el pulso a los sindicatos: La popularidad del presidente francés sigue bajo mínimos, pero su programa de reformas sociales sigue adelante": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Sarkozy/gana/pulso/sindicatos/elpepuint/20080622elpepiint_5/Tes "El Tiempo" de Colombia informa: "Ante la desaceleración de la economía, España se 'aprieta el cinturón'":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/ante-la-desaceleracion-de-la-economia-espana-se-aprieta-el-cinturon_4343124-1"La Nación" informa: "Zapatero anunció un recorte de la oferta del empleo público: El presidente de España reconoció un estancamiento económico pero dijo que no será "duradero", auguró un "crecimiento débil":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1024031"The Economist" analiza: "Ireland's voters speak: But will anybody listen to them?":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11580212"El Tiempo" de Colombia publica: "La Unión Europea perdió la paciencia con Irán por programa nuclear y le impuso fuertes sanciones":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/la-union-europea-perdio-la-paciencia-con-iran-por-programa-nuclear-y-le-impuso-fuertes-sanciones_4343100-1Asia – Pacífico /Medio OrieNTE"The Economist" analiza: "Beijing Olympics: Limbering up for the games, The security forces rehearse their exercise routine": http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11591389"CNN" informa: "Beijing: Cars come off roads for Olympics":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/06/23/pollution.olympics.ap/index.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "China asegura haber liberado a más de un millar de tibetanos: El Gobierno chino cree que el paso de la antorcha olímpica por la capital de Tíbet ayudará a olvidar los graves disturbios de hace tres meses": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/China/asegura/haber/liberado/millar/tibetanos/elpepuint/20080621elpepuint_6/Tes"China Daily" publica: "Tropical storm hits China's SE coast": http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/25/content_6794435.htm "El País" de Madrid informa: "Al menos 155 muertos por el paso del ciclón Fengshen en Filipinas: El balance puede aumentar por el naufragio de un ferry en el que viajaban 700 personas.- Hay decenas de desaparecidos": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/155/muertos/paso/ciclon/Fengshen/Filipinas/elpepuint/20080622elpepuint_3/Tes"New York Time" publica: "Hundreds Feared Dead in Philippines":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/world/asia/23filip.html?ref=world"Time" informa: "Vietnam's Prime Minister Tackles Inflation":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817174,00.html"China Daily" publica: "Tibet greets first foreign tourists after riot":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/25/content_6795095.htm"Time" publica: "S. Korea, US Agree on Beef Imports":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1816968,00.html "El Universal" de Méjico informa: "Yihad viola la tregua en Gaza: Lanza cohetes contra la ciudad de Sderot, en represalia por muerte de 2 miembros":http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/internacional/58195.html"MSNBC" informa: "Israel closes Gaza crossings after rocket fire: Day of violence presents cease-fire with its first serious test":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25346051/"El Tiempo" de Colombia publica: "'No podemos aceptar que un país como Irán tenga armas nucleares', dice el Primer Ministro de Israel":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/orienteproximo/home/no-podemos-aceptar-que-un-pais-como-iran-tenga-armas-nucleares-dice-el-primer-ministro-de-israel_4346248-1 "The Economist" analizA: "Israel and the Palestinians: Can a ceasefire hold?":http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11592840"New York Times" informa: " Female Suicide Bomber Kills 15 in Iraq":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/world/middleeast/23iraq.html?ref=world"Time" analiza: "The Mind of a Female Suicide Bomber":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817158,00.html"MSNBC" publica: "Iran won't rule out U.S. diplomatic presence: State Department eyes first office in Tehran since 1979 Islamic Revolution":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25348720/"CNN" publica: "Violent clashes continue in northern Lebanon":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/23/donors.palestinians.ap/index.html"New York Times" informa: "At Oil Conference, Saudis Offer Slight Rise in Production":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/world/middleeast/23saudi.html?ref=world "The Economist" analiza: "Saudi Arabia: The puzzle of oil production. Why the Saudis are worried about the high price of crude": http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11592833"MSNBC" informa: "Official: Taliban kills 22 from rival tribe: Bodies found dumped along road in Pakistan after border town seized":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25359276/"El País" de Madrid informa: "Mueren cuatro soldados de la coalición internacional en una emboscada en Afganistán. Los militares estaban embarcados en la ofensiva contra los talibanes iniciada esta semana en el sur del país": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Mueren/soldados/coalicion/internacional/emboscada/Afganistan/elpepuint/20080621elpepuint_7/TesAFRICA"MSNBC" informa: "Kenyan children tell of abductions, torture: Hundreds have been terrorized, first by militias and then the army":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25352892/ECONOMIA"CNN" publica: "Citigroup is readying to cut 10% of 65,000-person investment banking group worldwide, The Wall Street Journal reports.":http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/22/news/companies/citigroup_layoffs.ap/index.htm?cnn=yes"The Econoimist" publica su informe semanal: "Business this week":http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11599022&CFID=10602990&CFTOKEN=49506190"El País" de Madrid informa: "Trichet admite que "es posible" que el BCE suba los tipos de interés la próxima semana: El presidente del instituto emisor europeo advierte que el BCE está "determinado" y "en alerta máxima" para atajar la inflación": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Trichet/admite/posible/BCE/suba/tipos/interes/proxima/semana/elpepueco/20080625elpepueco_6/Tes"CNN" informa: "Oil prices surges despite Saudi pledge":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/23/oil.prices.ap/index.html"The Economist" publica: "Yahoo!, eBay and Amazon: The three survivors": http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11580247OTRAS NOTICIAS"La Nación" informa: "Sin acuerdo para frenar la escalada del petróleo: Sólo Arabia Saudita se comprometió a extraer más crudo":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1023918

This paper re-examines the development implications of international migration focusing on two issues: how the costs and benefits of migration change over time, and the significance of South-South migration for development. First, the analysis finds that although greater migration could push down the wages of native workers of advanced countries in the short run, these wages eventually recover. This pattern would be mostly caused by the beneficial effect of additional labor on the real returns on capital and fostering faster capital formation. Additional South-North migration could favor capital income recipients and reduces labor income in host regions in the short run. In contrast, in sending countries, capital owners could experience lower incomes while wages rise. Globally, the welfare gains of new migrants could be expected to exceed the losses of old migrants by a wide margin. The remaining natives in sending countries could enjoy a net increase in remittances as well as an increase in labor income, although income from capital might decline. Second, in a hypothetical scenario with lower South-South migration, the implied losses of remittance income could lead to substantially lower welfare in developing countries. Although the wage differentials among developing countries tend to be smaller relative to their wage differentials with high-income countries, South-South migrants make substantial contributions to remittances.

The proposed tobacco settlement agreement, as negotiated by some state attorneys general and the tobacco industry that was made public on June 20, 1997 (Appendix F), raises a complex array of public health, public policy, legal and economic issues. It was intended to be a blueprint for national tobacco control legislation that would end the most important litigation current and potential against the tobacco industry. As with most complex legislation, the deal, after it was announced, underwent a great deal of scrutiny and criticism. Many public health and policy groups analyzed the deal in whole or in part in order to provide guidance for those who wished to distill the essential elements and implications of the deal. While many have pronounced the original deal 'dead' as a result of this criticism, it remains the fundamental framework around which most proposals for federal legislation on tobacco has been based. As a result, a careful analysis of the terms and implications of the original June 20 deal remains a worthwhile effort. This report seeks to provide policy makers and advocates with a context and analysis of the most important aspects of the deal through a series of briefing papers, which can be read independently or collectively. Each paper addresses one aspect of the deal. The papers are organized according to general topics: political issues related to the deal, financial and tax aspects of the deal, regulatory implications of the deal, and civil liability controls in the deal. For those who desire a more technical approach to the issues, we have included five technical appendices to provide additional support regarding the economic analysis of the deal, the economic analysis of the lookback provision, the political analysis of the deal, and the public health analysis of the deal, the legal analysis of the deal. To the extent that the deal is reflected in any legislative proposals that emerge, this analysis will be relevant to that legislation. In the months leading up to the publication of the deal, many commentators discussed the relative merits of entering into a negotiated resolution of the tobacco litigation. The advocates of the deal pointed to the ability to obtain specific relief, the advantages of having a national tobacco policy, and the elimination of the risks to continuing the litigation. Critics of the deal-making process were concerned that making a deal would: guarantee tobacco industry profitability; require Congressional action, which in turn would provide weak proposals because of the influence the tobacco lobby in national politics; preempt stronger state and local regulatory efforts to control tobacco; and preclude broad based public health efforts to control tobacco in the future. Many commentators have described the deal as one in which the tobacco industry accepts strong restrictions in exchange for some limitation of liability. Our analysis reaches just the opposite conclusion: A close reading of the deal reveals that the benefits to the tobacco industry are concrete and substantial whereas the public health benefits are less clear. The Funding Provisions of the Deal Are Inadequate The money in the deal is large in absolute terms but small when compared to the damage done by tobacco products. Even if one takes the more limited view of the deal that its purpose is only to reimburse the states for future Medicaid expenses plus fund the specified public health programs, the payments are not high enough to cover these limited costs. If the deal is designed to reimburse society for all damage done by tobacco, it provides less than 10 cents on the dollar. The financial portions of the deal are structured in such a manner that they will guarantee industry profits. The Taxpayers will Absorb a Substantial Fraction of the Nominal Costs to the Industry All payments by the tobacco industry, including those made 'in lieu of' punitive damages, are tax deductible, which results in a decrease in the impact of the deal on the industry and a cost shifting to American taxpayers. Taxpayers will absorb 30-40% of the cost of the deal, which will need to be recovered through increased taxes or spending cuts. The tax subsidy provided to the tobacco industry by the deal, amounting to about $4 billion a year, dwarfs both the current tobacco price support program and the funds that the deal makes available for public health programs. The Industry Will be Protected from Litigation The civil liability protections will strongly protect the tobacco industry. The deal eliminates large-scale suits that are most threatening to the industry and only allows individual cases, which the industry has been successful in defeating. In addition, the deal changes the rules of evidence and civil procedure in ways that will make it more difficult for people with cancer, heart disease, and other smoking-induced problems to win their individual cases. The deal provides the industry financial security by capping exposure. These limitations on litigation will effectively preclude injured smokers from receiving just compensation and perhaps limit future criminal and civil enforcement actions against the tobacco companies. Moreover, the caps eliminate the incentives the civil justice system to improve corporate behavior, by reducing the threat that the tobacco companies will be held fully accountable for their actions. Under the terms of the deal, the industry will avoid about $150-$200 billion in liability at a cost of $6-$7 billion. Eliminating Litigation Will Eliminate a Valuable Public Health Tool The current litigation against the tobacco industry has a discernible benefit to the public health community which will be eliminated should the litigation cease. For example, the litigation provides a ready means to educate the public about the dangers of smoking and misbehavior of the tobacco industry. Without the prosecution of the current lawsuits, a valuable health education opportunity will be lost. In addition, the litigation which the deal seeks to resolve is based upon the enforcement of laws which serve public health interests, such as consumer protection and anti-trust laws. The deal restricts use of these laws in against the tobacco industry. Losing both a timely health education opportunity and the right to fully utilize consumer protection and related laws against the tobacco industry limits the public health tools to combat death and disease related to tobacco. The public health community has an interest in preserving the right to litigation to obtain social justice. The deal compromises the rights of individuals and institutions to sue the tobacco industry without fair compensation. Similarly, the public health community has an interest in fairly allocating the damages related to a particular harm. Societal resources which are currently being expended to remedy the harms related to tobacco could be re-allocated to serve other public health interests. The litigation provides a valuable tool to force the tobacco companies to pay for the damages related to tobacco, leaving societal resources to address other public health problems. The absence of litigation will remove one tool the public health community can use to force the tobacco companies to internalize the costs of the damage tobacco does. The Deal Requires Congress to Preempt Laws in Every State The essential principle behind the deal was the willingness of the Attorneys General, private lawyers, and health officials who negotiated the deal to support substantial limitations on liability of the tobacco industry for its past and future behavior. The deal not only 'legislatively settles' the Medicaid lawsuits brought by the Attorneys General, but also effectively ends most other forms of litigation against the tobacco industry. Since most of this litigation is being brought under state (as opposed to federal) consumer protection, fraud, anti-trust, and other laws, granting the tobacco industry the immunity it seeks will require Congress to preempt these laws in every state and the District of Columbia. In addition to preempting these laws, the deal preempts existing state authority to require ingredient disclosure and may increase the strength of tobacco industry claims that local and state restrictions on tobacco industry marketing practices are illegal. Regulatory Controls are Unnecessary and Insufficient The details of the regulatory provisions in the deal favor the tobacco industry. Rather than recognizing that there are many agencies with jurisdiction over tobacco, the deal concentrates almost exclusively on the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The deal also ignores the fact that most progress in tobacco use has been made at the local and state level. The FDA currently has jurisdiction over tobacco products and is executing its regulatory authority pursuant to its jurisdiction. The few provisions in the deal which are not currently a part of FDA regulations could become so even without the deal, or like the current advertising restrictions, be regulated by another agency. Furthermore, the expectations regarding the benefits attendant with many of the regulatory changes should be small. Even with the advertising restrictions in place, the tobacco industry will still find successful ways to market their products, and tobacco imagery will be ubiquitous. Similarly, the proposed regulations regarding tobacco warnings and restrictions on youth access add little new authority. The deal would essentially codify the law as it currently exists, except that it would also place limitations on future FDA authority. Although the codification of FDA authority may be desirable, the deal would add intensive rollback FDA authority by requiring the FDA to meet additional regulatory hurdles before it can regulate tobacco constituents and restricting how and when it can regulate nicotine. These hurdles will preclude much of the potential for true regulatory reform. Similarly, the secondhand tobacco smoke provisions in the deal represent a rollback of the current ability of the Department of Labor to regulate broadly. The secondhand smoke provisions within the deal accept industry claims that smokefree workplace laws would harm the hospitality industry, which is not true. The Lookback Provision Is Inadequate There are provisions in the deal designed to penalize the industry for not meeting specific targeted reductions in youth smoking. The lookback provision is a good example of how the technical details of the deal have important impacts that are not evident. The lookback provision ties goals in reducing teen smoking to the percentage of teens who are daily smokers. While 75% of smokers have their first cigarette by age 14, 75% do not become daily smokers until they reach age 18 (the cutoff for calculating the lookback penalty). Epidemiological evidence indicates that nicotine is as addictive as cocaine heroin and opiates. Symptoms of addiction begin before the onset of daily smoking. Limiting the measure of youth smoking to daily smokers will allow the tobacco industry to comply with the lookback provision by simply marketing in a way that leads children to begin smoking two years older than they do now; it will continue to recruit new adult smokers by addicting them as youths. By increasing the age of initiation by two years, the transition of most smokers to daily smoking in new smokers will occur after their eighteenth birthday. In addition, the penalty is too small to provide an effective economic incentive for the industry to reduce youth smoking; if the industry were to simply continue its current recruiting of teens, the after-tax cost of the lookback provision would be about a nickel a pack. Furthermore, the penalties are pooled among the industry, which decreases the pressure any one company will have to reform its behavior. The Deal Preserves the Oligopoly Structure of the Industry Throughout the deal there are a number of provisions which increase barriers to market entry and preserve the current profit structure. These provisions will encourage anti-competitive behavior and eliminate any incentive to innovate toward safer products. Furthermore, by closing the market, new companies will find it more difficult to compete. This situation will further guarantee excess profits for the existing companies. The Deal does not Provide for Full Disclosure of Tobacco Industry Wrongdoing One of the most important aspects of the current litigation is the ongoing disclosure of industry wrongdoing. The document disclosure provisions of the deal are weak and would permit the industry to continue to withhold privileged documents, which many believe are the most damaging to the industry. The deal may not be necessary to secure disclosure of these documents, because the Congress has subpoenaed and disclosed some tobacco industry documents, and more are emerging through litigation. Between further Congressional action and the litigation there is likely to be a continuous release of documents without a need for the deal. There are No Barriers Other than a Lack of Political Will to Adopting the Beneficial Provisions of the Deal Tobacco control advocates have successfully enacted legislation that meets many of the goals of the deal at the state and local level without compromise with the tobacco industry. The federal government could do the same. For example, the public health measures of the deal could be enacted and the funds for these programs appropriated out of the general fund or through an increase in the tobacco excise tax. Congress can give the FDA and Department of Labor more direct authority over tobacco products, and it could ensure full funding for their programs. Plaintiffs can enter (and Mississippi, Florida, Texas, San Francisco, and a plaintiffs' class of non-smoking flight attendants have entered) into individual legal settlements with the tobacco industry. The Deal is Silent on International Issues The deal ignores the implications that U.S. tobacco control policy has on international tobacco control efforts. The precedents established by the deal are particularly important because litigation against the tobacco industry is beginning in other countries. The limitations on liability in the deal may compromise the ability of other countries to recover the cost of tobacco-induced illness. The Deal is Based on Several Premises that are no Longer True The original premise behind the deal was that if the Attorneys General, public health advocates, and the tobacco industry could come to an agreement that all found acceptable, such legislation would be enacted into law rapidly. Some public health advocates argued that such a compromise was necessary and appropriate because the power of the tobacco industry in Congress was such that industry acceptance was necessary in order to get legislation enacted. Legislation was seen as necessary because the tobacco industry had never lost nor settled any health-oriented lawsuits against it. Because of this, rather than risking everything in Court, the Attorneys General and other decided that it was better to gain a partial victory in Congress. Since then, the terms of the deal have been declared unacceptable by all elements of the public health community, so the original premise of going to Congress with a partnership between public health and tobacco forces no longer holds. The tobacco industry has maintained that the deal should be enacted as negotiated and has dramatically increased its campaign contributions and lobbying activities in order to see the deal enacted. Tobacco executives have testified in Congress that a grant of immunity for the industry is a condition of industry support for federal tobacco legislation. Public health groups are divided about the wisdom of trading some form of immunity for the tobacco industry in exchange for public policy changes that some believe will reduce tobacco control. Even the forces in the health community who are willing to entertain such a trade, however, have rejected the deal as originally negotiated. As a result, they are now in the position of going into Congress opposed to the tobacco industry, the very situation that the deal was supposed to avoid. Finally, the belief that the tobacco industry would never settle or lose heath-related lawsuits has changed. The industry settled the Mississippi, Florida, and Texas Medicaid suits on favorable public health terms, as well as a case brought by San Francisco over the Joe Camel advertising character and a class action suit on secondhand smoke brought by flight attendants. The industry has also lost several cases brought by individuals. It will be difficult for the industry to return to a no-settlement strategy, particularly in light of documents and other information that have come out of the litigation process and Congressional hearings to date.

One of the most pernicious effects of the Marxist schema of base and superstructure is that it posits the economy and ideology as two separate and distinct levels. The base is where the economy does its work, silently and materially, and the superstructure does its work reproducing the relations of production by remaining entirely separate and distinct from the economy, by addressing morals, religion, the nation, everything but economic necessity. This rigid division makes it difficult to think of the ideological dimension of the economy and the economic dimension of ideology. I have written before on what I could call the ideological dimension of the economy, the way that work, wealth, and capital function not just as economic relations but are coded are moralized, made into statements of virtue and worth. I am not taking credit for this idea, it can be found in Hegel, and, more critically, in Marx's discussion of primitive accumulation. I have a whole book coming out which discusses the way that work does a "double shift" as both a fundamental aspect of economic life under capitalism and a central term in capitalist ideology. Beyond that, I think that it might be useful to think of similar double shifts, where the economy functions as ideology, and ideology works in the economy. First example, in analyzing the much discussed, and hopefully fiercely fought cuts at West Virginia University one point comes up repeatedly. Which is that humanities courses like languages and literature, generally bring in more money than they cost. Humanities professors are cheaper than faculty in other departments, such as business, and generally courses involve less costly technology than courses in STEM. There have also been suggestions that other aspects of the university, like its football team, are not only more expensive, with something like fourteen assistant coaches, but cost more than they bring in. I am not sure about that last point, however, and am honestly not going that deep into the matter. There are also larger points about the general decline in state funding for higher education. I am not suggesting that one make an argument defending education primarily in terms of costs and returns--far from it. My main point here is that eliminating language programs is not the result of a simple cost/benefit analysis, a comparison of revenue in and out, but from what could be considered the ideology of economic rationality. Languages, culture, and even puppetry just seem to be extravagant even if they are not. While an instrumental calculation tells us that courses in such departments bring in more revenue, more students, our idea of what is economically rational tells us that they are expensive and not essential to whatever we think a university is, increasingly a job training center. Economical is often a representation of calculation, an idea of what is worthwhile or expensive, rather than an actual calculation based on costs and revenue. Second example: and this comes from Adam Kotsko's post about streaming, streaming services, like other app based transformations such as Uber and Airbnb, seem to be the very model of market efficiency. They have effectively eliminated the middle man, the cable provider, television network, or video store, bringing more profits directly to the studio and more choice to the audience. I am not going to get into the failure of the latter (better reserved for another post), but the truth of the matter is that streaming has not been profitable with most services working at a loss for years. Nonetheless, streaming seems profitable and a model of what it means to be successful capitalist enterprise. So much so that when my university was cutting programs a few years ago a member of the board said that he wanted the university to be like Netflix not Blockbuster, by which I assume that he meant efficient, new. and online. It is the idea, or ideal of disruption, of change and obsolescence that, explains the interest in streaming services and not their actual profitability. Of course it is possible to say that part of the fetishization of apps has more to do with the long game, with the role they play in deskilling work and making working conditions more precarious in order to replace employees with workers with even less security and lower wages. The long game, the overall social effect, is something that capitalist from Adam Smith to Milton Freeman have argued companies are not supposed to not consider--their only concern should be immediate self-interest (or in Freeman's case shareholder interest). Third example, by now you have probably heard of the viral online hit "Rich Men North of Richmond" by Oliver Anthony. I am not going recommend the song as a song, but I have copied some of the lyrics below to discuss it as a cultural moment (albeit one probably forgotten by the time you read this). Livin' in the new worldWith an old soulThese rich men north of RichmondLord knows they all just wanna have total controlWanna know what you think, wanna know what you doAnd they don't think you know, but I know that you do'Cause your dollar ain't shit and it's taxed to no end'Cause of rich men north of RichmondI wish politicians would look out for minersAnd not just minors on an island somewhereLord, we got folks in the street, ain't got nothin' to eatAnd the obese milkin' welfareWell, God, if you're 5-foot-3 and you're 300 poundsTaxes ought not to pay for your bags of fudge roundsYoung men are puttin' themselves six feet in the ground'Cause all this damn country does is keep on kickin' them downI am going to skip right over the Qanon part about islands of minors and go straight to the representation of the economy. First, we get the usual demon of the right, the welfare queen or king, the song doesn't give us gender just height and weight. That this fiction persists long after the end of "welfare as we know it" is a testament to its power as a myth. To quote Jeff Sharlet, "You can't fact check a myth." Along with this myth that welfare is an incredibly easy life we get one of the other persistent themes of the right, the strange obsession with exactly what poor people consume, in this case fudge rounds, the Little Debbie snackcake that retails for less than three bucks for a nine ounce package. A cheap vice, all things considered. The song seems to suggest that at some particular body mass ratio it would be acceptable for the state to provide these snack cakes, but it is unclear where the cut off is. If you ask me we would be better worrying about the consumption habits of the wealthy than the poor: the former are going to private jet the planet to death while we are drawing cut off lines for snack cake consumption, but I digress.The real line that strikes me in this passage is "Cause your dollar ain't shit and it's taxed to no end." This passage is often cited as the real working class pain that is at the heart of this song. It is hard to deny the first part, the past few years of inflation have driven the buying power of the dollar down. The second part, however, is more dubious. There is no tax increase that explains that decrease. Rates have gone down nationally, but that varies by income bracket, and Virginia (where I assume this is coming from) has remained in the middle range of state income tax with a top rate of 5.75%, West Virginia is slightly higher at 6.50%. However, I would argue that as much as taxes cannot be the true cause of the economic anger at the core of this song, they are its necessary false cause. (To cite Spinoza, "inadequate ideas follow from the same necessity as adequate ideas)To discuss inflation, wages, and so on as causes of the decline of the dollar, of working class conditions, is to criticize capitalism, albeit obliquely. Capitalism, the economy, is not something one can critique, not because it is beyond reproach, held sacred, but because it is seen as a fact of life, the way of the world. To criticize capitalism would be to acknowledge it as an institution, as a human creation. Instead the critical force is reserved for politicians, for those rich men North of Richmond, who have imposed taxes.  Of course it is unclear why they would do this, the profit motive is a fairly clear motivating force for exploitation, taking it off of the table often means coming up with even more baroque explanations as to why the rich men are doing what they are doing. To some up briefly, my point here is not that there is nothing like economic determination, or material conditions and causes, but just that even material causes cannot be separated from their representation, how we grasp or image them. The economy, the other scene of politics, has effects only in and through that scene, and vice versa. 

 Summit success is often a matter of expectations, and, of course, depends on where you sit.  For Ukraine, this may not have been as successful as it would want since they didn't get a fast track into NATO.  But that was an unrealistic expectation.  I didn't expect Turkey to stop blocking Sweden's membership, so my expectations were exceeded and thus huge success.  But the summit is more than just one or two decisions, so I am going to review much of the communique and then the Canadian announcements to figure out how many woots does this summit get.  Of course, since my pals and I didn't get a chance to go to the expert forum side party this year, there is a cap on the excitement--no NATO family dance party for us.First, as mentioned above, Ukraine didn't get a superfast track to membership, as having Ukraine join while the war is going on would either mean that NATO invokes Article V--an attack has happened against a member and deserves a collective response--or it does not.  In the former case, NATO is now at war with Russia, something that the alliance has rightly been avoiding.  In the latter case, Article V gets eroded as it is not used when a member is attacked in a very serious way.  This is not just a few loose bombs or artillery shells like when forces in Syria hit Turkey.  The question really is how soon after the war would Ukraine become a member, and the answer this time was: very soon.  But it was not more definitive because the alliance requires consensus, and that is all that they could agree to.  I pushed back on twitter about cowardice or manliness.  NATO being at peace while Ukraine has been at war is not great for Ukraine, but the fact that Russia is not hitting the supplies going into Ukraine before they get there is hugely significant.  Expanding the war is not good for most folks, and the risk of nuclear war, which is small but real, is not great even for Ukrainians.  Second, Sweden is an unalloyed win for the alliance.  It makes defense of the Baltics easier since Sweden sits astride the best ways to reinforce the Baltics in a time of war.  It also means that countries leading the NATO missions in the Baltics, looking for more troops to plus up their battlegroups into brigades (going from 1k to at least 3k) have a robust potential donor to beg (force generation is begging in the words of a NATO military official we cited in our book with the ebook version on sale now!).  It is also a massive defeat for Russia, as Putin has long wanted to break NATO, but finds his aggressions in Ukraine in 2014 and in 2022 have only strengthened and expanded the alliance.  Finland and Sweden would not have asked to join had Russia stayed within its boundaries.  Ok, onto the communique, which represents a lot of homework and bargaining over the past year, with the summit serving as an artificial deadline to get folks to agree, kind of like an academic conference is designed really to get profs to finally finish their papers:the formation of the NATO-Ukraine Council. This supplants the old NATO-Russia Council which died due to Russia's aggression.  This gives Ukraine much visibility and status and allows the Ukrainians to participate meaningfully in many NATO conversations.  It ain't membership, but it is significant.Finland is now a member, woot!China as a threat--this requires work as some countries (France) want to keep sucking up to China.Lots of stuff on Russia, not recognizing Crimea as Russian, etc.  Naming Belarus and Iran as complicit (although not China).  The language on Russia can't be a partner for now is probably the closest we can get to declaring the NATO Russia Founding Act dead.Lots of stuff about supporting Ukraine, that no need to continue with the Membership Action Plan, which means Ukraine is closer to membership and is increasingly integrated.Some more language about ISIS and terrorism.2% gets the usual shoutout--making progress but now we recognize that 2% isn't enough.  More forward defense with regional defense plans, more troops at high readiness, moving from battlegroups to brigades in the east as promised last year.Defence Production Action plan--to improve delivery of weapons/ammunitionIntegrated Air and Missile Defense with emphasis on eastern flank--this represents a response to the roles played by drones and missile attacks in Ukraine.Continued opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons since nukes are part of NATO's deterrent strategy.  Not a surprise.No Japan office for NATO since France opposed it.  Consensus decision-making can suck... like how do we dump Hungary?The standing up of a Maritime Center for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure.  This seems in response to Russia primarily monkeying around with cables.Cyber got the longest paragraph, I think, with a new Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability to help members respond to cyber attacks.Western Balkans get several items--75-78--as tensions are brewing there.  Supporting Bosnia's integrity is directly aimed against Bosnian Serb separatism, KFOR continues to operate and has increased its troop numbers due to violence in the Serb-inhabited areas.  A reference there to conditions based not calendar driven brings me back to my Joint Staff days concern whether exit/reductions are determined by benchmarks (conditions) or milestones (time).  There was more, but that is the stuff that caught my eye.  So, much progress on some of the most important things, hard time getting consensus on NATO becoming relevant in the Pacific despite clearer language about the threat posed by China.  What about Canada?  I got asked lots of questions about 2%, and I didn't see anyone put Trudeau in a headlock for not making sufficient progress towards 2%.  Nor did I see Canada making a huge stink about Biden's sending of cluster munitions to Ukraine (a post for another day maybe).  Canada did take part in several announcements--a blueprint for Latvia's defense, a NATO plan for defending the Baltics, and the like.  Trudeau announced sending up to 2,200 Canadian troops to Latvia which is up from the original 450 or so and then 800-1000 that it has been at since last year.  He announced $2.6b in spending on the Latvia mission over the next three years including $1.2b.  I don't know if this is enough to cover the additional costs of sending the larger numbers of troops who have to be rotated every six months, the costs of more infrastructure (barracks, dining hall, training facilities, etc) for not just the more Canadians but the more NATO folks, etc.  Remember, Canada is the Framework Nation for Latvia, which means it is Canada's responsibility to lead the multinational battlegroup that is now becoming a multinational brigade.  That means providing some infrastructure for those who Canada cajoles to stick around (Albania, Czech Republic, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and North Macedonia) and maybe join us (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) to get to 3000+ troops.  Given that there are now eight places for NATO to send troops--the three Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania--so competition will be fierce to get more troops from some of these countries.  So, Canada has to make the place welcoming and a good training area--which means plenty of ammunition and other logistical support so they can exercise often. And no Defence Policy Update.  Which is a disappointment--it is very late.  When will be the next time where announcing it will be handy for the government?  Maybe when parliament is back in session?  ¯\_(ツ)_/¯So, I think Canada did the minimum to keep the criticism down, but perhaps didn't really do enough to set up the Latvia mission for success.  I don't think getting to 2% quickly is a realistic expectation, but the government could have made it a bit clearer that Canada would be moving in that general direction.  That there have been a heap of commitments made, that the personnel crisis itself needs much money thrown at it, so defence spending should be going up, even if it is not going to increase by 50%.Overall, the summit went well, the big things happened, the smaller things mostly worked out.  Putin's efforts to divide the alliance keep failing, the media's efforts to set unrealistic expectations and Zelensky's first outburst did not really upset things much.  I am sure many observers would prefer Trump running around, pushing over the leaders of smaller countries.  It would be more entertaining.  But we got enough progress on enough items.  Is it fast enough?  Not for Ukraine.  But a consensus-based organization is not going to move that quickly.  That NATO will soon have something like 30,000 troops forward deployed is pretty amazing.  And definitely not what Putin wants.  

Maritime piracy is still one of the most interesting manifestations of human activity by reason of the fact that it has, directly or indirectly, a number of points of contact between different problems of social, religious, political, economical and, of course, historical matter. Specifically, South-east Asia is a great example of how history, politics and religion are strongly and crucially imbued with the maritime banditry phenomenology. During the era of great maritime political entities exercising dominion along the Malay and Indonesian coasts, predation assumed character of endemicity going to fit firmly within the society, politics and economy networks. Inside Zhu Pan Zhi, the reports of the Song Dynasty about the barbarian peoples, is it possible to read about the piracy in the Great Southern Ocean (Nanyang) «the foreign ships were often attacked by pirates. The captives were the favourite of pirates, one captive can sell for 2 liang or 3 liang gold, the piracy prevents the merchants from visiting the ports» . Of great interest it is also the description of piracy in waters near Singapore (Temasek) and south of the straits that, in 1349, appeared in these terms: «The Dragon-teeth Strait (longyamen) is between the two hills of Temasek barbarians, which look like dragon's teeth'. Through the centre runs a waterway. The fields are barren and rice harvest is poor. The climate is hot with heavy rain in April and May. The inhabitants are addicted to piracy […] when junks sail to the European Ocean (Indian Ocean), the local barbarians allow them to pass unmolested, but when the junks reach the Auspicious Strait (Jilimen) on their return voyages, some 200-300 pirate prahus (boats) will put out to attack the junks for several days, the crew of junks have to fight with their arms and setting up cloth screen as a protection against arrows. Sometimes, the junks are fortunate enough to escape with a favouring wind; otherwise, the crews are butchered and the merchandise becomes pirates' booty» . As can be seen from the text, also the physical elements (water, poor soil, distress sea routes, monsoon climate) play an important role in explaining the aforementioned endemicity of pirate phenomenon: in one of the most relevant work by Anthony Reid, a supporter of the Braudelian method of historical investigation, it is reported that few major areas of the world have been so deeply marked by nature such as South-east Asia, going to emphasize the importance of geography in the study of human activities. During the first part of my research, a question to which I have tried to answer was to understand the extent to which individuals, who are placed in a given geographical and historical context, act in a manner consistent with that particular geo-cultural system and how, external elements in that system, can help to change the perspective of action; in essence, I have tried to study how and to what extent India, China and Europe (Western Culture) have affected the history of the indigenous population of South-east Asia and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in particular. The constitution of the great European colonial empires stretched from the Malacca Straits to the South China Sea, marked the beginning of a progressive modification process of maritime piracy both in terms of objectives to be achieved and also procedures to be followed; Nicholas Tarling lucidly points out in this regard "the old empires decayed, but were not replaced, and with their boundaries marauding communities appared, led by the adveturous Sharifs, or deprived aristocracies, or hungry chiefs" . The main ethnic groups who practiced piracy, the Riau-Lingga Malay, Bugis and Dayak of East Malaysia and Brunei, and Ilanun Balangingi from the southern Philippines and the Sulu sea, became corsairs in the pay of the colonial authorities and all those princes or sultans deprived of their possessions. However, alongside the politically motivated piracy, continued to resist a kind of maritime banditry conducted by fishing associations, outcasts or Chinese immigrants and so-called nomads people of the sea (Orang Laut), clanic and personalistic in nature whose cultural substrate was made up of bonds of friendship, kinship and blood. The remarkable fact is that the two types of piracy are not mutually exclusive but, on the contrary, represented the two faces of a coin and it was not unusual for pirates and corsairs to exchange roles when political or economic contingencies were changed. Interesting in this regard it was been the reading and examination of archival documents found at the National Archives in London (The National Archives) showing exchanges of correspondence and minute of some of the leading authorities of the British Straits Settlements between the first and second half of the nineteenth century. A set of letters that, given its enormous historical and political significance I decided to bring entirely, contains the correspondence (1863-67) between the Straits Settlements Governor Orfeur Cavenagh, Abu Bakar ibn Temenggong Daing Ibrahim Temenggong of Johor and Inche Wan Ahmed, exiled prince of Pahang become rebellious and pirate. Proceeding with the analysis of the phenomenon and given the interest of the international community for the sea routes passing into the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the next questions concerned what was the real impact of piracy on maritime trade, what costs in human and social terms it produced, which law enforcement measures riparian states and foreign countries (in colonial and post-colonial age) have come into force; in addition to these I had tried to understand who is the pirate, what are the main reasons for his actions, what is the connection, if does exist, between piracy, terrorism and organized crime. In this direction, starting from the definitions of piracy given by the International Maritime Organization and the International Maritime Bureau, I examined most of the international conventions and regional agreements in which the issue of maritime security and cooperation between states and supranational bodies is addressed, placing special attention to the rules and clauses contained in the treaties able to activate those mechanisms for cooperation and burden sharing (burden-sharing) indispensable to the solution or, more realistically, the containment of the problem. Of great relevance to this line of analysis it has proved useful the socio-anthropological approach by Carolin Liss on the links between maritime banditry, criminal syndicates and terrorist groups (criminal syndicate) and the statistical and methodological approach by Karsten von Hoesslin focused on quantity, quality and type of assaults committed at sea. Concluded the second part of the thesis, I went to compare what is written in both historical and contemporary perspective to understand what kind of conclusion emerged from the results of my research; I asked myself, therefore, a further question: taking as a fixed point the thought of Braudel and Reid, following the method of analysis of Liss and Hoesslin, examine the archival documents and translations of ancient texts on the subject (the Sejarah Melayu and Suma Oriental of Tome Pires), given the availability (more or less declared) from South-east Asian newly established states (post-independence) to cooperation and given the interest of third actors in the straits, is it conceivable and correct to sustain now, in the first half of the new millennium, the possibility of a modification of the ancient customs and traditions and entrenched rivalry between neighboring countries on the basis of a new collective consciousness directed to a harmonious resolution, conveyed by a general law, of the phenomenon of maritime piracy? Or are we facing with a false hub of history, with a point that falsely or inappropriately is considered the turnaround from a tradition that has its roots in the coastal kingdoms of the sixth century and which is the sub-cultural layer of those population who have made the sea their source of wealth and power? To say it once again with Braudel, has the longue durée history undergone a change of route or will it repeat and renew her cycle again and again, sweetened by new technological tools and new forms of politics and economics? And if a change is in place, why now and how does it happen? Will history repeat itself? To give an answer, as thoroughly as possible, to this question I tried to define some of those steps that the countries of ASEAN should follow in order to effectively combat maritime piracy, terrorism widespread locally and organized crime; what could be the milestones in the process of construction of a shared legal system able to provide answers to many of the legal issues including the lack of a common legislation on maritime security. The watchword in the near future will have to be 'mutual legal assistance' in view of the implementation, in national legal corpora, of all those rules necessary to give effect to the directions contained in international conventions. Eventually, I propose a different and further reading of all those theories that track in failure or in the great inefficiency of coordinating policies in the field of maritime safety, the proliferation of piracy. Though I substantially agree with some of those interpretations, two points are critical and deserves attention: the lack of a proper historical and historiographical perspective of analysis and what I have called the axiom of the ultimate solution.

This thesis is written within the contemporary classical institutional economics tradition. The intention has been to provide insight into how different institutions can enable us to avoid harmful effects and generate beneficial effects on the environment and food security from genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This is done by analysing how institutions influence perspectives on GMOs, the GMOs that are developed and commercialized, as well as our ability to handle possible uncertain and unknown effects of GMOs. The thesis consists of 4 papers. Paper 1 analyses scientists' perspectives on the release of GMOs into the environment, and the relationship between their perspectives and the institutional context that they work within, e.g. their place of employment (university or industry), funding of their research (public or industry) and their disciplinary background (ecology, molecular biology or conventional plant breeding). Q-methodology is employed to examine these issues. Two distinct perspectives are identified by interviewing 62 scientists. Perspective 1 is characterised by a moderately negative attitude to GMOs and the uncertainty and ignorance involved are emphasised. Perspective 2 is characterised by a positive attitude to GMOs and it is emphasised that GMOs are useful and do not represent any unique risks compared to conventional crops. The results show a strong association between scientists' perspective on GMOs and the explanatory variables training, funding and place of employment. Paper 2 analyses how different institutional structures shape the research and development (R&D) of GMOs. Whether this R&D is conducted within companies, cooperatives or public research organisations is expected to influence the type of crops and traits that are developed and therefore the effects on society and ecosystems that potentially could follow from the use of GMOs. This issue is analysed empirically by statistical analysis of 1323 notifications for field trials with GMOs in the EU. The results show that the type of R&D organisation influences strongly the traits and crops that are developed. Paper 3 analyses how the type of regulation for marketing of GMOs influences which GMOs that are commercialised. The EU and Norway have assessed the release of GMOs as commercial products quite differently. Of twenty four notifications approved by the EU, Norway has approved four, rejected ten, and has ten pending. The paper examines whether these differences could be explained by different judgments concerning the effects to be prevented and encouraged, response to uncertainty and and the burden of proof defined. Norwegian rejections are found to be explicable by the combination of no real benefit to society, lack of scientific knowledge, and involved risks. The main explanation for the EU approvals is that they see no reason to believe that there will be any adverse effects on health and the environment. Paper 4 analyses how capable three different governance regimes are for adequate handling of uncertain and unknown effects of GMOs. GMOs are characterized by strong uncertainty. This implies that procedures for identification, reduction and monitoring of uncertainty, as well as how to treat irreducible uncertainty will be highly incomplete. Governance mechanisms that facilitate cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality (communicate with the intention of reaching agreement exclusively via the force of better arguments) are therefore needed. The three governance regimes compared are: GMOs are produced by private firms and these firms are made liable for harm (GR1), GMOs are produced by private firms and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR2), GMOs are produced by public research organisations and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR3). GR3 will be stronger in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality than GR2. Public research organisations have fewer conflicts of interest with the government than private firms, and academic norms are important as opposed to firms where commercial norms are important. Difficulties in proving harm and identifying the responsible firm will make GR1 weak in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality. Based on the results of this thesis it is advised that consideration of the environment and food security justify institutional reforms concerning how we decide which GMOs that should be released into the environment and how we organise the R&D of GMOs. My analysis suggests that it is important to involve scientists from several disciplines in public marketing decisions on new technologies and that information about the contextual background of the scientists is relevant in these decisions. There are strong arguments for changing current practise where those that apply for marketing approval of GMOs also produce the risk assessment prior to marketing and the post marketing monitoring. It is further important to increase public GMO research to secure scientific advices and development of products that are independent from the priorities of the industry and to a greater extent could serve public needs. ; Denne avhandlinga er skrevet innenfor en moderne, klassisk institusjonell økonomisk tradisjon. Hensikten har vært å frambringe kunnskap om hvordan ulike institusjoner kan gjøre oss i stand til å unngå skadelige og å frambringe gunstige effekter av genetiske modifiserte organismer (GMOer) på miljø og matvaresikkerhet. Dette er gjort ved å analysere hvordan institusjoner påvirker perspektiver på GMOer, hvilke GMOer som utvikles og kommersialiseres, samt vår evne til å håndtere usikre og ukjente effekter av GMOer. Avhandlinga består av 4 artikler. Artikkel 1 analyserer 62 forskeres syn på effekter av GMOer, og sammenhengen mellom synet deres og den institusjonelle konteksten de arbeider i, i form av type arbeidsplass (universitet eller industri), finansiering av forskning (offentlig eller privat) og fagdisiplin (økologi, molekylær biologi, eller tradisjonell planteforedling). Ved bruk av Q-metode ble to ulike syn identifisert. Syn 1 innebar en moderat negativ holdning til GMOer og vektla usikkerhet og uvitenhet. Syn 2 innebar en positiv holding til GMOer og vektla at GMOer er nyttige og ikke vesentlig forskjellige fra konvensjonelle landbruksvekster. Resultatene viser en sterk sammenheng mellom forskeres syn på GMOer og forklaringsvariablene utdanning, finansiering og type arbeidsplass. Artikkel 2 analyserer hvordan ulike institusjonelle strukturer former forskning og utvikling (F&U) av GMOer. Vi forventa at om denne F&U blir gjort enten i private bedrifter, landbrukssamvirker, eller offentlige forskningsorganisasjoner påvirker hvilke arter og egenskaper som blir utvikla og dermed hvilke samfunns- og miljøeffekter som kan følge fra GMOer. Vi studerte dette ved hjelp av statistisk analyse av 1323 søknader om feltforsøk med GMOer i EU. Resultatene viser en sterk sammenheng mellom type forskningsorganisasjon og hvilke arter og egenskaper som blir utvikla. Artikkel 3 analyserer hvordan type regulering for omsetning av GMOer påvirker hvilke GMOer som blir godkjent for kommersiell bruk. Den europeiske unionen (EU) og Norge har vurdert søknader om omsetning av GMOer forskjellig. Av 24 søknader som er godkjent av EU, har Norge godkjent fire, avvist ti og ikke tatt stilling til ti. Artikkelen analyserer om disse forskjellene kan forklares med ulike vurderinger av hvilke effekter som er ønska og uønska, hvordan man reagerer på usikkerhet og uvitenhent og hva som er en rimelig bevisbyrde. De norske avslaga kan forklares med at de ikke kunne se at GMO-søknadene hadde samfunnsmessig nytteverdi eller var bærekraftige, samt at de vektla uheldige miljøeffekter og mangel på vitenskapelig kunnskap. Hovedforklaringen på godkjennelsene i EU er at de ikke fant noen grunner til at skadelige effekter ville inntreffe. Artikkel 4 analyserer hvor egna tre ulike regimer er for å håndtere usikre og ukjente effekter av GMOer. Stor usikkerhet knytta til GMOer medfører at prosedyrer for å identifisere, redusere og overvåke usikkerhet, samt hvordan man skal håndtere ikkereduserbar usikkerhet blir ufullstendige. Styringsmekanismer som legger til rette for samarbeidsvilje og kommunikativ rasjonalitet (kommunikasjon som har til hensikt å oppnå enighet ved bruk av argumenter) blir derfor viktig. Følgende tre regimer er sammenligna: GMOer produseres i private bedrifter og disse bedriftene er ansvarlige for eventuelle skader (R1), GMOer produseres i private bedrifter og myndighetene bestemmer hvilke GMOer som kan omsettes i markedet (R2), GMOer produseres i offentlige forskningsorganisasjoner og myndighetene bestemmer hvilke GMOer som kan omsettes i markedet (R3). Det er sannsynlig at R3 vill føre til bedre samarbeidsvilje og mer kommunikativ rasjonalitet enn R2. Offentlige forskningsorganisasjoner har færre interessekonflikter med myndighetene enn de private, og de er i større grad karakterisert av akademiske normer. Kommersielle normer har derimot en større plass i private bedrifter. Vanskeligheter med å bevise skade og skadegjører kan føre til at R1 gir svak samarbeidsvilje og lite kommunikativ rasjonalitet. Funnene i avhandlingen innebærer at dersom hensyn til miljø og matvaresikkerhet er viktige, bør man gjennomføre institusjonelle endringer av hvordan man beslutter hvilke GMOer som kan omsettes i markedet og hvordan samfunnet organiserer F&U av GMOer. Min analyse antyder at det er viktig å involvere forskere fra ulike disipliner i offisielle beslutninger om hvilke GMOer som kan omsettes og at informasjon om den kontekstuelle bakgrunnen til disse forskerne er relevant. Det er sterke argumenter for å endre dagens praksis hvor de som søker om å få omsette GMOer i markedet også gjennomfører risikovurderingen og overvåkningen. Det synes videre viktig å øke andelen offentlig GMO-forskning for å sikre vitenskapelige råd som er uavhengige av industrienes prioriteringer og som i større kan tjene samfunnets interesser.

This doctoral thesis examines how European merger control law is applied to the energy sector and to which extent its application may facilitate the liberalisation of the electricity, natural gas and petroleum industries so that only those concentrations will be cleared that honour the principles of the liberalisation directives (IEMD and IGMD ). In its communication on an energy policy for Europe, adopted on 10/01/2007, the Commission emphasized that a real internal European energy market is essential to meet Europe's three energy objectives, i.e. competitiveness to cut costs for citizens and undertakings to foster energy efficiency and investment, sustainability including emissions trading, and security of supply with high standards of public service obligations (Art. 106 TFEU). The EU issued three pre-liberalisation directives since the 1990s. Dissatisfied with the existing monopolistic structures, i.e. in Germany through demarcation and exclusive concession agreements for the supply of electricity and natural gas, which were until 1998 exempted from the cartel prohibition provision (§ 1 GWB), and the prevalence of exclusive rights on the energy markets, the Commission triggered infringement proceedings against four member states under Art. 258 TFEU. The CJEU confirmed that the Commission has the power to abolish monopoly rights under certain circumstances and the rulings had the effect of convincing the member states to enter into negotiations for an opening up of energy markets owing to the internal market energy liberalization directives of 1996 / 1998 / 2003 / 2009 / 2019 (IEMD and IGMD) . The core element of the IEMD and IGMD is to abolish exclusive rights and offer primarily at least large industrial electricity and gas consumers to choose their supplier (market opening for eligible consumers) and to grant negotiated or regulated third party access to transmission and distribution grids so to address natural monopolies. The second liberalization package of 2003 brought a widening of market opening and acceleration of pace of market opening to a greater number of eligible customers (all non-household consumers since July 2004 and all consumers since July 2007) and an increase in the provisions on management and legal unbundling. In parallel, two regulations regulate the access to cross-border electricity infrastructure (interconnectors) and the third party access to gas transmission networks. Two further Directives addressed the security of natural gas and power supply and a third deals with energy end use efficiency and services , a fourth dealt with the promotion of co-generation and a fifths covers marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive in combination with the Hydrocarbons-Licensing Directive ) backed by the public procurement directive in the energy sector. A regulation covers energy statistics. The implementation of the second energy package was slow and the Commission launched infringement proceedings against 5 member states in front of the CJEU (Art. 258, 256 TFEU). The 3rd energy package of 2009 addressed ownership unbundling of key-infrastructure ownership and energy wholesale and retail supply consisting of three regulations and two directives, deals with independent regulators, an agency for the cooperation of energy regulators (ACER) and cross-border cooperation (the European Network for transmission system operators for electricity and gas [ENTSO-E/G] and a regulation on cross-border grid access for electricity and natural gas. Another new regulation deals with market integrity and transparency . Hence, new regulations regulate guidelines on electricity balancing, congestion management, long-term capacity allocation, the code for grid access and transmission system operation . Other regulations address the guidelines for a European cross-border energy infrastructure, which has to be interpreted in the context of European environmental impact assessment law, the submission of data in electricity markets, establish a network code on demand connection , rule on a network code for grid access for direct current transmission systems, define guidelines on electricity transmission system operation, regulate a network code on electricity emergency , deal with security of natural gas supply and establish a programme to aid economic recovery by granting financial assistance. Finally, Directives promote the usage of renewable energies, regulate common oil stocks, the safety of offshore oil and gas production and the quality of petrol and diesel fuels. The 4th liberalization package consists of a new IEMD2019 and IGMD2019, of a new regulation on European cross-border electricity trade, of a regulation on risk preparedness in the electricity sector, of a new agency for the cooperation of European energy regulators, addresses energy efficiency and rules on good governance in the energy union. Since 2008, the Art. 194 I-II TFEU governs the ordinary legislation procedure in the energy sector (internal market in energy, security of energy supply, energy efficiency, energy saving, renewable energies, interconnection of energy grids) notwithstanding of unanimous decision making in case of energy taxation matters (Art. 194 III TFEU). A brief analysis of the economic implications of concentrations is followed by an assessment of the evolution of European merger control law under Art. 66 ECSCT, Art. 101 and 102 TFEU, the merger control regulation of 1989 and its significant amendments of 1997 and 2004. Then, the theoretical findings are contrasted to the results of recent merger proceedings in the energy sector with a focus on the VEBA/VIAG decision. Several deficiencies are established which limit the efficacy of merger control as a tool of offsetting shortcomings in the secondary EC law with regard to the liberalisation of the electricity and gas supply industry (IEMD and IGMD). Commitments proposed by the parties of a given concentration and accepted by the Commission as being sufficient to remedy a serious potential of dominance may only be of subsidiary relevance to the liberalisation of sectors owing to a number of analytical and practical drawbacks. One dominant drawback relates to the fact that the commitments depend always on parties' proposals and can never be imposed ex officio. Others relate to the blunt authorisations provided by the wording of Art. 6 and 8 MR1997 and MR2004 as to the implementation of undertakings. With regard to acquisitions of U.K. regional electricity companies by EdF, it is elaborated that the current merger control law leaves no scope for reciprocity considerations regarding acquisitions by incumbent companies in liberalised markets even though the acquirer is a protected public undertaking. Moreover, it is established that different decisions apply inconsistent market definitions. By means of the VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW cases, the question is addressed which causes are responsible for the established analytical and practical deficiencies of merger control in the energy sector. It is stated that the weaknesses of the IEMD 2009/72/EC and IGMD 2009/73/EC are partly responsible for weak undertakings which do not sufficiently remove the scope for dominance on the affected markets and which do not rule out any possibility of impediments of effective negotiated or regulated TPA and do not remove any commercial incentive of the grid subsidiaries of the vertically integrated companies as to access which discriminates between intra and extra group applicants. It is reported that another argument relates to the limited scope that the Commission has if it wants to remedy deficiencies of written primary law owing to the extraordinary nature of the implied powers doctrine based on the principle of constitutional state. Adverse political influence against competition authorities is also judged. Further, it is analysed that accidental regulation based on incidental provisions imposed on undertakings which may or not implement a concentration is by no means a consistent and non-discriminatory and predictable tool to overcome drawbacks of primary or secondary European law in a given sector owing to the democratic principle and the constitutional state doctrine. It is discussed that secondary legislation with regard to energy networks is inter alia restricted by Art. 345 TFEU and provisions of national constitutions which protect property rights against dis-proportionate expropriations or re-definitions of property. Further, legal authorisations of said calibre will have to be connected to a system of state liability law. Adverse political pressures are considered. The same is true for egoistic national policies which abstain from transnational task forces in order to settle difficulties and disputes. Furthermore, the adverse effect of different stages of the maturity of domestic markets, different consumer patterns and a potential isolation of the system is not neglected, because these conditions make it more difficult to apply consistent standards as to the appropriate market definition in order to facilitate harmonisation. The implementation of the VEBA/VIAG merger is discussed, as the former was further complicated owing to specifically evaluated circumstances which were difficult to predict. Nevertheless, the Commission is not exempted from the duty to take due care concerning potential impediments as to the realisation of parties' commitments. In contrast to the negative aspects, it can be highlighted that the Commission quickly realised flaws of the energy liberalisation project as expressed by the present form of the IEMD and IGMD. Consequently, the co-ordinative and innovative mechanisms of Florence and Madrid were created in order to boost the development of effective cross border trade - i.e. tariff systems and interconnector congestion management. It will be concluded that undertakings put forward by the parties and accepted by the Commission should be restricted to a subsidiary legal instrument, only applied if strictly necessary to overcome certain detrimental aspects of given concentrations in order to provide a hint for the legislator, to specify its legislation. Competition as a de-central distributor of risk, wealth and power will be extended to its maximum extent, if wholesale consumers benefit from lower energy prices which allow greater productivity of European products on the world markets in combination with higher environmental standards owing to modern, cost-efficient plants. A successful implementation will be described by liquid spot markets for power accompanied by tools of financial risk management like forwards, futures and options. These will be valuable indicators of efficient liberalisation of the European electricity and gas supply industries. ; Diese Doktorarbeit untersucht wie das Europäische Fusionskontrollverfahrensrecht auf den Energiesektor angewendet wird und in welchem Ausmaß seine Anwendung die Liberalisierung der Elektrizitäts-, Gas- und Erdölmärkte unterstützt, so dass nur solche Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse freigegeben wurden, die die Prinzipien der Liberalisierungsrechtsakte (Binnenmarktstromrichtlinie und Binnenmarktsgasrichtlinie). In ihrer Mitteilung über eine Energiepolitik für Europa, angenommen am 10.01.2007, betonte die Kommission, dass ein realer Energiebinnenmarkt essentiell ist, um Europas drei Energieziele zu erreichen, d.h. Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, um Kosten für Bürger und Unternehmen zu senken, um Energieeffizienz und Investitionen zu fördern, und Nachhaltigkeit, darin eingeschlossen ein Emissionshandel, und Energieversorgungssicherheit mit hohen Standards von öffentlichen Dienstleistungspflichten (Art. 106 AEUV). Die EU erließ drei Prä-Liberalisierungsrechtsakte seit den 1990er Jahren . Unzufrieden mit den existierenden monopolartigen Strukturen, d.h. in Deutschland durch Demarkationsverträge und ausschließliche Konzessionsverträge für die Versorgung von Strom und Erdgas, die bis 1998 vom allgemeinen Kartellverbot ausgenommen waren (§ 1 GWB), und die Vorherrschaft von ausschließlichen Rechten auf den Energiemärkten, löste die Kommission Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen vier Mitgliedstaaten gemäß Art. 258 AEUV . Der Gerichtshof bestätigte, dass die Kommission das Recht hat, ausschließliche Rechte unter gewissen Bedingungen abzuschaffen, und die Urteile hatten den Effekt, die Mitgliedstaaten zu überzeugen, in Verhandlungen für eine Marktöffnung der Energiemärkte gemäß den Energiebinnenmarktrichtlinien von 1996, 1998, 2003, 2009 und 2019 einzutreten (Strombinnenmarktrichtlinie und Gasbinnenmarktrichtlinie). Das Kernelement der Strombinnenmarktrichtlinie und Gasbinnenmarktsrichtlinie ist es, ausschließliche Rechte abzuschaffen und primär zumindest großen industriellen Strom und Gasverbrauchern das Recht einzuräumen, ihren Versorger frei zu wählen (Marktöffnung für auswählbare Verbraucher) und einen verhandelten oder regulierten Drittparteizugang zu Übertragungsnetzen und Verteilungsnetzen zu gewähren, um natürliche Monopole zu regulieren. Das zweite Liberalisierungspaket von 2003 brachte eine erweiterte Marktöffnung und Beschleunigung der Geschwindigkeit der Marktöffnung zu einer größeren Zahl von auswählbaren Verbrauchern (alle Nicht-Haushaltskunden seit Juli 2004 und alle Konsumenten ab Juli 2007) und eine Ausweitung der Vorschrift über Management- und rechtliche Entflechtung . Parallel dazu regeln zwei Verordnungen den Zugang zu grenzüberschreitenden Elektrizitätsinfrastrukturen (Interkonnektoren) und den Drittparteizugang zu Gas Übertragungsnetzwerken. Zwei weitere Richtlinien adressieren die Versorgungssicherheit von Erdgas und Strom und eine dritte behandelt die Energieendnutzungseffizienz und Dienstleistungen , eine vierte Richtlinie beschäftigte sich mit der Förderung von Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung und eine fünfte deckt Meeresumweltschutzpolitik ab (Marine Strategie Rahmenrichtlinie in Verbindung mit der Kohlenwasserstoff-Lizensierungsrichtlinie, verstärkt durch die Richtlinie über das öffentliche Auftragswesen im Energiesektor. Eine Verordnung behandelt Energiestatistiken. Die Umsetzung des zweiten Energiepakets war langsam und die Kommission leitete Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen 5 Mitgliedstaaten ein beim Europäischen Gerichtshof (Art. 258, 256 TFEU). Das dritte Energiepaket von 2009 adressierte die eigentumsrechtliche Entflechtung von Schlüssel-Infrastrukturen und die Energiegroßhandelsversorgung und die Kleinkundenenergieversorgung bestehend aus drei Verordnungen und zwei Richtlinien, beschäftigt sich mit unabhängigen Energieregulierungsbehörden, einer Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit von Energieregulierungsbehörden (ACER) und der grenzüberschreitenden Kooperation (das Europäische Netzwerk für Übertragungsnetzwerkoperatoren für Strom und Gas [ENTSO-E/G] und eine Verordnung über grenzüberschreitenden Netzzugang für Strom und Erdgas . Eine andere Verordnung behandelt die Marktintegrität und Transparenz. Außerdem regulieren neue Verordnungen Grundzüge der Strom-Balancierung, Verstopfungsmanagement, langfristige Kapazitätszuweisung, den Kodex für den Netzzugang und die Operation des Übertragungsnetzes. Andere Verordnungen regulieren die Grundsätze für eine europäische grenzüberschreitende Energie-Infrastruktur, welche im Kontext des europäischen Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfungsrechts interpretiert werden muss, die Einreichung von Daten über Strommärkte, etablieren einen Netzwerkkodex über Nachfrageverbindung, regeln einen Netzwerkkodex für den Netzzugang für Gleichstromübertragungssysteme, definieren Richtlinien über Stromübertragungssystemoperation, regulieren einen Netzwerkkodex über Stromversorgungsnotfälle, behandeln Erdgasversorgungssicherheit und etablieren ein Programm, um der ökonomischen Wiederherstellung zu helfen, indem finanzielle Hilfen gewährt werden. Schließlich fördern Richtlinien die Nutzung von erneuerbaren Energien, regulieren gemeinsame Erdölvorräte, die Sicherheit der Hochsee Erdöl- und Erdgasproduktion und die Qualität von Benzin und Diesel Kraftstoffen. Das vierte Liberalisierungspaket besteht aus einer neuen Strombinnenmarktrichtlinie 2019 und einer Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie 2019, aus einer neuen Verordnung über europäischen grenzüberschreitenden Stromhandel, aus einer Verordnung übrer Risikovorbereitung im Stromsektor, aus einer neuen Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der Europäischen Energie-Regulatoren, adressiert Energieeffizienz und regelt die gute Geschäftsführung in der Energieunion. Seit 2008 regelt Art. 194 I-II AUEV das ordentliche Gesetzgebungsverfahren im Energiesektor (Binnenmarkt für Energie, Energieversorgungssicherheit, Energieeffzienz, Energieeinsparung, erneuerbare Energien und die Interkonnektion von Energienetzen) unabhängig vom einstimmigen Entscheiden im Bereich von Energiebesteuerungen (Art. 194 III AEUV). Eine kurze Analyse der wirtschaftlichen Implikation von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen folgt die Untersuchung der Evolution des Europäischen Fusionskontrollverfahrensrechts gemäß dem ehemaligen Art. 66 EGKSV, Art. 101 and 102 AEUV, der Fusionskontrollverfahrensverordnung von 1989 und ihrer signifikanten Änderungen von 1997 und 2004. Dann werden die theoretischen Ergebnisse den Resultaten der Fusionskontrollverfahren im Energiesektor gegenübergestellt mit einem Schwerpunkt auf der VEBA/VIAG Entscheidung. Mehrere Schwachstellen werden herausgestellt, welche die Effektivität der Fusionskontrolle im Energiesektor herausstellen, die die Effektivität der Fusionskontrolle als ein Werkzeug zum Ausgleich der Schwachstellen im Sekundärrecht der EU mit Bezug auf die Liberalisierung der Strom- und Erdgasversorgungsindustrien mindern (Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktrichtlinie und Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie). Verpflichtungszusagen auf Vorschlag der Partien eines Unternehmenszusammenschlusses, die von der Kommission angenommen worden sind, um hinreichend zu sein, um ein seriöses Potential von Marktbeherrschung zu adressieren können nur auf hilfsweise Relevanz zur Liberalisierung on Wirtschaftssektoren dienen gemäß einer Anzahl von analytischen und praktischen Nachteilen. Ein relevanter Nachteil bezieht sich auf das Faktum, dass die Verpflichtungszusagen der Parteien immer auf den Parteivorschlägen fußen und dass sie niemals ex officio auferlegt werden können. Andere Nachteile beziehen sich auf die grobe Autorisierung der Kommission, wie sie nahegelegt wird durch den Wortlaut von Art. 6 and 8 Fusionskontrollverordnung 1997 und 2004 bezogen auf die Umsetzung von Nebenbestimmungen. Mit Bezug auf die Akquisition von regionalen Stromunternehmen im Vereinigten Königreich durch EdF wird herausgearbeitet, dass das gegenwärtige Fusionskontrollverfahrensrecht keinen Ansatz für Reziprozitätserwägungen lässt mit Bezug auf Akquisitionen durch amtierende Unternehmen in liberalisierten Märkten, auch wenn der Erwerber eine geschützte öffentliche Unternehmung ist. Außerdem wird herausgearbeitet, dass unterschiedliche Entscheidungen inkonsistente Marktdefinitionen herausarbeitet. Durch die VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW Entscheidungen wird die Frage beantwortet, welche Ursachen verantwortlich sind für die etablierten analytischen und praktischen Nachteile der Fusionskontrolle im Energiesektor. Es wird herausgestellt, dass die Schwächen der Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktrichtlinie 2009/72/EG und der Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie 2009/73/EG zu gewissen Anteilen verantwortlich sind für schwache Nebenbestimmungen, die nicht hinreichend den Anwendungsbereich für Marktbeherrschung auf den betroffenen Märkten eliminieren und die nicht jedwede Möglichkeit von Erschwernissen des verhandelten oder regulierten Drittparteizugangs zu Infrastrukturen ausschließen und welche nicht den kommerziellen Anreiz der Netztochtergesellschaften der vertikal integrierten Unternehmen entfernen, zu unterscheiden zwischen Intra- und Extra-Gruppen Netzzugangspetenten. Es wird geschildert, dass sich ein anderes Argument auf den limitierten Anwendungsbereich bezieht, dass die Kommission, wenn sie es möchte, um Nachteile zu adressieren des primären Gemeinschaftsrechts gemäß der außergewöhnlichen Natur der impIizierten Befugnisse Doktrin basieren auf dem Prinzip des Rechtsstaates. Gegenteilige politische Einflussnahme gegen Wettbewerbsbehörden wird außerdem untersucht. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert, dass akzidentielle Regulierung basierend auf Nebenbestimmungen, die vielleicht oder nicht einen Unternehmenszusammenschluss implementieren unter keinem Gesichtspunkt ein konsistentes und vorhersehbares Werkzeug ist, um Nachteile des primären oder sekundären Europäischen Rechts in einem gegebenen Sektor zu überwinden gemäß dem Demokratieprinzip und dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip. Es wird diskutiert, dass sekundäre europäische Rechtssetzung mit Bezug auf Energienetzwerke unter anderem durch Art. 345 AEUV begrenzt wird und dass Vorschriften nationaler Verfassungen, die Eigentumsrechte garantieren, gegen die unverhältnismäßige Enteignung oder Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmungen des Eigentum schützen . Darüber hinaus werden rechtliche Ermächtigungen des besagten Kalibers gewürdigt und mit einem System von Staatsverantwortlichkeitsrecht verbunden. Gegenteilige politische Drücke wurden erwogen. Das gleiche trifft zu für egoistische nationale Politiken, die von nationalen Taskforces Abstand nehmen, um Schwierigkeiten und Streitigkeiten zu adressieren. Außerdem wird der gegenteilige Effekt von unterschiedlichen Phasen der Reife häuslicher Märkte, unterschiedlichem Verbraucherverhalten und einer möglichen Isolation des Systems untersucht und nicht vernachlässigt, weil diese Bedingungen es schwieriger machen, konsistente Standards mit Bezug auf die sachgerechte Marktdefinition anzuwenden, um die Harmonisierung zu erleichtern. Die Einflüsse der VEBA/VIAG Fusion wird diskutiert, weil diese Entscheidung weiter erschwert war und kompliziert wurde durch spezielle ausgewertete Umstände, die schwierig vorherzusehen waren. Dennoch war die Kommission nicht befreit von der Verpflichtung, um notwendige Sorgfalt anzuwenden bezogen auf potentielle Erschwernisse bezogen auf die Realisierung der Verpflichtungszusagen der Parteien. Im Gegensatz zu den negativen Aspekten kann herausgestellt werden, dass die Kommission schnell Schwachstellen des Enerigeliberalisierungsprojektes erkannt hat, wie es durch die gegenwärtige Form der Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktrichtlinie und der Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie geprägt wird. Konsequenterweise wurden die koordinierenden und innovativen Mechanismen der Foren von Florenz und Madrid geschaffen, um die Entwicklung effektiven grenzüberschreitenden Energiehandels voranzutreiben, d.h. Tarifsysteme und Interkonnektorenverstopfungsmanagements. Es wird der Schluss gezogen, dass Unternehmen, vorangetrieben durch die Parteien und angenommen durch die Kommission, davon ausgenommen wurden sollen, ein subsidiäres rechtliches Instrument zu begrenzen, um gewisse schädliche Aspekte einer gegebenen Unternehmenskonzentration zu überwinden, um für einen Hinweis and den Gesetzgeber zu sorgen, seine Gesetzgebung zu spezifizieren. Wettbewerb als ein dezentrales Verfahren zur Verteilung von Risiko, Wohlstand und Macht wird ausgedehnt zu seinem maximalen Ertrag, wenn Großhandelsverbraucher von geringeren Energiepreisen profitieren, die eine gesteigerte Produktivität Europäischer Produkte auf den Weltmärkten bewirken in Kombination mit höheren Umweltstandards durch den Einsatz moderner, kosteneffzienter Produktionsstätten. Eine erfolgreiche Implementierung wird beschrieben durch liquide Spot-Märkte für Energie, begleitet durch Werkzeuge des finanziellen Risikomanagements wie Forward-Derivate, Future-Derivate und Optionen. Diese wurden wertvolle Indikatoren einer effizienten Liberalisierung der Europäischen Elektrizitäts- und Erdgasversorgungsindustrien sein.

Against the background of a new Labor Day weekend job report that found zero job net growth for the month of August, Republican candidates held another debate, this time under the auspices of MSNBC, not Fox. It took place in the Reagan library, in Simi Valley, California, with the 1980s Air Force One plane used by Reagan looming behind them as a powerful yet incongruent décor. Texas Governor Rick Perry, who entered the race three weeks ago and has already managed to reshape it, made it a contest between himself and Mitt Romney. Jon Huntsman is now a distant third in the polls, and the rest have been consigned to the back bench. Perry has consolidated support across a large swath of the Republican base, including Tea Partiers and the Evangelical right and already has amassed a war chest of campaign funds from contributors from Texas and across the country. Interestingly enough, Karl Rove, the self appointed kingmaker of the GOP and former GW Bush closest advisor, has come out against Perry, calling some of his views "toxic".As the first fundamental tests of the Republican primary approach, the campaign clearly entered a new stage last Wednesday during a debate that was mainly a duel between two protagonists, while the rest, acting as a Greek chorus reinforcing or challenging their responses, were given very little time by hosts Brian Williams (NBC) and John Harris (Politico). The primary field as first constituted was lackluster and therefore demanded new candidates. Perry seems to have satisfied that demand for the time being. Nevertheless, after the debate there was still some discontent among establishment Republicans, so the race is still fluid and new candidates may jump in before the first deadline in October.Governor Perry, as the front-runner in the latest polls, was not surprisingly the target of most of the others throughout the night. He has executive experience, a commanding demeanor, and a record to run on. Although not completely articulate, and lacking Romney's polished eloquence, he is tough and quick in his retorts, and his rhetoric resounded with the audience, drawing the strongest applause every time. His claim that he has created more jobs in Texas than Obama has managed to create nationally may be a winner with voters, but Texas' record on almost every other issue is unflattering and thus, main ammunition for his opponents. He was reminded, for example, that of all fifty states, Texas is last on education, to which he responded that Texas' problems stem from its long border with Mexico. That probably did not go well with the Hispanic voters watching on Univisión and Telemundo, but Perry doesn't seem to care, since he is riding the wave of anti-Latino feelings around the country. Confronted with the claim that Texas has the largest number of people without health insurance than all other 49 states , he did not give a direct answer but chose instead to mumble something about how "all Texans want is to get the federal government out of their lives". Both Michelle Bachman and Rick Santorum questioned Perry's social conservatism given his policy as governor, for example, to inoculate adolescent girls against HPV, which they portrayed as a government intrusion into the family realm and a license to practice pre-marital sex. And Ron Paul, a congressman from Texas, was a constant goad on the Governor's side, reminding the public that Perry used to be a Democrat and wholeheartedly supported Al Gore on his presidential bid in 1988. Perry defended himself well as he dismissed all the charges against him with one-liners and a disdainful smile. A shrewd politician and experience campaigner, he took the initiative at every turn and was able to steer the conversation to his own record of job creation as governor of Texas, contrasting it mockingly with Romney's as governor of Massachusetts. But Romney appeared unfazed as he joked that Perry could not take credit for everything that has gone well in the State of Texas, including its wealth of oil and gas, its zero state income tax and the (related) fact that main corporations made their headquarters there long before Perry was governor. Massachusetts is a much smaller state and has none of those advantages, he added. There were several quick exchanges like this: both candidates were well prepared to respond with facts and statistics, and the perception was that they both did well, with Perry defending himself aggressively at times and Romney maintaining his smooth and relaxed demeanor, even as he waited for the opportunity to deliver a blow to his new challenger.Host Brian Williams soon gave him that opportunity by asking Perry a question about Social Security, the government pension fund that experts say, will become insolvent in the year 2036 if it is not reformed. Perry's answer, which confirmed similar statements in his recently published book, made all the headlines the next day. He called it a "Ponzi scheme' (implying a criminal enterprise) and added that it was a "monstrous lie" to tell young people under thirty that they would get their Social Security when their time comes for them to retire: they won't. This statement has been reported by the Romney campaign as Perry's Waterloo: no candidate will win an election by making this kind of claim against the "third rail" of politics, a cherished and untouchable public trust; to do so is pure political suicide. Similar claims had prompted Karl Rove's comment about Perry's toxicity and spurred doubts about his electability. Ironically, it is the rhetoric and not the substance that separates the two candidates on this issue: as presidents, both would likely propose some privatization of Social Security, perhaps in the form of personal retirement accounts that can be managed by the workers themselves and would allow them to invest in the stock market. Another of Brian William's questions brought an unexpected burst of applause by the all- Republican audience even before Perry had had a chance to answer it. Williams asked how he could sleep at night knowing his state had applied the death penalty to 234 convicts, the highest rate in the nation, and some of whom were perhaps innocent. Perry said the crimes they had perpetrated deserved it, and that yes, he slept fine at night knowing that the appeals process was thorough and fair. Of course, people are entitled to their views on the death penalty, and quotes from the Bible have been used to justify it. But it is sad and even incongruous to see a purportedly well educated middle class audience of a purportedly Christian nation cheer the notion. Patti Davis, President Reagan's daughter, later said to an interviewer it was almost" blasphemous" to celebrate the death penalty at the Reagan library, given the fact that her father had approached the issue with a heavy heart and burden to his conscience, albeit accepting it as a necessary evil. Mitt Romney appeared poised, fluent on the economy and self confident. It may help him knowing that he has 250 billion dollars in his own personal account, and that he has outpaced all other candidates so far in fundraising. He seems to be the choice of the business elite and of urban and suburban Republicans (60% of his donors come from big cities and their surroundings). On the other hand, Perry's supporters say that through his ten years as governor of Texas, Perry has laid the groundwork to raise all the money he might need for a national election. He has a donor network that can "bundle" millions. Texas places no limits on how much donors can give to political campaigns, even as federal law limits donations to the derisory amount of $2,500 per person. Still, some critics say Perry would need to capture a broader donor base to compete in a national election. Michelle Bachman's adventure into the Republican primary may be coming to an end as her star fades and Tea Partiers and Evangelicals transfer their support to Rick Perry. Her campaign is in disarray over fundraising and strategy. Ed Rollins, a veteran GOP operative who managed Reagan's 1984 campaign, resigned as her advisor after Bachman could not be persuaded to focus on campaigning in Iowa only (where the first primary caucus will take place and where she won a straw poll a few weeks ago), instead of trying to run a national campaign. She hasn't been able to raise enough money outside Iowa and that limits her campaign's choices. Perry has taken her thunder. It doesn't help that the Congress woman keeps repeating her Manichean views on every single issue, insisting for example again during this debate, that it was wrong for the US to intervene in Libya because there was no national interest involved in the region, a position that nobody in the GOP establishment shares, especially now that Qaddafi is all but defeated.On Thursday, after two changes in schedule were forced on the White House (one due to the GOP debate on Wednesday, the other due to the opening of the NFL season shown at prime time on Thursday night), President Obama delivered his much awaited jobs creation speech. He unveiled a $ 447 billion plan, a mixture of tax cuts and new spending programs. It includes extending cuts in payroll taxes to individuals and employers, new infrastructure spending, a new mortgage refinancing program, retraining for the unemployed and tax credits to businesses that employ those who have been out of a job for over six moths. He also talked about a private-public infrastructure bank and emphasized that all this new spending would be coupled with more cuts in the deficit later. This was an attempt at a new marketing of the President's measures to stimulate the economy: he was more specific, more conciliatory and avoided using the word "stimulus" that has gotten so much bad press since most people think the initial package did not help the economy one bit.The President spoke with new confidence and conviction; he sounded re-energized and optimistic, and evoked in the public memories of "Obama the candidate". The next morning he was on the road to sell his plan to voters first in Virginia, speaking to 9,000 people gathered at the University of Richmond. Virginia, Ohio and North Carolina are the three states the President strategically chose to visit. Obama won all three in the 2008 election but they each voted Republicans to their legislatures in last year's mid-term elections. The Republican response in Congress was cautiously positive. Indeed, even as Obama's numbers in the polls continue to drop (44% approval rate of his person, with 59% disapproving of his handling of the economy, is the latest), approval of Congress is at an all time low of 13%. A change is tone has registered as Republicans realize that their do-nothing strategy has gone too far and it is time to stop playing the political game and address economic recovery in earnest. It is indeed refreshing, after the acerbic debt ceiling fights, to hear House majority leader Eric Cantor say it's time to build consensus and work together. Their brinkmanship has infuriated their constituents and put at risk all the gains made in last year's mid-term elections.It remains to be seen whether the electorate's disgust with excessive conflict and confrontation within the DC belt also extends to the presidential primary. Will voters choose the bold and aggressive governor from Texas who better reflects their anger with his provocative language (he wants to cut the "head off the snake" (meaning the federal government's interference with states policies), or the cooler, more cerebral, more conciliatory (indeed, in some ways, more Obama-like) candidate from Massachusetts that wants moderation and speaks to the middle class? In this head-to-head contest between Perry and Romney, one can assume people will ultimately choose the one they see can solve their problems, end the paralysis and get the country moving again. But the country's social fabric is torn by unemployment, anger and frustration with government and hopelessness about the future. As the more aggressive candidate, Perry may well be the one that embodies the spirit of the times.In his first national appearance, the Texan did not make any major mistakes. He has dislodged Romney from top in national polls, but not in New Hampshire, where Romney still leads by a wide margin. From now on, the calendar will drive the candidates' strategies. If Perry wins Iowa and Romney New Hampshire, it will definitely become a two person race going forward into South Carolina, where Baptists most likely will choose a Texan Evangelist over a New Englander Mormon. That might interrupt Romney's momentum. Then comes Florida, where there is a big number of Tea Partiers and an even larger number of retirees. The vote of these two groups will be decisive. Perry could lose the retirees on his Social Security attacks, which were mainly addressed to young voters who don't vote in primaries. But there is plenty of time to adjust his views and rectify his blunders so as to become more electable.Cocky, dark and handsome, a cross between Johnny Cash and John Wayne, Perry has a formidable presence that makes a good impression on voters. Blunt and direct in his speech, with a distinct Southern accent, his peculiar kind of charisma compensates for his lack of polish. He is tough and rugged, doesn't back down, and appeared solid in his philosophy of "detax, deregulate and delitigate". He is clearly the candidate that can win the Mid-West and the Deep South. The question is whether he will withstand the deeper scrutiny of a presidential race he entered late, and whether he can refine his arguments and still be reassuring. Romney still appears as the more electable candidate in a national election and the one that can more easily confront Obama. But he has two main weak points: his religion (he is a Mormon, a religion that has a bad name among other Christian denominations) and the Massachusetts health care law he signed when he was governor, that his rivals claim is a replica of what they disdainfully call "Obamacare", which all candidates, including Romney, have avowed to repeal as soon as they get to the White House. Will the race become a two-man contest from this point on? Americans should not hold their breath; there is still talk about new candidates entering the race: Sarah Palin and Rudy Giuliani seem to be waiting on the sidelines, ready to jump into the race at any time if prompted to do so by the polls or by the GOP establishment. The current survivors may still be challenged by others with more staying power and reality show experience.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia