Suchergebnisse

"China's transformation from a planned regime to a marketized and liberalized society has created unprecedented socioeconomic changes and challenges as well as new resources, capacities, and solutions. Collaborative governance (CG), the sharing of power and discretion between and within public, private, and nonprofit sectors for public purposes, has been increasingly adopted in China in response to daunting service demands and governance deficits. Using primary data and rigorous analysis, contributors offer perspectives on frontier developments of CG in China in areas such as elderly service delivery, environmental protection, disaster response, and infrastructure building with solid data and up-to-date analytical methods. In addition to a general theoretical examination of CG, this volume explores particular characters of CG as it's been adopted in China, contextual effects and consequences, and implications for future governance in China"--

Purpose – the purpose of this paper is to provide a general review of One Belt One Road initiative, the changing attitude of Europe towards China's FDI and potential effects of recently adopted Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. Design/methodology/approach – this analysis is based on material gathered from academic papers and other publications, media reports, as well as data from official sources and independent research centres. Systematic analysis, generalisation, secondary data analysis, as well as linguistic methods were used in this research paper. Finding – as Peoples' Republic of China (China) became one of the most important trade and investment partners of the EU, its rapid growth in economic and political influence and use of development policies, such as OBOR initiative, made the EU to label China as 'economic competitor' and 'strategic rival'. As around half of the EU members do not have investment screening mechanisms, the EU decided to adopt regulation for this matter – the Framework Regulation. It will become applicable from 11 October 2020 and will allow the EU and its Member States to raise concerns about effect of China's FDI on national security and public policy grounds and provides framework for screening of FDIs. Moreover, as the Framework Regulation establishes the list of projects of Union interest, which includes Trans-European Networks for Transport, whereas OBOR initiative is aiming at connecting China and Europe through land and sea route infrastructure, the European Commission will have an instrument to express its opinion regarding Chinese FDI, which are connected to OBOR initiative and related to transport infrastructure. Although such opinion will not binding, the member state will not be able to simply ignore but will have to provide explanation to the Commission if its opinion was not followed. Research limitations/implications – there are several research limitations: firstly, there is a lack of comprehensive information on implementation of OBOR initiative, as even the official webpage of Belt and Road does not provide such information; secondly the Framework Regulation will become applicable from 11 October 2020. As the latest data indicates a substantial decrease of China's investment in EU (in 2017 and 2018), the flows of China's capital under OBOR initiative in general and FDI in particular might further decline before the Framework Regulation comes into force in 2020. Furthermore, without the actual practice of the Commission or EU Member States in the use of Framework Regulation regarding the China's FDI, this analysis serves as an early and theoretical assessment of potential impact of such investment screening on projects under China's OBOR initiative. Finally, this general review paper does not seek to analyse problematic aspects of the Framework Regulation or procedural issues on implementation of screening mechanisms. Practical implications – as the OBOR initiative is broad in scope and vague in terms, this analysis allows to better understand its contents, China's rising importance in field of EU FDIs and provides introduction into the Framework Regulation, indicating its potential use by the EU or member states in regards to China's FDI related to OBOR initiative. Originality/Value – this analysis provides explanation on changing EU-China economic policy and serves as a sound starting point for further research on China's investments in Europe, OBOR initiative or the impact of Framework Regulation to China's FDI.

China initiates the "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) expansion strategy which is composed of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (21st CMSR) expansion sub-strategies, seeking to integrate the 27 countries (perhaps 65 ones around the world) along the lines of OBOR Asian economic system with a demography of 4.4 billion, $US 21-trillion- dollar giant market into China type Asian economic system via the OBOR expansion strategy. On the one hand, China can exert itself in giving full play in the following advantageous areas such as the construction of infrastructure, high-speed railway, nuclear energy, industrial manufacturing, e-commerce, military manufacturing, etc.; on the other hand, China can also shift its surplus production capacity, capital, technology as well as labor-intensive industries into establishing China type Asian economic system so that China's dream for interconnectivity, common prosperity and rise of Asia comes true finally.

This article deals with public, political discourse over One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in Poland. OBOR has recently become very popular in Poland as it encapsulates the noticeable fascination on China and on geopolitics among parts of Polish society. This article describes this phenomenon and delaminates the mainstream political discourse over OBOR into two main strands: great geopolitical and/or geoeconomic chance (pro-OBOR discourse) and security threat (anti-OBOR). The advocates of the former see the project as a great geopolitical and economic opportunity for Poland; the supporters of the latter find it a threat to Polish security and/or economic interests. This discourse echoes internal divisions within current Polish government on its China policy and can be observed against the background of China's dynamic enter to Central and Eastern Europe, particularly to Czech Republic, Hungary and Serbia.

The developing world is the new engine of growth that will drive shared prosperity in the future.

Since the inauguration of the first DPP-administration in May 2000, cross-strait relations have not seen much de- terioration, though they have not relaxed neither. The new government of Chen Shuibian started rather cau- tiously vis-ä-vis Beijing and evoked the impression of genuinely being interested in achieving a Sino-Taiwanese rapprochement. However, as the presidency went on, it became clear that neither Chen nor his party would com- promise on the 'one China'-principle which was finally re- jected as a basic consensus to be shared by both sides of the Taiwan strait. In August 2002, Chen implicitly confirmed Li Denghui's 1999-formula of "special state-to- state" relations when he declared that Taiwan and the mainland are "two countries on each side" (yibian yiguo).

Disputing research that depicts weak states getting overwhelmed by China's financial might, this article argues that the political elites in a relatively weak and small state such as Malaysia are adept in engaging with a rising China to advance key projects, furthering their own agenda. In the case of Malaysia, the eventual outcome of this interaction is dependent on three key conditions: fulfilment of Malaysia's longstanding pro-ethnic Malay policy, a mutual vision between the state and federal authorities, and advancement of geopolitical interests for both Malaysia and China. The article puts forward a typology illustrating various possible outcomes to examine the interconnections between key players at a time of Chinese ascendancy. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

In seinem Artikel erörtert der Autor die Positionen der beiden größten Parteien Taiwans, KMT und DPP, hinsichtlich der Chinapolitik seit 2000. In einem ersten Schritt wird die Festlandpolitik der DPP seit der Chen-Regierung skizziert, die für eine strikte Erhaltung der taiwanesischen Souveränität eintritt. In einem zweiten Schritt wird der politische Standpunkt der Oppositionspartei KMT dargestellt, der eine Beibehaltung des 'Ein-China-Prinzips' und eine zukünftige Einigung beinhaltet. Allerdings weist die KMT das chinesische Modell 'Ein Land, zwei Systeme' zurück und plädiert auch für eine Souveränität Taiwans. In einem dritten Schritt wird die Politik und Strategie der chinesischen Regierung gegenüber Taiwan während der Chen-Präsidentschaft beschrieben. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden die mögliche politische Situation im Falle einer Regierung von KMT und der Koalitionspartei PFP und die damit einher gehenden Risiken für die Souveränität Taiwans bzw. die dadurch verbesserte Position Chinas erörtert. In einer Schlussfolgerung werden die möglichen politischen Szenarien zusammengefasst. (ICG2)