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BACKGROUND: Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are the leading cause of mortality in Fiji, a middle-income country in the Pacific. Some food products processed sold and marketed by the food industry are major contributors to the NCD epidemic, and the food industry is widely identified as having strong economic and political power. However, little research has been undertaken on the attempts by the food industry to influence public health-related policies and programs in its favour. The "corporate political activity" (CPA) of the food industry includes six strategies (information and messaging; financial incentives; constituency building; legal strategies; policy substitution; opposition fragmentation and destabilisation). For this study, we aimed to gain a detailed understanding of the CPA strategies and practices of major food industry actors in Fiji, interpreted through a public health lens. METHODS AND RESULTS: We implemented a systematic approach to monitor the CPA of the food industry in Fiji for three months. It consisted of document analysis of relevant publicly available information. In parallel, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 10 stakeholders involved in diet- and/or public health-related issues in Fiji. Both components of the study were thematically analysed. We found evidence that the food industry adopted a diverse range of strategies in an attempt to influence public policy in Fiji, with all six CPA strategies identified. Participants identified that there is a substantial risk that the widespread CPA of the food industry could undermine efforts to address NCDs in Fiji. CONCLUSIONS: Despite limited public disclosure of information, such as data related to food industry donations to political parties and lobbying, we were able to identify many CPA practices used by the food industry in Fiji. Greater transparency from the food industry and the government would help strengthen efforts to increase their accountability and support NCD prevention. In other low- and middle-income countries, it is likely that a systematic document analysis approach would also need to be supplemented with key informant interviews to gain insight into this important influence on NCD prevention.

The coronation of King Janusz Kwiek, which took place in 1937, was meant to integrate the Romani elite in the interwar sociopolitical life of Poland. Unfortunately, the creation of a homogeneous and centralized Romani representation through the royal institution ended in a fiasco. Firstly, the centralized model of power was in conflict with the Romani nomadic system in Poland, which was based on a multitude of leaders, including women whose power resulted from hierarchical dependence. Secondly, it quickly became clear that from the mid-1920s onward, when the presence of Polish Romani in mainstream social life crystallized, there has been no bottom–up social initiatives promoting King Janusz Kwiek's attempts towards sociopolitical reform. Therefore, the Romani population was not prepared for changes and no effective state coercive measures were created to enforce the introduction of the postulated changes. Thus, although the activities of both actors—the Kwieks and the Polish authorities—often had a facade character, consisting in more or less weak 'governance' of the Romani minority, their joint activity favored the political maturation of the Romani elite and its comprehensive development. This was despite of the many shortcomings of the close relationship between the Romani people and the Polish administration, as a result from the dictatorial rule in Poland at the time.

The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in the state of Washington through campaign contributions, lobbying, and filing lawsuits. The tobacco industry has become a major source of campaign contributions to legislative candidates. In the 1985-86 legislative session, the tobacco industry contributed $31,100 to legislative candidates. Contributions reached a peak during the 1989-90 legislative session when the tobacco industry contributed $119,059 to legislative candidates. During the current 1995-1996 election cycle, the tobacco industry has contributed $69,573 to legislative candidates between January 1, 1995 to September 30, 1996. Tobacco industry contributions to legislative candidates is expected to exceed the 1993-1994 amount of $70,524. During the 1993-1994 legislative session, the combined contributions of Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and the Tobacco Institute ranked eighth among top contributors to legislative campaigns in Washington. In the past few election cycles, there has been a significant shift in tobacco industry contributions away from the Democratic party and towards the Republican party in Washington. During the 1989-90 election cycle, 47 percent of tobacco industry contributions to legislators, legislative candidates, political parties and party controlled committees went to the Republican party. Contributions to Republicans increased to 60 percent in the 1991-1992 election cycle and 66 percent in the 1993-1994 election cycle. Between January 1, 1995 and September 30, 1996, the tobacco industry contributions to the Republican party has increased to 83 percent. The tobacco industry makes significant contributions to legislative leaders. House Speaker Clyde Ballard has received $11,880 in tobacco industry contributions since 1986, more than any other current legislator. All Republican House Leaders have received tobacco industry contributions and generally had more pro-tobacco industry policy scores. In the Senate, where the Democrats held a one vote majority during the 1995-1996 session, Majority Leader Sid Snyder received $3,600 from the tobacco industry throughout his career. Valoria Loveland, the Democratic Caucus Chair, received $1,600 in tobacco industry contributions during the 1995-1996 electoral cycle. In addition to providing campaign contributions, the tobacco industry is active in lobbying members of the legislature and the administration. In 1993 and 1994, the tobacco industry spent $643,188. The trend suggests that the tobacco industry will exceed that amount during the 1995-1996 session. In 1995, the tobacco industry spent $368,660 in lobbying expenditures, an increase in the rate of lobbying expenditures over the previous election cycle. The tobacco industry became an especially active lobby in 1991 and 1992, after a number of local smoke free and youth access ordinances were passed in Washington cities and counties. A statistical relationship exists between tobacco industry campaign contributions and state legislative behavior. The more money a legislator receives, the less likely he or she is to support tobacco control efforts. The tobacco industry also tends to contribute more money to legislators that have supported the industry in the past. Besides campaign contributions and lobbying, the tobacco industry has used legal tactics to slow down tobacco control activity in the state of Washington. Legal action by the tobacco industry has 1) lead the city of Puyallup to rescind a smoke-free restaurant ordinance, 2) forced the Department of Labor and Industries to defend their clean indoor air regulations in Superior court, and 3) has created an atmosphere of intimidation among organizations associated with Project ASSIST. Despite the highest tobacco tax in the nation, none of the money raised from tobacco taxes has been earmarked for tobacco prevention or cessation programs. The state of Washington is among 19 states and counties that is suing the tobacco industry in order to recover health and medical costs associated with tobacco related illnesses.

The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in Ohio through campaign contributions, lobbying and litigation. The tobacco industry has become a major source of campaign contributions to legislative candidates and political party committees. In the 1981-1982 election cycle, the tobacco industry contributed $3,970 to candidates and parties. In 1995-1996, the tobacco industry contributed $55,440 to candidates and parties. A majority of tobacco industry contributions to legislative candidates and political are contributed to the Republican party. During the 1991-92 and 1993-1994 electoral cycles, the tobacco industry contributed 54% and 53%, respectively, of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. During the 1995-1996 electoral cycle, the tobacco industry contributed 77% of their legislative and political party contributions to the Republican party. In contrast to other states, there is not a statistically significant relationship between tobacco industry campaign contributions and legislative behavior in Ohio. Several health related groups, such as Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and United Health Care of Ohio, Association of Physician Assistants, the Ohio Health Information Management Association, and Ohio Dietetic Association are represented by lobbyists who also represent the tobacco industry. This pattern of representation raises the possibility of conflict of interests among lobbyists who represent the tobacco industry and health groups. Franklin County in 1994 and Knox County in 1995 had formulated regulations making almost all or all public places smokefree. These regulations were rejected in Ohio courts. Since these defeats, there has been no progress (except voluntarily) on smokefree public places. Tobacco control advocates and organizations have effectively organized in preventing preemptive youth access legislation from passing in the Ohio state legislature.