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For the first time in twelve years, Venezuela sees real prospects for political change with the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for 28 July. Although the electoral process has been plagued by numerous and serious irregularities, the political opposition led by María Corina Machado and the candidate Edmundo González Urrutia, a former diplomat who has been allowed by the government to participate, has a clear chance of winning. In fact, more than 80 per cent of the Venezuelan population expects a change of government, according to the latest polls.[1]The background: Economic collapse and human rights violations In its eleven years of government, Nicolás Maduro has led Venezuela to the worst crisis in its history, which is why popular discontent is so widespread. The economy has suffered a 74 per cent contraction between 2013-2023[2] and a protracted hyperinflationary process, exceeding 500 per cent annually between 2016-2021.[3] The country's minimum wage fell to 3.5 US dollars a month in 2024,[4] causing poverty levels to reach 80 per cent in 2023,[5] and 7.7 million Venezuelans left the country between 2016-2024.[6] Meanwhile oil production – the country's main source of income – has fallen from 3 million barrels a day in 2013[7] to 800,000 barrels in 2024,[8] signalling a collapse of the country's production capacities.[9] In parallel, under the "Anti-Blockade Law" of 2020,[10] the government enshrined secrecy as a rule for the public administration, transferring countless state businesses and companies to businessmen and operators among its political allies,[11] to the detriment of the national economy.[12] Maduro has arguably acted as Boris Yeltsin's government did in Russia between 1991-1999, creating a class of 'oligarchs' who support him in power. Therefore, the US sanctions imposed on the country in 2019[13] have only further aggravated Venezuela's economic predicament; but they are not the origin of the country's crisis. In parallel, the violation of human rights has further complicated the political situation in the country. Both the Office of the UN High Commissioner[14] and the UN Human Rights Council[15] have denounced the perpetration of serious human rights violations in Venezuela as a state policy,[16] with the justice system – the Attorney General's Office and the judicial power – acting as an instrument of political persecution.[17] Against this backdrop, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has initiated an investigation for crimes against humanity that directly involve President Maduro and senior government officials.[18]The government's manipulation of the electoral process Amidst this profound political and economic crisis, the government is obliged by the Constitution to hold a presidential election, in which the oppositions have decided to participate united.[19] Since this scenario is politically risky for the government, measures to control the electoral process and outcome have been introduced. In August 2017, after the election of the Constituent Assembly, Smartmatic, the company in charge of Venezuela's automated electoral system, denounced that the National Electoral Council (CNE) issued different results from those in the company's system;[20] subsequently, the government cancelled Smartmatic's contract and awarded responsibility for the system to an unknown company without experience. Furthermore, between 2015-2023, through the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), the government judicially intervened against the different opposition parties, including left-wing parties.[21] In 2023, the government forced the resignation of the Directors of the CNE[22] to nominate a well-known political ally at its head – the same individual who, acting as a Comptroller General, had issued more than 150 political disqualifications between 2019 and August 2023.[23] Finally, in January 2024, the Maduro administration dismissed the President of the TSJ and appointed another ally to head it.[24] These new officers, both in the TSJ and the CNE, ratified the political disqualifications issued since 2019 against political leaders who aspired to compete in the 2024 election, whether they were Chavistas, such as myself,[25] or members of the traditional opposition.[26] To further manipulate the process, the government moved forward the date of the election, which was originally supposed to be held in December (to fulfil the constitutional period of six years), and scheduled it for 28 July (the birthday of the late President Chávez), thereby seeking to gain the support of pro-Chávez voters. More importantly, this change in dates has prevented the different opposition forces from preparing properly for the electoral campaign. Finally, the Permanent Electoral Registry (REP) was allowed to register new voters only for a few days,[27] also obstructing the registration and change of address of those who live abroad. The latter is a fundamental aspect, since, due to the mass migration outside the country in recent years, it is estimated that there are at least 3 million expatriate voters – for which only 508 new voters and 6,000 address changes were registered, using all kinds of absurd obstacles and requirements.[28]The violation of the Barbados Agreement and its consequences Through the most recent manipulation measures, the government of Nicolás Maduro violated the terms of the negotiations and agreements undertaken with the US Administration, which had also been endorsed by the Venezuelan opposition (PUD), known as the "Barbados Agreement".[29] The Agreement, signed on 17 October 2023, entailed a commitment by the government to allow free and fair elections and not to disqualify opposition candidates. As part of the Agreement, prisoners were exchanged and the sanctions against Venezuela were lifted. The US released Colombian businessman Álex Saab,[30] closely linked to Nicolás Maduro, while the government of Venezuela freed twelve US prisoners.[31] On 18 October, the Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) lifted the US sanctions[32] imposed on the oil and financial sector of Venezuela in 2019.[33] However, following the subsequent ratification of political disqualifications and the new wave of repression and political arrests by the Maduro government,[34] the US government warned that, if previous agreements were not fulfilled, it would restore sanctions on Venezuela.[35] The Maduro government responded defiantly. Finally, on 13 February, Juan González, special assistant to the White House responsible for negotiations with the Venezuelan government, announced his "resignation", because of the failure of the Biden Administration's strategy towards the Maduro government.[36] Finally, two months later, on 17 April, the White House re-imposed sanctions on the Venezuelan oil sector[37] that became effective as of 31 May, issuing OFAC License 44A.[38] The decision dealt a severe blow to Maduro's aspirations to "normalize" relations with the United States, internationally legitimize his government and attempt to relaunch the country's derelict oil industry. The immediate effect of the re-imposition of sanctions will translate into the inability to increase Venezuela's oil production and exports. This will deprive the government of resources from oil revenues, which are essential to stabilise, at least temporarily, the economy and show some comfort to the population in the run-up to the election. But the greatest impact will be on the international players in the oil market, discouraging their participation or investments in the sector. Notably, this is due not only to the risk of being subject to sanctions, but also to the lack of transparency in the legal framework: after the approval of the "Anti-Blockade Law" and the disapplication of the Organic Law of Hydrocarbons, international companies, such as French Total, Norwegian Equinor, Japanese INPEX and even Russian Rosneft, stopped oil operations in Venezuela between 2020 and 2021.[39]A campaign of its own kind Even though strong doubts remain that the government will really hand over power as a result of an unfavourable outcome in the election, the voting intention is quite high among Venezuelan citizens, currently at over 70 per cent, and popular participation in the electoral mobilizations organized by the oppositions have exceeded all expectations. Nicolás Maduro, at a political event on 4 February, after having denounced another alleged conspiracy against him – which caused a new wave of political arrests[40] – declared that he "will win by hook or by crook" the upcoming election.[41] In a similar vein, other officials of the Venezuelan government, such as the Minister of Defence Vladimir Padrino López[42] and Diosdado Cabello,[43] Deputy Head of the ruling PSUV party, hinted at the fact that they will not accept an election victory by the opposition. These very serious statements, which add up to the aforementioned irregularities and the lack of impartiality of TSJ and CNE, cast disturbing doubts on the possibility of free and transparent elections being really held; and, even worse, on whether the government is truly willing to hand over power in case of an electoral defeat, as all polls suggest. Meanwhile, the leadership of María Corina Machado, a radical exponent of the right-wing opposition, has been greatly strengthened in the country. Although she was not authorised to enter the election, she is organizing rallies all over the country, gathering thousands of people, campaigning for the unitary opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez. For his part, Maduro does not expose himself to being in open spaces, due to the widespread rejection and low support he generates among the population. Indeed, he always appears in controlled spaces surrounded by security and is depicted in close shots and images. The campaign and the mobilisation of the electoral apparatus supporting the government are primarily led by other political actors of Madurismo, and are able to gather only limited crowds compared with those of Maria Corina Machado's rallies. Overall, it is a strange campaign, in which the presidential candidates do not participate directly. Through the campaign, what prevails among the population is boredom, fatigue and rejection of the incumbent government. Overall Venezuelan people seem to be willing to vote for whomever is able to remove Maduro from power.Looking beyond 28 July The short-term scenarios are far from clear. The polls and mass opposition mobilisations suggest that Maduro will be defeated electorally. The government, if it feels cornered, may still try to prevent Edmundo González's candidacy from materialising by means of political disqualification, using the CNE or the TSJ; it may also try to suspend the electoral process using a military provocation with Guyana as an excuse, over which it has hardened its rhetoric in recent months.[44] In the event that the election is really held and there is majority support for the opposition, the government can still resort to electoral fraud, as it controls the entire process, and Maduro can proclaim himself the winner. This is especially important because the electoral process is not under international electoral monitoring: the CNE rejected the observation mission of the European Union, and other countries such as Brazil and Colombia stated that, due to lack of time, they will not be able organise their own missions, while the UN is still evaluating whether to send an electoral mission to Venezuela. Today more than ever, international support is essential to accompany the upcoming election and the country's political process. Should vote rigging occur, there could be a massive popular mobilisation against it, as María Corina Machado has called to go "all the way in", suggesting that she is not willing to accept frauds. In this scenario, the role of the armed forces – whether they would support Maduro or not – would be crucial, as well as that of the international community in preventing political turmoil. Should Maduro, and those who have surrounded him in these eleven years of government, accept their defeat and hand over power to the opposition, there are still six months to wait until the new government takes office, as according to the Constitution this must take place in January 2025. In other words, the country will face a period of tremendous uncertainty and likely destabilisation. If a new government is installed, presided over by González Urrutia, but under the strong influence of María Corina Machado, with a right-wing shock programme, it remains to be seen whether the "transition" will be possible and whether such an administration will be able to govern the country, avoiding violence and destabilisation, and perhaps even a coup d'état. In any possible scenario, the big questions will be about the role of the military, which until now has been fundamental in supporting Maduro's government, and the capacity of the different political forces of the opposition to reach an inclusive national agreement with the participation of those broad sectors of real Chavismo that are opposed to Maduro. A political agreement will be essential to return to the true spirit of the Constitution, re-establish the rule of law and address the immense needs of the population.Rafael Ramírez is former Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Minister (2014) and UN Ambassador (2014-2017); Venezuelan Oil Minister and CEO of PDVSA (2002-2014).[1] Meganalisis, Encuesta CATI Meganálisis. Verdad Venezuela abril 2024, May 2024, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tSReQeVZHrfA8aaYCP77026nz2x2WoDi/view?usp=drive_link.[2] Statista, Venezuela: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Current Prices from 1985 to 2025, April 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/371876.[3] Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), "República Bolivariana de Venezuela", in Estudio Económico de América Latina y el Caribe 2023, November 2023, https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/18052be0-dcaf-448b-b02e-5244cd422b66/content.[4] AFP, "Maduro Keeps Venezuela Minimum Wage Frozen but Raises Bonuses", in Barron's, 2 May 2024, https://www.barrons.com/news/maduro-keeps-venezuela-minimum-wage-frozen-but-raises-bonuses-97bc6ae3.[5] Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Encovi 2023 | Encuesta nacional de condiciones de vida 2023, March 2024, https://assets.website-files.com/5d14c6a5c4ad42a4e794d0f7/65f8aa0a4054c8b7a93fe274_Presentacio%CC%81n%20ENCOVI%202023%20integrada%20prensa%20v1303%20(1).pdf.[6] Regional Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants of Venezuela (R4V), Refugees and Migrants in the Region, May 2024, 3 June 2024, https://www.r4v.info/en/node/91585.[7] Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), Estados financieros consolidados, 31 de diciembre de 2013, 2012 y 2011, con el Informe de los contadores públicos independientes, 2013, p. 96, http://www.pdvsa.com/images/pdf/RELACION%20CON%20INVERSIONISTAS/Estados%20Financieros/2013/Estados%20Financieros%20Consolidados%20al%2031%20de%20diciembre%20de%202013%202012%202011.PDF.[8] Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Monthly Oil Market Report, 11 June 2024, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/338.htm.[9] Rafael Ramírez, "El colapso de la industria petrolera", in RafaelRamirez.net, 22 September 2020, https://www.rafaelramirez.net/?p=5602.[10] Venezuela, "Ley constitucional antibloqueo para el desarrollo nacional y la garantía de los derechos humanos", in Gaceta Oficial de la Républica Bolivariana de Venezuela, No. 6,583 (12 October 2020), http://spgoin.imprentanacional.gob.ve/cgi-win/be_alex.cgi?Documento=T028700033940/0&Nombrebd=spgoin&CodAsocDoc=2307&Sesion=2023551607.[11] Regina García Cano and Joshua Goodman, "Shadowy Brokers Walk Off with Billions in Venezuelan Oil", in AP News, 31 March 2023, https://apnews.com/article/e4bb5d055f16eae94c9bcec6c7a6dbf5; "Las empresas de Alex Saab y Álvaro Pulido se habrían quedado con 1.500 millones de dólares de PDVSA", in Semana, 15 April 2023, https://www.semana.com/mundo/articulo/la-huella-de-alex-saab-en-el-millonario-desfalco-a-pdvsa-la-petrolera-estatal-venezolana/202323.[12] Marianna Parraga, "Exclusive: Middlemen Have Left Venezuela's PDVSA with $21.2 Billion in Unpaid Bills", in Reuters, 21 March 2023, http://reut.rs/3yZF03r.[13] White House, Executive Order 13857: Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to Venezuela, 25 January 2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/executive-order/13857.[14] UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), Situation of Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/50/59), 12 August 2022, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/50/59.[15] UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/54/57), 11 December 2023, https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/54/57.[16] OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/41/18), 9 October 2019, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/41/18.[17] OHCHR, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/48/69), 28 December 2021, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/48/69.[18] Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: ICC Investigation Opens, 3 November 2021, https://www.hrw.org/node/378814.[19] On 3 May 2018, the alliance of traditional opposition parties (Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, MUD) called to abstain in the presidential election of 20 May; "Alianza opositora llama a la abstención en presidenciales venezolanas", in France 24, 3 May 2018, https://www.france24.com/es/20180503-alianza-opositora-llama-la-abstencion-en-presidenciales-venezolanas.[20] Smartmatic, Smartmatic Announces Cease of Operations in Venezuela, 6 March 2018, https://www.smartmatic.com/us/media/smartmatic-announces-cease-of-operations-in-venezuela.[21] People's Electoral Movement, 15 May 2014; Min-Unit, 6 August 2015; COPEI, 30 June 2016; Venezuelan Ecological Movement, 4 July 2018; Democratic Action, 15 June 2020; First Justice, 17 June 2020; Popular Will, 7 July 2020; Motion Republican, 23 July 2020; Tupamaro, 19 August 2020; Homeland for All, 21 August 2020; New Vision of my Country, 22 August 2020; Country Commitment, 25 August 2020; Communist Party of Venezuela, 11 August 2023.[22] "Renuncia el último rector principal de ente electoral de Venezuela cercano a la oposición", in Deutsche Welle, 20 June 2023, https://www.dw.com/es/a-65982882.[23] Elvis Amoroso was a deputy to the National Assembly for the ruling party in 2006. In October 2018, he was appointed Comptroller of the Republic.[24] On 26 April 2022, Caryslia Rodríguez was appointed magistrate of TSJ and president of the Electoral Chamber. On 17 January 2024, as the new president of the TSJ, she ratified the disqualification of Machado.[25] Venezuela National Assembly, AN recibe al Contralor General de la República, 4 March 2021, https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/noticias/an-recibe-al-contralor-general-de-la-republica; EFE, "La Contraloría venezolana inhabilitó a 150 funcionarios entre 2019 y 2020", in Swissinfo, 4 March 2021, https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/la-contraloría-venezolana-inhabilitó-a-150-funcionarios-entre-2019-y-2020.[26] In October 2023, the Supreme Court of Justice disqualified opponents Henrique Capriles and María Corina Machado.[27] "Cierra el plazo para la inscripción de votantes en Venezuela", in EFE, 17 April 2024, https://wp.me/pdaKzp-4lXw.[28] Transparencia Electoral, Rumbo a las elecciones presidenciales de Venezuela: ¿Qué pasó esta semana? (29 de abril al 03 de mayo 2024), 3 May 2024, https://transparenciaelectoral.org/?p=10427.[29] "El Gobierno de Venezuela y la oposición firman un acuerdo de garantías para las presidenciales de 2024", in EFE, 17 October 2023, https://wp.me/pdaKzp-2XMb.[30] "Alex Saab: Cabo Verde entrega a Estados Unidos al empresario vinculado al gobierno de Nicolás Maduro y acusado de corrupción", in BBC News, 16 October 2021, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-58942596.[31] "Estados Unidos acuerda liberar a Álex Saab a cambio de 36 presos en Venezuela", in France 24, 20 December 2023, https://www.france24.com/es/américa-latina/20231220-estados-unidos-acuerda-liberar-a-Álex-saab-a-cambio-de-36-presos-en-venezuela.[32] "EE.UU. levanta sanciones sobre petróleo y gas a Venezuela", in Deutsche Welle, 19 October 2023, https://www.dw.com/es/a-67144136.[33] US Department of the Treasury, Issuance of Venezuela-related General Licenses and Associated Frequently Asked Questions, 18 October 2023, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231018_44.[34] Ibis León, "Detenciones a dirigentes políticos en Venezuela: así es el patrón represivo", in Efecto Cocuyo, 17 December 2023, https://wp.me/p6JdTn-2olw.[35] US Department of State, Venezuelan Supreme Court Rulings and the Barbados Agreement, 27 January 2024, https://www.state.gov/venezuelan-supreme-court-rulings-and-the-barbados-agreement.[36] Eric Martin and Patricia Laya, "Biden's Top Latin America Adviser Juan Gonzalez to Step Down", in Bloomberg, 13 February 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-13/biden-top-latin-america-adviser-juan-gonzalez-planning-to-depart.[37] Jennifer Hansler and Osmary Hernandez, "US to Reimpose Sanctions on Venezuela's Oil and Gas Sector", in CNN, 17 April 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/17/politics/us-reimpose-oil-sanctions-venezuela/index.html.[38] US Department of the Treasury, Issuance of Venezuela-related General License and Associated Frequently Asked Questions, 17 April 2024, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240417.[39] Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber and Olesya Astakhova, "Rosneft Sells Venezuelan Assets to Russia after U.S. Sanctions Ramp Up", in Reuters, 29 March 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN21G02O; Mariela Nava, Marianna Parraga and Deisy Buitrago, "Focus: Venezuela's Oil Partners Head for the Exit, Forgoing Unpaid Debt", in Reuters, 27 October 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/venezuelas-oil-partners-head-exit-forgoing-unpaid-debt-2022-10-27.[40] Between January and April 2024, arrest warrants were issued against civilians and members of the military accused of "conspiring" against Nicolás Maduro. Alicia Hernández, "La ola de detenciones a activistas y a críticos del gobierno de Venezuela que recrudece el conflicto político", in BBC News, 13 February 2024, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cy6ey29200no; "Venezuela Arrests Activist for Alleged Links to Maduro Assassination Attempt", in Reuters, 16 April 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-arrests-activist-alleged-links-maduro-assassination-attempt-2024-04-16.[41] "'Vamos a ganar por las buenas o por las malas', dice Maduro", in Deutsche Welle, 4 February 2024, https://www.dw.com/es/a-68170506.[42] Vladimir Padrino (@vladimirpadrino), "La Ley Orgánica para la Defensa de la Guayana Esequiba establece en su artículo 25 que quienes hayan tenido conductas que de manera 'directa o indirecta' apoyaran la posición de Guyana en la controversia territorial, no podrán optar a cargos de elección popular", X post, 26 April 2024, https://x.com/vladimirpadrino/status/1783867416205795330.[43] "'Si quieren calle, vamos a la calle': Diosdado Cabello insiste en que el chavismo no saldrá del poder", in El Nacional, 14 June 2023, https://www.elnacional.com/venezuela/ni-por-las-buenas-ni-por-las-malas-diosdado-cabello-reitera-que-la-oposicion-no-gobernara-el-pais.[44] Rafael Ramírez, "Venezuela-Guyana Dispute over Essequibo", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|07 (February 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18122.
Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Naregallu-1 microwatershed was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and these physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundaries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characteristics, classification, behavior and use potentials of the soils in the microwatershed. The present study covers an area of 869 ha in Koppal taluk and district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought - prone with an average annual rainfall of 662 mm, of which about 424 mm is received during south–west monsoon, 161 mm during north-east and the remaining 77 mm during the rest of the year. An area of 89 per cent is covered by soils and 11 per cent is by habitation and settlements. The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below. The soils belong to 16 soil series and 29 soil phases (management units) and 5 Land Management Units. The length of crop growing period is 150 cm). About 7 per cent area in the microwatershed has loamy soils and 82 per cent clayey soils at the surface. About 70 per cent area has non-gravelly (200 mm/m) in available water capacity. About 19 per cent area of the microwatershed has nearly level (0-1% slope) lands and 70 per cent area of the microwatershed has very gently sloping (1-3% slope) lands. An area of about 31 per cent area is moderately (e2) eroded and about 58 per cent area is slightly (e1) eroded. An area of about 77 per cent soil are moderately alkaline to strongly alkaline (pH 7.8-9.0) and an area of about 12 per cent soil are very strongly alkaline (pH >9.0) in soil reaction. The Electrical Conductivity (EC) of the soils in the entire cultivated area of the microwatershed is dominantly 0.75%) in 11 per cent area. An area of about 81 per cent is medium (23-57 kg/ha) and 8 per cent is low (>23 kg/ha) in available phosphorus. An area of about 37 per cent is medium (145-337 kg/ha) and 52 per cent is high (>337 kg/ha) in available potassium. Available sulphur is low (20 ppm) in 7 per cent area of the microwatershed. An area of about 46 per cent is low (4.5 ppm) and 39 per cent is deficient (1.0 ppm) in available manganese content. Entire cultivated area of the microwatershed is sufficient (>0.2 ppm) in available copper content. An area of about 53 per cent is deficient (0.6 ppm) in available zinc content. The land suitability for 31 major crops grown in the microwatershed was assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (S1) and moderately suitable (S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the microwatershed Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum 225(26) 540(62) Sapota 116(13) 18(2) Maize 80(9) 648(75) Pomegranate 116(13) 506(58) Bajra 116(13) 622(72) Guava 116(13) 18(2) Groundnut 61(7) 129(15) Jackfruit 116(13) 18(2) Sunflower 187(22) 434(50) Jamun 61(7) 473(54) Cotton 173(20) 592(68) Musambi 187(22) 434(50) Red gram 116(13) 463(53) Lime 187(22) 434(50) Bengalgram 162(19) 603(69) Cashew 133(15) - Chilli 116(13) 128(15) Custard apple 270(31) 496(57) Tomato 116(13) 112(13) Amla 133(15) 632(73) Brinjal 97(11) 610(70) Tamarind 61(7) 474(54) Onion 97(11) 36(4) Marigold 116(13) 649(75) Bhendi 97(11) 573(66) Chrysanthemum 116(13) 649(75) Drumstick 133(15) 488(56) Jasmine 116(13) 199(23) Mulberry 133(15) 286(33) Crossandra 116(13) 249(29) Mango 61(7) 75(9) Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan has been prepared for the 5 identified LMUs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fodder, fibre and other horticulture crops. Maintaining soil-health is vital for crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested for these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc., Soil and water conservation treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required. As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands, field bunds and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. That would help in supplementing the farm income, provide fodder and fuel, and generate lot of biomass which in turn would help in maintaining the ecological balance and contribute to mitigating the climate change. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE SURVEY The results indicated that 35 farmers were sampled in Naregallu-1 micro watershed among them 11 (31.43%) were marginal farmers, 9 (25.71 %) were small and semi medium farmers, 4 (11.43 %) were medium farmers and 2 (5.71 %) large farmers. The data indicated that there were 181 population households were there in the studied micro watershed. Among them 111 (61.33 %) men and 70 (38.67 %) were women. The average family size of marginal, small farmers and semi medium farmers were 5, medium farmer was 6 and large farmer was 7. The data indicated that 23 (12.71%) people were in 0-15 years of age, 88 (48.62 %) were in 16-35 years of age, 50 (27.62 %) were in 36-60 years of age and 20 (11.05 %) were above 61 years of age. The results indicated that, 97.14 per cent of household's heads were practicing agriculture and 2.86 per cent of the household heads were agricultural labour. The results indicated that the Naregallu-1had 28.18 per cent illiterates, 29.83 per cent of them had primary school education, 1.10 per cent of them had middle school, 25.41 per cent them had high school education, 6.08 per cent of them had PUC education, 0.55 per cent them had diploma education, 7.73 per cent of them had degree education and 1.10 per cent of the household members had other education. The results indicated that agriculture was the occupation for 23.76 per cent of the household members, 59.67 per cent were agricultural labourers, 14.36 per them were students and 1.10 per cent of them were children and housewives respectively. In case of marginal farmers 26 per cent were agriculturist, 60 percent was in agricultural labour and 12 per cent of them were students. In case of small farmers 22 per cent of them were agriculturist, 60 per cent of them were agricultural labour and 16 per cent of them were students. In case of semi medium farmers 23.81 per cent of the family members were agriculturist, 54.76 per cent of them were agricultural labour and 19.05 per cent of them were students. In case of medium farmers 25 per cent of the family members were agriculturist, 62.50 per cent of them were in agricultural labour and 12.50 per cent of them were students. In case of large farmers 20 per cent of the family members were agriculturist, 66.67 per cent of them were in agricultural labour and 6.67 per cent of them were students. The results showed that 100 per cent of them have not participated in any local institutions. The results indicated that 97.14 per cent of the households possess Katcha house and 2.86 per cent of the households possess Pucca house. The results showed that, 91.43 per cent of the households possess TV, 5.71 per cent of the households possess DVD player, 74.29 per cent of the households possess Mixer grinder, 11.43 per cent of the households possess refrigerator, 11.43 per cent of the households possess bicycle, 85.71 per cent of the households possess motor 2 cycle, 2.86 per cent of the households possess Car, 2.86 per cent of the households possess landline phone, 85.71 per cent of the households possess mobile phones and 2.86 per cent of the households possess computer/laptop. The results showed that the average value, television was Rs.23281, DVD/VCD Player was Rs. 1600, mixer grinder was Rs.1903, refrigerator was Rs.11000, bicycle was Rs.1050, motor cycle was Rs.32882, Car was Rs. 300000, landline phone was Rs. 500, mobile phone was Rs.1507 and computer/laptop was Rs. 12500. The results showed that, about 8.57 per cent of the households possess bullock cart, 22.86 per cent of them possess plough, 2.86 per cent of the households equally possess seed/fertilizer drill, power tiller, tractor, thresher, groundnut decorticator, chaff cutter and earth remover/duster, 11.43 per cent of the households possess irrigation pump, 14.29 per cent of the households possess sprayer, 5.71 per cent of the households possess sprinkler, 51.43 per cent of the households possess weeder and 20 per cent of the households possess harvester. The results showed that the average value of bullock cart was Rs.26666; the average value of plough was Rs. 2200, the average value of seed/fertilizer drill was Rs.3500, the average value of irrigation pump was Rs. 273250, the average value of power tiller was Rs. 150000, the average value of tractor was Rs. 300000, the average value of sprayer was Rs. 2600, the average value of sprinkler was Rs. 3000, the average value of weeder was Rs. 42, the average value of harvester was Rs. 74, the average value of thresher was Rs. 25, the average value of groundnut decorticator was Rs. 18000, the average value of chaff cutter was Rs. 2100 and the average value of Earth remover/Duster was Rs. 20000. The results indicated that, 14.29 per cent of the households possess bullocks, 8.57 per cent of the households possess local cow, 14.29 per cent of the households possess crossbred cow and 5.71 per cent of the households possess buffalo. In case of marginal farmers, 9.09 per cent of the households possess both bullock and local cow respectively and 18.18 per cent of the households possess crossbred cow. In case of small farmers, 22.22 per cent of households possess equally bullock and buffalo and 11.11 per cent possess local cow. In case of semi medium farmers, 11.11per cent of the households possess bullock and 22.22 per cent of the households possess crossbred cow. In medium farmers, 25 per cent of the households possess local cow. 50 per cent of the large farmers possess bullock and crossbred cow respectively. The data regarding the average labour availability in Naregallu-1 micro watershed is presented in Table 14. The results indicated that, average own labour men available in the micro watershed was 1.91, average own labour (women) available was 1.18, average hired labour (men) available was 17.86 and average hired labour (women) available was 19.37. 3 In case of marginal farmers, average own labour men available was 2.09, average own labour (women) was also 1.18, average hired labour (men) was 9.18 and average hired labour (women) available was 11.18. In case of small farmers, average own labour men available was 2.22, average own labour (women) was 1.22, average hired labour (men) was 15.22 and average hired labour (women) available was 15.89. In case of semi medium farmers, average own labour men available was 1.44, average own labour (women) was 1.11, average hired labour (men) was 22.22 and average hired labour (women) available was also 22.22. In medium farmers average own labour men available was 1.75, average own labour (women) was 1.50, average hired labour (men) was 29.25 and average hired labour (women) available was 33. In large farmers average own labour men available was 2, average own labour (women) was 0, average hired labour (men) was 35 and average hired labour (women) available was 40. The results indicated that, 5.71 per cent of the household opined that hired labour was adequate and 94.29 per cent of the household opined that hired labour was inadequate. The results indicated that, households of the Naregallu-1 micro watershed possess 1.80 ha (3.75 %) of dry land and 46.27 ha (96.25 %) of irrigated land. Marginal farmers possess 1.80 ha (36.95 %) of dry land and 3.08 ha (63.05%) of irrigated land. Small farmers possess 7.17 ha (100 %) of irrigated land. Semi medium farmers possess 12.87 ha (100 %) of irrigated land. Medium farmers possess 10.07 ha (100%) of irrigated land and large farmers possess 13.07 ha (100%) of irrigated land. The results indicated that, the average value of dry land was Rs. 443049.32 and average value of irrigated was Rs. 490456.62. In case of marginal famers, the average land value was Rs. 443049.32 for dry land and Rs. 1655321.93 for irrigated land. In case of small famers, the average land value was Rs. 1004178.43 for irrigated land. In case of semi medium famers, the average land value was Rs. 473656.08 for irrigated land. In case of medium famers, the average land value was Rs. 297709.93 for irrigated land. In large farmers the average land value was Rs. 99411.77 for irrigated land. The results indicated that, there were 23 functioning and 3 de-functioning bore wells in the micro watershed. The results indicated that, bore well was the major irrigation source for 65.71 per cent of the farmers and 5.71 per cent of the farmers were using canal for irrigation. The results indicated that on an average the depth of the bore well was 68.88 meters. The results indicated that, in case of marginal farmers there was 3.08 ha of irrigated land, in case of small farmers there was 7.17 ha of irrigated land, semi medium farmers were having 12.88 ha of irrigated land, medium farmers were having 10.06 4 ha of irrigated land and large farmers having 13.08 ha irrigated land. On an average there were 46.26 ha of irrigated land. The results indicated that, farmers have grown coriander (0.40 ha), cotton (1.21 ha), cowpea (0.88 ha), groundnut (0.50ha), Sorghum (1.24 ha), maize (38.21 ha), paddy (0.81 ha), bajra (0.81 ha), red gram (1.62ha) and sunflower (2.98 ha) in kharif season. Also grown 2.27 ha of cowpea and 3.33 ha sunflower in Rabi season. Marginal farmers have grown coriander, groundnut, Maize, Bajra, cowpea and sunflower. Small farmers have grown cowpea and maize. Semi medium farmers have grown sorghum, maize, paddy, cowpea and sunflower. Medium farmers have grown cotton, maize and red gram. Large farmers have grown only maize. The results indicated that, the cropping intensity in Naregallu-1 micro watershed was found to be 85.70 per cent. In case of marginal farmers it was 100 per cent, in small farmers it was 88.19, in semi medium farmers it was 87.80, in medium farmers it was 64.04 per cent and in large farmers it was 100 per cent. The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for bajra was Rs. 36122.49. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 46683. The net income from bajra cultivation was Rs. 10560.51, thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.29. The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for maize was Rs. 41582.91. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 62427.57. The net income from maize cultivation was Rs. 20844.65. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.5. The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for paddy was Rs. 42196.36. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 42237.00. The net income from paddy cultivation was Rs. 40.64. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.0. The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for Cowpea was Rs. 33136.50. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 22466.85. The net income from Cowpea cultivation was Rs. -10669.65. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:0.68. The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for groundnut was Rs. 54187.89. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 96239.63. The net income from groundnut cultivation was Rs. 42051.74. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.78. The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for Sunflower was Rs. 32861.40. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 51830.19. The net income from Sunflower cultivation was Rs. 18968.79. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.58. The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for Sorghum was Rs. 20210.43. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 31377.85. The net income from Sorghum cultivation was Rs. 11167.42. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.55. 5 The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for cotton was Rs. 60504.72. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 23053.33. The net income from cotton cultivation was Rs. -37451.39. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:0.38. The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for coriander was Rs. 71385.06. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 111150. The net income from coriander cultivation was Rs. 39764.94. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.56. The results indicated that, the total cost of cultivation for Red gram was Rs. 24308.69. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 46312.50. The net income from Red gram cultivation was Rs. 22003.81. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.91. The results indicated that, 83 tons of dry fodder was available for 44 days and 46 tons of green fodder was available for 26 days in studied micro watershed. The results indicated that, 2.86 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was adequate and 22.86 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was inadequate. Similarly 22.86 per cent of the households opined that green fodder was adequate and 2.86 per cent of the households opined that green fodder was inadequate. The table indicated that the average income from service/salary was Rs. 72,685.71, business Rs. 2,857.14, wage Rs. 285.71, agriculture Rs. 102,091.43, non farm income Rs. 428.57 and dairy farm Rs.857.14. The results indicated that the average expenditure from service/salary was Rs. 2,428.57, business Rs. 1,714.29, agriculture Rs. 33,114.29 and dairy farm Rs. 171.43. On an average the expenditure was Rs. 11,005.24. The results indicated that, sampled households have grown 13 coconut trees in their field. The results indicated that, households have planted 25 Neem trees, 8 tamarind tress, 2 banyan trees and 2 peeple trees in their field and also grown 2 Neem trees in the backyard. The results indicated that, bajra, coriander, cotton, cowpea, sorghum, paddy, Red gram and sunflower crops were sold to the extent of 100 per cent and maize was sold to the extent of 56.32 per cent. The results indicated that, 5.71 percent of the households have sold their produce to local/village merchant, 85.71 percent of the households have sold their produce to regulated market, 34.29 percent of the households have sold their produce to cooperative marketing society and 5.71 percent of the households sold their produce in contract marketing arrangement. 6 The results indicated that, 2.86 per cent of them have used cart, 128.57 per cent of the households used tractor and 2.86 per cent have used truck as a mode of transport. The results indicated that, 65.71 percent used fire wood as a source of fuel and 34.29 percent of the households used LPG as a source of fuel. The results indicated that, piped supply was the source of drinking water for 11.43 per cent of the households and 88.57 per cent of them were using bore well for drinking water. The results indicated that, electricity was the major source of light for 100 per cent of the households. The results indicated that, 37.14 per cent of the households possess sanitary toilet i.e. 27.27 per cent of marginal, 55.56 per cent of small, 22.22 per cent of semi medium, 25 per cent of medium and 100 per cent of large farmers had sanitary toilet facility. The results indicated that, 25.71 per cent of the sampled household's possessed APL card, 60 per cent of the sampled households possessed BPL card and 14.29 per cent of the sampled households have not possessed BPL card. The results indicated that, 57.14 per cent of the households participated in NREGA programme which included 36.36 percent of the marginal, 100 per cent of the small, 55.56 per cent of the semi medium, 25 percent of the medium farmers and 50 per cent of the large farmers. The results indicated that, cereals, pulses and milk were adequate for 100 per cent, 11.43 per cent and 22.86 respectively. Oilseed, vegetables and fruits were adequate for 2.86 per cent of the households correspondingly. The results indicated that, pulses, oilseed, vegetables, fruits, milk and egg were inadequate for 88.57 per cent, 11.43 per cent, 8.57 per cent, 11.43 per cent, 57.14 per cent and 54.29 per cent of the household. The results indicated that, Lower fertility status of the soil was the constraint experienced by 8.57 per cent of the households, wild animal menace on farm field (31.43%), frequent incidence of pest and diseases (65.71%), inadequacy of irrigation water (8.57%), high cost of Fertilizers and plant protection chemicals (51.43%), high rate of interest on credit (2.86%), low price for the agricultural commodities (5.71%), lack of marketing facilities in the area (20%), lack of transport for safe transport of the agricultural produce to the market (25.71%), less rain fall (100%) and source of agri. Technology information (Newspaper/TV/Mobile) (85.71%). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project
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Last week brought us the news that Dr. Craig Steven Wright, an eccentric Australian who has long claimed to be Bitcoin's pseudonymous creator Satoshi Nakamoto, was bench-slapped by the High Court, where Mr. Justice Mellor ruled at the conclusion of the proceedings that Wright was not Satoshi Nakamoto, not the author of the Bitcoin white paper, not the author of its software and, by extension, not the creator of Bitcoin.This bench ruling comes after years of litigation and weeks of hearings around the question of the provenance of the Bitcoin white paper and software. Full details of the court's findings on these points will be provided in a written judgment at a later date so I refrain from offering my own conclusions on the evidence, or an assessment of correctness of the ruling, here.As is public knowledge, I was one of the first lawyers – if not the first lawyer – to represent a client on the business end of Wright's years-long litigation campaign, when, in 2019, a Twitter user I know was the first crypto community member to receive legal threats from Wright's lawyers for claiming that Wright was not Satoshi, the very conclusion Mr. Justice Mellor also reached today. A short time later, an acquaintance of mine, Peter McCormack, dared to say the same thing. Peter was promptly sued by Wright in England. Wright won his case against Peter, albeit winning only nominal damages of £1 due to certain deficiencies in Wright's case.In my view, Wright's legal team chose to bring these claims in England for one reason, and one reason only: England is, and long has been, the easiest place in the English-speaking world to win a defamation action, because in England, the playing field is tilted so to the advantage of a claimant that even weak claims can win.This is not a new problem, and its roots go deep. Defamation is an ancient tort with its origins in the landed aristocracy seeking to protect their names and reputations from lesser men. The Anglo-Saxon tort of scandalum magnatum, a "fake news" tort for defaming great men of the realm (and thus not a tort capable of being inflicted on lesser men), was used as early as the 13th century. In later years, various other torts like seditious libel were used to punish political dissent – even where that dissent should be substantially true – and the imposition of these ancient rules in the Thirteen Colonies, most famously in the John Peter Zenger trial of 1735, served as focal points around which a new, young nation, the United States of America, began to develop its fledgling judicial system which led, eventually, to its free speech doctrine embodied today by First Amendment jurisprudence.In the modern formulation, defamation is the publication of a statement of fact to a third party, which is false, which is likely to cause serious harm to their reputation. In this respect it differs little from the tort in the United States. However, in England, the history of the tort – protecting the powerful from the powerless – has never been fully written out of its bones, because the burden of proof in a defamation action rests not with the claimant but with the defense. Not with the Saxon noble with the ear of the King, but with the humble pamphleteer who dared to speak out about his abuses. Not with the Member of Parliament accused of some lecherous or disreputable conduct, but the journalist who reported on it. Not with a person claiming to be Bitcoin's creator, offering nothing approaching definitive proof that he or she is (being a transaction or message signed with one of Satoshi's private keys), and armed with institutional financial backing, but the humble Twitter user who simply observed what appeared to be true, based on a cold assessment of the facts, and dared to repeat what he thought was true in writing. Put simply, at any time, in any defamation claim, the deck is always stacked against speakers and favors those who are most likely to be spoken about.On a practical level, this means that it is conceivable that a future plaintiff in England seeking to conceal certain truths or propound certain falsehoods, but with knowledge of the totality of the circumstances concerning that conduct, confidence that he or she can control those variables, and possessing the resources to reasonably predict that he or she will be able to use lawfare to intimidate others from discussing it, can stifle freedom of speech by using the threat of defamation litigation and, in some cases, being less than forthright with the courts. We need not look back to the Saxons to find a proven example of this: see, e.g., Jeffrey Archer, Baron Archer and former Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party, who famously won a defamation case against the Star newspaper over a visit to a prostitute whose life was ruined by the case in the late 1980s, only to be sent to prison a decade and a half later, when his testimony was discovered to have been false.The point is not that Archer lied, or that he was punished for a lie. The point is that his initial case was so weak that he should never have won a civil action in the first place, or assumed that victory was possible, but the structure of English defamation law made a victory possible if not inevitable, thus incentivizing Archer to bring it anyway. Requiring a defendant to prove the truth of his statement, particularly where seeking to prove a negative, can be nearly impossible. It is far fairer and in the interests of justice to require a claimant, who starts the dispute, seeks the remedy, possesses direct knowledge of all of relevant facts about his past conduct, and is the party asking the state to intercede on his or her behalf with the full might of its power, to prove the truth under these circumstances.I offer no view on the truth or falsity of Wright's statements or evidence in this case. That is a matter for the High Court to address in its fuller ruling. What I do know is that the question of the truth of his claims should have been addressed years ago in Wright v. McCormack, but it was not dealt with because the burden of proof was on the defense and the cost of going through the exercise COPA - a coalition of very well-funded corporations - just went through was likely too much for an individual defendant like Peter to bear. In future, it is possible to make England a fairer place for speakers and help the English marketplace of ideas be a home for the truth. Ask claimants in a defamation action to bear the burden of proving their case. It's a simple change. Parliament should make it.
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It's that time of year, and despite all the budgetary drama unfolding on Capitol Hill, lawmakers have already finished most of their holiday shopping for their favorite children: Pentagon contractors. Through cryptic "program increases" to the defense budget appropriations for fiscal year 2024, most with no listed author and little to no justification, Congress has added more than $25 billion to the Pentagon's procurement and research accounts for fiscal year 2024. Based on the continuing resolution that Congress passed in November, Congress has until February 2 to either pass another stopgap measure, or pass a final Pentagon spending bill, at which point we should be able to see which program increases make the cut. If history is any indication, almost all of them will be in the final bill.In the meantime, a new database created by Taxpayers for Common Sense reveals each of these program increases, whether they fund projects that weren't funded at all in the Pentagon's budget request, and whether they fund projects requested in Unfunded Priorities Lists (UPLs), extra-budgetary wish lists that Congress requires military service branch and combatant command leaders to submit to Congress each year.The numbersLawmakers on the House Appropriations Committees got to work early, adding 479 program increases for a combined $9.5 billion. When their Senate counterparts got to work, they included 636 program increases in their bill worth nearly $15 billion — so all in all 1,115 program increases. Broken down by bill section, there were 172 increases for procurement between the House and Senate at a cost of $14 billion, and 943 for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) at a cost of $10.5 billion. When the House version of the Defense Appropriations bill came to the floor, lawmakers added 11 more program increases for procurement, and another 90 for RDT&E, for a combined $1.1 billion.While these kinds of adds are nothing new, their numbers do seem to be growing, particularly in the RDT&E category. In fact, the number of RDT&E top-ups has grown by 72% in the past four years, from 600 for FY2021, to 776 for FY2022, to 996 for FY2023, up to 1,033 for FY2024. More troubling still is that 1,010 of the total 1,216 increases, or $14.5 billion of the $25.7 billion lawmakers have added to these accounts, are for projects the Pentagon didn't fund at all in its budget request.Are they earmarks?According to Congress, these increases aren't earmarks, but in practice, they often serve the same purpose and are not subject to transparency reforms traditional earmarks have faced since 2007.Traditional earmarks, rebranded by Congress as "congressionally directed funding" or "community project funding," support projects that fund a specific entity for a specific purpose in a specific place. This made them a favored tool for lawmakers to funnel taxpayer dollars into their district or state. But these earmarks come with rules, requiring members to put their names on them, and in the House's case, requiring members to list their earmarks on their websites. Program increases are not bound by these rules. They have no name attached (apart from amendments, which list their sponsors) and generally lack any accompanying justification. In the Senate Appropriations Committee report on the Pentagon spending bill, a section on "funding increases" stipulates that "funding increases shall be competitively awarded, or provided to programs that have received competitive awards in the past." So Congress seems to differentiate these increases from earmarks on the basis that they're competitively awarded, unlike traditional earmarks. In practice, that rationale breaks down.Next-gen earmarksOne program increase allocates $2 million for "urban subterranean mapping technology," a fancy name for tunnel detection. This increase has appeared in every Pentagon spending bill since FY2020, for a total of $17 million over five years, but there's almost no publicly available information about this project. That is other than Sen. Joe Manchin's (D-W.Va.) regular celebrations of funding for West Virginia-based Marshall University to research urban subterranean mapping technology in press release after press release after press release after press release, all of which were published before the funds they celebrate were formally awarded.Some adds are even more blatantly noncompetitive. In the House, someone added $7 million for "Omniblast water sensor technology." If that sounds weirdly specific, it's because it is. The Omniblast water sensor is a trademarked product, owned by a company called Advanced Materials and Devices (AMAD), Inc. It goes without saying that program increases for patented products can only be fulfilled by the patent owners, so AMAD Inc. is more than a shoe-in for any "competitive" award process. And while AMAD Inc. was awarded a contract for "a wearable underwater blast sensor" in 2022, it was the only bidder, suggesting a not so competitive process in the past.As to whether this funding, like an earmark, is meant to serve the political interests of a specific lawmaker, we can't know for sure without knowing the author. But AMAD Inc. is based in Reno, Nevada, in the district of Rep. Mark Amodei's (R-Nev.), who sits on the House Appropriations Committee. While AMAD Inc. hasn't made any political contributions to Rep. Amodei's campaigns, it did spend $150,000 on lobbying in 2022, and $120,000 on lobbying in the first three quarters of 2023, expenses paid to a lobbying firm called Cornerstone Government Affairs. Cornerstone donated $3,000 to Rep. Amodei so far in the 2024 election cycle, its first time contributing to any of his campaigns.Unjustified adds, unjustifiable secrecyAsked about these program increases, a Senate Appropriations Committee staffer pointed to the unfunded priorities they fund as a justification. But there are two problems with that argument. One is that Unfunded Priorities Lists (UPLs) are just that: unfunded, meaning the Pentagon didn't find them important enough to include in its $826 billion request. Almost by definition, items on these UPLs are non-priorities for the Pentagon. The second problem is that UPLs only accounted for about $1.9 billion of the $25.7 billion lawmakers added to the Pentagon's request for procurement and RDT&E. The staffer also argued that the Pentagon sometimes "relies upon congressional increases to keep production lines open or to sustain readiness of the military." This tack obfuscates the fact that for a lot of the funds Congress adds, it subtracts funds from elsewhere in the Pentagon budget. While the offsets for the committee adds are as opaque as their authors, the offsets listed in amendments overwhelmingly raid the Pentagon's Operations and Maintenance account. That's Congress' prerogative, but lawmakers can't raid O&M to pay for procurement and research adds and then say with a straight face that those adds are about supporting military readiness.All this isn't to say that none of these projects are worth funding. There's more than 1,200 of them, so surely some are. But with the lack of transparency for who requests and approves them, whether the funds are competitively awarded, and whether they align with any cogent national security strategy, who's to say? If lawmakers think cramming another $25 billion for procurement and research into a $826 billion budget of an agency that just failed its sixth audit is worthwhile, they should at least let us know who's adding what and to what end.
Canada has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis in its relationship to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and its offshoot, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the CPTPP (comprising Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam). Initially a disinterested and disengaged observer of the developing TPP process back in 2006–09, by 2011–12 Canada underwent a conversion to become a determined, almost desperate suitor seeking to gain entry to the TPP club. It finally succeeded, but a change of government in 2015 led to a re-evaluation of the decision to accede to the TPP, under pressure from anti-globalization forces. Effectively, Canada sat on its hands for over a year until the U.S. had determined its final position. Then, after the TPP's impending collapse, when the United States under then president Donald Trump announced its withdrawal, Canada changed tack once again and decided to work with Japan and others to rescue the agreement. However, during the negotiations to adapt the original TPP into the TPP-11 agreement (which became known as the CPTPP), Canada earned a reputation as a difficult and demanding partner, pushing its "progressive trade agenda" and slowing down the process. Indeed, Canada is often seen as trying to impose very progressive values on a region with little receptivity for such views. The cultural-exemption and auto-trade issues were of principal concern to Canada. Through its policy positions and negotiation style, Canada under the Trudeau government almost scuttled the CPTPP process and risked finding itself locked out once again. Quick action was taken to stem the damage and Canada became not only a signatory, but one of the first six countries to ratify the CPTPP, bringing it into force on December 30, 2018. Today, Canada has fully embraced the CPTPP, situating it as an important leg in its developing Indo-Pacific strategy, and is open to considering expansion to new members who are able and willing to meet the CPTPP's high standards.
Deborah Elms, in her essay "The Origins and Evolutions of TPP Trade Negotiations"(Elms, 2016, 29-49), sketches out the history of how the TPP came into being, starting with the "P4 agreement" (between Singapore, Chile, New Zealand and Brunei) in June 2005. That agreement, technically called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, came into effect "with very little attention" (Elms, 2016, 30) and was incomplete. It did not cover investment or financial services, which were to be left for later negotiation. When the parties finally got around to discussing the two missing chapters in February 2008, the United States joined the discussions. In September 2008, a couple of months prior to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to be held in Lima, Peru in November, the U.S. announced that it would seek to join the agreement in its entirety. This set the stage for announcements at that meeting of other countries joining the talks, namely Australia, Peru and Vietnam. Now there were eight. What about Canada? At the Lima summit, attended by then prime minister Stephen Harper and then international trade minister Stockwell Day, Canada expressed no interest in getting on board, much to the frustration of accompanying officials (Stephens, Conversation). Elms states (2016, 40) that Canada had expressed interest in joining earlier but had been rebuffed over concerns regarding the supply management system that it maintains for dairy, poultry and eggs. Dairy is a particular concern for both the United States and New Zealand. However, senior Canadian officials closely involved with APEC and trade policy at the time told the author that Canada had been invited to join the P4 agreement in the early days, by New Zealand, but had refused (Sloan; Plunkett). The assessment was that Canada had little to gain, as it already had an agreement with Chile, at the time was negotiating one with Singapore (which was never completed) and had little to gain from an agreement with New Zealand, given the political need to defend the dairy industry. There are various explanations for Canada's lack of interest in 2008–09. Part of the reasoning was domestic. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper was in a minority situation and would remain so until Harper won his first majority in 2011 (after two minority governments in which he was prime minister). Despite the Conservatives' support for trade liberalization, it was a hot-button issue and anti-globalization sentiments were vocal, in Canada and in other countries. The Harper government was dealing with the 2008 financial crisis and was focused very much on the U.S. market and NAFTA. The initial coolness toward the P4 continued to apply, and from the perspective of trade negotiating resources, Canada was already fully engaged in negotiations with South Korea and the EU. There was concern that if Canada entered the TPP negotiations, it would have to make additional market concessions beyond those already conceded in NAFTA, but with little likelihood of getting additional concessions from the U.S. Yet, in the end, it was probably NAFTA that changed the position of Harper vis-à-vis the TPP. Both Canada and Mexico had preferential access to the U.S. market through NAFTA.There was growing concern in both countries that the TPP could be a back door to the U.S. market, undermining the value of NAFTA concessions. Autos were a particular concern. Canada and Mexico concluded therefore that they needed to be at the negotiating table.In essence, Canada decided to try to enter the TPP tent for defensive reasons, although the possibility of Japan eventually joining was an additional factor, given Canada's longstanding desire to improve its access to the Japanese market and the limited prospect that a bilateral agreement would be concluded in the foreseeable future (Ciuriak 2018).
That realization kicked off a series of meetings with officials from TPP-negotiating states, since admittance of new negotiating partners required a unanimous decision of the existing members. But, as in many things, the United States played an outsized role. The U.S. initially was not helpful, especially at the officials level. It is not fully clear why, but anecdotally the author was told by U.S. trade officials that the addition of Canada would "complicate" matters. Canada's unhelpful position on trade in dairy products was certainly a factor. Canada pushed its advocacy to the political level and Canadian participation in the TPP was a major topic of discussion between Harper and then president Barack Obama at the 2011 Honolulu APEC summit. At that meeting, Obama "welcomed" Harper's expression of interest in seeking to join the TPP talks and initiating consultations toward that goal (White House 2011).
Programa Oficial de Doutoramento en Estatística e Investigación Operativa. 555V01 ; [Abstract] This doctoral thesis is dedicated to functional regression for scalar response. In particular, we focus on functional semiparametric models, which combine the practical advantages of parametric and nonparametric approaches, surpassing both methodologies. Accordingly, several semiparametric models involving a functional singleindex component were studied from a theoretical and practical perspective. First, for the functional single-index model (FSIM) and the semi-functional partial linear single-index model (SFPLSIM), we provide uniform consistency results (over all parameters involved) for kernel- and k-Nearest-Neighbours-based statistics related to the estimation of the semiparametric component. Second, for the sparse semifunctional partial linear single-index model (SSFPLSIM), we develop a variable selection procedure in the linear component based on penalized least squares (PLS). The good behaviour of this method is theoretically assured (rates of convergence of the estimators are obtained, as well as asymptotic behaviour of the variable selection procedure). Third, the SSFPLSIM is adapted to the case in which covariates with linear e ect come from the discretization of a curve. For this new model, the multi-functional partial linear single-index model (MFPLSIM), the variable selection problem was also studied. Consequently, two new algorithms were proposed (providing theoretical results that ensure their good performance) to solve the ine ciency of the PLS method when it is directly applied to the MFPLSIM. For all the models and procedures mentioned above, theoretical results are accompanied by both simulation studies and real data applications which illustrate the good performance of the proposed methodology in practice. ; [Resumo] Esta tese está adicada ao estudo da regresión funcional con variable resposta escalar. En particular, centrámonos en modelos funcionais semi-paramétricos, os cales combinan as vantaxes prácticas dos enfoques paramétrico e non-paramétrico, superando a ambas metodoloxías. Desta maneira, estudáronse, tanto dende o punto de vista te orico como dende a perspectiva pr actica, varios modelos semi-param etricos que involucran unha compoñente funcional single-index. En primeiro lugar, para o functional single-index model (FSIM) e para o semi-functional partial linear single-index model (SFPLSIM) establecemos resultados de consistencia uniforme (sobre todos os parámetros involucrados) para os estatísticos de tipo núcleo e tipo k-veciños-máis-próximos relacionados coa estimación da compoñente semi-paramétrica do modelo. En segundo lugar, para o sparse semi-functional partial linear single-index model (SSFPLSIM) desenvolvemos un procedemento de selección de variables na compoñente linear baseado en mínimos cadrados penalizados (PLS, iniciais de penalized least squares). O bo comportamento deste método asegurouse dende o punto de vista teórico (obtendo taxas de converxencia dos estimadores, así como o comportamento asintótico do procedemento de selección de variables). En terceiro lugar, o SSFPLSIM adaptouse ao escenario no cal as covariables con efecto linear proveñen da discretización dunha curva. Para este novo modelo, o multi-functional partial linear single-index model (MFPLSIM), estudouse tamén o problema da selección de variables e propuxéronse dous novos algoritmos (dos que aseguramos teoricamente o seu bo comportamento) para resolver a inefi cacia do método PLS cando se aplica directamente ao MFPLSIM. Para todos os modelos e procedementos citados, os resultados teóricos acompañáronse de estudos de simulación e aplicacións a datos reais que ilustran o bo comportamento na práctica da metodoloxía presentada. ; [Resumen] Esta tesis está dedicada al estudio de la regresión funcional con variable respuesta escalar. En particular, nos centramos en modelos funcionales semi-paramétricos, los cuales combinan las ventajas prácticas de los enfoques paramétrico y no-paramétrico, superando a ambas metodologías. De esta forma, se estudiaron, tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como desde la perspectiva práctica, varios modelos semi-paramétricos que involucran una componente funcional single-index. En primer lugar, para el functional single-index model (FSIM) y para el semi-functional partial linear single-index model (SFPLSIM) establecemos resultados de consistencia uniforme (sobre todos los parámetros involucrados) para los estadísticos de tipo núcleo y de tipo k-vecinos-más-próximos relacionados con la estimación de la componente semi-paramétrica del modelo. En segundo lugar, para el sparse semi-functional partial linear single-index model (SSFPLSIM) desarrollamos un procedimiento de selección de variables en la componente linear basado en mínimos cuadrados penalizados (PLS, iniciales de penalized least squares). El buen comportamiento de este método se ha asegurado desde el punto de vista teórico (obteniendo tasas de convergencia de los estimadores, así como el comportamiento asintótico del procedimiento de selección de variables). En tercer lugar, el SSFPLSIM se ha adaptado al escenario en el cual las covariables con efecto linear provienen de la discretización de una curva. Para este nuevo modelo, el multi-functional partial linear single-index model (MFPLSIM), se ha estudiado también el problema de selección de variables y se propusieron dos nuevos algoritmos (de los que aseguramos teóricamente su buen comportamiento) para resolver la ine ficiencia del método PLS cuando se aplica directamente al MFPLSIM. Para todos los modelos y procedimientos citados, los resultados teóricos se acompañaron de estudios de simulación y aplicaciones a datos reales que ilustran el buen comportamiento en la práctica de la metodología presentada. ; Xunta de Galicia; ED481A-2018/191 ; Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01 2016-2019 ; Xunta de Galicia; ED431G2019/01 ; Xunta de Galicia; ED431C 2016-015 ; Xunta de Galicia; ED431C2020-014 ; This research has been partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO) under Grants MTM2014-52876-R and MTM2017-82724-R, by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (MICINN) under Grant PID2020-113578RB-I00, by the Xunta de Galicia through Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia accreditation under Grants ED431G/01 2016-2019 and ED431G 2019/01 and through the Grupos de Referencia Competitiva under Grants ED431C 2016-015 and ED431C2020-014 and in part by the European Union (European Regional Development Fund-ERDF). The author particularly thanks the contracts financed by the research group MODES (from May 1, 2017 to August 31, 2017) and by the CITIC (from September 1, 2017 to May 30, 2018) and the PhD contract financed by the Xunta de Galicia and the European Union (European Social Fund-ESF), the reference of which is ED481A-2018/191 (from May 31, 2018). Some results of this thesis have been obtained during a stay of the author at the Universit ́e Paul Sabatier, Toulouse (from March 13, 2019 to June 12, 2019), financed by the Xunta de Galicia, with reference ED481A-2018/191
The article investigates the approaches to the genesis and evolution of institutionalism theory. The aim of the study is a retrospective analysis of the institutional approach in political science and tracing the evolution of the institutional paradigm. The author proceeds from the fact that in the institutional tradition there are several theoretical blocks, such as: French legal institutionalism, institutional issues of sociological and political thought of the XIX - first half of the twentieth century, and American economic institutionalism of the same period. It was found out that the institutional approach as a holistic methodological program for studying the social order was first developed within the sociological direction of Western European jurisprudence. It is determined that the basis of institutional theory in French jurisprudence is the idea of equilibrium, according to which social development is regarded as a spontaneous equilibrium process, and the order that emerges in the process of such development is not predetermined by nature or sovereign. It is revealed that the researchers of the XIX - first half of the XX century interpret institutions mainly as fundamental collective social structures, the normative and legitimating power of which lies in the sphere of values, while their attention is concentrated around formal institutions. Im addition, the article highlights the significant contribution to the development of the institutional paradigm of the representatives of the economic theory of American institutionalism. It has been found that within the tradition of American institutionalism, the nature of institutions is explained as a set of informal and derived formal norms of thought and behavior that determine human interaction with the environment, as well as human relationships. The temporality of the variability of institutions occurs as a result of conscious and unconscious choice of people. It is substantiated that «classical» institutionalism considered politics as a normative system free from individual interests. A characteristic feature of this tradition was legalism, which involves the interpretation of politics in terms of constitution and law. At the same time, the idealization of institutions led to the idealization of the public interests they reflected, which acquired the character of an independent entity, not related to the interests of specific individuals. That is why holistic methodology is a key feature of the old institutionalism. The author concludes that the objectivist approach remains fundamental to traditional institutionalism. This narrows the scope for exploring the role of the subjective factor in political processes. In addition to objectivism, a specific feature of this approach is the institutional-structural determinism in the understanding of political reality. Political reality in this regard is viewed as completely dependent on the formatting and functioning of political institutions. ; У статті досліджено підходи до генезису та еволюції теорії інституціоналізму. Метою дослідження є ретроспективний аналіз інституціонального підходу в політичній науці та прослідковування еволюції інституціональної парадигми. Автор виходить з того, що в інституціональній традиції є кілька теоретичних блоків, як-то: французький правовий інституціоналізм, інституціональна проблематика представників соціологічної та політологічної думки ХІХ – першої половини ХХ століття, а також американський економічний інституціоналізм цього ж періоду. З'ясовано, що інституціональний підхід як цілісна методологічна програма вивчення соціального порядку вперше був розроблений в межах соціологічного напрямку західноєвропейського правознавства. Визначено, що основою інституціональної теорії у французькому правознавстві є ідея рівноваги, за якою суспільний розвиток відбувається як спонтанний рівноважний процес, а порядок, який постає в процесі такого розвитку, не є наперед встановленим ні природою, ні сувереном. Розкрито, що дослідники ХІХ – першої половини ХХ ст. трактують інститути переважно як фундаментальні колективні структури суспільства, нормативна і легітимаційна сила яких міститься у сфері цінностей, однак їх увага сконцентрована довкола формальних інститутів. Виокремлено суттєвий внесок у розвиток інституціональної парадигми представників економічної теорії американського інституціоналізму. З'ясовано, що в межах традиції американського інституціоналізму природа інститутів пояснюється як сукупність неформальних і похідних від них формальних норм мислення та поведінки, що визначають взаємодію людини з навколишнім середовищем, а також відносини між людьми. Темпоральність змінюваності інститутів відбувається у результаті свідомого та несвідомого вибору людей. Обґрунтовано, що «класичний» інституціалізм розглядав політику як незалежну від індивідуальних інтересів нормативну систему. Характерною прикметою відповідної традиції був легалізм, який передбачає інтерпретацію політики в термінах конституції і права. Водночас ідеалізація інститутів зумовлювала ідеалізацію відображуваних ними суспільних інтересів, що набували характеру самостійної сутності, не пов'язаної з інтересами конкретних індивідів. Тому саме холістська методологія є ключовою ознакою старого інституціоналізму. Автор доходить висновку, що об'єктивістський підхід залишається базовим для традиційного інституціоналізму. При цьому відбувається звуження можливостей дослідження ролі суб'єктивного чинника в політичних процесах. Крім об'єктивізму, специфічною прикметою вказаного підходу є інституціонально-структурний детермінізм у розумінні політичної реальності. Політична реальність у цьому плані розглядається як повністю залежна від форматування і функціонування політичних інститутів. ; У статті досліджено підходи до генезису та еволюції теорії інституціоналізму. Метою дослідження є ретроспективний аналіз інституціонального підходу в політичній науці та прослідковування еволюції інституціональної парадигми. Автор виходить з того, що в інституціональній традиції є кілька теоретичних блоків, як-то: французький правовий інституціоналізм, інституціональна проблематика представників соціологічної та політологічної думки ХІХ – першої половини ХХ століття, а також американський економічний інституціоналізм цього ж періоду. З'ясовано, що інституціональний підхід як цілісна методологічна програма вивчення соціального порядку вперше був розроблений в межах соціологічного напрямку західноєвропейського правознавства. Визначено, що основою інституціональної теорії у французькому правознавстві є ідея рівноваги, за якою суспільний розвиток відбувається як спонтанний рівноважний процес, а порядок, який постає в процесі такого розвитку, не є наперед встановленим ні природою, ні сувереном. Розкрито, що дослідники ХІХ – першої половини ХХ ст. трактують інститути переважно як фундаментальні колективні структури суспільства, нормативна і легітимаційна сила яких міститься у сфері цінностей, однак їх увага сконцентрована довкола формальних інститутів. Виокремлено суттєвий внесок у розвиток інституціональної парадигми представників економічної теорії американського інституціоналізму. З'ясовано, що в межах традиції американського інституціоналізму природа інститутів пояснюється як сукупність неформальних і похідних від них формальних норм мислення та поведінки, що визначають взаємодію людини з навколишнім середовищем, а також відносини між людьми. Темпоральність змінюваності інститутів відбувається у результаті свідомого та несвідомого вибору людей. Обґрунтовано, що «класичний» інституціалізм розглядав політику як незалежну від індивідуальних інтересів нормативну систему. Характерною прикметою відповідної традиції був легалізм, який передбачає інтерпретацію політики в термінах конституції і права. Водночас ідеалізація інститутів зумовлювала ідеалізацію відображуваних ними суспільних інтересів, що набували характеру самостійної сутності, не пов'язаної з інтересами конкретних індивідів. Тому саме холістська методологія є ключовою ознакою старого інституціоналізму. Автор доходить висновку, що об'єктивістський підхід залишається базовим для традиційного інституціоналізму. При цьому відбувається звуження можливостей дослідження ролі суб'єктивного чинника в політичних процесах. Крім об'єктивізму, специфічною прикметою вказаного підходу є інституціонально-структурний детермінізм у розумінні політичної реальності. Політична реальність у цьому плані розглядається як повністю залежна від форматування і функціонування політичних інститутів.
The Journal of Interdisciplinary Research in Experimental Methods has a history of 9 years, promoting a space for research, exchange and dissemination so necessary these days for economic sciences. Although its specificity lies in experimental methods and interdisciplinary studies, it can be observed in this issue that the lens is broadened towards other types of research that favor the enrichment of various theories typical of our discipline.In the first place, colleagues Yanely Castillo Texis and Bertina Romero Sánchez present a work on the implementation of the control system in the inventory area, in a particular area of Mexico, specifically the state of Tlaxcala, based on the diagnosis of a company from the place. It is interesting to appreciate the applied methodology, since it is divided into phases to achieve a better diagnosis and demonstrate the need to be responsible in the inventory control process, a model that can be replicated in other types of companies.The second article, by Claudio Gamero Enríquez, also addresses problems related to production, this time regarding the application of a logistics control system from the input of materials to the output of finished products. The author has collected information from three companies and applied a novel northwest corner method, followed by a stone-to-stone jump method in order to optimize the most efficient route.Third, an article by Graciela Sturm is presented, in which various economic theories are approached from three perspectives: freedom of personal and educational choice, the potential for economic well-being and ethics as a political value, and virtue as a value. With that purpose, the author makes a historical journey that interrelates the approaches, from her most significant contributions, also contributing her own perspective on the matter.The fourth article, presented by Sergio Lagunas Puls and Carmen Lilia Cervantes Bello, proposes the purpose of applying hyperbolas as representations of international trade. This method consists of applying the tool to exports from Mexico to the United States, specifically in the iron and steel-based manufacturing industry, highlighting these trajectories in geometric form. It should be noted how interesting the results obtained, which can influence both organizational policies, as well as in the field of public policies.Finally, a quasi-experimental type of work is presented, developed by Beatriz C. Cavazos Rodríguez, Natalia R. Córdova Cisneros, Ricardo J. Hinojosa Fano and Matías Bahena Sánchez, in which the determinants of satisfaction with life in Mexico are analyzed , from the division between treatment and control groups. The method applied is Propensity Score Matching, from which it is sought to inquire about the sociodemographic determinants of life satisfaction in that country. The results discussed show us the way in which psychological and sociological factors influence the degree of satisfaction with ways of life.Finally, as is our custom, we deeply thank the authors who have enhanced their contributions. Also to the evaluators and collaborators, whose work we highlight and have contributed with their experience to the result of this issue. All of the above is essential to maintain the level of academic quality characteristic of the University of Buenos Aires and of our Journal. We invite anyone who wants to participate to get in touch with our team, in order to continue contributing to the discipline with research papers and academic productions that highlight interdisciplinarity and experimental methods. Prof. Emerita Dr. María Teresa CasparriDirector of the IADCOM Institute ; La Revista de Investigación Interdisciplinaria en Métodos Experimentales cuenta con una trayectoria de 9 años, impulsando un espacio de investigación, intercambio y difusión tan necesario por estos días para las ciencias económicas. Si bien su especificidad radica en los métodos experimentales y los estudios interdisciplinarios, podrá observarse en el presente número que se amplía el lente hacia otro tipo de investigaciones que favorecen al enriquecimiento de diversas teorías propias de nuestra disciplina.En primer lugar, las colegas Yanely Castillo Texis y Bertina Romero Sánchez exponen un trabajo sobre la implementación del sistema de control en el área de inventarios, en una zona particular de México, específicamente el estado de Tlaxcala, a partir del diagnóstico de una empresa del lugar. Es interesante apreciar la metodología aplicada, ya que se divide en fases para alcanzar un mejor diagnóstico y demostrar la necesidad de ser responsables en el proceso de control de inventario, modelo que puede ser replicable en otro tipo de empresas.El segundo artículo, de Claudio Gamero Enríquez, aborda también problemáticas vinculadas a la producción, en esta oportunidad respecto a la aplicación de un sistema de control logístico desde las entradas de materiales hasta la salida de productos terminado. El autor ha relevado información de tres empresas y aplicado un novedoso método de esquina noroeste, seguido por un método de salto de piedra en piedra con el fin de optimizar la ruta más eficiente.En tercer lugar, se presenta un artículo de Graciela Sturm, en el cual se abordan diversas teorías económicas desde tres perspectivas: la libertad de elección personal y educacional, la potencialidad del bienestar económico y la ética como valor político, y la virtud como valor. Con ese propósito, la autora realiza un recorrido histórico que interrelaciona los abordajes, desde sus aportes más significativos, aportando también su propia mirada al respecto.El cuarto artículo, presentado por Sergio Lagunas Puls y Carmen Lilia Cervantes Bello plantea como propósito aplicar hipérbolas como representaciones de comercio internacional. Este método consiste en aplicar la herramienta a las exportaciones desde México a Estados Unidos, específicamente en la industria de manufacturas basadas en hierro y acero, destacando dichas trayectorias en forma geométrica. Cabe destacar lo interesante de los resultados obtenidos, que pueden influir tanto en las políticas de índole organizacional, así como también en el ámbito de las políticas públicas.Por último, se expone un trabajo de tipo cuasi experimental, desarrollado por Beatriz C. Cavazos Rodríguez, Natalia R. Córdova Cisneros, Ricardo J. Hinojosa Fano y Matías Bahena Sánchez, en el cual se analizan los determinantes de satisfacción con la vida en México, a partir de la división entre grupos de tratamiento y de control. El método aplicado es el de Pareamiento por Puntaje de Propensión, a partir del cual se busca indagar sobre los determinantes sociodemográficos en la satisfacción respecto de la vida en dicho país. Los resultados abordados nos muestran la forma en que los factores psicológicos y sociológicos influyen en el grado de satisfacción respecto de los modos de vida.Para finalizar, como es nuestra costumbre, agradecemos profundamente a los/as autores/as que han realzado sus aportes. También a los/as evaluadores/as y colaboradores/as, cuya labor destacamos y han contribuido con su experiencia al resultado del presente número. Todo lo expuesto es fundamental para mantener el nivel de calidad académica característico de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y de nuestra Revista. Invitamos a toda persona que quiera participar que se ponga en contacto con nuestro equipo, con el fin de seguir aportando a la disciplina con trabajos de investigación y producciones académicas que destaquen la interdisciplinariedad y los métodos experimentales. Prof. Emérita Dra. María Teresa CasparriDirectora del Instituto IADCOM
In the context of research into the relationship between secularism and multiculturalism in contemporary India, this paper points to their specific interrelatedness and the distinctive Indian approach to secularism through the idea of a principled distance as a way to adjust to religious pluralism that has a close affinity with multiculturalism. Contrary to opinions that secularism is alien to the Indian civilisation, by a selection of instances through Indian history, the paper illustrates the broader meaning of "Indian" religious and secular thinking and also points to the significance of interaction among various religious cultures and subcultures, particularly between Hinduism and Islam/Sufism. However, the paper focuses on the analysis of Indian constitutional secularism and legally warranted multiculturalism. Debates on multiculturalism follow two distinct directions: the first examines multiculturalism as a state policy in the form of federalisation of its political system, whereas the second is concerned with the meaning of multiculturalism and its implications for the issues of individual and group rights, culture, religion, and secularism. It also touches upon the influence of the British colonial rule on the shaping of interreligious relations in independent India. The last section questions the ascendancy of Hindu nationalism, particularly in view of the rise to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014, its appropriation of the new "idea" of India, especially the Hindu nationalist narrative, which endangers India's official ideology of secularism, as well as the position of the minorities, in particular of the Muslim minority. The article is divided into seven sections. The Introduction outlines, in general, the main distinction between secularism and multiculturalism and their relationship, referring to the two principal approaches to secularism: (1) neutrality between different religions, and (2) prohibition of religious associations in state activities. Indian secularism tends to emphasise neutrality in particular rather than prohibition in general. The second section, Traces of the Indian Secular Thought through History, examines the view, particularly pervasive among Hindutva supporters, that secularism is alien to the Indian civilisation from the perspectives of history and philosophy, which both provide evidence that "the constituents of secularism which make up the concept are not alien to Indian thought" (Thapar, 2013: 4). In this context, the most evoked name in connection with religious tolerance is that of Ashoka Maurya, who in his edicts called not only for the co-existence of all religious sects but also for equal respect for those who represented them. Many centuries later, Moghul Emperor Akbar supported dialogue across adherents of different religions, including atheists. He laid the formal foundations of a secular legal structure and religious neutrality of the state. The paper here also points to the significance of interaction among various religious cultures and subcultures, the more so between Hinduism and Islam/Sufism. It focuses on extending the meaning of "Indian" religion in the sense that it includes multiple religions, such as Brahmanism, Buddhism, Jainism, Bhakti, Shakta, Islam/ Sufism, Guru-Pir tradition, which, but for Brahmanism, challenge orthodoxy by giving greater weight to social ethics rather than to prescriptive religious texts. The third section, Multiculturalism in Indian Context, refers to the Indian legally warranted multiculturalism and relating debates followed by two distinct directions. The first examines multiculturalism as a state policy in the form of federalisation of its political system; a process which involves the political accommodation of ethnic identities, which remains the most effective method of management and resolution of conflicts. The second direction is concerned with the meaning of multiculturalism and its implications for the issues of individual and group rights, culture, religion, secularism. According to Rajeev Bhargava (1999: 35, 2007), cultural particularity might undermine the "common foundation for a viable society", and might also lessen individual freedom, thus invalidating the values of liberal democracy. From there follows the question of constitutional protection of personal laws of religious communities, which is, in a way, in collision with the primary secular identity, that of a citizen (Thapar, 2010, 2013). The fourth section, Characteristics of Indian Secularism, analyses in some detail the Articles of the Indian Constitution concerned with the basic understanding of secularism, i.e., that religion must be separated from the state "for the sake of religious liberty and equality of citizenship." The analysis indicates that, while some Articles (Indian Constitution, Articles 25–26) depart from the mainstream western secularism, others are close to the Western liberal leanings, like those stipulating that the state will have no official religion (constitutional amendment 42) or that no religious instruction will be allowed in educational institutions maintained wholly out of state funds, as well as that no person attending any educational institution receiving financial aid from state funds shall be required to take part in compulsory attendance at religious instruction or worship (Articles 27–28/1/). But, more specifically, the idea of a principled distance from religious pluralism points to India's highly contextual, thus distinctively Indian, version of secularism. The fifth section, The Question of Indian Identity, argues that, with the inauguration of democracy in India, multiculturalism was adopted as a policy of recognising and respecting diversity, guaranteeing the protection and rights of minorities and positive discrimination for the historically marginalised, and emphasising intergroup equality, while leaving the issue of intragroup equality somewhat aside. In the last section, Challenges of Hindu Nationalistic Ideology, the author points to some manifestations of the current ascendency of Hindu nationalism, particularly resulting from the Bharatiya Janata Party coming to power in 2014, such as the increasing identification of state leaders with Hindu cultural symbols and, at the same time, decreasing official support for the public festivals of minorities, Mus lims and Christians in the first place. According to Hindu nationalists, most Muslims and Christians are converts from Hinduism and should therefore recognise the precedence of the Hindu culture in India. Anti-Muslim prejudice in India stems not from the ideas of their racial or cultural differences but, above all, from questioning their loyalty to India. Here emerges the question of the "secular nationalism" of the Congress Party as opposed to the "Hindu nationalism" of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which insists on Hinduism as the essential token of the Indian national identity, implying cultural and political pre-eminence of Hindus in India. The Conclusion summarises some of the main points regarding the relationship between secularism and multiculturalism in the Indian context, indicating that despite the present challenges that Hindu nationalism poses to both, "…the Indian experience suggests that some form of moderate secularism will continue to remain necessary as a state framework to check the advance of religious majoritarianism" (Bajpai, 2017: 224). The author assumes that the article offers some constructive avenues for future studies on secularism and multiculturalism, which should not only provide further insights into the Indian case but also enhance the understanding of the varieties of secular trajectories worldwide, as well as their implications for democracy.
Tourism, as the third largest export sector in the world, is of great importance to global communities (UNWTO, 2018). Global Wellness Institute (2018) until 2022 predicted for the medical tourism industry an average of ≈8% of annual growth; however, with one of the highest risks, i.e. disease risk (in this case COVID-19), since April 6 2020, 96% of the world's countries have travel restrictions: About 43 percent of states have closed all or part of their borders. About 21 percent of states have introduced travel bans for passengers from certain countries affected by COVID-19. About 27 percent of states have suspended all or part of their international flights to their The remaining 9% of states have applied the following travel restrictions: (i) the requirement to immediately dissociate or quarantine, normally within 14 days since the arrival at destination; (ii) annulment or revocation of the visa upon arrival; (iii) travel bans for passengers arriving from certain regions (UNWTO, 2020). As a result, the tourism industry, alongside with medical tourism, is experiencing a major recession and the GWI (2018) forecast for 2022 loses its meaning. As a new form of tourism, medical tourism has become one of the fastest growing sectors of the tourism industry. Medical tourism can be defined as a "purposeful trip abroad to receive medical care" (Keckley and Underwood, 2008). Medical tourism can be viewed from two perspectives (Plianbangchang, 2018): Reactive means medical care that pays special attention to the treatment or elimination of existing diseases; Rehabilitation of the disabled is a conventional medicine that is sometimes called the sickness Proactive approach to health ensures/preserves the well-being, these services are focused on health promotion and disease Heung et al. (2011), Ganguli and Ebrahim (2017), Tham (2018), Nilashia et al. (2019) found that the development of medical tourism in Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore is mainly influenced by the following factors: competence/human capital, infrastructure andsuperstructure, government approach/policy/regulation, the range of developed services, communication between different market segments, investment opportunities, lack of strategic planning, underdeveloped public-private partnerships and international cooperation, shortcomings in marketing and branding strategies, lack of a unified accreditation and certification system. However, the authors did not single out and assess one of the most important phenomena hindering development – the consequences caused by risk factors. Lithuanian researchers studied the risk in various aspects: patient safety, adverse event management, risk factor management and assessment (Kaleininkaitė and Trumpaitė, 2007; Buškevičiūtė and Leškevičiūtė, 2008; Kanapeckienė and Jurkuvėnas, 2009; Staliūnienė, 2009; Mekšriūnaitė and Rudaitis, 2013; Paškevičius, 2014; Stasytytė and Aleksienė, 2016; Jankauskienė and Kostereva, 2019; Babinskas and Kanapeckienė, 2019, etc.), however, the management of tourism risk factors has not been sufficiently studied yet. The following authors have examined the risk management of medical tourism in foreign literature: Wybo, 2004; Camillo, 2015; Mutalib et al., 2016; Winsena et al., 2016; Hasan et al., 2017; Plianbangchang, 2018; Ravulakollu et al., 2018; Nilashia et al., 2019; Lubowiecki-Vikuk and Dryglas, 2019; Hyder et al., 2019. The problem of the research is how to effectivelymanage the risk factors of medical tourism. The aim of the research is to develop a management model after analysing the risk factors of medical tourism. Objectives of the study: (1) to define medical tourism risk factors; (2) to analyse risk managementalgorithms. Research methods: comparative logical analysis ofscientific literature, modelling, generalization. Medical tourism organizations can be called complex socio-technical organizations that operate in a complex dynamic environment. As a result, these organizations are exposed to external and internal risk factors that need to be identified, analysed, assessed, prioritized, and managed. In this work, the author solved the problem: how to effectively manage the risk factors of medical tourism. During the analysis of the performed scientific literature, it was found that we can ensure a successful risk cleaning process by keeping with the following consistency: risk analysis, anticipation of possible accidents/factors, strategic planning, ensuring control and feedback, risk profiling, during which all possible risk factors are classified and prioritized. The risk of medical tourism involves two stages: first, when patients are abroad and second, when patients leave the hospital and return to their place of residence. Lack of information and insufficient communication between the doctor abroad and in the home country is another negative effect of medical tourism as the continuity of patient care is interrupted. Health information is not transferred from foreign hospitals to the home country, which can lead to several consequences, such as the inability to identify potential complications in a timely manner and the toxicity caused by the drugs used (Carrera and Lunt, 2010). Cammillo (2015) has attributed the emergence of medical tourism risk to the lack or scarcity of strategic managementskillsatthedestination.Strategicmanagement is a dynamic process in which the current situation is constantly assessed and each step is planned/forecasted. This requires a strong understanding of the organization as well as an understanding of the global environment in which the organization operates. This includes situation analysis SWOT. In this context, strategic management is forced to include risk assessment, risk management, crisis management and prevention strategies, and effective interdepartmental communication. The above-mentioned author singles out the following risk factors that have to be assessed during strategic risk management:1. Human error; 2. Office error; 3. Trust in the wrong person; 4. Unauthorized procedures; 5. Unlimited access to electronic data; 6. Unrestricted access for third parties; 7. Improper maintenance; 8. Insufficient control; 9. Misuse of confidential information; 10. Errors of court; 11. Improper standard operating procedures. Conclusions After examining the risk factors of medical tourism, they can be divided into two categories: external and internal risk Based on the research of tourism risk aspects conducted by researchers in recent years, tourist/patient risk perceptions are often summarized from five to seven aspects. Five aspects of risk covered financial/economic risk, psychological risk, operational risk, equipment or technical risk, health risk, accident/physical risk and social risk. In addition to these dimensions, six dimensions of risk included one more risk, i.e. time risk, and seven aspects of risk included loss of opportunity. After analysing risk management systems/algorithms/ models, it was determined that the most significant preconditions for a successful medical tourism risk management process are the following: risk analysis/ forecasting; identification of accidents/factors; strategic planning; ensuring control and feedback; risk profiling, during which all possible risk factors are classified and ; Medicinos turizmo organizacijas galima vadinti kompleksinėmis sociotechninėmis organizacijomis, kurios veikia sudėtingoje dinaminėje aplinkoje. Todėl šios organizacijos yra veikiamos išorinių ir vidinių rizikos veiksnių, kuriuos reikia identifikuoti / analizuoti / vertinti / prioretizuoti ir valdyti. Šiame straipsnyje autorius sprendė problemą – kaip veiksmingai valdyti medicinos turizmo rizikos veiksnius. Analizuodamas mokslinę literatūrą autorius nustatė, kad užtikrinti sėkmingą rizikos valdymo procesą galima laikantis šio nuoseklumo: rizikos analizė; galimų nelaimingų įvykių / veiksnių numatymas; strateginis planavimas; kontrolės ir grįžtamojo ryšio užtikrinimas; rizikos profilio sudarymas, kurio metu visi galimi rizikos veiksniai yra klasifikuojami ir prioretizuojami.
Метою статті є дослідження проблемних аспектів відповідальності роботодавця за незаконне звільнення, зокрема щодо пришвидшення порядку відшкодування шкоди незаконно звільненому працівнику, вдосконалення механізму адміністративної відповідальності роботодавця за незаконне звільнення, посилення гарантій працівників при масовому звільненні, внесення змін до кримінального законодавства щодо грубого по- рушення законодавства про працю, вчиненого в умовах пандемії коронавірусу SARSCoV- 2. Для досягнення мети зазначеної наукової статті застосовано комплекс загальнонаукових та спеціальних методів. Зокрема, завдяки діалектичному методу пізнання встановлено базовий підхід до вивчення проблем, які виникають під час вирішення питання про відповідальність роботодавця за незаконне звільнення працівників; герменевтичному – здійснено тлумачення законодавчих актів у зазначеній сфері. Також у статті широко використані загальнонаукові методи, такі як індукція, дедукція, аналіз, синтез, узагальнення. Спеціально-наукові методи, зокрема, формально-юридичний (догматичний) використано при розробленні пропозицій щодо внесення змін до чинного законодавства України. В науковій статті сформульовано основні причини, що сприяють порушенню трудового законодавства з боку роботодавців. За результатами аналізу чинних законодавчих норм встановлено, що на теперішній час відсутні норми, які би забороняли, виправдовували або давали право роботодавцям звільняти працівників у зв'язку із запровадженням в країні карантинних заходів. Враховуючи це, роботодавці намагаються приховати дійсні обставини та підстави звільнення під законними підставами, передбаченими КЗпП України, кількість незаконних звільнень у період карантину невпинно зростає, про що свідчать статистичні дані, надані Державною службою зайнятості. З огляду на це, автором запропоновано ряд змін до чинного законодавства України, зокрема: 1) до ст. 235 Кодексу законів про працю щодо виплати працівнику грошової компенсації у зв'язку з його незаконним звільненням за рахунок державного бюджету України у разі фактичної ліквідації підприємства до моменту прийняття судом рішення про стягнення з роботодавця середнього заробітку за час вимушеного прогулу; 2) до Кодексу законів про працю – з метою запровадження позитивного досвіду Франції в частині складання на підприємствах соціальних планів для пом'якшення негативних наслідків масового скорочення персоналу з економічних причин; 3) доповнення ст. 41 Кодексу України про адміністративні правопорушення положенням щодо відповідальності роботодавця за незаконне звільнення або відмову у прийнятті на роботу у випадках, що виключають його кримінальну відповідальність. Також, автором підтримано наукову позицію щодо необхідності внесення змін до ст. 172 Кримінального кодексу України щодо виключення поняття «грубе порушення законодавства про працю» і перетворення складу злочину, передбаченого цією статтею, на матеріальний. ; Целью статьи является исследование проблемных аспектов ответственности работодателя за незаконное увольнение, в частности относительно ускорения порядка возмещения вреда незаконно уволенному работнику, совершенствование механизма административной ответственности работодателя за незаконное увольнение, усиления гарантий работников при массовом увольнении, внесение изменений в уголовное законодательство относительно грубого нарушения законодательства о труде, совершенного в условиях пандемии коронавируса SARS-CoV-2. Для достижения цели указанной научной статьи применен комплекс общенаучных и специальных методов. В частности, благодаря диалектическому методу познания установлено базовый подход к изучению проблем, возникающих при решении вопроса об ответственности работодателя за незаконное увольнение работников; герменевтическому – осуществлено толкование законодательных актов в указанной сфере. Также в статье широко использованы общенаучные методы, такие как индукция, дедукция, анализ, синтез, обобщение. Специально научные методы, в частности, формально-юридический (догматический) использовано при разработке предложений по внесению изменений в действующее законодательство Украины. В научной статье сформулированы основные причины, способствующие наруше- нию трудового законодательства со стороны работодателей. По результатам анализа действующих законодательных норм установлено, что в настоящее время отсутствуют нормы, которые бы запрещали, оправдывали или давали право работодателям увольнять работников в связи с введением в стране карантинных мероприятий. Учитывая это, работодатели пытаются скрыть истинные обстоятельства и основания освобождения под законными основаниями, предусмотренными КЗоТ Украины, количество незаконных увольнений в период карантина постоянно растет, о чем свидетельствуют статистиче- ские данные, предоставленные Государственной службой занятости. Учитывая это, автором предложен ряд изменений в действующее законодательство Украины, в частности: 1) в ст. 235 Кодекса законов о труде по выплате работнику денежной компенсации в связи с его незаконным увольнением за счет государственного бюджета Украины в случае фактической ликвидации предприятия до момента принятия судом решения о взыскании с работодателя среднего заработка за время вынужденно- го прогула; 2) в Кодекс законов о труде – с целью внедрения положительного опыта Франции в части составления на предприятиях социальных планов для смягчения негативных последствий массового сокращения персонала по экономическим причинам; 3) дополнение ст. 41 Кодекса Украины об административных правонарушениях положением об ответственности работодателя за незаконное увольнение или отказ в приеме на работу в случаях, исключающих его уголовную ответственность. Также, автором поддержано научную позицию о необходимости внесения изменений в ст. 172 Уголовного кодекса Украины относительно исключения понятия «грубое нарушение законодательства о труде» и превращение состава преступления, предусмотренного этой статьей, на материальный. ; The purpose of the article is to study the problematic aspects of the employer's liability for illegal dismissal, in particular, regarding the acceleration of the procedure for compensation for harm to an unlawfully dismissed employee, improving the mechanism of employer's administrative liability for illegal dismissal, strengthening workers' guarantees in case of mass dismissal, and amending criminal legislation regarding gross violations of labor legislation committed in the context of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic. To achieve the goal of this scientific article, a complex of general scientific and special methods was applied. In particular, thanks to the dialectical method of cognition, a basic approach to the study of problems arising when deciding the issue of the employer's responsibility for the illegal dismissal of employees has been established; hermeneutic – the interpretation of legislative acts in this area has been carried out. Also, the article widely uses general scientific methods such as induction, deduction, analysis, synthesis, generalization. Specially, scientific methods, in particular, formal-legal (dogmatic) were used in the development of proposals for amendments to the current legislation of Ukraine. The scientific article formulates the main reasons for the violation of labor legislation by employers. Based on the results of the analysis of the current legislative norms, it was established that at present there are no norms that would prohibit, justify, or give employers the right to fire workers in connection with the introduction of quarantine measures in the country. Given this, employers are trying to hide the true circumstances and grounds for release under legal grounds provided for by the Labor Code of Ukraine, the number of illegal dismissals during the quarantine period is constantly growing, as evidenced by statistics provided by the State Employment Service. Taking this into account, the author proposed a number of changes to the current legislation of Ukraine, in particular: 1) in Art. 235 of the Labor Code on the payment of monetary compensation to an employee in connection with his illegal dismissal at the expense of the state budget of Ukraine in the event of the actual liquidation of the enterprise before the court decides to recover average earnings from the employer during the forced absence; 2) in the Code of Labor Laws – with the aim of introducing the positive experience of France in terms of drawing up social plans at enterprises to mitigate the negative consequences of mass layoffs for economic reasons; 3) addition to Art. 41 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses by the provision on the responsibility of the employer for illegal dismissal or refusal to hire in cases excluding his criminal liability. Also, the author supported the scientific position on the need to amend Art. 172 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine regarding the exclusion of the concept of "gross violation of labor legislation" and the transformation of the corpus delicti provided for by this article into a material one.
Метою статті є дослідження проблеми реалізації та ефективності юридичних гарантій у галузі соціально-трудових правовідносин, які надаються науково- педагогічним працівникам, що мають статус внутрішньо переміщеної особи. Стаття присвячена проблемам реалізації та ефективності юридичних гарантій, які надаються науково- педагогічним працівникам, що мають статус внутрішньо переміщеної особи. Автор обґрунтовує та аналізує ефективність пільг та переваг, що надаються науково- педагогічним працівникам, що мають статус внутрішньо переміщеної особи при виникненні, зміні та припиненні трудових та соціально-правових відносин. Хоча в науковій літературі і містяться публікації, щодо правового захисту внутрішньо-переміщених осіб, на даний час існує досить невелика кількість досліджень в площині трудового права і права соціального захисту, які б комплексно охоплювали проблему повноти та ефективності юридичних гарантій, що надаються науково- педагогічним працівникам, що мають правовий статус внутрішньо переміщеної особи. Вирішення поставлених завдань здійснювалось за допомогою використання таких методів, як аналіз та узагальнення наукової, науково-популярної літератури та нормативно-правових актів які надають пільги та переваги науково- педагогічним працівникам, що мають статус внутрішньо переміщеної особи. Автор пропонує внести певні зміни та доповнення в чинне законодавство, яке регулює правовідносини в галузі надання соціально-трудових гарантій науково- педагогічним працівникам, що мають статус внутрішньо переміщеної особи. Абзац 1 пункту 6 Постанови Кабінету Міністрів № 505 від 01.10.2014 р. викласти у наступній редакції: «Грошова допомога не призначається у разі, коли будь-хто із членів сім'ї має у власності житлове приміщення (частину житлового приміщення), яке, за своєю площею, придатне для проживання (з розрахунку 13,65 квадратних метрів на одну особу), що розташоване в інших регіонах, ніж тимчасово окуповані території. Доповнити ст. 42-1 КЗпП частиною другою наступного змісту: «Працівник який вимушений був звільнитися з місця роботи у результаті або з метою уникнення негатив- них наслідків збройного конфлікту чи техногенного характеру і має статус внутрішньо переміщеної особи, має переважне право на укладення трудового договору у разі поворотного прийняття на роботу при поновленні Україною контролю над територією де знаходиться місце роботи такого працівника». Практична цінність статті полягає в обґрунтуванні і аналізі соціально-правових гарантій, що надаються внутрішньо переміщеним особам, які працюють у закладах вищої освіти, а також внесення пропозицій щодо удосконалення соціального і правового захисту внутрішньо переміщених осіб. ; Целью статьи является исследование проблемы реализации и эффективности юридических гарантий в области социально-трудовых отношений, предоставляемых научно-педагогическим работникам, имеющим статус внутренне перемещенного лица. Статья посвящена проблемам реализации и эффективности юридических гарантий, предоставляемых научно-педагогическим работникам, имеющим статус внутренне перемещенного лица. Автор обосновывает и анализирует эффективность льгот и преимуществ, предоставляемых научно-педагогическим работникам, имеющим статус внутренне перемещенного лица при возникновении, изменении и прекращении трудовых и социально-правовых отношений. Хотя в научной литературе и содержатся публикации, по правовой защите внутренне перемещенных лиц, в настоящее время существует достаточно небольшое количество исследований в плоскости трудового права и права социальной защиты, которые комплексно охватывали проблему полноты и эффективности юридических гарантий, предоставляемых научно-педагогическим работникам, имеющих правовой статус вну- тренне перемещенного лица. Решение поставленных задач осуществлялось с помощью использования таких методов, как анализ и обобщение научной, научно-популярной литературы и нормативно-правовых актов предоставляющих льготы и преимущества научно-педагогическим работникам, имеющим статус внутренне перемещенного лица. Автор предлагает внести определенные изменения и дополнения в действующее законодательство, регулирующее правоотношения в сфере предоставления социально-трудовых гарантий научно-педагогическим работникам, имеющим статус внутренне перемещенного лица. Абзац 1 пункта 6 Постановления Кабинета Министров № 505 от 01.10.2014 г. изложить в следующей редакции: «Пособие не назначается в случае, когда кто-либо из членов семьи имеет в собственности жилое помещение (часть жилого поме- щения), которое, по своей площади, пригодное для проживания (из расчета 13,65 квадратных метров на одного человека), расположенного в других регионах, чем временно оккупированных территориях. Дополнить ст. 42-1 КЗоТ частью второй следующего содержания: «Работник который вынужден был уволиться с места работы в результате или во избежание негативных последствий вооруженного конфликта или техногенного характера и имеет статус внутренне перемещенного лица, имеет преимущественное право на заключение трудо- вого договора при возвратном приеме на работу при возобновлении Украиной контроля над территорией где находится место работы такого работника ». Практическая ценность статьи состоит в обосновании и анализе социальнопра- вовых гарантий, предоставляемых внутренне перемещенным лицам, работающим в учреждениях высшего образования, а также внесение предложений по совершенствованию социальной и правовой защиты внутренне перемещенных лиц. ; The purpose of the article is investigation of the problem of implementation and effectiveness of legal guarantees in the field of social and labor relations, which are granted to scientific and pedagogical workers who have the status of internally displaced persons. The article is devoted to the problems of implementation and effectiveness of legal guarantees, which are provided to scientific and pedagogical workers who have the status of internally displaced persons. The author substantiates and analyzes the effectiveness of privileges and benefits provided to scientific and pedagogical workers who have the status of an internally displaced person in the occurrence, change and termination of labor and socio-legal relations. Although the scientific literature contains publications on the legal protection of internally displaced persons, there is currently a relatively small number of studies in the field of labor law and social protection law, which would comprehensively cover the problem of completeness and effectiveness of legal guarantees provided to research and teaching staff. having the legal status of an internally displaced person. The decision of the tasks was carried out by means of the use of such methods as analysis and generalization of scientific, popular scientific literature and normative legal acts which grant privileges and benefits to the scientific and pedagogical workers who have the status of an internally displaced person. The author proposes to make certain changes and additions to the current legislation, which regulates the legal relationship in the field of providing social work guarantees to scientific and pedagogical workers who have the status of internally displaced persons. Paragraph 1 of clause 6 of the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 505 dated 10/01/2014 should read as follows: "There is no monetary benefit in the event that any of the family members owns a living space (part of the living space), which, in its area, suitable for living (at the rate of 13.65 square meters per person) located in other regions than temporarily occupied territories. Supplement art. 42-1 of the Labor Code, part two of the following sentence: "An employee who was compelled to resign from work as a result, or in order to avoid the negative consequences of an armed conflict or an anthropogenic nature and has the status of an internally displaced person, has a pre-emptive right to conclude an employment contract in the event of a return decision work on the restoration of Ukraine control over the territory where the place of work of such an employee is located». The practical value of the article is to substantiate and analyze the social and legal guarantees provided to internally displaced persons working in higher education institutions, as well as to make proposals to improve the social and legal protection of internally displaced persons.
Full author list: R. Morgan, M. Soares-Santos, J. Annis, K. Herner, A. Garcia, A. Palmese, A. Drlica-Wagner, R. Kessler, J. García-Bellido, T. G. Bachmann, N. Sherman, S. Allam, K. Bechtol, C. R. Bom, D. Brout, R. E. Butler, M. Butner, R. Cartier, H. Chen, C. Conselice, E. Cook, T. M. Davis, Z. Doctor, B. Farr, A. L. Figueiredo, D. A. Finley, R. J. Foley, J. Y. Galarza, M. S. S. Gill, R. A. Gruendl, D. E. Holz, N. Kuropatkin, C. Lidman, H. Lin, U. Malik, A. W. Mann, J. Marriner, J. L. Marshall, C. E. Martínez-Vázquez N. Meza, E. Neilsen, C. Nicolaou, F. Olivares E., F. Paz-Chinchón, S. Points, J. Quirola-Vásquez, O. Rodriguez, M. Sako, D. Scolnic, M. Smith, F. Sobreira, D. L. Tucker, A. K. Vivas, M. Wiesner, M. L. Wood, B. Yanny, A. Zenteno, T. M. C. Abbott, M. Aguena, S. Avila, E. Bertin, S. Bhargava, D. Brooks, D. L. Burke, A. Carnero Rosell, M. Carrasco Kind, J. Carretero, L. N. da Costa, M. Costanzi, J. De Vicente, S. Desai, H. T. Diehl, P. Doel, T. F. Eifler, S. Everett, B. Flaugher, J. Frieman, E. Gaztanaga, D. W. Gerdes, D. Gruen, J. Gschwend, G. Gutierrez, W. G. Hartley, S. R. Hinton, D. L. Hollowood, K. Honscheid, D. J. James, K. Kuehn, O. Lahav, M. Lima, M. A. G. Maia, M. March, R. Miquel, R. L. C. Ogando, A. A. Plazas, A. Roodman, E. Sanchez, V. Scarpine, M. Schubnell, S. Serrano, I. Sevilla-Noarbe, E. Suchyta, and G. Tarle ; On 2019 August 14, the LIGO and Virgo Collaborations detected gravitational waves from a black hole and a 2.6 solar mass compact object, possibly the first neutron star-black hole merger. In search of an optical counterpart, the Dark Energy Survey (DES) obtained deep imaging of the entire 90% confidence level localization area with Blanco/DECam 0, 1, 2, 3, 6, and 16 nights after the merger. Objects with varying brightness were detected by the DES Pipeline, and we systematically reduced the candidate counterparts through catalog matching, light-curve properties, host-galaxy photometric redshifts, Southern Astrophysical Research spectroscopic follow-up observations, and machine-learning-based photometric classification. All candidates were rejected as counterparts to the merger. To quantify the sensitivity of our search, we applied our selection criteria to full light-curve simulations of supernovae and kilonovae as they would appear in the DECam observations. Because the source class of the merger was uncertain, we utilized an agnostic, three-component kilonova model based on tidally disrupted neutron star (NS) ejecta properties to quantify our detection efficiency of a counterpart if the merger included an NS. We find that, if a kilonova occurred during this merger, configurations where the ejected matter is greater than 0.07 solar masses, has lanthanide abundance less than 10-8.56, and has a velocity between 0.18c and 0.21c are disfavored at the 2σ level. Furthermore, we estimate that our background reduction methods are capable of associating gravitational wave signals with a detected electromagnetic counterpart at the 4σ level in 95% of future follow-up observations. ; R. Morgan thanks the LSSTC Data Science Fellowship Program, which is funded by LSSTC, NSF Cybertraining Grant #1829740, the Brinson Foundation, and the Moore Foundation; his participation in the program has benefited this work. F. O.E. acknowledges support from the FONDECYT grant No. 1201223. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program under grant No. 1744555. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. Funding for the DES Projects has been provided by the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. National Science Foundation, the Ministry of Science and Education of Spain, the Science and Technology Facilities Council of the United Kingdom, the Higher Education Funding Council for England, the National Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the Kavli Institute of Cosmological Physics at the University of Chicago, the Center for Cosmology and AstroParticle Physics at The Ohio State University, the Mitchell Institute for Fundamental Physics and Astronomy at Texas A&M University, Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos, Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico and the Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, and the Collaborating Institutions in the Dark Energy Survey. The Collaborating Institutions are Argonne National Laboratory, the University of California at Santa Cruz, the University of Cambridge, Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas, Medioambientales y Tecnológicas-Madrid, the University of Chicago, University College London, the DES-Brazil Consortium, the University of Edinburgh, the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH) Zürich, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, the Institut de Ciències de l'Espai (IEEC/CSIC), the Institut de Física d'Altes Energies, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München and the associated Excellence Cluster Universe, the University of Michigan, NFS's NOIRLab, the University of Nottingham, The Ohio State University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Portsmouth, SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, Stanford University, the University of Sussex, Texas A&M University, and the OzDES Membership Consortium. The UCSC team is supported in part by NASA grant NNG17PX03C, NSF grant AST-1815935, the Gordon & Betty Moore Foundation, the Heising-Simons Foundation, and by fellowships from the David and Lucile Packard Foundation to R.J.F. Based in part on observations at Cerro Tololo InterAmerican Observatory at NSF's NOIRLab (NOIRLab Prop. ID 2012B-0001; PI: J. Frieman), which is managed by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy (AURA) under a cooperative agreement with the National Science Foundation. Based on observations obtained at the Southern Astrophysical Research (SOAR) telescope, which is a joint project of the Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia, Inovação e Comunicações (MCTIC) da República Federativa do Brasil, the U.S. NSF's NOIRLab, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), and Michigan State University (MSU). The DES data management system is supported by the National Science Foundation under grant Nos. AST-1138766 and AST-1536171. The DES participants from Spanish institutions are partially supported by MICINN under grants ESP2017-89838, PGC2018-094773, PGC2018-102021, SEV2016-0588, SEV-2016-0597, and MDM-2015-0509, some of which include ERDF funds from the European Union. IFAE is partially funded by the CERCA program of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007- 2013), including ERC grant agreements 240672, 291329, and 306478. We acknowledge support from the Brazilian Instituto Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia (INCT) e-Universe (CNPq grant 465376/2014-2). This paper has gone through internal review by the DES collaboration. This manuscript has been authored by the Fermi Research Alliance, LLC under Contract No. DE-AC02- 07CH11359 with the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, Office of High Energy Physics.
Ethno-political leadership is an important indicator of the social and political representation of minority groups in a multicultural social environment. The most effective form of its implementation provides for the representation of the ethnic community at the level of the highest legislative body of the state. A number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe have developed their own models of such representation over the last past decades. They are implemented through guaranteed reservation of seats for representatives of ethnic communities, lower numerical thresholds for representation in parliament, inclusion of ethno-political leaders in the lists of national parties, single-member districts may provide sufficient minority representation as well. The relevance of the study of the ethno-political leadership in the context of parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities is objectively determined by the multi-ethnicity of Ukrainian society, declaration of Ukraine's integration into the EU structures and implementation of European democratic principles of governance.The subject of the research are public and political leaders, mostly heads of national-cultural societies, foundations, ethnopolitical parties. The author applies the method of electoral statistic analysis for parliamentary elections of 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 and 2019. Synthetically generalized of minority representation in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of all nine convocations. Emphasis is made on the political participation of representatives of the multi-ethnic regions in Ukraine (Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Northern Azov, Southern Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia).Adequate representationof people's deputies of Russian and Jewish ethnic origin has considered in the article. Among the ethnopolitical leaders of Jewish ethnicity, the figure of Kharkiv resident Olexander Feldman stands out, who since 2002 has invariably been a people's deputy of Ukraine. Vadim Rabinovych, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress is represented in parliament for only the last two terms. The most constant (since 1998 as a people's deputate) is the position of the Crimean Tatar leader, national democrat Mustafa Dzhemilev. A similar ideological orientation is taken by the head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov. The co-founder of the «Our Land» Party Anton Kisse is a stable ethno-political leader of the Bulgarians in Ukraine. The unbalanced position of the ethno-political leadership of the Romanian (Ivan Popescu) and the Hungarian (Ishtvan Haidosh, Vasyl Brenzovich) representatives is also has considered. It is indicated about the first steps at the parliamentary representation of the Azov Greeks in the person of Dmytro Lubinets.The author concludes about the low efficiency of parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities in Ukraine, which is caused by permanent changes in electoral legislation, negative electoral and engineering practice of gerrymandering and neglecting of European good practices of including minority ethnic groups in politics, which are defined in international documents. ; Этнополитическое лидерство является важным индикатором общественно-политической репрезентации миноритарных групп в условиях поликультурной социальной среды. Наиболее эффективная форма его реализации предусматривает представительство этнической общины на уровне высшего законодательного органа государства. Ряд стран Центрально-Восточной Европы в течение последних десятилетий выработали собственные модели подобной репрезентации. Они реализуются через гарантированное резервирование мест для представителей этнических общин, снижение процентного барьера для прохождения в парламент, включение этнополитических лидеров в списки общенациональных партий, создание одномандатных округов для этнических меньшинств, проживающих компактно. Актуальность исследования проблематики этнополитического лидерства в контексте парламентского представительства этнических меньшинств объективно обусловлено полиэтничностью украинского общества, декларированием интеграции Украины в структуры ЕС и внедрением европейских демократических принципов управления.Предметом исследования являются общественные и политические лидеры, как правило руководители национально-культурных обществ, фондов, этнополитических партий. Автор применяет методику анализа электоральной статистики парламентских выборов 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 и 2019. Синтетически обобщенно репрезентацию миноритарной этничности в Верховной Раде Украины всех девяти созывов. Сделан акцент на политическом участии представителей полиэтнических регионов Украины (Крым, Восточная Украина, Северное Приазовье, Южная Бессарабия, Буковина, Закарпатье).В статье прослежены достаточно значительный уровень репрезентации народных депутатов российского и еврейского происхождения. Среди этнополитических лидеров еврейской этничности выделяется фигура харьковчанина Александра Фельдмана, который с 2002 года неизменно является народным депутатом Украины. Лидер Всеукраинского еврейского конгресса Вадим Рабинович представлен в парламенте лишь последних двух каденций.Наиболее постоянной (с 1998 года в качестве народного детутата) является позиция крымскотатарского лидера, национал-демократа Мустафы Джемилева. Подобную идеологическую позицию занимает глава Меджлиса крымскотатарского народа Рефат Чубаров. Стабильным этнополитическим лидером болгар Украины выступает соучредитель партии «Наш край» Антон Киссе. Рассматривается также несбалансированная позиция этнополитического лидерства представителей румынской (Иван Попеску) и венгерской (Иштван Гайдош, Василий Брензович) общин Украины. Указанно о первых шагах парламентской репрезентации приазовских греков в лице Дмитрия Лубинця.Автор делает вывод о низкой эффективности парламентского представительства этнических меньшинств Украины, которая обусловленаперманентным изменением избирательного законодательства, отрицательной избирательно-инженерийной практикой джерримендеринга и пренебрежением европейскими положительными практиками включения миноритарных этнических групп в политику, которые определены в международных документах. ; Етнополітичне лідерство є важливим індикатором громадсько-політичної репрезентації міноритарних груп у полікультурному соціальному середовищі. Найбільш ефективна форма його реалізації передбачає представництво етнічної громади на рівні вищого законодавчого органу держави. Ряд країн Центрально-Східної Європи впродовж останніх десятиліть виробили власні моделі такої репрезентації. Вони реалізуються через гарантоване резервування місць для представників етнічних громад, зниження відсоткового бар'єру для проходження в парламент, включення етнополітичних лідерів у списки загальнонаціональних партій, створення одномандатних округів для етнічних меншин, які проживають компактно. Актуальність дослідження проблематики етнополітичного лідерства в контексті парламентського представництва етнічних меншин об'єктивно зумовлене поліетнічністю українського суспільства, декларуванням інтеграції України до структур ЄС і впровадженням європейських демократичних принципів урядування.Предметом студії виступають громадські та політичні лідери, як правило очільники національно-культурних товариств, фондів, етнополітичних партій. Автор застосовує методику аналізу електоральної статистики парламентських виборів 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2014 та 2019 років. Відтак синтетично узагальнено репрезентацію міноритарної етнічності у Верховній Раді України всіх дев'яти скликань. Зроблено акцент на політичній участі та представництві в українському парламенті політиків із поліетнічних регіонів України (Крим, Східна Україна, Північне Приазов'я, Одещина, Чернівеччина, Закарпаття).У статті прослідковано досить значний рівень репрезентації народних депутатів російського та єврейського походження. Серед етнополітичних лідерів єврейської етнічності виділяється постать харків'янина Олександра Фельдмана, який з 2002 року незмінно є народним депутатом України. Лідер Всеукраїнського єврейського конгресу Вадим Рабинович представлений у парламенті лише останніх двох каденцій.Найбільш сталою (з 1998 року в якості народного детутата) є позиція кримськотатарського лідера Мустафи Джемілєва. Подібну до нього націонал-демократичну позицію займає очільник Меджлісу кримськотатарського народу Рефат Чубаров. Стабільним етнополітичним лідером болгар України виступає співзасновник партії «Наш край» Антон Кіссе. Розглядається також незбалансована позиція етнополітичного лідерства представників румунської (Іван Попеску) та угорської (Іштван Гайдош, Василь Брензович) громад України. Окреслено перші кроки в парламентській репрезентації приазовських греків Дмитра Лубінця.Автор робить висновок про низьку ефективність парламентського представництва етнічних меншин України, яка зумовлена перманентною зміною виборчого законодавства, негативною виборчо-інженерійною практикою джеррімендерингу та нехтуванням європейськими позитивними практиками включення міноритарних етнічних груп у політику, що визначені в міжнародних документах.