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This paper empirically investigates the effectiveness of competition policy by estimating its impact on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth for 22 industries in 12 OECD countries over the period 1995-2005. We ?nd a robust positive and signi?cant effect of competition policy asmeasured by newly created indexes. We provide several arguments and results based on instrumental variables estimators as well as non-linearities to support the claim that the established link can be interpreted in a causal way. At a disaggregated level, the effect on TFP growth is particularly strong for speci?c aspects of competition policy related to its institutional setup and antitrust activities (rather than merger control). The effect is strengthened by good legal systems, suggesting complementarities between competition policy and the ef?ciency of law enforcement institutions.

peer-reviewed ; When extending the bailout facility availed of by Ireland , the IMF, ECB and Commission of the EU ("the troika") insisted that a number of measures be taken in respect of the Irish economy. While many of these related to reducing the costs of the public sector and the reduction of the country's social welfare costs, some related directly to Irish competition law. ; ACCEPTED ; peer reviewed

Contemporary public sector reforms in Australia have been dominated by efficiency, productivity and contestability considerations captured in National Competition Policy (NCP). Both in the reform process in general and in the NCP processes in particular, the lack of priority attributed to non-economic concerns such as coordination, equity, representation, political accountability, consultation and distributive outcomes has been a serious omission. The idea of public interst, once central to democratic public administration, has re-emerged to challenge the perceived excesses of economic rationalism as the unifying idea of reform. Although public interest stands in a long tradition in public administration, it is a complex and contested idea which requires significiant development if it is to have policy utility in the reform process. Nonetheless public interest may be viewed as an analytical frame which enables a rebalancing of the ideas which influence policymaking. In this paper it is argued that substantive situational manifestations of public interest can be used to complement rather than undermine the efficiency, productivity and contestability objectives of public sector reform.

Contemporary public sector reforms in Australia have been dominated by efficiency, productivity and contestability considerations captured in National Competition Policy (NCP). Both in the reform process in general and in the NCP processes in particular, the lack of priority attributed to non-economic concerns such as coordination, equity, representation, political accountability, consultation and distributive outcomes has been a serious omission. The idea of public interst, once central to democratic public administration, has re-emerged to challenge the perceived excesses of economic rationalism as the unifying idea of reform. Although public interest stands in a long tradition in public administration, it is a complex and contested idea which requires significiant development if it is to have policy utility in the reform process. Nonetheless public interest may be viewed as an analytical frame which enables a rebalancing of the ideas which influence policymaking. In this paper it is argued that substantive situational manifestations of public interest can be used to complement rather than undermine the efficiency, productivity and contestability objectives of public sector reform.

This paper empirically investigates the effectiveness of competition policy by estimating its impact on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth for 22 industries in 12 OECD countries over the period 1995-2005. We find a robust positive and significant effect of competition policy as measured by newly created indexes. We provide several arguments and results based on instrumental variables estimators as well as non-linearities, to support the claim that the established link can be interpreted in a causal way. At a disaggregated level, the effect on TFP growth is particularly strong for specific aspects of competition policy related to its institutional set up and antitrust activities (rather than merger control). The effect is strengthened by a good legal system, suggesting complementarities between competition policy and the efficiency of law enforcement institutions. ; In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir die Effektivität von Wettbewerbspolitik anhand der empirischen Schätzung ihrer Auswirkung auf das totale Faktorproduktivitätswachstum (TFP) für 22 Branchen in 12 OECD-Ländern über den Zeitraum 1995-2005. Wir finden eine robuste positive und statistisch signifikante Wirkung der Wettbewerbspolitik, welche von neu erstellten Indizes gemessen wird. Wir präsentieren unterschiedliche Argumente und Ergebnisse basierend auf Instrumental-Variablen Schätzern sowie Nichtlinearitäten, um den geschätzten Zusammenhang als kausal interpretieren zu können. Auf einer disaggregierten Ebene aufgeschlüsselt ist die Auswirkung auf das TFPWachstum besonders stark für spezifische Aspekte der Wettbewerbspolitik, welche eher mit deren institutionellen Aufbau und kartellrechtlichen Tätigkeiten in Zusammenhang stehen als mit der Fusionskontrolle. Wir zeigen, dass der gemessene Effekt durch gute Rechtssysteme gestärkt wird, was auf Komplementaritäten zwischen Wettbewerbspolitik und der Effizienz der Justiz hindeutet.

For over a hundred years, competition policy has been a central part of a market economy's legal framework. Over the past third of a century, however, the scope and effectiveness of competition policy has been narrowed under the influence of certain ideas about the functioning of the market economy, sometimes referred to as the Chicago School of Law and Economics—ideas which have subsequently been widely discredited within the economics profession, but whose influence within antitrust law remains significant. This paper argues that, to the contrary, changes in our economy and our understandings of the interplay between economics and politics necessitates a broader reach for competition policy even than envisaged by the original advocates of antitrust law. This takes on particular significance with recent reports, such of that of the Council of Economic Advisers of President Obama, highlighting the increase in market power across many important sectors of the US economy and persistent higher rates of return to capital than seem consistent with competition. These monopoly rents may, in turn, play an important role in the country's growing inequality.