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Geo-economic tensions and global collective action problems call for international cooperation to revise and develop rules to guide both the use of domestic subsidies and responses by governments to cross-border competition spillover effects. Current WTO rules that divide all subsidies into either prohibited or actionable categories are no longer fit for purpose. Piecemeal efforts in preferential trade agreements and bi- or trilateral configurations offer a basis on which to build, but are too narrow in scope and focus. Addressing the spillover effects of subsidies could start with launching a work program at the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO to mobilize an epistemic community concerned with subsidy policies, tasked with building a more solid evidence base on the magnitude, purpose and effects of subsidy policies.

"This book provides an in-depth empirical analysis and theoretical history of the institutional development of EU police cooperation, with a focus on the creation and integration of Europol. Presenting a thoroughly comprehensive analysis, the book systematically traces integration dynamics and the evolution of EU police cooperation over a 40-year period, assessing the influence of cross-country interdependencies, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship on Member States' behaviour and institutional choice. By combining a wealth of sources including previously unpublished sources and personal insights from key decisionmakers, it explores which driving factors shape processes of differentiation and integration in this sovereignty-sensitive policy domain, and how, and attempts to explain state preferences on international police cooperation in the light of major theories of European integration. The book will be of key interest to students, scholars and practitioners working in or on the fields of police cooperation, Justice and Home Affairs policy, EU governance and security studies, both at national and European level"--

How do states allocate joint fish stocks that straddle international boundaries? What factors determine who gets what during international negotiations between fishing states? These questions strike at the heart of the literature on international cooperation, and thus answering them will shed light not simply on international and transboundary fisheries management but also on the general challenges of international cooperation. This paper examines how domestic groups influence negotiators and thus the ultimate terms of international agreements. The research focuses on seven agreements spanning 20 years (signed by Norway and Iceland) for managing four shared fish stocks that straddle national and international waters. The main conclusion suggests that a state with a powerful domestic interest group usually gets a more favorable agreement when negotiating with a state with weaker domestic interest groups.

World commodity markets-and particularly the markets for agricultural commodities-remain highly distorted despite the wave of liberalization that has swept world trade since the 1980s. Some markets for commodities are characterized by imperfect competition. Where monopolies or oligopolies in trade arise either because of government regulation or through other barriers to entry, distortions may arise that call for the application of antitrust law and other forms of pro- competitive policy action. Commodity markets are distorted on both the export and the import sides, with serious implications for world prices and their volatility. Governments also have a long history of intervening in markets for other natural resources, both renewable and non-renewables. Protection rates for imports of non-agricultural natural resources are generally low because of pressure from user industries. However, importing countries confronting exporters of resources with market power and thus the ability to affect world prices may seek to use import tariffs or excise taxes to lower demand and shift rents away from supplying nations. In sum, a wide mix of policy instruments is used by countries to influence the level and volatility of domestic prices for commodities. Countries also pursue policies that may affect international prices, either indirectly or directly, if they are large suppliers or importers.

AbstractAs crises grow more transnational in origin and effect, managing them effectively will require international cooperation. This article explores the dilemmas inherent to producing common crisis management capacities across national governments. Drawing on the literature related to "international public goods," the article builds an approach for understanding these dilemmas through the lens of collective action and the perverse incentives associated therein. The article applies this approach to cooperation in Europe on an issue that typifies the transnational crisis—the spread of communicable disease—and highlights obstacles to European Union ambitions to build a robust system for disease surveillance and control. Having isolated the obstacles, the article then identifies solutions to facilitate cooperation toward more effectively producing the good in question.

The international climate change regime is comprised of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol. Under the regime, China and India, two of the largest developing countries, have been exempted from any binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets that apply to developed countries. However, with their GHG emissions increasing, China and India have faced growing international pressure to undertake binding mitigation obligations in international climate change negotiations. To enhance their bargaining power in the negotiations, China and India have been cooperating with each other, which has not only led to a new approach to addressing climate change but also defended the ethical benchmark of the regime. In addition, their cooperation has weakened the EU's traditional leadership status and the leadership ambitions of the US such that China and India will now play a more important role in shaping the future of the regime. (J Contemp China/GIGA)