Suchergebnisse

THE EMERGENCE IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES OF THE NOTIONS OF COMPLEXITY AND INTERACTION BETWEEN PHENOMENA IS REFLECTED TODAY, IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES, IN A GROWING INTEREST IN ENTITIES OTHER THAN STATES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AS SUBJECTS OF ANALYSIS. THIS STUDY DEALS WITH THE CATEGORY OF TRANSNATIONAL FORCES WHICH ARE USUALLY KNOWN AS "INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS" (INGOS) OR "TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS." IT ADDRESSES SOME OF THE MORE SIGNIFICANT ISSUED IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TODAY.

Bei internationalen Warenlieferungen begegnet die Durchsetzung von Eigentumsvorbehalten und ähnlichen dinglichen Sicherungsrechten regelmäßig erheblichen Problemen und kann mitunter scheitern. Oft wird der Eigentumsvorbehalt im Bestimmungsstaat der Lieferung nicht (voll) anerkannt, weil er nicht den Voraussetzungen des dort anwendbaren Rechts entspricht. Das Werk zeigt auf, dass diese und weitere Probleme einer praktikablen Lösung zugeführt werden können, indem die Übertragung des Eigentums an der zu liefernden Ware und die Begründung eines Eigentumsvorbehaltes oder einer vergleichbaren dinglichen Sicherung daran, abweichend von bisherigen Meinungsstand, einheitlich nach den Regeln des von Käufer und Verkäufer gewählten Sachenrechts des Bestimmungsstaates vorgenommen werden können. Der Autor analysiert hierbei Inhalt, Begründung und Wirkungsweise aller de lege lata möglichen Anknüpfungen der mit internationalen Warenlieferungen einhergehenden dinglichen Rechtsfragen

Much of the contemporary literature on the utility of international sanctions approaches the apparent riddle of why sanctions are embraced so eagerly when they are supposedly such an "ineffective" tool of statecraft by focusing on the instrumental and rational purposes of sanctions. As a result, one purpose that does not always lend itself to a rational means-end calculus—the purpose of punishment—tends to be overlooked or, more commonly, dismissed outright. This article explores punishment as both a useful and an effective purpose of international sanctions. It argues not only that sanctions should be distinguished from other forms of hurtful statecraft but also that they are a form of "international punishment" for wrongdoing, despite the difficulties of applying the term "punishment" in the context of international relations. The article then examines the purposes of punishment and reveals that only some are understandable when a model of means-end rationality is used, suggesting that the element of the nonrational also plays an important role in international sanctions. The argument is then applied to the case of U.S. sanctions imposed after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan to demonstrate the different purposes of punishment at work in this case. The article concludes that just as we cannot understand punishment as a purposive human activity solely by reference to a rational model of a means to a clearly delineated end, so too we cannot entirely understand sanctions as a form of international punishment by an attachment to a rational model of policy behavior. However, some forms of punishment are exceedingly effective, and this may explain why sanctions continue to be a popular instrument of statecraft.