Suchergebnisse

Today's international war crimes tribunals lack police powers, and therefore must prod and persuade defiant states to co-operate in the arrest and prosecution of their own political and military leaders. Victor Peskin's comparative study traces the development of the capacity to build the political authority necessary to exact compliance from states implicated in war crimes and genocide in the cases of the International War Crimes Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Drawing on 300 in-depth interviews with tribunal officials, Balkan and Rwandan politicians, and Western diplomats, Peskin uncovers the politicized, protracted, and largely behind-the-scenes tribunal-state struggle over co-operation

The past three decades have witnessed the development of a rich literature that applies the formal tools of game theory to understanding international cooperation and international institutions. We divide this literature into three "generations" of scholarship. With a few notable exceptions, the first generation used very simple models-2x2 normal form games-to understand why states need to cooperate and why they comply with their cooperative agreements under conditions of anarchy. This first generation unfortunately bogged down in the neorealist-neoliberal debate. Second-generation scholars began to use tailor-made models to address the neorealist-neoliberal debate and to turn to new questions, such as how international agreements are created and how domestic political divisions affect international cooperation. With answers to the key questions of how international agreements are created and complied with, third-generation scholars could turn to increasingly refined models to answer specific questions about international institutions, such as the proper size of multilateral agreements, how the gains of cooperation are distributed, whether flexibility provisions should be built into agreements, and the specific functions of international organizations. Adapted from the source document.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, local consular cooperation has become a priority on the European agenda. The new challenges in terms of security and public order, generated by phenomena such as the increase in migratory flows from outside the European Union (EU) or international terrorism, have upgraded the strategic role of consular cooperation as a means of reinforcing the integrated management of the EU's external borders. This paper explores the institutional development of this external aspect of EU internal security. It examines the patterns of administrative cooperation resulting from both the institutionalization of channels of intergovernmental consular cooperation and the deployment of EU rules and procedures, and draws attention to the contested political visions that preside over this multimodal system of administrative governance. Adapted from the source document.

Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally and engaged in cross-border operations. As a result, financial crises and potential bail-outs by governments have important international implications. Extending Allen and Gale (2000) we provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bail-outs financed by distortionary taxes. In the sequential game between governments, there are inefficiencies due to spillovers, free-riding and limited burden-sharing. When countries are of equal size, an increase in cross-border deposit holdings improves, in general, the non-cooperative outcome. For efficient crisis managment, ex-ante fiscal burden sharing is essential as ex-post contracts between governments do not achieve the same global welfare.

This study compares the best practices of international joint development and domestic development programs through case-study analysis to identify the key variables that contribute to a program's eventual success or failure and to understand the elements that are crucial to managing these programs.

Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally and engaged in cross-border operations. As a result, financial crises and potential bail-outs by governments have important international implications. Extending Allen and Gale (2000), we provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bail-outs financed by distortionary taxes. In the sequential game between governments, there are inefficiencies due to spillovers, free-riding and limited burden-sharing. When countries are of equal size, an increase in cross-border deposit holdings improves, in general, the non-cooperative outcome. For efficient crisis managment, ex-ante fiscal burden sharing is essential as ex-post contracts between governments do not achieve the same global welfare.

Bringing a unique voice to international taxation, this book argues against the conventional support of multilateral co-operation in favour of structured competition as a way to promote both justice and efficiency in international tax policy. Tsilly Dagan analyses international taxation as a decentralised market, where governments have increasingly become strategic actors. While many of the challenges of the current international tax regime derive from this decentralised competitive structure, Dagan argues that curtailing competition through centralisation is not necessarily the answer. Conversely, competition - if properly calibrated and notwithstanding its dubious reputation - is conducive, rather than detrimental, to both efficiency and global justice. International Tax Policy begins with the basic normative goals of income taxation, explaining how competition transforms them and analysing the strategic game states play on the bilateral and multilateral level. It then considers the costs and benefits of co-operation and competition in terms of efficiency and justice

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- Part I. A Theory of Democratization and International Organizations -- 2. From Democratization to International Organizations -- 3. From International Organizations to Democratic Consolidation -- Part II. Quantitative Evidence -- 4. Quantitative Evidence on Forming versus Joining -- 5. Quantitative Evidence onDemocratic Consolidation and International Organizations -- Part III. Qualitative Evidence -- 6. The Baltic Experience -- 7. Forming, Remodeling, and Reforming -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index