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A comprehensive textbook on the tools of mathematical sociology and their applicationsMathematical models and computer simulations of complex social systems have become everyday tools in sociology. Yet until now, students had no up-to-date textbook from which to learn these techniques. Introduction to Mathematical Sociology fills this gap, providing undergraduates with a comprehensive, self-contained primer on the mathematical tools and applications that sociologists use to understand social behavior.Phillip Bonacich and Philip Lu cover all the essential mathematics, including linear algebra, graph theory, set theory, game theory, and probability. They show how to apply these mathematical tools to demography; patterns of power, influence, and friendship in social networks; Markov chains; the evolution and stability of cooperation in human groups; chaotic and complex systems; and more.Introduction to Mathematical Sociology also features numerous exercises throughout, and is accompanied by easy-to-use Mathematica-based computer simulations that students can use to examine the effects of changing parameters on model behavior.Provides an up-to-date and self-contained introduction to mathematical sociologyExplains essential mathematical tools and their applicationsIncludes numerous exercises throughoutFeatures easy-to-use computer simulations to help students master concepts

Comments: 99 Pages. Expanded and Presented Article's Version at "The 2016 GRavitational-Wave Astronomy International Conference in Paris, Institute d'Astrophysique de Paris (IAP), Sorbonne University, 'Paris VI - UPMC, CNRS, LERU, EUA', Paris, France (2016). 'Supported by the European Union's 7th Framework Program: FP7/PEOPLE-2011-CIG,' 2016. (http://www.iap.fr/vie_scientifique/ateliers/GravitationalWave/2016/scripts/abstract.aspx) ; International audience ; In Part I (pp. 1-10) of this article, I provide a general analysis of a number of current discontinuous approaches to fundamental physics. In Part II (the main part, pp. 11-99, Ref. [37]), as a new mathematical approach to the origin of basic laws of nature, using a new algebraic axiomatic (matrix) formalism based on the ring theory and Clifford algebras (presented in Sec.2), "it is shown that certain mathematical forms of the fundamental laws of nature, including laws governing the fundamental forces of nature (represented by a set of two definite classes of general covariant massive field equations, with new matrix formalisms), are derived uniquely from only a very few axioms" ; where in agreement with the rational Lorentz group, it is also basically assumed that the components of relativistic energy-momentum can only take rational values. Based on the definite mathematical formalism of this axiomatic approach, along with the C, P and T symmetries (represented by the corresponding quantum matrix operators) of the fundamentally derived field equations, it is concluded that the universe could be realized solely with the (1+2) and (1+3)-dimensional space-times. On the basis of these discrete symmetries of the derived field equations, it has been also shown that only left-handed particle fields (along with their complementary right-handed fields) could be coupled to the corresponding (any) source currents. Moreover, it is shown that the (1+3)-dimensional cases of uniquely determined two classes of general covariant field equations, represent, respectively, new massive forms of the bispinor fields of spin-2, and spin-1 particles; and (1+2)-dimensional cases of these equations represent new massive forms of the bispinor fields of spin-3/2 and spin-1/2 particles, respectively. As a particular consequence, it is shown that a certain massive formalism of general relativity – with a definite form of torsion field appeared originally as the generator of gravitational field's invariant mass – is obtained only by first quantization (followed by a basic procedure of minimal coupling to space-time geometry) of a certain set of special relativistic algebraic matrix equations. It has been also proved that Lagrangian densities specified for the originally derived new massive forms of the Maxwell, Yang-Mills and Dirac field equations, are also gauge invariant, where the invariant mass of each field is generated solely by the corresponding torsion field. In addition, in agreement with recent astronomical data, a new form of massive gauge boson is identified (compatible with U(1) symmetry group) with invariant mass: " m γ ≈ 4.90571×10 -50 kg ", which generated by a coupled torsion field of the background space-time geometry. Moreover, based on the definite mathematical formalism of this axiomatic approach, along with the C, P and T symmetries (represented basically by the corresponding quantum operators) of the fundamentally derived field equations, it has been concluded that the universe could be realized solely with the (1+2) and (1+3)-dimensional space-times (where this conclusion, in particular, is based on the T-symmetry). It is proved that CPT is the only (unique) combination of C, P, and T symmetries that could be defined as a symmetry for interacting fields. In addition, on the basis of these discrete symmetries of derived field equations, it has been also shown that only left-handed particle fields (along with their complementary right-handed fields) could be coupled to the corresponding (any) source currents. Furthermore, it has been shown that the metric of background space-time is diagonalized for the uniquely derived fermion field equations (defined and expressed solely in (1+2)-dimensional space-time), where this property generates a certain set of additional symmetries corresponding uniquely to the "SU(2) L ⊗U(2) R " symmetry group for spin-1/2 fermion fields (representing "1+3" generations of four fermions, including a group of eight leptons and a group of eight quarks), and also the "SU(2) L ⊗U(2) R " gauge symmetry groups for spin-1 boson fields coupled to the spin-1/2 fermionic source currents. Hence, along with the known elementary particles, eight new elementary particles, including four new charge-less right-handed spin-1/2 fermions (two leptons and two quarks), a spin-3/2 fermion, and also three new spin-1 (massive) bosons are predicted axiomatically by this new mathematical approach (on a fundamental gauge-theoretic basis) . As a particular result, based on the definite matrix formalism of the uniquely derived general covariant form of Maxwell (and also Yang-Mills) field equations, it has been also concluded that magnetic monopoles could not exist in nature. Comments: 99 Pages. A summary of a submitted and accepted research project ("Foundations of Physics", "Investigation of the Origin of Space-Time", and "Ontology"), Japan, 2012 - 2015. Expanded and Presented Article's Version at "The 2016 GRavitational-Wave Astronomy International Conference in Paris, Institute d'Astrophysique de Paris (IAP), Sorbonne University, 'Paris VI - UPMC, CNRS, LERU, EUA', Paris, France, 2016. 'Supported by the European Union's 7th Framework Program: FP7/PEOPLE-2011-CIG,' 2016. (http://www.iap.fr/vie_scientifique/ateliers/GravitationalWave/2016/scripts/abstract.aspx) This article has been invited and presented at the following international conferences: -The 2016 SIAM International Conference on Mathematical Aspects of Materials Science, Philadelphia, USA, 2016. (https://www.siam.org/meetings/ms16) -The 17th International Conference on Quantum Foundations: Quantum and Beyond, International Centre for Mathematical Modeling in Physics, Engineering and Cognitive Sciences (ICMM), Linnaeus University, Sweden, 2016. (https://lnu.se/en/qb/) -The 4th International Conference on New Frontiers in Physics, CERN Organized and Supported Conference (Europe), ICNFP-2015. (https://indico.cern.ch/e/icnfp2015/) -The 2016 International Conference on Algebraic Geometry and Mathematical Physics, University of Tromsø, Norway, 2016. (https://site.uit.no/) -The XXXVII Max Born International Symposium, International Conference on Non-commutative Geometry, Quantum Symmetries and Quantum Gravity (II), Wroclaw University, Poland, 2016. (http://ift.uni.wroc.pl/~mborn37/) -The 2016 GRavitational-wave Astronomy International Conference in Paris, Institute d'Astrophysique de Paris (IAP), The University of Paris VI - Sorbonne University, CNRS, LERU, EUA, Paris, France, 'Supported by the European Union's 7th Framework Program: FP7/PEOPLE-2011-CIG,' 2016. (http://www.iap.fr/vie_scientifique/ateliers/GravitationalWave/2016/scripts/abstract.aspx) -The 22nd Internnational Australian Institute of Physics Congress (AIP), University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, 2016. (http://appc-aip2016.org.au) -The 21st International Conference on General Relativity and Gravitation, Columbia University, New York, USA, 2016. (http://www.gr21.org) External URLs (including preprints and earlier publications of this article): https://cds.CERN.ch/record/1980381/, https://INSPIREHEP.net/record/1387680/, https://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/handle/2115/59279/ , http://jairo.NII.ac.jp/0003/00047402/en/, https://indico.CERN.ch/event/344173/session/22/contribution/422/attachments/1140145/1646101/R.a.Zahedi--OnDiscretePhysics-Jan.2015-signed.pdf, https://CORE.ac.uk/display/41880261/, http://philsci-archive.PITT.edu/11497, http://philpapers.cdp.UWO.ca/rec/zahotl/, http://www.ijqf.org/archives/3495, http://ci.NII.ac.jp/naid/120005613576, https://citeseerx.ist.PSU.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.675.2202/, https://LNU.se/contentassets/1489145f113348f382202fbf0d1d4094/qb-abstracts-compiled-160613.pdf, http://mts-ncomms.Nature.com/ncomms_files/2017/07/10/00136200/00/136200_0_art_file_2445656_bsw9c4.pdf , https://indico.CERN.ch/event/344173/contribution/1740565/attachments/1140145/1726912/R.A.Zahedi--Forces.of.Nature.Laws-Jan.2015-signed.pdf .

Comments: 99 Pages. Expanded and Presented Article's Version at "The 2016 GRavitational-Wave Astronomy International Conference in Paris, Institute d'Astrophysique de Paris (IAP), Sorbonne University, 'Paris VI - UPMC, CNRS, LERU, EUA', Paris, France (2016). 'Supported by the European Union's 7th Framework Program: FP7/PEOPLE-2011-CIG,' 2016. (http://www.iap.fr/vie_scientifique/ateliers/GravitationalWave/2016/scripts/abstract.aspx) ; International audience ; In Part I (pp. 1-10) of this article, I provide a general analysis of a number of current discontinuous approaches to fundamental physics. In Part II (the main part, pp. 11-99, Ref. [37]), as a new mathematical approach to the origin of basic laws of nature, using a new algebraic axiomatic (matrix) formalism based on the ring theory and Clifford algebras (presented in Sec.2), "it is shown that certain mathematical forms of the fundamental laws of nature, including laws governing the fundamental forces of nature (represented by a set of two definite classes of general covariant massive field equations, with new matrix formalisms), are derived uniquely from only a very few axioms" ; where in agreement with the rational Lorentz group, it is also basically assumed that the components of relativistic energy-momentum can only take rational values. Based on the definite mathematical formalism of this axiomatic approach, along with the C, P and T symmetries (represented by the corresponding quantum matrix operators) of the fundamentally derived field equations, it is concluded that the universe could be realized solely with the (1+2) and (1+3)-dimensional space-times. On the basis of these discrete symmetries of the derived field equations, it has been also shown that only left-handed particle fields (along with their complementary right-handed fields) could be coupled to the corresponding (any) source currents. Moreover, it is shown that the (1+3)-dimensional cases of uniquely determined two classes of general covariant field equations, represent, respectively, new ...

Contents -- Volume I: Definition, Conception, and Development -- Contributors Preface Part I History, Definition, and Diagnostic Issues 1 -- 1 Aggression and Violence: Definitions and Distinctions 3 -- Johnie J. Allen and Craig A. Anderson -- 2 Cultural -- Norms and Definitions of Violence Kirby Deater-Deckard and Jennifer E. Lansford -- 3 Legal -- Definitions of Violence and Aggression Cody N. Charette and Eric W. Hickey -- 4 The Development of Aggression From Early Childhood to Adulthood Richard E. Tremblay, Sylvana M. Côté, Julie Salla, and Gregory Michel -- 5 Gender Differences in Violence and Aggression Lee Copping -- 6 Online Misogyny Targeting Feminist Activism: Anita Sarkeesian and Gamergate, Melinda C.R. Burgess, Felicia Byars, Leila Sadeghi-Azar, and Karen E. Dill-Shackleford -- 7 Cross-Cultural Differences in Aggression Douglas P. Fry -- 8 Violence in the Family Donald G. Dutton, Katherine R. White, and Christie Tetreault -- 9 Mass Killing Charles R. Butcher, Charles H. Anderton, and Jurgen Brauer -- 10 Psychiatric Diagnosis and Violence: Description and Mechanisms Mark R. Serper and Yosef Sokol -- 11 Psychopathy, Violence, and Aggression Dennis E. Reidy and Megan C. Kearns -- 12 Introduction to Sexual Violence Ibitola O. Asaolu and Mary P. Koss -- 13 Hate Crime Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld -- 14 Violence and Moral Philosophy Bob Brecher -- Part II Biology 15 The Evolution of Human Violence and Aggression: The Contribution of Peace Ethology Peter Verbeek -- 16 Genetics of Aggression in Nonhuman Animals Anna V. Kukekova -- 17 Psychophysiology of Violence and Aggression Jonathan C. Waldron and Angela Scarpa -- 18 Neuroanatomy of Violence and Aggression Yaling Yang -- 19 The Role of Neurotransmitters in Violence and Aggression Klaus A. Miczek, Joseph F. DeBold, Kyle Gobrogge, Emily L. Newman, and Rosa M.M. de Almeida -- 20 Testosterone and Human Aggression Justin M. Carré;, Erika L. Ruddick, Benjamin J.P. Moreau, and Brian M. Bird -- 21 Animal Models of Aggression and Violence Sietse F. de Boer and Jaap M. Koolhaas -- 22 Interplay Between Genetic and Environmental Influences on the Development of Aggressive-Antisocial Behavior During Childhood and Adolescence Frank Vitaro, Mara Brendgen, and Richard E. Tremblay -- Part III Theoretical Accounts 23 Developmental Pathways to Aggression and Violence Sheryl L. Olson and Ka I. Ip -- 24 Masculinities, Aggression, and Violence Walter S. DeKeseredy -- 25 Protective Factors Against Crime and Violence in Adolescence Friedrich Lösel and Doris Bender -- 26 Cognitive-Behavioral Factors and Anger in the Occurrence of Aggression and Violence Raymond W. Novaco -- 27 The Developmental of Aggression and Violence Over the Life Span Jeffrey D. Burke -- 28 Addressing Children's Disruptive Behavior Problems: A 30-Year Journey With Stop Now And Plan (SNAP) Leena K. Augimeri, Debra Pepler, Margaret Walsh, and Michelle Kivlenieks -- 29 Does Alcohol Cause Violence and Aggression? Whitney Brown and Kenneth E. Leonard -- 30 Do Drugs Cause Violence? Kisha M. Radliff, Kathryn L. Zeanah, and Joe E. Wheaton -- 31 Does Poverty Cause Violence? Vania Ceccato -- 32 Do Group Processes Cause Violence and Aggression? Sabine Otten -- 33 Displaced Aggression is Alive and Well William C. Pedersen, Jennifer Ellison, and Norman Miller -- 34 Media, Violence, Aggression, and Antisocial Behavior: Is the Link Causal? Courtney Plante and Craig A. Anderson -- 35 Humor and Violence Charles S. Gulas, Marc G. Weinberger, and Kunal Swani -- 36 Is the Link Between Games and Aggression More About the Player, Less About the Game? Christopher J. Ferguson, Nicholas David Bowman, and Rachel Kowert -- 37 The General Aggression Model and Its Application to Violent Offender Assessment and Treatment Flora Gilbert, Michael Daffern, and Craig A. Anderson -- 38 On Automatic As Well As Controlled Psychological Processes in Aggression, From the Cognitive Neoassociation Perspective Leonard Berkowitz -- 39 Social Learning Theory and the Development of Aggression Jackson A. Goodnight, Sarah A. Wilhoit, and Angela Receveur -- 40 Frustration-Aggression Theory Johannes Breuer and Malte Elson -- 41 Behavioral Explanations of Aggression and Violence Michael M. Mueller and AjamuNkosi -- 42 Psychoanalytic Concepts of Violence and Aggression Svenja Taubner, Sven Rabung, Anthony Bateman, and Peter Fonagy -- 43 Social-Psychological Explanations of Aggression and Violence Barbara Krahé; -- 44 Violence and Aggression in Socially Disorganized Neighborhoods Renee Zahnow and Rebecca Wickes -- 45 Race and Gender Stereotypes and Violence and Aggression Melinda C.R. Burgess -- 46 Forgetting Everything We Think We Know: High Self-Esteem and Violence Joseph M. Boden -- 47 Strain Theory, Violence, and Aggression Lee Ann Slocum and Robert Agnew -- 48 Theories of Political Violence Ekkart Zimmermann -- Volume II: Assessment, Prevention and Treatment of Individuals Contributors Preface Part IV Assessment of Individuals 49 Principles and Foundations of Psychological Assessment Jane E. Fisher, William O'Donohue, and Stephen N. Haynes -- 50 Dyadic Conceptualization, Measurement, and Analysis of Family Violence Lindsey M. Rodriguez and Murray A. Straus -- 51 Assessment of Callous and Related Traits Eva R. Kimonis and Natalie Goulter -- 52 Physiological Measurement and Assessment Christopher J. Patrick and Sarah J. Brislin -- 53 Systematic Screening for Challenging Behaviors in Tiered Support Systems Jeffrey Sprague and Kathleen Lynne Lane -- 54 Psychiatric Assessment of Violence John S. Rozel, Abhishek Jain, Edward P. Mulvey, and Loren H. Roth -- 55 Psychoanalytic Assessment of Violence Jessica Yakeley -- 56 Psychopathy and Violence Colleen M. Lillard, Jennifer C. Johnson, and Michael J. Vitacco -- 57 Risk Assessment, Violence, and Aggression Catherine S. Shaffer, Adam J.E. Blanchard, and Kevin S. Douglas -- 58 Violence in Individuals With Major Psychiatric Disorders: Its Prediction and Treatment in Light of Heterogeneous Pathways to Violence Menahem I. Krakowski -- Part V Individual Interventions for Prevention 59 Preschool Life Skills: Toward Teaching Prosocial Skills and Preventing Aggression in Young Children Kevin C. Luczynski and Tara A. Fahmie -- 60 Teaching Gun Safety Skills to Children Raymond G. Miltenberger, Diego Valbuena, and Sindy Sanchez -- Part VI Individual Treatment: Therapies 61 Evidence- Based Practice and Children and Adolescents: What Works? What Works Best? Tia Navelene Barnes, Kristen Merrill O'Brien, Michelle M. Cumming, Donna Spencer Pitts, and Stephen W. Smith -- 62 Evidence-Based Practice and Adults: What Works? What Works Best? James McGuire -- 63 Applied Behavior Analysis and Treatment of Violence and Aggression James K. Luiselli and Joseph N. Ricciardi -- 64 Anger Management Graham Glancy, Stefan Treffers, and Michael Saini -- 65 Mindfulness and the Treatment of Aggression and Violence Nirbhay N. Singh, Giulio E. Lancioni, and Alan S.W. Winton -- 66 Third Wave Therapies and the Treatment of Violence and Aggression Amie Zarling and Ashley Taylor -- 67 Parent Training and the Treatment of Violence and Aggression Linda Anne Valle and Jennifer W. Kaminski -- 68 Training Staff to Manage Violence and Aggression Richard Whittington and Owen Price -- 69 Psychodynamic Treatment of Violence and Aggression: Empirical Evidence and New Approaches Svenja Taubner, Peter Fonagy, Anthony Bateman, and Sven Rabung -- 70 Multisystemic Therapy for Violent and Aggressive Youths Charles M. Borduin, Alex R. Dopp, Lauren B. Quetsch, and Benjamin D. Johnides -- 71 Pharmacological Management of Aggressive Behavior in Psychiatric Patients Laurette E. Goedhard and Eibert R. Heerdink -- 72 Psychopharmacological Approaches to Aggression and Violence in Adults With Severe Mental Illness: What Works? What Works Best? Leslie Citrome and Jan Volavka -- 73 The Fast Track Project: Effects on Violence and Aggression and Related Outcomes Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group -- 74 Interventions Targeting Alcohol, Violence, and HIV: Current Evidence and Future Directions -- Lori A.J. Scott-Sheldon, Theresa E. Senn, and Tyler S. Kaiser.

Enabling & Understanding Sustainability -- Ferrous & Non-ferrous Metals Processing. Recycling of Poly-Metallic Residues from Metal Industry -- Current Status and Future Developments / Jürgen Antrekowitsch -- Bauxite Residue for Phosphorus Removal from Waste Water / Gamini Mendis, Amanda Brock, Kai Gao, Indrajeet Chaubey, Ron Turco, John Howarter -- Modeling the Electromagnetic Processing of Recycled Silicon Dust / G Djambazov, K Pericleous, V Bojarevics, M Forzan, F Dughiero -- Potential Contribution to the Supply of Silver by the Recycling of Industrial Residues from Zn, Pb and Cu Plants / Stefan Steinlechner -- Thermodynamic Analysis of Zinc Status in the Upstream Eaf Offgas Cleaning Systems Associated with In-Process Separation of Zinc from Eaf Dust / Naiyang Ma -- Evaluation of Reactor Reov-01 with Ti Electrode for Electrochemical Recovery of Ag from Industrial Wastes / Pedro Alberto Ramirez Ortega, Victor Esteban Reyes Cruz, Maria Aurora Velóz Rodríguez, Laura Garcia Hernández, Diana Arenas Islas, Mizrraim Uriel Flores Guerrero, Luis Garcia L -- Mini Mill Solutions in the Recycling of Electic Arc Furnace Dust -- The 2Sdr Process / Gernot Rösler, Christoph Pichler, Stefan Steinlechner, Jürgen Antrekowitsch -- Understanding & Enabling Sustainability -- (Rechargeable) Batteries. Roadmap for the Lifecycle of Advanced Battery Chemistries / Timothy W Ellis, John A Howes -- Portland Cement with Battery Waste Contents / Henry A Colorado, Sergio A Colorado -- Automotive Lithium-Ion Battery Recycling: A Theoretical Evaluation / Reza Beheshti, Ragnhild E Aune -- Life Cycle Analysis Summary for Automotive Lithiumion Battery Production and Recycling / Jennifer B Dunn, Linda Gaines, Jarod C Kelly, Kevin G Gallagher -- Enabling & Understanding Sustainability -- Rare Earth Element Applications. Life Cycle Assessment of Rare Earth Production from Monazite / Callum Browning, Stephen Northey, Nawshad Haque, Warren Bruckard, Mark Cooksey -- Recovery of Rare Earth Elements from the Ferrous Fraction of Electronic Waste / Lars K Jakobsson, Mark W Kennedy, Ragnhild E Aune, Gabriella Tranell -- Fundamental Study of the Rare Earths Recycling Through the Pyrotetallurgical Route -- Phase Relations and Crystallization Behavior of the Cao-Sio-NdO System / Thu Hoai Le, Annelies Malfliet, Bart Blanpain, Muxing Guo -- Mitigating Supply Risk of Critical and Strategic Materials: The Role of Trade Policies / Vasken Xhaxhollari, Michele Bustamante, Gabrielle Gaustad -- Sustainable Processing of Phosphogypsum Waste Stream for the Recovery of Valuable Rare Earth Elements / Mugdha Walawalkar, Connie K Nichol, Gisele Azimi -- Life Cycle Analysis for Solvent Extraction of Rare Earth Elements from Aqueous Solutions / Ehsan Vahidi, Fu Zhao -- Characteristics of Light Rare Earths from Korean Coal Power Plants Ash / T Thriveni, Ahn Ji Whan -- Enabling & Understanding Sustainability -- Building Materials & Slag Valorization. Energy Generation From Waste Slags: Beyond Heat Recovery / Jinichiro Nakano, James Bennett, Anna Nakano -- Production of Lightweight Aggregate and Ceramic Balls Using Gold Tailings, Red Mud And Limestone / Hyunsik Park, Soo-kyung Kim, Doyun Shin, Jeong-soo Sohn -- Accounting for Variation in Life Cycle Inventories: The Case of Portland Cement Production in the U.S. / Xin Xu, Maggie Wildnauer, Jeremy Gregory, Randolph Kirchain -- Kinetics of Dephosphorization from Steelmaking Slag By Leaching With CHO-Noh-Hcl Solution / Yong Qiao, Jiang Diao, Xuan Liu, Xiaosa Li, Tao Zhang, Bing Xie -- Treatment Of Molten Steel Slag for Cement Application / João B Ferreira Neto, Catia Fredericci, João O G Faria, Fabiano F Chotoli, Tiago R Ribeiro, Antônio Malynowskyj, Andre N L Silva, Valdecir A Quarcioni, Andre A Lotto -- Incorporation of Sewage Sludge into Heavy Clay Ceramic Body / Carlos Mauricio Fontes Vieira, Isabela Oliveira Rangel Areias, Sergio Neves Monteiro -- Designing Materials and Systems for Sustainability. Industrial Symbiosis Among Small and Medium Scale Enterprises: Case of Muzaffarnagar, India / Shourjomoy Chattopadhyay, Nandini Kumar, Charlie Fine, Elsa Olivetti -- Life Cycle Assessment of Metallurgical Processes Based on Physical Flowsheet Models / Madeleine Scheidema, Markus Reuter, Antti Roine -- Total-Corrosion Effects of Anthocleista Djalonensis and NaCrO on Steel-Rebar in HSo: Sustainable Corrosion-Protection Prospects in Microbial/Industrial Environment / Joshua Olusegun Okeniyi, Cleophas Akintoye Loto, Abimbola Patricia Idowu Popoola -- Materials Research to Enable Clean Energy: Leverage Points for Risk Reduction in Critical Byproduct Material Supply Chains / Michele L Bustamante, Gabrielle Gaustad -- Heterogeneous Materials Design for Sustainable Nuclear Waste Storage Using Life Prediction by Conformal Finite Element Analysis / F Rabbi, K Brinkman, K Reifsnider -- Life-Cycle Costing Promotes Use of Corrosion-Resistant Alloys / John Grubb, James Rakowski -- System of State Regulation of Sustainable ORE Processing and Production Waste Treatment in the Russian Arctic / Vyacheslav Tsukerman, Ludmila Ivanova, Vladimir Selin -- Understanding & Enabling Sustainability -- Light Metals Recycling & Waste Valorization. Electrodynamic Sorting of Light Metals and Alloys / Raj Rajamani, James Nagel, Nakul Dholu -- Scrap Characterization to Optimize the Recycling Process / Sean Kelly, Diran Apelian -- The Value of Integrated Production Planning for Twostage Aluminum Recycling Operations / Jiyoun C Chang, Elsa A Olivetti, Randolph E Kirchain -- Solar Aluminum Recycling in A Directly Heated Rotary Kiln / Martina Neises-von Puttkamer, Martin Roeb, Stefania Tescari, Lamark de Oliveira, Stefan Breuer, Christian Sattler -- Metal Recovery from Dross Through Rotary Crushing and Separation Producing Products Instead of Waste / David J Roth -- A Laboratory Study of Electrochemical Removal of Noble Elements from Secondary Aluminium / Ole S Kjos, Sverre Rolseth, Henrik Gudbrandsen, Egil Skybakmoen, Asbjorn Solheim, Trond H Bergstrøm -- Production of Magnesium and Aluminum-Magnesium Alloys from Recycled Secondary Aluminum Scrap Melts / Adam JGesing, Subodh K Das, Raouf OLoutfy -- Recovery of Aluminum from the Aluminum Smelter Baghouse Dust / Myungwon Jung, Brajendra Mishra -- Understanding & Enabling Sustainability -- Education Research Innovation. The Material Life Cycle A Steering Wheel for Europe's Raw Materials Academy / Eric Pirard, Jenny Greberg -- Education Programs and Activities in China for the Sustainability of Metallurgical Industry and their Perspective / Guangqiang Li, Chengyi Zhu, Junying Zhang -- Understanding & Enabling Sustainability -- Education Research Innovation + Electronic Equipment. Sustainability: Opportunities for Teaching Old Concepts Via New Problems / Gabrielle Gaustad -- 3D Printed Abs and Carbon Fiber Reinforced Polymer Specimens for Engineering Education / Michael Golub, Xingye Guo, Mingyo Jung, Jing Zhang -- Waste Management of Printed Wiring Boards: A Life Cycle Assessment of the Metals Recycling Chain from Liberation Through Refining / Mianqiang Xue, Alissa Kendall, Zhenming Xu, Julie M Schoenung -- Utilizing Economic Value, Resource Availability, and Environmental Impact Metrics to Improve the Weee And Battery Directives and Promote Alignment With The European Commission Circular Economy Strategy / Patrick Ford, Eduardo Santos, Paulo Ferrão, Fernanda Margarido, Krystyn J Van Vliet, Elsa Olivetti -- Hightemperature Characterisation and Technoeconomics of E-Waste Processing / Michael A Somerville, Paul Kolton -- Enabling Energy Efficient Electronics Through Thermally Conductive Plastic Composites: Novel Surface Modification Techniques For Boron Nitride in Epoxy / Alex N Bruce, Holly Avins, Inez Hua, John A Howarter -- Environmental and Economic Evaluation of Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)Funnel Glass Waste Management Options in the United States / Qingbo Xu, Mengjing Yu, Alissa Kendall, Wenzhi He, Guangming Li, Julie M Schoenung -- Poster Session. Recovering of Carbon Fiber Present in an Industrial Polymeric Composite Waste through Pyrolysis Method while Studying the Influence of Resin Impregnation Process: Prepreg / Thiago Ribeiro Abdou, Denise Crocce Romano Espinosa, Jorge Alberto Soares Tenório -- Evaluation Of Adding Grits in the Manufacture of Soilcement Bricks / Rita de Cássia S S Alvarenga, Délio Porto Fassoni, Larissa de Almeida Miranda, Márcia Lana Pinheiro -- The Experience in Development of Technique and Technology of Electric Pulse Disintegration of Rocks and Ores / Anatoly Usov, Vyacheslav Tsukerman, Alexander Potokin, Daniil Ilin -- Precipitation of Metals from Liquor Obtained in Nickel Mining / Mónica M Jiménez Correa, Paula Aliprandini, Jorge A Soares Tenório, Denise Crocce Romano Espinosa -- Green Structural Ceramic With Addition of Raw Clay Waste / Alessandra Savazzini Dos Reis, Viviana P Della-Sagrillo, Francisco RValenzuela-Diaz

Benny Gantz, the former chief of the Israel Defense Forces and prime minister in a revolving arrangement with Benjamin Netanyahu several years ago, announced that he is quitting the war cabinet. What impact this has on Netanyahu's government and its war policy in Gaza is now the subject of high speculation.He and another centrist former IDF commander, Gadi Eisenkot, had accepted a place in the war cabinet to underscore Israeli unity in the wake of the October 7 Hamas assault on Israeli towns in the southern Negev. They have, for the most part, supported, or at least acquiesced in, the government's Gaza campaign.Despite international insistence that a ceasefire was essential to the well-being of Gaza's battered civilian population and diplomatic intervention, Gantz and Eisenkot have backed Netanyahu's insistence that a ceasefire before Hamas had been completely dismantled would be unacceptable to Israel. Their position mirrors the Hamas view: any ceasefire that does not recognize Hamas's authority in Gaza or permits Israel to resume the war after hostages and their remains have been repatriated is unacceptable to Hamas's Gaza wing. Much ink has been spilled analyzing Qatari, Egyptian and U.S. missteps or hidden agendas in the negotiations, but the fact is that neither Yahya Sinwar nor Benjamin Netanyahu could sign up to ceasefire terms that granted the other even the most symbolic of victories.The stated reason for Gantz's defection, which he foreshadowed a couple of weeks ago, was Netanyahu's failure to produce a post-conflict plan for Gaza that wasn't laughable. The prime minister has floated various arrangements. The first was to use Gazan businessmen for service delivery, essentially of humanitarian goods, but of more kinds of imports as time progressed, and as the Israeli conduit to Gaza for non-military purposes. How this would evolve into a government for Gaza was not clear, but the Israeli government did seem to think that its business partners would eventually coalesce into a governing authority. This idea was shredded by the first attempt to put it in practice, when a shipment of food that Israel had transferred to these new partners was raided by Hamas. Thereupon another conception took flight involving the Saudis, or other moderate Arab states, accepting security responsibility and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, offering "temporary" refuge to Gazans displaced by Israeli military operations. This idea was promptly and predictably derided by the proposed participants. More recently, the government's planning crossed the line between absurdism and surrealism by circulating a brochure of the "new" Gaza, which depicted a science fiction version of contemporary Dubai. This made the Onion look like the Wall Street Journal. Gantz himself advanced the idea of a kind of Star Wars bar governing authority consisting of personnel from an array of moderate Arab governments, Western powers, NGOs and some Gazans who could verify that had never heard of Hamas. Both Gantz and Netanyahu refuse to countenance a role for the Palestinian Authority; Gantz, it's well to remember, opposes a two-state solution. Gantz's criticism of Netanyahu's lack of a "day after" plan is certainly apt, but Gantz's own seems unequal to the desolation of Gaza and the vacuum that Israel's campaign will have created.Be that as it may, the question on the tips of many tongues is whether Gantz's departure will unleash a political process resulting in Netanyahu's defenestration. This seems unlikely. The Knesset numbers are what they are. Netanyahu's coalition will not fall. And the Knesset calendar is what it is. Netanyahu just has to last until 25 July, when the legislature goes into recess. It won't come back until the week before the November 4 U.S. elections, which could produce a Trump presidency.And before the Knesset recesses, Netanyahu will have had yet another occasion to address both houses of the U.S.Congress. This will stir up the large reservoir of American support for Israel's Gaza campaign, burnish Netanyahu's credentials as custodian of the U.S.-Israel relationship and set the stage for nearly three more years of Netanyahu's leadership.One of Netanyahu's claims is likely to be that under his skillful leadership, dire predictions of a widening war and escalating violence have not come to pass. While it is true that Israel's north is in parts uninhabitable, the same could be said for Lebanon's south. As for increasing exchanges of fire across the Blue Line that separates the two countries, "…well, you should see the other guy." A confrontation with Iran in April was handled like a clockwork Kennedy School class project orchestrated by Thomas Schelling. Israel organized a coalition of the U.S., France, UK, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to neuter Iran's attack and responded with the perfect blend of constraint and precision firepower. The picture of course was more complicated than that and raised ominous questions about how a real war would play out. But for Netanyahu's domestic political purposes these considerations are obviously irrelevant.Even as Netanyahu's probable durability leaves a workable Gaza endgame open to grave doubt, it also raises the question of what Israel will do in the north. Israel pundits and officials have been beating the war drums for weeks, suggesting that the IDF is prepared to enter Lebanon and push Hezbollah 30 kilometers or more back from the Blue Line. Hezbollah has up to 100,000 missiles and rockets it could rain on Israel in response. The IDF however has been planning for an operation in Lebanon since the fiasco of the 2006 war. Military planners likely believe they have got the problems sorted: Swift attrition of Hezbollah's missiles via thousands of airstrikes and a well-stocked air defense umbrella; new and improved tactics for use of armor and infantry; and the advantage of surprise. Much of Israel's armor is in the north, there aren't any Israeli civilians in the area to worry about, and the ongoing exchanges of fire would provide cover for a surprise attack.On the other hand, Netanyahu will probably shy away from the tremendous risks that such a war would entail; he would be especially averse to starting another full-scale and far more challenging fight until Gaza has been digested. If he is attracted to the idea, he might prefer to wait until after Election Day in the U.S. Dealing with Trump might make a Lebanon War easier to prosecute; a Biden White House would be decidedly less sympatico.As for the near term, Gantz should take the opportunity for a relaxing vacation. The only real question is Itamar Ben-Gvir's demand that he be included in the war cabinet upon Gantz's departure. This might make the hair stand up on the backs of many necks in Washington and Israel, but the fact is that Netanyahu has been quite attentive to Ben-Gvir's preferences from the outset. Indeed ,he was channeling this ultra-right winger in his latest public statement on Israel's war aims, in which he doubled down on the proposition that the security of Israel – that is, the destruction of Hamas – takes precedence over the fate of the hostages.

After six years of U.S. "maximum pressure," Iran's economy continues to defy dire predictions of economic collapse that motivated Trump's hasty 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (also known as the JCPOA). The Biden administration's continuation of the same policy since 2021 is similarly based on the logic that the weaker Iran's economy is, the more likely Tehran will bend to Washington's will. The economy's resilience is evidenced by the fact that in the first nine months of the Iranian fiscal year (March 21 to December 20, 2023), GDP grew by a 6.7% annual rate, and it is very likely to finish the year in two months with a growth rate exceeding the World Bank and IMF forecasts of about 4%.But, after more than a decade of decline in their living standards, resilience is not what ordinary Iranians are looking for. As a result of Trump's reimposition of sanctions in 2018, Iran's economic growth fell by 13.6 percentage points, from a positive annual growth rate of 9.5% during 2016-2017, when the JCPOA had eased U.S. sanctions, to negative 4.1% per year during 2018-2019.Since 2020, and helped by rising oil revenues, the economy has recovered some, growing steadily, if slowly, by about 4% per year. Even the damage from the Covid-19 pandemic, which was mostly on employment, has been repaired, and employment is now back to its pre-pandemic level. But, as Israel's war on Gaza continues, renewed tensions and proxy fights with the U.S. could put these fragile gains at risk of a reversal.Flawed recoveryThis modest growth has done little to dampen deep dissatisfaction with the economy among ordinary Iranians. Living standards have not yet recovered to their pre-Trump level, and inflation remains very high. In 2022, real household expenditures per capita were 7.7% below their 2017 level, far below where Iranians expected to be now based on two decades of rising real consumption before sanctions tightened in 2011.
Inflation is an even larger source of popular discontent. For reasons that are not peculiar to Iranian society, people show more concern with rising prices than real incomes. They are unhappy with rising prices even if their incomes are keeping up with inflation.
In 2018, with poor prospects from oil exports, the rial lost 2/3 of its value in a short time and caused prices to spike. Inflation rose from 8.1% in 2017 to 26.7% in 2018 and has remained above 30% since. Since the beginning of the Iranian year, a new Central Bank governor has tried to reduce inflation to below 30%, a very modest goal, but so far he has not succeeded. Last month, inflation was at 36.5% annual rate despite tightened credit and fiscal austerity, which shows itself in a stagnant real estate market.This mixed record is what hardliners are presenting to voters in the March 1 parliamentary elections and the record that President Ebrahim Raisi will be defending when he stands for re-election in June 2025. And this is no ordinary re-election because hardliners, who view the Raisi administration as the first "revolutionary government" since the founding of the Islamic Republic, hope to deliver on their promise of economic prosperity. They need to convince voters that their strategy of giving up on the nuclear deal and turning to the East (read China and Russia) can do better than the record of reformist presidents Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), whom they consider pro-west and "neo-liberal".Both Khatami and Rouhani were re-elected with bigger margins to their second terms. For President Raisi to do the same in 2025 he needs the robust growth rate of the past year to continue in 2024. As I argued last November, meeting this challenge is an important reason why Iranian hardliners are unwilling to get drawn into the Israel-Hamas conflict.Darker clouds on the horizon threaten economic recoveryBesides the fact that economies grow faster when they are recovering from a trough, the growth should slow down in 2024. In addition, rising tensions in the region worsen the prospect for growth. Iran may be intent on not getting involved, but protecting its fragile recovery from an expanding regional conflict may be increasingly difficult. Iran's allies in the "resistance front" in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are challenging U.S. and Israeli forces. Even if Iran stays out of the fray, the conflict is bound to have a negative effect on Iran's recovery, if only because Washington would try harder to limit Iran's oil exports and refuse Iran access to its previously frozen funds.This month Iran angered Iraq and Pakistan after it bombed two locations in these countries, ostensibly taking revenge for a terrorist attack a month ago in Kerman that killed over 100 bystanders. Adding a third nuclear power to the two that it is already in conflict with – the U.S. and Israel – may show Iran's military resolve but also increases the risk of conflict.Rising tensions have caused the rial, which enjoyed months of stability, to lose 10% of its value in the free market just in the past two weeks. If the rial continues to lose value, the task of bringing inflation down to below 30% will become much harder in the coming months.More lax enforcement of oil sanctions since Biden's election, intended to keep Iran from increasing its stockpile of enriched uranium and obtain the release of U.S. hostages, has allowed Tehran to sell more oil. More oil revenues have been the largest factor in Iran's economic recovery. According to the Statistical Center of Iran, in the last three years the value added of the oil and gas sector has grown three times as fast as the GDP. So, if Washington decides to police Iran' oil exports more aggressively, growth will suffer.Finally, in the longer run, the financial components of U.S. sanctions prevent Iran from taking advantage of its deep devaluations by increasing its non-oil exports. Devaluations have reduced the cost of unskilled Iranian labor in export markets to about $10 per day, half the average unskilled wage in China. Devaluations helped Iran substitute its own products for imports, but there are limits to this substitution, especially with the domestic demand depressed to fight inflation. A fuller economic recovery from the loss of oil exports requires exporting more manufactures and services, which financial sanctions make costly and difficult.Escaping sanctions?Iran's recent diplomatic successes have reduced its isolation but will not translate into economic growth in the short term. In 2023, Iran, aided by China, repaired its broken diplomatic relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors; gained entry into BRICS, an organization that includes rising non-aligned global players; and joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that, at least in one observer's opinion, is a "game changer." While these developments bode well for Iran's ability to resist U.S. sanctions in the long run, they are unlikely to translate into more investment and economic growth in the short run.What these successes have accomplished so far is to convince Iranian hardliners that their strategy of resistance to U.S. pressure has raised the Islamic Republic's global stature, just as the West has tried to isolate it. They see the emerging multipolar world as one in which unilateral sanctions lose their sting and one that allows Iran to turn its newfound geopolitical capital into economic growth.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has meted out economic punishment both as a means of coercion and a moral warfare tool, rendering it a de facto accompaniment in the naming and shaming of various foes of the United States. The largest sanctions of all have been imposed on Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine. Unfortunately, this case has also become the greatest example of the failure of sanctions to achieve their desired results. Together with the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, this has contributed to the growing belief that this war may end in stalemate, or even Russian victory.By 2021, the U.S. had already imposed over 8,000 sanctions on individuals and companies globally, targeting regional sectors in a range of countries. In the last two years, this number has seen an astronomical increase. According to a Columbia University database, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) holds comprehensive sanctions on six countries and three regions. Targeted export sanctions extend to 19 countries including Belarus, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, prohibiting under U.S. law any financial and commercial relations with designated companies or individuals. On multitudinous occasions, these U.S.-led sanction regimes have been found to inflict asymmetrical burdens on impoverished foreign citizens, hinder democratization, and in the most serious cases exacerbate humanitarian crises in violation of international law.In the days following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, President Biden introduced a series of allies-coordinated sanction packages targeting Russia's weapons industry, technology exports, foreign assets, banks, energy companies, and wealthy businessmen. Western states then went on to completely isolate Russia from the global financial market. In these measures lay a hope that such a severe sanctions regime would not only impede Russia's warmaking capabilities but cripple support from political elites so drastically that Putin's technocratic regime would collapse. Nearly two years into the war, Biden's introduction of new sanction packages every other month since February 2022 has not toppled the Russian regime or led it to agree to Western demands for a withdrawal from Ukraine. Russia's increased allocation of national GDP to defense, which is predicted to reach an all time high of 6%, stands as proof of this unpleasant truth. James Galbraith of the Institute for New Economic Thinking remarks that most Western studies on the Russian economy today begin with the question of how badly it is doing. This framework — focused on finding pain in the Russian economy and highly reliant on confirmation bias — forgoes the intellectual distance necessary to accurately pinpoint the roots of sanctions failure.There is no doubt that Russia's economy is feeling the impact of sanctions and faces a rather bleak future. Its aviation and car manufacturing sectors were particularly affected with a decline of 80% due to inaccessible components. The collapse of Western direct investment, combined with capital flight and severe brain drain, foreshadows decades of economic struggle for Russia's future generations.Still, this is nowhere near the outcome promised by U.S. officials. Claims that the Russian economy is about to collapse seem to stem from a need to reassure voters who are suffering from collateral sanctions damage, be it rising energy prices or deteriorating living standards.The most widely discussed reasons for the failure of Russia sanctions focus on issues in their enforcement: Their bypassing by southern states in complex supply chains, the loopholes of dual-use goods exports, and companies' reluctance to completely halt business with the Russian market. It is also clear that Western planners greatly underestimated the worldwide willingness (including by Western partners like India) to reject sanctions and continue buying Russian energy. Most recently, a POGO report found that even the U.S. Department of Defense has remained a loyal client of Russian oil.However, one can also credit Russian economic planning for cushioning the blow of sanctions. At the very outset of the war, the government and the Central Bank promptly reacted with a combination of restrictions on the free flow of capital and a 20% increase in interest rates. In only two months after the invasion, banks saw 90% of initially withdrawn funds returned to Russian accounts. After 20 months, a war economy has replaced Russia's pre-war export diversification and technological innovation priorities. Moscow's GDP shows a resilient growth of 2.2% this year, with the IMF only recently altering its prediction for the year 2024 from 2.8% to 1.1%. Despite severe capital flight, Russia's current account surplus grew to $16.6 billion in the third quarter of this year, reflective of a large increase in foreign trade despite Western sanctions regimes. There are, however, questions about the reliability of official figures, especially given that Russian trade statistics were made private for over a year, resuming only in March 2023. In line with Fortress Russia economics, the government recently imposed new measures compelling Russian exporters in energy, metals, and agriculture to convert their foreign currency earnings into rubles, and released new duties on non-oil exporters. Overall, anti-dollar strategies and currency swaps have pushed Russia closer to countries such as China, Iran, and Turkey, some of which share the aim of curbing American financial influence. This illustrates another danger in U.S. sanctions: Far from strengthening U.S. global power, they are in fact spurring other countries to reduce their economic dependence on the U.S.It appears therefore that the West may have to rethink its sanctions policy. As each side of the conflict begins to fathom the possibility of a non-military resolution, Western states must also face the difficult truth that sanctions (and Russia's frozen sovereign debt) could become be a necessary sacrifice in negotiations if Russia is to be brought to make peace. Indisputably, timing would be of key importance to what is perhaps still at present an unimaginable step for most U.S. officials. If proposed prematurely, an initiative to ease sanctions on Russia would also risk backfiring politically, which is why it should be broached in entirely confidential talks with Russia. Sanctions relief should come only as part of a settlement, and should be accompanied by firm and binding guarantees that the sanctions would be automatically reimposed in the event of fresh Russian aggression.The failure of sanctions against Russia echoes a long series of such failures, against Cuba (for sixty years), Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and elsewhere. While they may have some utility as bargaining leverage in negotiations, this only applies — as in the case of Russia — if the United States is prepared to lift them in return for agreement. What is more, sanction-setting betrays a pattern of stickiness: Once legislated by Congress, U.S. sanctions have historically tended to become permanent.It is high time that the United States recognized the clear lessons of modern history and modified its approach to the intermittently useful — albeit deeply flawed — strategy of economic coercion.

With about 120 days remaining until Taiwanese voters head to the polls for the January 2024 presidential election, it's evident that Lai Ching-te, the candidate of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has established a clear lead over each individual contender (although not when the combined strength of the others is taken into account). Although some public opinion polling has shown a strong sentiment for change in 2024, Lai has been consistently ahead with support fluctuating at around 35 percent, while his opponents have scored an aggregate of around 50 percent since May. And his prospects have improved even more since the founder of electronics manufacturing giant Foxconn, Terry Gou, formally declared his candidacy in late August, further fragmenting Lai's opposition by creating a third opposition candidate alongside Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) and Hou Yu-ih from the Kuomintang (KMT). Even though Hou, Ko, and Gou have all declared a readiness to forge a coalition — a strategy that has emerged as the only plausible possibility of thwarting Lai's occupancy of the presidential palace – the prospect of each assuming a subordinate role in another's campaign likely remains highly unattractive to them, especially to Gou. Moreover, should any party display a willingness to make concessions, reaching consensus will likely require meticulous, confidential, and protracted negotiations. Given the current trend, a critical question looms large regarding the future of U.S.-China relations: Are Washington and Beijing prepared for another DPP administration in Taiwan led by Lai Ching-te, the self-proclaimed "political worker of Taiwan Independence?" Are the two powers ready for the unique set of risks that a Lai-led government in Taiwan could pose to their bilateral relations?As an avid baseball fan, Lai used to describe himself as a "relief pitcher" on the political mound, an observation elaborated by President Tsai Ing-wen, who praised Lai as a "skillful pitcher." Unfortunately, however, in terms of stability across the Taiwan Strait, what Lai could be skillful at is possibly delivering a "strikeout" scenario to the already fragile Sino-U.S.-Taiwan triangle.Lai's "strike one" could very well exhaust Beijing's strategic patience regarding peaceful unification. While discussions swirl about the possibility of Beijing having set a reunification deadline — some U.S. analysts argued for a 2027 timeline, others a 2035 deadline for forceful unification — these predictions often overlook the role that Taiwan's domestic politics could play in affecting Beijing's calculations. Beijing would likely be hesitant to confront a Taiwan leadership aligned with the "92 consensus" should the KMT's Hou pull off next year's presidential election. However, a third consecutive triumph for the DPP's presidential bid led by one of the mainland's least favorite Taiwanese politicians might lead Beijing to conclude that Taiwan's public sentiment has irreversibly shifted in favor of formal independence. If so, the prospects for much greater Chinese pressure on Taiwan – perhaps even a coercive takeover – could increase considerably."Strike two" on Lai's part would be the impact of his policies on the efficacy of Washington's longstanding "dual deterrence" strategy regarding the Taiwan Strait, an approach intended to discourage unilateral changes to the status quo by both Beijing and Taipei. Within the DPP, Lai is seen as a political figure deeply aligned with pro-independence forces, as witnessed by the more extreme stance he took during his challenge to President Tsai in the DPP primary in 2019. Lai's label, promoted at the time as the "golden grandson of Taiwan Independence" frequently evokes parallels with former Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian's moniker of "son of Taiwan."In recent months, some in the United States have seemed to cast doubt on Lai's stated intention to maintain the status quo. However, there is also strong support for Lai's pro-independence stance in Washington, especially in Congress. A Lai victory in next year's election would likely embolden support for Taiwan Independence in Congress and elsewhere and encourage him to alter President Tsai's relatively cautious stance on cross-strait issues and adopt more assertive pro-independence policies, thus undermining Washington's "dual deterrence" strategy.Lai's "strike three" would be the blow that he could deliver to Taiwan's economic prosperity. Despite President Tsai's effort to pursue economic diversification from China through initiatives such as the "New Southbound Policy," Taiwan's economic growth still largely relies on China. As Taiwan's biggest trading partner, China (Hong Kong included) accounted for nearly 40 percent of Taiwan's total trade in 2022. Taiwan's trade surplus with the mainland and Hong Kong even surged to $100.43 billion in 2022 from $66.66 billion in 2016. Such growth could be explained by China's tireless effort to woo Taiwan through economic incentives, as well as the geographically and culturally entwined relationship between Taiwan and the mainland.However, China has also been active in using economic disincentives, by stifling trade and exchanges on certain targeted commodities, to pressure Taiwan. Concerns have recently surfaced about China's possible intention to terminate the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan if Lai were to be elected. Although many argue that such a move itself would have only a limited impact on Taiwan's economy, the deeper implications for Taiwan could be substantially negative, as Taiwan's prosperity relies on investors' faith in a secure and stable environment.Of course, Lai rejects the notion that his presidency would constitute a "strikeout" for Taiwan. In a Bloomberg interview in August, Lai stressed his commitment to peace and the importance of upholding the status quo. In late August, he even playfully conveyed his willingness to share shrimp fried rice and bubble tea with Chinese President Xi Jinping in what was intended as a goodwill gesture.. In early September, Lai stated that he would "fight for peace" and seek cooperation with China if elected. In the eyes of many in Taiwan and across the globe, Lai's rebuttals present a compelling case. There are valid concerns regarding the KMT's pro-Beijing stance and the relative inexperience of the four-year-old TPP's ability to run a national government. These concerns revolve around the potential consequences: either strengthening China's sway and influence within Taiwan if the KMT should win, or weakening Taiwan's governance under the TPP at a time when the need for internal strength and unity is paramount in countering China's mounting pressure. Terry Gou's candidacy raises even more pronounced concerns, primarily stemming from the fact that Foxconn, the multinational company he founded, possesses billions of dollars in assets located within mainland China. This substantial economic stake potentially provides Beijing with significant leverage over a President Gou.These concerns have led many observers to view a government led by Lai as the least risky option, albeit not without its challenges.But a Lai victory in January 2024 will clearly pose major challenges to both Washington and Beijing. It is imperative that both capitals carefully think through the possible consequences that could result from such a development and consider policies designed to avert them. Doubling down on extreme opposition to a President Lai through coercive means (by Beijing) or greater political support for his pro-independence instincts (by Washington) could prove disastrous.

Last week saw former Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin retire from politics after a poor election showing, and join the Tony Blair Institute, where she will be "advising political leaders on their reform programs." The news raised some eyebrows for several reasons.For one, former British Prime Minister Blair's long history of advising authoritarians for money, as well as the Institute's own funding from the Saudi government, already sits awkwardly with the non-profit's original rationale of at "articulat[ing] a vision of liberal democracy that can garner substantial support," as well as "progressive values." Also there is Blair's leading role in the invasion of Iraq, which sits squarely at odds with Marin's hawkishness on Russian President Vladimir Putin's similarly illegal and disastrous invasion of Ukraine. Over her tenure, Marin rejected U.S. President Joe Biden's suggestion of giving Putin an "off-ramp" to end the war, offered to transfer fighter jets to Kyiv, and declared she would back Ukraine's war effort for as long as 15 years, because a lack of military victory would lead to "decades of this kind of behavior."But there's also the fact that Blair's institute was until recently at least partly funded by sanctioned Russian billionaire Moshe Kantor, a figure with close ties to the Kremlin and the largest shareholder in the strategically significant Russian fertilizer company Acron. As prime minister, Marin was one of the leading supporters of Western sanctions on Russia, calling for them to impact "the everyday lives of ordinary Russians," and vowing that Finland would grit its teeth through the "long winter" their blowback would cause. Thanks to those sanctions, Fins paid €5 billion more in electricity costs over 2022 and the country tipped into a recession, even if a mild winter meant predictions of blackouts didn't materialize. This was all meant to be worth it to defend the "values of a free and democratic world." Yet here Marin is, taking a paid position with an institute partly funded by a sanctioned, Kremlin-connected billionaire, and run by someone responsible for an illegal invasion of his own. Marin is not the only Western hawk who has displayed such hypocrisy. Since August, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas has been embroiled in a potentially career-jeopardizing scandal over her husband's business interests, when it was revealed a trucking company he co-owned continued to do business in Russia long after Moscow's invasion began. Worse, the company was part of the supply chain providing Russian security forces with tear gas — which means Kallas and her husband were indirectly profiting off the Kremlin's repression of anti-war protesters. Yet Kallas has been a strident hawk on the war. She has labeled calls for negotiations "very dangerous," has repeatedly called diplomacy to end the war mere "appeasement," banned tourist visas for ordinary Russians while urging others to do the same, and demanded tighter sanctions while admonishing local companies to find a "moral compass" and avoid deals that would let Moscow circumvent sanctions. Thanks to those sanctions, Estonia saw the EU's single biggest price hikes for food and fuel.Others may not have financial ties to Russia, but have histories of cozy relations with Kremlin-connected oligarchs or even Putin himself. Former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson took a hardline position on the war, insisting it could only end through total military victory instead of peace talks, vowing to "squeeze Russia from the global economy, piece by piece," and traveling to Kyiv to scuttle a reportedly tentative peace deal in the war's early months, preferring to inflict more military damage to Russia. Johnson, whose party received a deluge of Russian-connected donations since he became prime minister in 2019, has long been close with Russian oligarchs. He helped make the UK a destination for oligarchs to park their cash free from accountability, and had several personal relationships with them. That includes Evgeny Lebedev, son of an oligarch and former KGB spy who helped Putin win power and tried to help him win Western support for annexing Crimea. Johnson personally intervened on the younger Levedev's behalf to get him peerage in the House of Lords, despite a security risk warning from MI6. Johnson isn't alone among British prime ministers. Blair himself has engaged in hawkish rhetoric on the war, arguing for military defeat of Moscow as a way toward peace. Yet he had a close and friendly relationship with Putin when he was in 10 Downing Street, tacitly backing and admitting to sympathizing with the Russian leader's war in Chechnya, and even refusing to rule out advising him in exchange for money.In the United States, Hillary Clinton has been a vocal liberal hawk, suggesting early on that Ukraine be turned into an Afghanistan-like quagmire for Russia, and declaring the best way for the war to end "is for Ukraine to win." Clinton herself was once embroiled in a Russia-related scandal: while her office was responsible for helping approve a deal that gave Russian state atomic agency Rosatom control of large percentage U.S. uranium reserves, her husband, former president Bill Clinton, received a $500,000 speaking fee from a Kremlin-connected bank that promoted the stock of the Canadian mining company being purchased by the Russian firm.Putin, whom Clinton visited at his home on the trip, personally thanked Clinton for the speech. Back in 2006, he himself lamented that, even as he expressed unease about Putin's authoritarianism, the U.S. government was being too critical of the Russian leader. Even some ultra-hawkish columnists once started out with far less strident positions on Putin. Atlantic columnist Anne Applebaum, who recently wrote that "even the worst successor imaginable, even the bloodiest general or most rabid propagandist, will immediately be preferable to Putin," once wrote about the Russian leader's "bold and unexpected decision" to ally himself with the United States after September 11 and argued that the Russian military's friendliness with U.S. adversaries and Putin's disinterest in a free press didn't mean "we shouldn't cooperate with Russia." Chess champion Garry Kasporov, who recently all but accused Biden and his team of being in cahoots with Putin for being nominally open to the idea of negotiating, once called Putin and his coterie "people with whom the West could do business," and explicitly justified his Chechen war. Explaining that the Chechen rebels were "bandits" and needed to be cracked down on for the government to "win support for painful economic reforms," he urged the West to "not demand that Mr. Putin immediately halt the Chechen operation" or threaten cutting off financial assistance over it. It's striking that at a time when McCarthyite accusations are rife in Western debate on the war and on the subject of diplomacy specifically, so many of those who have taken the most uncompromising positions publicly either have a history of more pragmatic stances, or of their own financial and personal connections to Kremlin-linked figures and Putin himself. It raises the question of how sincere the maximalist rhetoric and drive for escalation over diplomacy really is, and whether at least some hawks are engaging in risky and reckless behavior they don't fully believe — perhaps as a form of overcompensation in a jinogistic climate.

The Washington Post editorial board declared on Wednesday that the United States must steel itself for a "long struggle in Ukraine."


"No end to the carnage is in sight, and calls for a negotiated solution are wishful thinking at this point," the Post argued. "As [Russian President Vladimir] Putin invests in Russia's war economy, he shows no signs of giving up his fantasy of Russian neo-imperial glory."


After 18 months of grinding war, there is indeed reason to think that the war will continue far into the future, and there's plenty of evidence to suggest American predictions that Ukraine could win in the near term were overly optimistic. But, in its endorsement of a long-term approach to the conflict, the Post leaves out all the "wishful thinking" on which a theory of decisive Ukrainian victory relies.


One such rosy assumption is that Ukraine can continue fighting more or less indefinitely so long as it continues to enjoy firm backing from the West. That claim ignores evidence pointing to high casualty rates among Ukrainian troops, not to mention a recent New York Times report suggesting that 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers have died and an additional 100,000 have been injured since the war began, according to U.S. officials.


While the Post does cite the Times' reporting, it misses one of the piece's most important revelations: Casualty data suggests that the war has escalated dramatically over the past year. While total casualties for the first nine months of the war were estimated at 200,000, an additional 300,000 soldiers have been killed or injured since. In other words, the rate of combined casualties went from 20,000 per month to more than 33,000 per month in the war's current phase.


Ukrainian leaders have acknowledged this sharp uptick in casualties and jettisoned Western tactics in order to slow the blood-letting, leading some U.S. officials to accuse Kyiv of being excessively "casualty averse," as the Times notes in its article.


Macabre undertones aside, it's worth considering that Ukraine, which has refused to share casualty data with the U.S., likely has a better picture of the demographic realities that it faces in its battle with far-larger Russia than Washington does. Officials in Kyiv are also more acutely aware that their efforts to conscript new soldiers have been increasingly undermined by widespread corruption and draft dodging.


Another bit of magical thinking put forward by the Post is the claim that, if Washington had simply moved faster and supplied Ukraine with better weapons (and more of them), then the current offensive would have surely been a success. The corollary to this line of thinking is that the U.S. simply needs to increase the quality and quantity of its military aid, and battlefield success will ensue.


But, as Branko Marcetic recently noted in RS, this theory goes against the broad view of military experts, who argue that "no weapon would be a 'magic bullet' against the dug-in Russian defenses." It also ignores the political realities facing the Biden administration. The U.S. has already given Ukraine more than $43 billion in military aid since the war began, and Congress is now considering a new spending package that includes an additional $13 billion in weapons for Kyiv.


This generous support represents one of the largest security assistance programs in American history, but recent polling suggests that voters have become increasingly skeptical of the need to continue it, raising the specter that Ukraine could factor into President Joe Biden's presidential campaign.


Other prominent examples of supposedly pro-Ukraine magical thinking include the widely-held belief that Kyiv will emerge from the conflict as a strong, democratic state, as well as the dubious theory that Ukraine's stalwart defense is the only thing stopping Russia from attacking NATO directly.


"In the event that Mr. Putin succeeds in subjugating Ukraine, there is reason to believe his next targets would include NATO front-line members that the United States is obligated by treaty to defend — not only with weapons but also with troops," the Post argued, without deigning to explain why a war-weary Russia would like its chances in a fight against the world's most powerful military alliance.


Of course, none of this is to say that a diplomatic push would be guaranteed to succeed. But, while the U.S. continues to argue that there is no partner for peace in Russia, it's hard to ignore the fact that, as far as the public record shows, Washington has yet to make any attempt to tie its strong support for Kyiv with a clear plan to get Moscow to the negotiating table. Perhaps it's time to give a new kind of wishful thinking a try.


In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:


— A growing number of U.S. officials have started to wonder whether Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was right to call for peace negotiations with Russia last November, when Ukraine had momentum on the battlefield and fighting was set to slow due to wintery conditions, according to Politico. "We may have missed a window to push for earlier talks," an anonymous official told Politico. "Milley had a point." Notably, the official added a caveat that few policymakers believe Russia has been serious about peace talks at any point since the war began. And National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan played down the increasing concerns about a potential quagmire on Tuesday, telling reporters that Kyiv's slow advances in the east are part of a "methodical, systematic" retaking of territory.


— Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Sweden, Denmark and Greece over the weekend in a trip aimed at shoring up diplomatic and military support among Ukraine's smaller European backers, according to the Guardian. Zelensky secured a promise of a new military aid package from Croatia's prime minister following a meeting in Athens and posed for photos with the Danish prime minister in an F-16, symbolizing Copenhagen's decision to give Kyiv 19 of the advanced fighter jets.


— Ukraine is in talks with insurers to create a safe shipping corridor through the Black Sea following Russia's decision last month to rip up an agreement that allowed Ukraine to export its grain via the waterway, according to the Wall Street Journal. The tentative plan would have Kyiv take on some of the liability for any damage caused to grain ships, which would bring down the cost of insurance for shipping companies to a more manageable level. The vessels would travel via a new shipping lane that starts in Odessa and hugs Ukraine's shore until it reaches parts of the sea belonging to NATO member states Romania and Bulgaria.


U.S. State Department news:


The State Department did not hold a press briefing this week.

Anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions are causing irreversible climate change. To address this issue, the European Union (EU) committed to strong decreases in GHGs emissions. However, to reach carbon (C) neutrality by 2050 it will also be necessary to implement atmospheric C removals by natural sinks, such as soils. To partially compensate for CO2 emissions, the 4 per 1000 initiative of 2015 proposed an annual 4‰ soil organic carbon (SOC) stock increase in the first 30-40 cm depth of the soil. Yet, the feasibility of such an ambitious target is still under debate because it may require substantial and rapid changes in agricultural practices that would be hard to achieve. The most efficient way to increase SOC stocks is to increase the C input to the soil. Pro-cess-based biogeochemical models can simulate the dynamics of SOC and are increasingly used to support decision-makers on SOC mitigation policies. Despite the numerous models available to describe the SOC dynamics, simulations are still somewhat unreliable. This is because uncertainties not only derive from the mechanistic structure of the models and the processes included, but also from the input data and the parameter values used.The objective of this thesis is to estimate the C input required to yearly increase SOC stocks by 4‰ in European croplands. To solve this problem, we build an inverse modeling approach and apply it to a multi-model ensemble to assess the uncertainties of the estimations according to different representations of the SOC dynamics. Then, to improve the simulation of SOC stocks, we test a new, statistically derived, parametrization technique.As a first attempt to provide insights for policymakers, we generate maps of the C input required to reach the 4‰ target in the whole European cropland area, under two scenarios of climate change. Our study demonstrates that there are substantial uncertainties around the C input required to reach a 4‰ target. However, a general pattern emerges at the European cropland scale, where the 4‰ target seems feasible under future scenarios of climate change, only assuming drastic increases of C input to the soil. In particular, higher C input is required in Northern Europe, while higher uncertainties are associated with the European South. The high variability of the simulated C input requirements highlights the advantage of using multi-model ensembles, in order to consider the range of uncertainty linked to their different mechanistic structures. Yet, multi-model ensembles still tend to underestimate the C input required to increase SOC stocks. Major efforts should be made to improve model simulations, especially to capture the effect of additional C input on the accumulation of SOC. At a local scale, the calibration of model parameters was necessary to fit observed SOC stock variations. When long-term SOC stock monitoring is not available, the necessity for improved parametrization techniques emerges. The calibration that we proposed at the European scale improved the simulation of first-year SOC stocks. However, it increased the divergence of predicted SOC stocks across models. Future work should focus on the reduction of model uncertainties in order to provide reliable predictions of future SOC stock variations and their related processes. ; Les émissions anthropiques de gaz à effet de serre (GES) provoquent un changement climatique irréversible. L'Union Européenne (UE) s'est engagée à diminuer fortement ses émissions de GES. Cependant, pour atteindre la neutralité carbone (C) d'ici 2050, elle devra également séquestrer du C atmosphérique dans des puits naturels, tels que les sols. Pour compenser partiellement les émissions de CO2, l'initiative 4 pour 1000 a proposé en 2015 un objectif d'augmentation annuelle de 4‰ des stocks de carbone organique du sol (COS) dans les 30-40 premiers cm de profondeur du sol. Pourtant, la faisabilité d'une telle augmentation fait l'objet de débats car elle pourrait nécessiter des changements substantiels et rapides dans les pratiques agricoles qui seraient difficiles à mettre en œuvre. Le moyen le plus efficace pour accroître les stocks de COS est d'augmenter l'apport de C dans le sol. Les modèles basés sur les processus biogéochimiques peuvent simuler la dynamique du COS et sont de plus en plus utilisés pour aider les décideurs dans leurs politiques d'atténuation du COS. Cependant, malgré les nombreux modèles disponibles pour décrire la dynamique du COS, les simulations sont encore peu fiables. En effet, les incertitudes ne proviennent pas seulement de la structure mécaniste des modèles et des processus qu'ils prennent en compte, mais aussi des données utilisées en entrée et des valeurs des paramètres.L'objectif de cette thèse est d'estimer l'apport de C nécessaire pour augmenter annuellement les stocks de COS de 4‰ dans les terres cultivées européennes. Pour cela, nous avons construit une modélisation inverse et l'avons appliquée à un ensemble multi-modèle. Nous avons ainsi évalué les incertitudes dans les estimations des entrées de C selon différentes représentations de la dynamique du COS. Ensuite, pour améliorer la simulation des stocks de COS, nous avons testé une nouvelle paramétrisation issue de dérivée statistiques.Afin de fournir un premier aperçu aux décideurs politiques, nous avons généré des cartes de l'apport de C nécessaire pour atteindre l'objectif de 4‰ dans l'ensemble des terres cultivées européennes, et ce, pour deux scénarios de changement climatique.Notre étude a démontré qu'il existe des incertitudes substantielles autour de l'apport de C nécessaire. Cependant, un profil général émerge, où atteindre un objectif d'augmentation de 4‰ du stock de COS à l'échelle des terres cultivées européennes semble réalisable pour les scénarios futurs de changement climatique seulement via des augmentations drastiques de d'apport de C. En particulier, un apport de C plus élevé est nécessaire en Europe du Nord, tandis qu'en Europe du Sud les incertitudes sont plus élevées. La grande variabilité dans les simulations d'apport de C nécessaires à l'objectif 4‰ souligne l'avantage d'utiliser des ensembles multi-modèles, afin de prendre en compte la gamme d'incertitudes liées à leurs différentes structures mécanistiques. Cependant, les ensembles multi-modèles ont encore tendance à sous-estimer l'apport de C nécessaire pour augmenter les stocks de COS. Des progrès importants doivent donc encore être faits pour améliorer les simulations des modèles, en particulier pour saisir l'effet d'un apport supplémentaire de C sur l'accumulation de COS. A l'échelle locale, la calibration des paramètres des modèles a été nécessaire pour simuler les variations observées des stocks de COS. Lorsque le suivi à long terme du stock de COS n'est pas disponible, il est nécessaire d'améliorer les techniques de paramétrisation. La calibration que nous avons proposée à l'échelle européenne a amélioré la simulation des stocks de COS de la première année mais a augmenté la divergence des stocks de COS prédits par les modèles. De futurs travaux se concentrant sur la réduction des incertitudes des modèles afin de fournir des prédictions fiables des variations futures des stocks de COS et des processus associés sont donc essentiels.

Anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions are causing irreversible climate change. To address this issue, the European Union (EU) committed to strong decreases in GHGs emissions. However, to reach carbon (C) neutrality by 2050 it will also be necessary to implement atmospheric C removals by natural sinks, such as soils. To partially compensate for CO2 emissions, the 4 per 1000 initiative of 2015 proposed an annual 4‰ soil organic carbon (SOC) stock increase in the first 30-40 cm depth of the soil. Yet, the feasibility of such an ambitious target is still under debate because it may require substantial and rapid changes in agricultural practices that would be hard to achieve. The most efficient way to increase SOC stocks is to increase the C input to the soil. Pro-cess-based biogeochemical models can simulate the dynamics of SOC and are increasingly used to support decision-makers on SOC mitigation policies. Despite the numerous models available to describe the SOC dynamics, simulations are still somewhat unreliable. This is because uncertainties not only derive from the mechanistic structure of the models and the processes included, but also from the input data and the parameter values used.The objective of this thesis is to estimate the C input required to yearly increase SOC stocks by 4‰ in European croplands. To solve this problem, we build an inverse modeling approach and apply it to a multi-model ensemble to assess the uncertainties of the estimations according to different representations of the SOC dynamics. Then, to improve the simulation of SOC stocks, we test a new, statistically derived, parametrization technique.As a first attempt to provide insights for policymakers, we generate maps of the C input required to reach the 4‰ target in the whole European cropland area, under two scenarios of climate change. Our study demonstrates that there are substantial uncertainties around the C input required to reach a 4‰ target. However, a general pattern emerges at the European cropland scale, where the 4‰ target seems feasible under future scenarios of climate change, only assuming drastic increases of C input to the soil. In particular, higher C input is required in Northern Europe, while higher uncertainties are associated with the European South. The high variability of the simulated C input requirements highlights the advantage of using multi-model ensembles, in order to consider the range of uncertainty linked to their different mechanistic structures. Yet, multi-model ensembles still tend to underestimate the C input required to increase SOC stocks. Major efforts should be made to improve model simulations, especially to capture the effect of additional C input on the accumulation of SOC. At a local scale, the calibration of model parameters was necessary to fit observed SOC stock variations. When long-term SOC stock monitoring is not available, the necessity for improved parametrization techniques emerges. The calibration that we proposed at the European scale improved the simulation of first-year SOC stocks. However, it increased the divergence of predicted SOC stocks across models. Future work should focus on the reduction of model uncertainties in order to provide reliable predictions of future SOC stock variations and their related processes. ; Les émissions anthropiques de gaz à effet de serre (GES) provoquent un changement climatique irréversible. L'Union Européenne (UE) s'est engagée à diminuer fortement ses émissions de GES. Cependant, pour atteindre la neutralité carbone (C) d'ici 2050, elle devra également séquestrer du C atmosphérique dans des puits naturels, tels que les sols. Pour compenser partiellement les émissions de CO2, l'initiative 4 pour 1000 a proposé en 2015 un objectif d'augmentation annuelle de 4‰ des stocks de carbone organique du sol (COS) dans les 30-40 premiers cm de profondeur du sol. Pourtant, la faisabilité d'une telle augmentation fait l'objet de débats car elle pourrait nécessiter des changements substantiels et rapides dans les pratiques agricoles qui seraient difficiles à mettre en œuvre. Le moyen le plus efficace pour accroître les stocks de COS est d'augmenter l'apport de C dans le sol. Les modèles basés sur les processus biogéochimiques peuvent simuler la dynamique du COS et sont de plus en plus utilisés pour aider les décideurs dans leurs politiques d'atténuation du COS. Cependant, malgré les nombreux modèles disponibles pour décrire la dynamique du COS, les simulations sont encore peu fiables. En effet, les incertitudes ne proviennent pas seulement de la structure mécaniste des modèles et des processus qu'ils prennent en compte, mais aussi des données utilisées en entrée et des valeurs des paramètres.L'objectif de cette thèse est d'estimer l'apport de C nécessaire pour augmenter annuellement les stocks de COS de 4‰ dans les terres cultivées européennes. Pour cela, nous avons construit une modélisation inverse et l'avons appliquée à un ensemble multi-modèle. Nous avons ainsi évalué les incertitudes dans les estimations des entrées de C selon différentes représentations de la dynamique du COS. Ensuite, pour améliorer la simulation des stocks de COS, nous avons testé une nouvelle paramétrisation issue de dérivée statistiques.Afin de fournir un premier aperçu aux décideurs politiques, nous avons généré des cartes de l'apport de C nécessaire pour atteindre l'objectif de 4‰ dans l'ensemble des terres cultivées européennes, et ce, pour deux scénarios de changement climatique.Notre étude a démontré qu'il existe des incertitudes substantielles autour de l'apport de C nécessaire. Cependant, un profil général émerge, où atteindre un objectif d'augmentation de 4‰ du stock de COS à l'échelle des terres cultivées européennes semble réalisable pour les scénarios futurs de changement climatique seulement via des augmentations drastiques de d'apport de C. En particulier, un apport de C plus élevé est nécessaire en Europe du Nord, tandis qu'en Europe du Sud les incertitudes sont plus élevées. La grande variabilité dans les simulations d'apport de C nécessaires à l'objectif 4‰ souligne l'avantage d'utiliser des ensembles multi-modèles, afin de prendre en compte la gamme d'incertitudes liées à leurs différentes structures mécanistiques. Cependant, les ensembles multi-modèles ont encore tendance à sous-estimer l'apport de C nécessaire pour augmenter les stocks de COS. Des progrès importants doivent donc encore être faits pour améliorer les simulations des modèles, en particulier pour saisir l'effet d'un apport supplémentaire de C sur l'accumulation de COS. A l'échelle locale, la calibration des paramètres des modèles a été nécessaire pour simuler les variations observées des stocks de COS. Lorsque le suivi à long terme du stock de COS n'est pas disponible, il est nécessaire d'améliorer les techniques de paramétrisation. La calibration que nous avons proposée à l'échelle européenne a amélioré la simulation des stocks de COS de la première année mais a augmenté la divergence des stocks de COS prédits par les modèles. De futurs travaux se concentrant sur la réduction des incertitudes des modèles afin de fournir des prédictions fiables des variations futures des stocks de COS et des processus associés sont donc essentiels.

En este estudio se realizó una encuesta de preferencias declaradas con un diseño experimental D-eficiente utilizando el software Ngene, a una muestra representativa de la ciudad de CuencaEcuador, para un viaje desde el hogar ya sea al lugar de trabajo o al centro de estudios, para lo cual se seleccionaron aleatoriamente ocho parroquias urbanas, a su vez, de cada parroquia seleccionada se eligieron sectores de manera aleatoria para la aplicación de la respectiva encuesta. Luego, con los datos conductuales recogidos se estimaron, mediante el software BIOGEME (Bierlaire, 2003, 2009), ocho modelos de elección discreta, de los cuales, las mejores especificaciones resultaron ser el modelo Logit Multinomial (LMN) y Logit Anidado con los que se obtuvo evidencia de que para un día sin lluvia el valor de los ahorros de tiempo de viaje estaría entre $2,40/hora (MNL) y $0,60/hora (NL); el valor de los ahorros de tiempo de espera fue de $1,80/hora (MNL y NL)) y el valor de los ahorros por cuadra caminada estaría entre $0,27/cuadra (MNL) y $0,22/cuadra (NL); mientras que para un día con lluvia el valor de los ahorros de tiempo de viaje estaría entre $4,20/hora (MNL) y $6,60/hora (NL); el valor de los ahorros de tiempo de espera sería de $3,60/hora (MNL) y $6,00 (NL) y el valor de los ahorros por cuadra caminada estaría entre $0,59/cuadra (NL) y $0,39/cuadra (MNL). Además, se evidencia que hogares que en promedio tienen ingresos mensuales altos, entre $1001-$3000 o más, valoran entre 83% y 91% más su tiempo de viaje; entre 40% y 53% más su tiempo de espera y entre 10% y 43% más sus cuadras caminadas en un día sin lluvia y con lluvia respectivamente. Los resultados válidos tanto para realizar la valoración de los atributos de servicio de transporte, como para hacer predicciones o inferencias son los reportados por el modelo Logit Anidado (NL), ya que este relaja algunos de los supuestos restrictivos del modelo Logit Multinomial (MNL); sin embargo, se presentan los resultados de los dos modelos con fines comparativos. En el análisis de escenarios de política pública se encuentra que si la Dirección de Gestión de Movilidad planifica impulsar el uso del tranvía como columna vertebral del sistema de movilidad en Cuenca un incremento en su tarifa podría no ser la vía más adecuada, pues provocaría una disminución sustancial de su demanda que podría hacer no sostenible la explotación de este servicio, además si se desea impulsar la demanda de buses, una disminución en el tiempo de espera de bus generaría un notable aumento de su demanda debiéndose aumentar la capacidad del sistema para hacer frente a la demanda esperada; de la misma forma, si se decide aumentar el costo de viaje de los buses habría un efecto sustitución desde los buses hacia el tranvía. Así mismo, si se desea mitigar la demanda de vehículos privados, aumentos en los costos de estacionamiento y costos de viaje como impuestos al rodaje junto a mejoras de variables de servicio como menores tiempos de viaje o de espera de transporte público, vinculado con la reducción de frecuencias de servicio de buses y una adecuada red vial en Cuenca en el modelo de demanda de transporte estimado, podrían resultar políticas públicas eficientes para democratizar el espacio público y reducir la congestión, obteniendo de esta forma beneficios económicos sociales en la reducción del tiempo de viaje de los usuarios. De esta manera se obtiene evidencia empírica de que la sensibilidad de los usuarios actuales o potenciales de los diferentes modos de transporte urbano cambia significativamente ante variaciones en las variables de nivel de servicio de los diferentes modos de transporte. ; In this study a stated preference survey was conducted with a D-efficient experimental design using Ngene software, to a representative sample of the city of Cuenca-Ecuador, for a trip from home either to the workplace or to the study center, for which eight urban parishes were randomly selected, in turn, from each selected parish sectors were randomly chosen for the application of the respective survey. Then, with the behavioral data collected, eight discrete choice models were estimated using BIOGEME software (Bierlaire, 2003, 2009), of which the best specifications were the Multinomial Logit model (LMN) and the Nested Logit model, with which evidence was obtained that for a day without rain the value of travel time savings would be between $2.40/hour (MNL) and $0.60/hour (NL); the value of wait time savings was $1.80/hour (MNL and NL) and the value of savings per block walked would be between $0.27/block (MNL) and $0.22/block (NL); while for a day with rain the value of travel time savings would be between $4.20/hour (MNL) and $6.60/hour (NL); the value of waiting time savings would be between $3.60/hour (MNL) and $6.00 (NL) and the value of savings per block walked would be between $0.59/block (NL) and $0.39/block (MNL). In addition, it is evident that households that on average have high monthly incomes, between $1001-$3000 or more, value between 83% and 91% more their travel time; between 40% and 53% more their waiting time and between 10% and 43% more their blocks walked on a non-rainy and rainy day respectively. The valid results for both the valuation of transportation service attributes and for making predictions or inferences are those reported by the Nested Logit (NL) model, since it relaxes some of the restrictive assumptions of the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model; however, the results of the two models are presented for comparative purposes. In the analysis of public policy scenarios, it is found that if the Directorate of Mobility Management plans to promote the use of the tramway as the backbone of the mobility system in Cuenca, a fare increase may not be the most appropriate way, since it would cause a substantial decrease in demand, which could make the operation of this service unsustainable; moreover, if it is desired to boost the demand for buses, a decrease in bus waiting time would generate a significant increase in demand and the system's capacity would have to be increased to meet the expected demand; Likewise, if it is decided to increase the cost of bus travel, there would be a substitution effect from buses to the streetcar. Likewise, if it is desired to mitigate the demand for private vehicles, increases in parking costs and travel costs such as road taxes together with improvements in service variables such as reduced travel times or waiting times for public transport, linked to the reduction of bus service frequencies and an adequate road network in Cuenca in the estimated transport demand model, could result in efficient public policies to democratize public space and reduce congestion, thus obtaining social economic benefits in the reduction of travel time of users. In this way, empirical evidence is obtained that the sensitivity of current or potential users of the different modes of urban transport changes significantly in response to variations in the level of service variables of the different modes of transport. ; Magíster en Economía ; Cuenca

Penelititan ini bertujuan untuk menemukan bukti empiris tentang faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi ketepatan waktu pelaporan keuangan perusahaan pertambangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Faktor-faktor yang diuji dalam penelitian ini yaitu: kompleksitas operasi, ukuran perusahaan, likuiditas, dan umur perusahaan. Sampel dari penelitian ini menggunakan 40 perusahaan tambang yang konsisten terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode tahun 2016-2019 yang diambil dengan menggunakan metode purposive sampling. Faktor-faktor tersebut kemudian diuji dengan menggunakan regresi logistic pada tingkat signifikansi 5 persen. Hasil penelitian mengidentifikasi bahwa likuiditas berpengaruh positif pada ketepatan waktu pelaporan keuangan perusahaan, sedangkan ukuran perusahaan, kompleksitas operasi, dan umur perusahaan tidak berpengaruh pada ketepatan waktu pelaporan keuangan perusahaan pertambangan yang terdafar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. DAFTAR PUSTAKAAdrianti, R. (2019). 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