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Abstract
A biophysical chemist and a political scientist team up to explore striking parallels between the requisites of "stability" and the causes of instability within both the cellular/molecular world of biophysical chemistry and the world of social and political organization of self-assembled, societal structures, such as sovereign states and institutions. The structure, function, and organizational similarities of such parallelisms are particularly noteworthy, given that human agency introduces greater contingency in the sociopolitical world than do the "laws of Nature" in the natural-scientific world. In this perspective piece, we critically identify and analyze these parallels between the natural and the social realms through the prism of the shared concept of stability, including causal factors that embrace the full "stability spectrum" from instability to stability. This spectrum includes the crucial bridging, time-dependent, intermediate, kinetic state of "metastability." Our analyses reveal that, in the microscopic/molecular world of the physical sciences, the thermodynamic and kinetic characterizations of the stabilities and transformations between physiochemical "states" exhibit cognate properties and features in the macroscopic world of sociopolitical arenas in ways that reflect a greater than traditionally assumed continuity between Nature and society. Select examples from the natural and social realms are presented and elaborated on to illustrate these parallelisms, while underscoring the striking similarities in their functional consequences.

This article employs an interpretive approach, and in the light of contributions to this symposium by Butler and McAllister, and McLean et al., holds that metrics of research 'quality' are socially constructed and hence are as 'subjective' as peer review. Thus it rejects the use of stand-alone metrics as an 'objective' basis to inform funding allocations. Rather, the optimum method of 'quality' assessment is a panel-based exercise with expert judgement informed by a range of discipline-sensitive metrics and peer review of publications. The article maintains that the politics of metrics of political science conceals interests about the foundations of social scientific knowledge, and so the dispute over metrics and peer review is a metaphor for the conflicting epistemological preferences of UK political scientists. It is also argued that metrics-led assessment subjects political science to 'Gradgrinding' on two fronts: that political science departments amount to less than the sum of their parts, and the audit culture strips the discipline of its humanism.

There was a period in America when the political science and history disciplines were not that far apart. Both approaches to analyzing civil society had evolved out of an old Anglo-American tradition where these two subjects, along with philosophy and literature, were all considered in relationship to one another. During the formative years of the American research university, which took place at the turn of the twentieth century, both disciplines shared common founding fathers. A classic example was Charles Beard, whose influence spanned both areas of scholarship. Indeed, it was a breakaway faction of the American Historical Association that formed the American Political Science Association.

Modern political science has created a separation between political theory & empirical political research that impoverishes both sides & is becoming increasingly outdated. I suggest that the work of Michel Foucault is profitably understood in the context of American social & political science, including the empirical research of Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman, & Thomas Schelling, & that the social theorists' work is better appreciated within Foucault's rigorous philosophical framework. Foucault's use of an open "game" context converges with the positions of both Wittgenstein & Schelling to suggest a theory that provides insights into the non-tyrannical theory that Hanna Pitkin sought. It also opens prospects for a theoretically integrated agenda for empirical & normative political research. 91 References. Adapted from the source document.

Political activity is dangerous. Arising inevitably out of men's ability to influence each other, conferring upon them the benefits of joint endeavour, an indispensable source of social boons, it is also capable of doing great harm. Men can be moved to injure others or to ruin themselves. The very process of moving implies a risk of debasement for the moved and for the mover. Even the fairest vision of a good to be sought offers no moral guarantee, since it may poison hearts with hatred against those who are deemed an obstacle to its achievement.No apology is required for stressing a subjective dread of political activity: the chemist is not disqualified as a scientist because he is aware that explosives are dangerous: indeed that chemist is dangerous who lacks such awareness.This feeling of danger is widespread in human society and has ever haunted all but the more superficial authors. Although, to be sure, few have, like Hobbes, brought it out into the open, it has hovered in the background, exerting an invisible but effective influence upon their treatment of the subject; it may be, to a significant degree, responsible for the strange and unique texture of political science.There are no objects to which our attention is so naturally drawn as to our own fellows. It takes a conscious purpose to watch birds or ants, but we can not fail to watch other men, with whom we are inevitably associated, whose behaviour is so important to us that we need to foresee it, and who are sufficiently like us to facilitate our understanding of their actions. Being a man, which involves living with men, therefore involves observing men. And the knowledge of men could be called the most fairly distributed of all kinds of knowledge since each one of us may acquire it according to his willingness and capacity.

I concur with Professor Meyer that Communist area studies must rejoin the main lines of the discipline of political science. An unfortunate methodological separation has existed much too long, a separation that might be figuratively characterized as a "loose, bipolar system," with Sovietology at one pole and systematic political science at the other. The schism between Kremlinology, deductive reasoning, and, frequently, spectral evidence, on the one side, and scientific concept formation, empiricism, verification, and theory-construction, on the other, must come to an end. Professor Meyer's paper is a contribution toward this objective, both on its own merits and for the critical discussion that it will undoubtedly stimulate.