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A journal article on the politics and governance of the British colony of Rhodesia. ; In 1923 Southern Rhodesia, a country with a population of 33 000 Whites and approximately 1 000 000 Africans, gained Responsible Government. This was a great achievement for the white settlers, and an event of considerable significance for the future of the whole country. It was achieved in the face of opposition from the Colonial Office, the existing government of the British South Africa Company, and the South African government; for it had generally been supposed from the earliest date of white settlement that the country's future would be linked with that of South Africa. The hostility that developed in Southern Rhodesia towards such a course was due to the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, and was encouraged by the B.S.A. Company, which was reluctant to relinquish the reins of administration before it had achieved its economic aims; the Company therefore persuaded the Colonial Office to consent to the alternative of Responsible Government, which had been first proposed by the settlers themselves, and had been incorporated in the terms of the Supplemental Charter of 1915.1 Had the demand for this form of government been delayed, it is possible that it might have been subject to the later change in Colonial Office thinking towards its colonies in terms of the Devonshire Declaration and Passfield Memorandum, in view of the small number of white settlers in the country; and such a development would in turn have made it more likely that the country would have joined the Union of South Africa.

This article explains different dimensions of trust relevant to trust in government and, therefore, suggests a brief model for practical application. The study pursues content analysis method for theoretical treatment of knowledge produced from studying secondary sources of literature. Imitating the context, the concept of trust is clarified first, and then dimensions of trust are arranged under two broad heads: institutional trust and social trust. And then follow the analyses and the subdivisions thoroughly. A compendious model is suggested with possible solutions for public trust in government. Explanations claim that aggregation of institutional trust, that is, political, administrative and social trust, might build an array of trustworthy governance, though adequate pertinent literature are not easily available. This paper recommends that trust in government model may be tested for further empirical study.

Why do we need government? A common view is that government is necessary to constrain people's conduct toward one another, because people are not sufficiently virtuous to exercise the requisite degree of control on their own. This view was expressed perspicuously, and artfully, by liberal thinker James Madison, in The Federalist, number 51, where he wrote: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary." Madison's idea is shared by writers ranging across the political spectrum. It finds clear expression in the Marxist view that the state will gradually wither away after a communist revolution, as unalienated "communist man" emerges. And it is implied by the libertarian view that government's only legitimate function is to control the unfortunate and immoral tendency of some individuals to violate the moral rights of others.

AbstractWe offer evidence that public sector corruption has an inverse association with evaluations of performance at both the local and central government levels. Consistent with ex ante expectations, perceptions of corruption among local government officials are directly and negatively related to performance evaluations at the local government level and relatively less so at the central government level. Conversely, perceptions of corruption among overall government officials have a stronger negative association with performance evaluations of central governments relative to performance evaluations of local governments. These results confirm that individual evaluations of public sector corruption affect perceived government performance evaluations, with local–local, local–central, central–local, and central–central level variances. Regressions by country groups—such as European Union membership, or geographic clusters, such as Southeastern Balkan or the former Soviet Union states—continue to support the core findings with one caveat. Results from two‐level random intercepts and slopes regression models show that the negative association between perceived corruption and government performance evaluation is weaker in contexts with relatively higher levels of public corruption.

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a revenue maximizing Government that also pursues environmental objectives. In our model, pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, and the leasing of pollution permits is seen as an equivalent to a pollution tax. We show that environmental policy based on durable pollution permits can be welfare superior to a pollution tax regime. The intuition is that a monopolistic Government would, in order to maximize its revenues, try to restrict the permit sales below the welfare maximizing level. While a pollution tax or leasing charge allows the Government to credibly commit to a monopoly level of pollution in future periods, a system based on durable permits weakens the monopolistic Government?s ability to credibly restrict future sales. Therefore, a pollution tax regime may be better for the environment and simultaneously increase Government revenues, but social welfare is larger with pollution permits. Hence, a regime where the Government cannot commit to monopoly quantities may be preferable from a welfare economic perspective. This argument in favor of durable permits complements more traditional arguments based on information asymmetries and innovation incentives.

published_or_final_version ; Geography and Geology ; Master ; Master of Philosophy

Series title also at head of t.-p. ; Mode of access: Internet.

536Relationship of international law and municipal law — Customary international law — Doctrine of incorporation — Primacy of statute over rule of customary international law — State immunityState immunity — Jurisdictional immunity — Claim against State for torture allegedly committed by State officials — Acts of torture allegedly committed in Kuwait and United Kingdom by agents of Kuwaiti Government — Whether English courts having jurisdiction in respect of torture committed in Kuwait being acts in violation of international law — State immunity governed by statute — Whether explicit provision required in statute to establish exception to immunity — Tortious acts committed within jurisdiction — Standard of proof required to establish exception to immunity — Balance of probabilities — State Immunity Act 1978, Sections 1 and 5 — The law of England