Suchergebnisse

Examines role of the politics of race and racial discrimination in the study of international relations theory; includes post-colonialism, international labor recruitment, and other issues; 6 articles. Contents: Racial assumptions in global labor recruitment and supply, by Randolph B. Persaud; Race, amnesia, and the education of international relations, by Sankaran Krishna; Come to Africa: a hermeneutics of race in international theory, by Siba N. Grovogui; Theorizing the racialization of global politics and the Caribbean experience, by Hilbourne Watson; "Nuclear apartheid" as political position: race as a postcolonial resource? by Shampa Biswas; Desert tracts: statecraft in remote places, by Roxane Lynn Doty.

First established at the International Penitentiary Congress of London in 1872, the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission was organized as it now exists by constitutional regulations adopted in 1880, confirmed in 1886, and revised in 1926, 1929, 1946 and 1948. Eleven international congresses have been convened, the last in Berlin in 1935; and the commission held its most recent meeting in Bern in August of 1949. The commission took as its terms of reference responsibility for promoting exchanges of views among expert penologists of all countries in order to develop standards and advise as to the development of progressive methods of preventing crime and treating offenders: The expenses for 1949 were estimated at 121,400 Swiss francs ($28,365), payable by the members at a ratio of 170 Swiss francs ($39.64) per one million inhabitants. By a resolution of October 16, 1948, the commission and other major international organizations concerned with the prevention of crime and treatment of offenders agreed on the various aspects of the field in which each would work and on cooperation with the United Nations. ILO, WHO, and UNESCO were among the specialized agencies which agreed to the resolution. A later resolution on cooperation with the United Nations, adopted by the commission in August 1949 was reviewed by ECOSOC which, in turn, requested the United Nations Secretary-General to coatinue consultations with IPPC with a view toward its integration in the United Nations system.

ABSTRACT
Subsidies are frequently used by states as an instrument of industrial policy for promoting economic growth, and are a major reason for international trade frictions. Existing industrial subsidy rules, especially the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), appear insufficient for effective international subsidy regulation. Subsidy rules reform has been initiated in and outside the World Trade Organization (WTO). Though subsidies are not a China-specific issue, China is an implied target and a major stakeholder of the reform, given the profound impact of its state-led economy. The reform faces a difficult situation: states are tempted to use subsidies to meet various challenges, whereas multilateral efforts in the WTO seem unpromising due to the different positions of world leading economies, and plurilateral efforts led by the trilateral group also face an unclear prospect of multilateralization. Improving international subsidy regulation calls for both rule-making efforts and political consensus and international cooperation, especially from world leading economies.

This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.

World governance today is characterized by international organizations lacking democratic legitimacy and control by the citizens they claim to represent. They are also criticized for being inefficient. This leads to violent protests and to NGOs having great influence. To address these problems, we propose international governance based on the democratic idea of citizen participation: All citizens of the member countries of international organizations have the potential right to participate in the decision-making of international organizations via initiatives, referendums and recalls. In order to reduce transaction costs, a representative group of citizens is randomly selected who can actually exercise their participation rights.