Suchergebnisse

U.S. and Soviet strategic command, control, and communications are "survivably interdependent." Neither country can credibly deter nor plausibly fight wars involving the threat or use of nuclear forces without observing "rules of the road" about C3. These rules include clarification of their intentions during a crisis; exchange of information and persons to preserve crisis stability; and tacit agreement about not attacking the "brain" or "central nervous systems" of the opponent early in war. Command reciprocity does not automatically guarantee equal superpower awareness of that fact, or equivalent willingness to incorporate it into U.S. and USSR military doctrine. Thus, U.S. forces and C must be planned with the recognition that command reciprocity may not withstand the early phases of war. The impact of proposed new technologies such as the Strategic Defense Initiative on U.S.-Soviet strategic command reciprocity is also acknowledged, although the details are not now foreseeable. Command reciprocity will continue whether the "defensive transition" in U.S.-Soviet strategic forces occurs at a rapid or incremental rate.

Expectations for the survivability of U.S. strategic forces and command, control, and communications (C3) may exceed the requirements of political prudence and military necessity. U.S. forces and commanders need not be expected to survive improbable threats and extreme worst-case scenarios. Given technical limitations and political probabilities, the requirements for survivability should include allowing for evolutionary adjustment of capabilities and technologies. Imposing irrelevant survivability requirements may also be self-defeating for American strategy, as the case of MX illustrates.

U.S. declaratory and employment policies have been modified toward escalation control and flexible targeting for war in Europe. These efforts, however useful in principle, are unlikely to make much difference given political constraints within which targeting and war plans must operate. Europeans fear the possibility of a general nuclear, regional nuclear, or conventional war. No U.S. declaratory policies can reassure them that NATO/Warsaw Pact war in Europe can be controlled, should deterrence fail. European emphases upon deterrence and detente will continue to contrast with American interest in defense and credible, controlled war-fighting capabilities.

Compatibility of NATO strategic and theater deterrence and escalation control rationales. Contents: Soviet doctrine and experience; U.S. expectations and controlled war; Active and passive defense; The Soviet conventional attack.

Mutual assured destruction has been the victim of its own successes. Understood in the context of changed technology and plausible scenarios, MAD contributes important insights pertinent to the issues of crisis and arms race stability. Adaptation to new environmental conditions will guarantee the survival of MAD; that adaptation will require some reconsideration of it as a sufficient condition, as well as a necessary one, for strategic stability.

Mutual assured destruction (MAD) ist ein Opfer ihrer eigenen Erfolge geworden. In den meisten Ausführungen über die Strategie der Abschreckung wird diese Doktrin abgelehnt. Verteidigungsplaner und akademische Strategen erwecken den Eindruck, daß MAD nur noch archivarischen Wert hat. Dies ist ein schwerwiegender Irrtum. Angewandt auf das strategische Rüstungsverhältnis zwischen USA und UdSSR könnte ein solcher Glaube eine schädliche Wirkung auf Theorie und Politik haben. Hierfür werden Gründe genannt. Nach Darlegung des Wesens und der Eigenschaften von MAD und nach Untersuchung des Stellenwertes von MAD in der strategischen Konzeption wird gefolgert, daß sie lebendig ist und daß sie eine Voraussetzung für die Stabilität der Abschreckung ist. (BIOst-BwD/Hie)