Search results

Key words: sports activities, sports activities legal regulation, temporary laws, ambushmarketing, image rights, local rulemaking The article analyses the legal regulation of the use of intellectualproperty in sports activities. The relevance of the study is justified by the fact that theincome of the global sports industry is increasingly depending on the use of the intellectualproperty by sports organizations.The author notices that adoption of temporary laws aimed at protecting the intellectualproperty rights of sports organizations who organize major sporting events ina country are distinctive features of sports activities. There were two similar laws inthe Ukrainian legislation. Although these laws contained some gaps, this experienceshould become a basis for the introduction of the concept of ambush marketing on aregular basis in the domestic law.Analysis of international agreements in the sporting sphere shows that nowadaysamong the world sports organizations, only intellectual property of InternationalOlympic Committee has an exclusive basis of protection. At the same time, the factthat in general the use and protection of intellectual property is given too little attentionin international agreements in the field of sports gives greater importance tolocal regulations adopted by sports authorities.According to the established practices of foreign sports organizations, professionalrules and contracts between the athlete and the organization contains mutual restrictionsof the use of a number of intellectual property objects constituting the athlete'simage. To date, in Ukrainian practice, only regulations and contracts of several footballorganizations contain the similar provisions, which at the same time have a numberof shortcomings. One of the issues is terminological ambiguity in image rightslegal phenomena, which is still new to Ukrainian practice, and therefore requires theconsistency of definitions between different sports organizations.Thus, although Ukrainian legislation creates the background for domestic sportsorganizations to benefit from their intellectual property, it still requires the adoptionof some new important definitions. ; Ключові слова: спортивна діяльність, правове регулювання спортивної діяльності,закони тимчасової дії, паразитичний маркетинг, право на образ, іміджеві права,локальна нормотворчість У статті міститься огляд нормативно-правових актів, що регулюють відносини у спор-тивній діяльності в розрізі використання об'єктів права інтелектуальної власності у сферіспорту. На основі аналізу законодавства України, міжнародних договорів і особливостейлокальної нормотворчості визначено проблемні аспекти розпорядження об'єктами праваінтелектуальної власності у вітчизняному спорті. Окреслено світові тенденції, що роз-кривають специфіку використання об'єктів права інтелектуальної власності у спорті таповинні стати орієнтиром для законодавця та спортивних організацій України. Список використаних джерел: 1. Clark J. Changing the game. Outlook for the global sports market to 2015. PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 2011. P. 40 URL: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/hospitality-leisure/pdf/changing-the-game-outlook-for-the-global-sports-market-to-2015.pdf (дата звернення 30.04.2021). 2. Лавренюк О. Ю. Цивільно-правове регулювання відносин інтелектуальної власності у сфері спорту : дис. … канд. юрид. наук. Одеса, 2019. 236 с. 3. Про фізичну культуру і спорт : Закон України від 24.12.93 № 3809-XII. Відомості Верховної Ради України. 1994. № 14. С. 80. 4. Про підтримку олімпійського, паралімпійського руху та спорту вищих досягнень в Україні : Закон України від 14.09.2000 № 1954-III. Відомості Верховної Ради України. 2000. № 43. С. 370. 5. Про антидопінговий контроль у спорті : Закон України від 07.02.2017 № 1835-VIII. Відомості Верховної Ради України. 2017. № 11. С. 102. 6. Про організацію та проведення фінальної частини чемпіонату Європи 2012 року з футболу в Україні : Закон України від 19.04.2007 № 962-V. Відомості Верховної Ради України. 2007. № 31. С. 405. 7. WIPO. Sport & IP — Licenses and Sponsorships in Sport. URL: http://www.wipo.int/ip-sport/en/licenses.html (дата звернення 08.04.2021). 8. Дорошенко Д. О. Захист від паразитичного маркетингу як один з пріоритетів спортивного права України / Тези доповідей міжнародної науково-практичної конференції «Спортивне право України: сучасний стан і перспективи розвитку» (19 жовтня 2018 року). Навчально-науковий «Центр спортивного права», Запорізький національний університет, Запоріжжя, 2018. C. 74. 9. Brazil. General Law of the World Cup. Law No. 12.663 of June 5, 2012 URL: https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/335085 (дата звернення 08.04.2021). 10. Cape Town, South Africa. 2010 FIFA World Cup By-law, 2009. Published in Province of Western Cape: Provincial Gazette no. 6594 on 16 January 2009 URL: https://openbylaws.org.za/za-cpt/act/by-law/2009/2010-fifa-world-cup/eng/ (дата звернення 30.03.2021). 11. Про забезпечення охорони та захисту прав інтелектуальної власності УЄФА під час проведення в Україні фінальних матчів Ліги чемпіонів УЄФА та Ліги чемпіонів УЄФА серед жінок сезону 2017/2018 : Закон України від 22.05.2018 № 2444-VIII. Відомості Верховної Ради України. 2018. № 22. С. 194. 12. Major Events Management Act 2007. Public Act 2007 No 35. Date of assent 28 August 2007. URL: https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2007/0035/latest/DLM411987.html (дата звернення 30.03.2021). 13. Організація Об'єднаних Націй. Найробський договір про охорону Олімпійського символу (Найробі, 26 вересня 1981 року). URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_995#Text (дата звернення 30.03.2021). 14. Міжнародний Олімпійський комітет. Олімпійська хартія 2020 - DidWeDe, Лозанна, Швейцарія. URL: http://noc-ukr.org/about/officialdocuments/olimpiyska-khartiya/ (дата звернення 30.03.2021). 15. Parrish R. Sports law and policy in the European Union. Manchester University Press. 2003. P. 271. 16. World Athletics. Book C - C2. TECHNICAL RULES (In force from 1 November 2019 and amended on 31 January 2020) URL: https://www.worldathletics.org/about-iaaf/documents/book-of-rules (дата звернення 30.03.2021). 17. Венедиктов В. С. Трудовое право Украины (Общая часть). Харьков : НУВД, 2004. С. 187. 18. University of New Hampshire - Franklin Pierce School of Law. IP Mall. PREMIER LEAGUE CONTRACT URL: https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/Agent%20Contracts%20Between%20Players%20&%20Their%20Agents/6_PREMIER%20LEAGUE%20PLAYERS%20CONTRACT.pdf (дата звернення 30.03.2021). 19. Галузева Угода між Громадською спілкою «Федерація футболу України», Об'єднанням професіональних футбольних клубів України «Прем'єр-Ліга», об'єднанням футбольних клубів «Професіональна футбольна ліга України», та Всеукраїнською професійною спілкою «Футбол України», Всеукраїнською асоціацією футболістів-професіоналів у сфері професіонального футболу України на 2017-2022 роки. Київ-2017. URL: http://dev.pfl.ua/docs/07d3098c0649d1810a8a75fb1f1740a7.pdf (дата звернення 30.03.2021). 20. Федерація футболу України. РЕГЛАМЕНТ Федерації футболу України зі статусу і трансферу футболістів. Київ-2018 URL: https://uaf.ua/about-ffu/library (дата звернення 30.03.2021). 21. The Football Association Premier League L.imited. Handbook Season 2020/21 URL: https://resources.premierleague.com/premierleague/document/ 2020/09/11/dc7e76c1-f78d-45a2-be4a-4c6bc33368fa/2020-21-PL-Handbook-110920.pdf (дата звернення 30.03.2021). 22. Turkish Airlains EoroLeague. EUROLEAGUE BYLAWS. URL: https://www.euroleague.net/rs/85b6m5hxnomx8xap/84bd1f8d-134d-42a0-a8ee-cd688d29aaa2/d0c/filename/201718elbylaws.pdf (дата звернення 30.03.2021). ===================== 1. Clark J. Changing the game. Outlook for the global sports market to 2015. PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 2011. P. 40 URL: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/hospitality-leisure/pdf/changing-the-game-outlook-for-the-global-sports-market-to-2015.pdf (data zvernennia 30.04.2021). 2. Lavreniuk O. Yu. Tsyvilno-pravove rehuliuvannia vidnosyn intelektualnoi vlasnosti u sferi sportu : dys. … kand. yuryd. nauk. Odesa, 2019. 236 s. 3. Pro fizychnu kulturu i sport : Zakon Ukrainy vid 24.12.93 № 3809-XII. Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. 1994. № 14. S. 80. 4. Pro pidtrymku olimpiiskoho, paralimpiiskoho rukhu ta sportu vyshchykh dosiahnen v Ukraini : Zakon Ukrainy vid 14.09.2000 № 1954-III. Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. 2000. № 43. S. 370. 5. Pro antydopinhovyi kontrol u sporti : Zakon Ukrainy vid 07.02.2017 № 1835-VIII. Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. 2017. № 11. S. 102. 6. Pro orhanizatsiiu ta provedennia finalnoi chastyny chempionatu Yevropy 2012 roku z futbolu v Ukraini : Zakon Ukrainy vid 19.04.2007 № 962-V. Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. 2007. № 31. S. 405. 7. WIPO. Sport & IP — Licenses and Sponsorships in Sport. URL: http://www.wipo.int/ip-sport/en/licenses.html (data zvernennia 08.04.2021). 8. Doroshenko D. O. Zakhyst vid parazytychnoho marketynhu yak odyn z priorytetiv sportyvnoho prava Ukrainy / Tezy dopovidei mizhnarodnoi naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii «Sportyvne pravo Ukrainy: suchasnyi stan i perspektyvy rozvytku» (19 zhovtnia 2018 roku). Navchalno-naukovyi «Tsentr sportyvnoho prava», Zaporizkyi natsionalnyi universytet, Zaporizhzhia, 2018. C. 74. 9. Brazil. General Law of the World Cup. Law No. 12.663 of June 5, 2012 URL: https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/335085 (data zvernennia 08.04.2021). 10. Cape Town, South Africa. 2010 FIFA World Cup By-law, 2009. Published in Province of Western Cape: Provincial Gazette no. 6594 on 16 January 2009 URL: https://openbylaws.org.za/za-cpt/act/by-law/2009/2010-fifa-world-cup/eng/ (data zvernennia 30.03.2021). 11. Pro zabezpechennia okhorony ta zakhystu prav intelektualnoi vlasnosti UIeFA pid chas provedennia v Ukraini finalnykh matchiv Lihy chempioniv UIeFA ta Lihy chempioniv UIeFA sered zhinok sezonu 2017/2018 : Zakon Ukrainy vid 22.05.2018 № 2444-VIII. Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy. 2018. № 22. S. 194. 12. Major Events Management Act 2007. Public Act 2007 No 35. Date of assent 28 August 2007. URL: https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2007/0035/latest/DLM411987.html (data zvernennia 30.03.2021). 13. Orhanizatsiia Ob'iednanykh Natsii. Nairobskyi dohovir pro okhoronu Olimpiiskoho symvolu (Nairobi, 26 veresnia 1981 roku). URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_995#Text (data zvernennia 30.03.2021). 14. Mizhnarodnyi Olimpiiskyi komitet. Olimpiiska khartiia 2020 - DidWeDe, Lozanna, Shveitsariia. URL: http://noc-ukr.org/about/officialdocuments/olimpiyska-khartiya/ (data zvernennia 08.04.2021). 15. Parrish R. Sports law and policy in the European Union. Manchester University Press. 2003. P. 271. 16. World Athletics. Book C - C2. TECHNICAL RULES (In force from 1 November 2019 and amended on 31 January 2020) URL: https://www.worldathletics.org/about-iaaf/documents/book-of-rules (data zvernennia 30.03.2021). 17. Venedyktov V. S. Trudovoe pravo Ukraynы (Obshchaia chast). Kharkov : NUVD, 2004. S. 187. 18. University of New Hampshire - Franklin Pierce School of Law. IP Mall. PREMIER LEAGUE CONTRACT URL: https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/Agent%20Contracts%20Between%20Players%20&%20Their%20Agents/6_PREMIER%20LEAGUE%20PLAYERS%20CONTRACT.pdf (data zvernennia 30.03.2021). 19. Haluzeva Uhoda mizh Hromadskoiu spilkoiu «Federatsiia futbolu Ukrainy», Obiednanniam profesionalnykh futbolnykh klubiv Ukrainy «Premier-Liha», obiednanniam futbolnykh klubiv «Profesionalna futbolna liha Ukrainy», ta Vseukrainskoiu profesiinoiu spilkoiu «Futbol Ukrainy», Vseukrainskoiu asotsiatsiieiu futbolistiv-profesionaliv u sferi profesionalnoho futbolu Ukrainy na 2017-2022 roky. Kyiv-2017. URL: http://dev.pfl.ua/docs/07d3098c0649d1810a8a75fb1f1740a7.pdf (data zvernennia 30.03.2021). 20. Federatsiia futbolu Ukrainy. REHLAMENT Federatsii futbolu Ukrainy zi statusu i transferu futbolistiv. Kyiv-2018 URL: https://uaf.ua/about-ffu/library (data zvernennia 30.03.2021). 21. The Football Association Premier League L.imited. Handbook Season 2020/21 URL: https://resources.premierleague.com/premierleague/document/2020/09/11/dc7e76c1-f78d-45a2-be4a-4c6bc33368fa/2020-21-PL-Handbook-110920.pdf (data zvernennia 30.03.2021). 22. Turkish Airlains EoroLeague. EUROLEAGUE BYLAWS. URL: https://www.euroleague.net/rs/85b6m5hxnomx8xap/84bd1f8d-134d-42a0-a8ee-cd688d29aaa2/d0c/filename/201718elbylaws.pdf (data zvernennia 30.03.2021).

Aboriginal representatives contemplating an open argument with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission(ATSIC) about funding or representation sometimes caution each other:'don't shoot the banker'. There is little doubt that this volume of essays on ATSIC will be taken in some quarters to be doing just that, but they are intended, and should be viewed, in a more constructive light. They are a collective attempt to analyse this complex organisation after six years of its operation, and to open up debate about reform. The writers adopt a variety of perspectives on the role and impact of ATSIC, and they do not agree with each other on all points. The volume as a whole concentrates on the representative role of ATSIC, its presentation of itself as the supreme Aboriginal representative and political body. It does not echo the fairly common, and often misplaced, criticisms of waste and inefficiency of ATSIC as a development program funding organisation. The writers understand the difficulties faced by staff, councillors and Commissioners in meeting the massive problem of Aboriginal material advancement. They would all feel, however, that ATSIC can also make its problems greater by ignoring much of the advice, experience and community knowledge of other Aboriginal organisations and individuals. The essays in this book span the wide area in Aboriginal politics that ATSIC itself covers. HC (Nugget) Coombs opens the volume with a reminder of the history and origin of the present structure, which is a far cry from the recommendations of his report that led to the abolition of its predecessor, the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC). He is particularly critical of ATSIC's electoral system which neglects to include existing community-based representative organisations. Several of the chapters are concerned with problems of ATSIC Regional Councils. In particular, Rowse's examination of the emerging political consciousness of Regional Councillors complements Finlayson and Dales's analysis of the frustrations of Regional Planning from the participants' perspective, and the tensions this produces between the Regional Councils and ATSIC itself. Smith's chapter concerns the problem of dealing with Aboriginal cultural complexity and diversity in a single structure. The chapter places the regional concerns examined by Rowse, and Finlayson and Dale, in the context of ATSIC's national funding and policy strategies. Both my chapter and Dillon's are concerned also with these 'big picture' issues. I examine ATSIC's role as the political representative of a distinct and separate people which, due to Australia's international obligations, has a right of political self-determination in association with the nation state. I find it is not constituted to perform this well, and has its effectiveness further reduced by having the incompatible responsibility of Aboriginal development and welfare funding. Dillon looks for the reasons for confusion and ineffectiveness of ATSIC's many roles in the turbulent history of its foundation, and the complexities of Aboriginal political life. He concludes ATSIC would do better if it did less, backed off from its claim to be supremely representative, and made better use of its unique position within government, rather than distinct from it. The range of these essays shows clearly one immediate problem with assessing ATSIC - it has no single and easily grasped corporate nature. Any statement about ATSIC must suffer from being aimed at only one of the manifestations of this highly complex organisation to the neglect of others. This is as true for an outside observer as for the varied participants. Even a Regional Council Chairperson may from time to time be heard to refer to their Council's 'trouble with ATSIC', as if they were not themselves ATSIC. Thus, there is a danger of allowing critical points levelled at one aspect of the organisation to overshadow or neglect contradictory elements of the same organisation that are moving in alternative directions. In comparison with previous administrative arrangements ATSIC has been an enormous step forward for indigenous control of important aspects of life. Equally, it has over its first six years of operation provided a proving ground for much indigenous expertise and raised, wittingly or not, high expectations. It is the voices of those pushing at the outer limits of ATSIC's capabilities that, by and large, the authors of the essays in this volume are used to hearing. From these essays on diverse regions and areas of ATSIC's operation some common themes emerge. All papers reveal that greater regionalisation of the ATSIC structure and greater integration with Aboriginal communities and their organisations is called for. Regionalisation is now recognised to be a positive step by many people within ATSIC itself, but this needs to go further than simply increasing local control over development plans. Most of the papers, but in particular Rowse's analysis of the opinions of Regional Councillors, and Finlayson and Dale's description of their planning problems, lead to the conclusion that: • Funding needs to be aggregated much more than at present. Blocks of funds for broad purposes should be made rather than the multitude of single project schemes that now abound. Many block grants could be allocated on at least a triennial basis rather than following the present annual bidding cycle. Problems of accountability can be overcome, as they are in other publicly-funded organisations. • Regional Councils should be integrated much more firmly with existing regional and local community organisations. • If this is done, Regional Councils must be better resourced to act as regional representatives. Regional Plans must be seen as part of the political accommodation between whites and Aborigines in a particular region, not just as money grant wish-lists. This requires greater use of Regional Office resources, and a reexamination of the role of the Regional Office itself. Changes of this nature are being increasingly driven by the need for better representation of Aboriginal interests in the regions, particularly as a result of the Native Title Act 1993 and the mediation requirements of the National Native Title Tribunal. More powerful regional bodies, with more security of funding, which gain a wider role for themselves as representatives, rather than simple distributors of funds, would bring into question ATSIC's national role. While firmly defending itself from outside criticism, ATSIC nationally often does not seem to have a clear policy about its role. • Is it the cradle-to-grave care provider it often suggests it ought be? • Is it the Aboriginal parliament its original conservative critics feared it would be? • Or should it simply be a coordinating and consultation body to render more effective development programs administered by other bodies? The confusion of functions, and resultant frustration, revealed in many of the chapters in this book lead to the conclusion that ATSIC should not try to be all of these things it is neither possible nor required. Its representative structure relies too much on rather simple and formal electoral principles at the national Board level, providing no means of ensuring the necessary synthesis and balancing of community voices. To have a 'representative structure' is not the same as to actually be politically representative. Nor does ATSIC's control of Aboriginal material development programs mean that Aborigines are at last running their own affairs. There is more to self-determination than this. In practical terms as well it cannot fund and administer every aspect of Aboriginal development. It does not have the expertise, and if it were to acquire it this would be a wasteful duplication. As presently structured, it is equally far from being able to offer Aborigines self-government, either regionally or nationally. Self­ government must necessarily develop regionally. Even if the regional developments suggested here do occur, this will not automatically make the elected board, or the bureaucratic office­ holders, more authentically representative of Aboriginal voices. A broader forum is required for this. One in which Regional Councils and community organisations can directly participate, as my chapter suggests. Mike Dillon also points out, ATSIC would be more effective accepting itself as part of government - a rather privileged and potentially influential part. It should use its power of closeness to government, coupled with its relative independence, to influence more effectively the other Commonwealth program and policy providers. It could then strategically allow the emergence of a more independent forum for the diversity of Aboriginal political views. This may be the role it eventually accepts at the national level- the coordinator of national Aboriginal development policy. With a regional structure more effectively empowered to reflect regional needs it could perform this function well, and contribute its voice as the arm of Aboriginal material development - one powerful voice among many of the legitimate Aboriginal representative organisations throughout the country.

Problem statement: general view and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks. Achieving the goals and realizing the interests of states and transnational corporations and even some specific actors on the world stage is gaining new opportunities through the intensive development of high technology, innovation, information and global cyberspace. Open military confrontation and other types of conflicts in these conditions are transformed into hybrid forms of destructive actions, in which the component of cognitive influences aimed at the human mind, worldview, mentality, which are an integral part of the cognitive sphere of society, grows. Such influences, at the present stage of development of society, are often aimed at forming distrust, changing views and value systems, weakening social cohesion and distorted perception of national interests and values, etc., so their study and counteraction is extremely relevant. Analysis of recent publications in sphere of research and identification of previously unresolved parts of the general problem. Issues related to the study of the cognitive sphere and its components, various cognitive influences on the audience in the process of communication, cognitive manipulation, especially in the field of discourses, and their consequences, were considered in the works of many domestic and foreign researchers, namely: M. Eisenko, L. Apostel, M. Bakhtin, D. Bolinger, P. Brown, E. Bienvenu, R. Blakar, X. Weinrich, A. Vezhbytska, V. Vinokur, Y. Habermas, J. Gintikki, G. Grice, S. Green, T. van Dyck, V. Demyankov, V. Zabotkin, A. Zvirintsev, S. Kara-Murza, E. Koit, O. Kubryakova, R. Lakoff, J. Lakoff, J. Lich, Y. Lotman , S. Levinson, D. Marr, J. Allwood, J. Austin, M. Popper, G. Pocheptsov, O. Rosenstock-Hussey, J. Searle, W. Stewart, S. Tulmin, L. Yakubinsky. At the same time, the study of multilevel, interconnected destructive cognitive effects in cyberspace and through cyberspace in hybrid conflicts and the analysis of practical experience of their coping and consequences, especially with regard to deep systemic aspects and synergies in modern publications are insufficiently addressed. The aim of the article is to study the threats and features of cognitive influences on society in cyberspace and respond to them to reduce the risks of their consequences. Main results. Modern hybrid warfare is a war with a combination of fundamentally different types and methods of its conduct, which are used in a coordinated manner to achieve its goals. It is a high-tech conflict, a continuation of the policy of states (coalitions, political groups, transnational corporations, etc.) in order to impose their will on opponents through complex, adaptive, asymmetric and synchronized influences on them in multidimensional space and various spheres with a combination of conventional and unconventional components, ensuring multiplicity and synergy of results and a high level of uncertainty for opponents regarding the ultimate goals and ways to achieve them. Its features are permanent, variable, in wide ranges, intensity, focus on systemic destabilization and changes that are useful to achieve the interests of the beneficiary, in all spheres of life and activity of the state that is the object of aggression. Hybrid actions, in addition to the purely force component, include complex destructive cognitive, informational, informational-psychological, propaganda and disinformation influences on certain target groups and society as a whole, with cyberattacks on information resources, infrastructure, economic processes and democratic institutions. At the same time, cognitive influences play a significant role in trying to manage communication, transform the beliefs of target audiences to the right (desired) and control their behavior. Issues of destructive cognitive actions are directly related to the processes of emission, processing, interpretation, transformation and internalization of knowledge in managed communication from strategic to tactical levels, from general to targeted impacts on society as a whole and its individual components and specific targets. audiences with integrated use of linguistic, figurative, hidden media effects, mental and other influences at different levels of cybersocial interaction, which, in modern conditions, is increasingly carried out in cyberspace and / or through cyberspace. The theoretical and applied results presented in the article can be used to ensure timely detection of dangers and threats of destructive cognitive influences on society in cyberspace and through cyberspace, risk assessment of their implementation and taking measures to counter and neutralize them. Conclusions. Cognitive influences have become an integral part of hybrid conflicts, both interstate and domestic, and between any geopolitical and regional actors, corporations, and organizations. The cognitive component has an exceptional role in the set of factors that form and cause conflict, affect its course and results, intensity and consequences. Therefore, modern, and especially conflicts of the future, are and will be conducted for the cognitive sphere of society (society, social groups, individuals), taking control and management of cognitive space, which includes perception, awareness, beliefs, understanding and values, intellectual environment of both individuals and social groups and society as a whole, in which, in fact, is their decision-making. Therefore, the main result of successful destructive cognitive influences is a change in the model of the world and its perception in man, social groups and society as a whole, which provides the opportunity to take control and external management on emotional, moral, cultural, ideological and mental levels with the formation stereotypes for the perception of reality through their prism. Of particular importance are the imposition and promotion of erroneous scientific, social, economic, state, military theories, paradigms, concepts, strategies, narratives, which are most effectively promoted and implemented through educational and scientific institutions, NGOs, electronic, social networks and the blogosphere. To this end, all opportunities for strategic communication are used, informational, psychological, cyber and other measures (actions, operations, etc.) are taken, which are aimed at both the direct participants in the conflict and the population of the participating countries, the international community. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of the threats of such influences, their timely detection and deploy an effective system to counter them and neutralize them, because it becomes one of the key components of national security for today and in the future. Key words: cognitive influences; cyberspace; cybersecurity; destructive cyber influences; information security. ; У статті розглядаються теоретико-прикладні аспекти, особливості, небезпеки, загрози і ризики когнітивних впливів на соціум у кіберпросторі і через кіберпростір та реагування на них. Доведено, що боротьба за отримання контролю над певними цільовими групами в сучасних умовах передбачає насамперед можливість управління їхньою когнітивною сферою з використанням методів ментального, образного, мовного тощо впливів на неї. Це здійснюється в різноманітних інфокомунікаційних системах відповідно до ситуацій, переважно через соціальні мережі, блогосферу, художню, науково-популярну і наукову літературу та відповідні ресурси в інтернеті, розважальну і професійно-орієнтовану аудіо- і відеопродукцію, рекламу, ЗМІ, а також шляхом уведення змін, які сприяють цьому, в наукові теорії, навчальні програми тощо. Основна мета – навмисний вплив на відповідні цільові аудиторії для трансформації їх поглядів, переконань, світогляду, і самого сприйняття дійсності відповідно до інтересів і потреб сторони, яка справляє вплив. Це завжди багатоплановий, багатовекторний, комплексний, системний та керований процес загальної спрямованості або цільові, спрямовані на суспільство в цілому або на цільові групи, конкретних індивідів (ключових акторів), який передбачає справляння за єдиним замислом, планом, місцем і часом когнітивних, інформаційних, інформаційно-психологічних, кібер-впливів тощо. У сучасних умовах значна кількість сфер людської життєдіяльності перенеслася до кіберпростору та здійснюється через кіберпростір. При цьому майже єдиним джерелом знань та інформації для більшості людей поступово стають різноманітні інформаційні та освітні портали й електронні ресурси, які формуються в кібер­просторі. Це значно впливає на формування та зміну світогляду і ментальності соціуму. Саме через глобальну мережу «Інтернет» молодь сприймає найбільше неперевіреної, часто негативної, небажаної і навіть небезпечної інформації. Відсутність захисту соціуму від когнітивних загроз, які реалізуються в кіберпросторі і через кіберпростір, стає серйозним фактором ризику, деякі аспекти зменшення якого розглядаються в цій роботі. Ключові слова: когнітивні впливи; кіберпростір; кібербезпека; деструктивні кібервпливи; інформаційна безпека.

Problem statement: general view and its connection with important scientific or practical tasks. Achieving the goals and realizing the interests of states and transnational corporations and even some specific actors on the world stage is gaining new opportunities through the intensive development of high technology, innovation, information and global cyberspace. Open military confrontation and other types of conflicts in these conditions are transformed into hybrid forms of destructive actions, in which the component of cognitive influences aimed at the human mind, worldview, mentality, which are an integral part of the cognitive sphere of society, grows. Such influences, at the present stage of development of society, are often aimed at forming distrust, changing views and value systems, weakening social cohesion and distorted perception of national interests and values, etc., so their study and counteraction is extremely relevant. Analysis of recent publications in sphere of research and identification of previously unresolved parts of the general problem. Issues related to the study of the cognitive sphere and its components, various cognitive influences on the audience in the process of communication, cognitive manipulation, especially in the field of discourses, and their consequences, were considered in the works of many domestic and foreign researchers, namely: M. Eisenko, L. Apostel, M. Bakhtin, D. Bolinger, P. Brown, E. Bienvenu, R. Blakar, X. Weinrich, A. Vezhbytska, V. Vinokur, Y. Habermas, J. Gintikki, G. Grice, S. Green, T. van Dyck, V. Demyankov, V. Zabotkin, A. Zvirintsev, S. Kara-Murza, E. Koit, O. Kubryakova, R. Lakoff, J. Lakoff, J. Lich, Y. Lotman , S. Levinson, D. Marr, J. Allwood, J. Austin, M. Popper, G. Pocheptsov, O. Rosenstock-Hussey, J. Searle, W. Stewart, S. Tulmin, L. Yakubinsky. At the same time, the study of multilevel, interconnected destructive cognitive effects in cyberspace and through cyberspace in hybrid conflicts and the analysis of practical experience of their coping and consequences, especially with regard to deep systemic aspects and synergies in modern publications are insufficiently addressed. The aim of the article is to study the threats and features of cognitive influences on society in cyberspace and respond to them to reduce the risks of their consequences. Main results. Modern hybrid warfare is a war with a combination of fundamentally different types and methods of its conduct, which are used in a coordinated manner to achieve its goals. It is a high-tech conflict, a continuation of the policy of states (coalitions, political groups, transnational corporations, etc.) in order to impose their will on opponents through complex, adaptive, asymmetric and synchronized influences on them in multidimensional space and various spheres with a combination of conventional and unconventional components, ensuring multiplicity and synergy of results and a high level of uncertainty for opponents regarding the ultimate goals and ways to achieve them. Its features are permanent, variable, in wide ranges, intensity, focus on systemic destabilization and changes that are useful to achieve the interests of the beneficiary, in all spheres of life and activity of the state that is the object of aggression. Hybrid actions, in addition to the purely force component, include complex destructive cognitive, informational, informational-psychological, propaganda and disinformation influences on certain target groups and society as a whole, with cyberattacks on information resources, infrastructure, economic processes and democratic institutions. At the same time, cognitive influences play a significant role in trying to manage communication, transform the beliefs of target audiences to the right (desired) and control their behavior. Issues of destructive cognitive actions are directly related to the processes of emission, processing, interpretation, transformation and internalization of knowledge in managed communication from strategic to tactical levels, from general to targeted impacts on society as a whole and its individual components and specific targets. audiences with integrated use of linguistic, figurative, hidden media effects, mental and other influences at different levels of cybersocial interaction, which, in modern conditions, is increasingly carried out in cyberspace and / or through cyberspace. The theoretical and applied results presented in the article can be used to ensure timely detection of dangers and threats of destructive cognitive influences on society in cyberspace and through cyberspace, risk assessment of their implementation and taking measures to counter and neutralize them. Conclusions. Cognitive influences have become an integral part of hybrid conflicts, both interstate and domestic, and between any geopolitical and regional actors, corporations, and organizations. The cognitive component has an exceptional role in the set of factors that form and cause conflict, affect its course and results, intensity and consequences. Therefore, modern, and especially conflicts of the future, are and will be conducted for the cognitive sphere of society (society, social groups, individuals), taking control and management of cognitive space, which includes perception, awareness, beliefs, understanding and values, intellectual environment of both individuals and social groups and society as a whole, in which, in fact, is their decision-making. Therefore, the main result of successful destructive cognitive influences is a change in the model of the world and its perception in man, social groups and society as a whole, which provides the opportunity to take control and external management on emotional, moral, cultural, ideological and mental levels with the formation stereotypes for the perception of reality through their prism. Of particular importance are the imposition and promotion of erroneous scientific, social, economic, state, military theories, paradigms, concepts, strategies, narratives, which are most effectively promoted and implemented through educational and scientific institutions, NGOs, electronic, social networks and the blogosphere. To this end, all opportunities for strategic communication are used, informational, psychological, cyber and other measures (actions, operations, etc.) are taken, which are aimed at both the direct participants in the conflict and the population of the participating countries, the international community. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of the threats of such influences, their timely detection and deploy an effective system to counter them and neutralize them, because it becomes one of the key components of national security for today and in the future. Key words: cognitive influences; cyberspace; cybersecurity; destructive cyber influences; information security. ; У статті розглядаються теоретико-прикладні аспекти, особливості, небезпеки, загрози і ризики когнітивних впливів на соціум у кіберпросторі і через кіберпростір та реагування на них. Доведено, що боротьба за отримання контролю над певними цільовими групами в сучасних умовах передбачає насамперед можливість управління їхньою когнітивною сферою з використанням методів ментального, образного, мовного тощо впливів на неї. Це здійснюється в різноманітних інфокомунікаційних системах відповідно до ситуацій, переважно через соціальні мережі, блогосферу, художню, науково-популярну і наукову літературу та відповідні ресурси в інтернеті, розважальну і професійно-орієнтовану аудіо- і відеопродукцію, рекламу, ЗМІ, а також шляхом уведення змін, які сприяють цьому, в наукові теорії, навчальні програми тощо. Основна мета – навмисний вплив на відповідні цільові аудиторії для трансформації їх поглядів, переконань, світогляду, і самого сприйняття дійсності відповідно до інтересів і потреб сторони, яка справляє вплив. Це завжди багатоплановий, багатовекторний, комплексний, системний та керований процес загальної спрямованості або цільові, спрямовані на суспільство в цілому або на цільові групи, конкретних індивідів (ключових акторів), який передбачає справляння за єдиним замислом, планом, місцем і часом когнітивних, інформаційних, інформаційно-психологічних, кібер-впливів тощо. У сучасних умовах значна кількість сфер людської життєдіяльності перенеслася до кіберпростору та здійснюється через кіберпростір. При цьому майже єдиним джерелом знань та інформації для більшості людей поступово стають різноманітні інформаційні та освітні портали й електронні ресурси, які формуються в кібер­просторі. Це значно впливає на формування та зміну світогляду і ментальності соціуму. Саме через глобальну мережу «Інтернет» молодь сприймає найбільше неперевіреної, часто негативної, небажаної і навіть небезпечної інформації. Відсутність захисту соціуму від когнітивних загроз, які реалізуються в кіберпросторі і через кіберпростір, стає серйозним фактором ризику, деякі аспекти зменшення якого розглядаються в цій роботі. Ключові слова: когнітивні впливи; кіберпростір; кібербезпека; деструктивні кібервпливи; інформаційна безпека.

The changeover of the ruling of the modern Ukrainian territory between East and West had lasted for around 800 years beginning from the Mongol-Tatar invasion. It was that time when Batu Khan defeated Ancient Rus that the present territory of Ukraine came under complete and absolute ruling of the Tatar East. In the 16th century as a part of Lithuania Ukraine was included into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and then passed under the rule of the Polish magnates, under the yoke of the Western Polish civilization. In 1569 the Union of Lublin was signed that formalized the accession of the Ukrainian territory to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the period from the 10th to the 19th centuries there was no such state as Ukraine on the world political map. In the 10th century some part of the territory of present Ukraine was taken by Kievan Rus, in the 13th century — by Golden Horde, in the 14th-15th centuries — by Lithuania, Golden Horde and Russia. In the next centuries the territory of Ukraine was controlled by the Ottoman Empire, Poland and Russia. And only in 1918 the state of Ukraine appeared on the political map.Single Soviet Ukraine created by Bolsheviks did not present any internal cultural and language unity as it was always shared by different empires being the hostile and irreconcilable centers of force in Europe — the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire.In 1917-1920 about dozens of different republics were established in the territory of Ukraine. They were isolated within the borders of their formations. Accordingly, it may be said that in 1917-1920 Ukraine presented a mosaic of different formations which were often formed due to ambitions of some scoundrels and political adventurers striving to get to power and to become the leader of a state. But only the tough policy of Bolsheviks aimed to prevent the disintegration process permitted Ukraine to preserve its territory. After its election the Supreme Council started preparation of the Draft Declaration of Ukraine State Sovereignty simultaneously with the Draft Law on Ukraine State Sovereignty. Both drafts were considered in May 1990. After their discussion it was decided to develop the Draft Declaration of State Sovereignty.On July 16, 1990 the Ukrainian Parliament after long discussions adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine by majority voting. This declaration which did not change and substitute the Constitution of Ukrainian SSR became a very important document for establishment of the Ukrainian statehood having laid the basis for the future Constitution of Ukraine.The concept of the new Constitution of Ukraine envisaged the establishment of the presidential republic. As a result, in June 1991 the laws «On Establishment of the Office of President of Ukrainian SSR with Making Alterations and Additions in the Constitution», «On President of Ukrainian SSR" and "On Election of President of Ukrainian SSR». The office of president was established to strengthen the vertical of executive power and to make it in the future independent of executive power of union bodies. The law assigned broad authorities to the president. Thus, the president acquired the right to cancel the decisions of the USSR bodies of executive power in the territory of Ukrainian SSR if they contradicted its constitution.By mid-1991 the legislative base was created in Ukraine which, in fact, made it an independent state as the laws adopted in 1990 and in the first half of 1991 brought out Ukraine from subordination to the USSR powers. The single economic, political and military space of the USSR practically ceased to exist. By this time Ukraine subordinated only nominally to union authorities. On August 24 the Extraordinary Meeting of Supreme Rada passed the Act on Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. That time it was also decided to conduct on December 01 the republican referendum to confirm the Act of Independence. This was done with a view to demonstrate to the union authorities that the Ukrainian people were endeavoring to become independent, thus, making legitimate the Act of Independence. After becoming independent in 1991 Ukraine entered the new stage of its development. The regional system of Ukraine revealed two clear poles — Donbass and Galichina which determined the country's development for decades ahead. ; Изменения территории современной Украины между Востоком и Западом тянется уже почти 800 лет — со времен монголо-татарского нашествия. Именно тогда после уничтожения ханом Батыем Древней Руси современная территория Украины оказалась под полным и безраздельным правлением татарского Востока. В XVI веке в составе Литвы Украина была включена в Речь Посполитую и перешла в подчинение к польским магнатам, попав под гнет западно-польской цивилизации. В 1569 году была подписана Люблинская уния, результатом которой стало присоединение украинских земель к Речи Посполитой.Если брать отрезок времени с X по XIX век, то такого государства, как Украина, на политической карте мира не существовало. На части территории нынешней Украины в X веке была Киевская Русь, в XIII веке — Золотая Орда, в XIV–XV веках — Литовское государство, Золотая Орда и Россия. В последующие столетия территория Украины находилась под контролем Оттоманской империи, Польши, России. И лишь в 1918 году на политической карте появилось государство Украина.Созданная большевиками единая советская Украина не представляла собой внутреннего культурно-языкового единства, поскольку всегда была разделена между разными империями, являвшимися враждебными и непримиримыми центрами силы в Европе, — Речью Посполитой, Российской и Австро-Венгерской империями.В период 1917–1920 годов на территории Украины было образовано около десятка разных республик. Все они предполагали обособление в границах тех территорий, которые охватывали новые образования. В соответствии с этим можно говорить о том, что территория Украины периода 1917–1920 годов представляла собой мозаику различных образований, которые зачастую были результатом амбиций отдельных проходимцев и политических авантюристов, желающих получить в свои руки власть и провозгласить себя руководителем государства. Лишь жесткая политика большевиков, направленная на то, чтобы не допустить разбегания земель, позволила Украине сохранить свою территорию.После своего избрания Верховный Совет приступил к разработке проекта Декларации о государственном суверенитете Украины. Одновременно разрабатывался проект закона о государственном суверенитете Украины. Оба проекта — закона и декларации — были рассмотрены в мае 1990 года. После их обсуждения было принято решение о разработке проекта в виде Декларации о государственном суверенитете.16 июля 1990 года украинский парламент после длительного обсуждения подавляющим большинством принял Декларацию о государственном суверенитете Украины. Декларация, которая не меняла и не заменяла собой Конституцию УССР, стала важным документом в становлении украинской государственности, заложив основы будущей Конституции Украины.Концепция новой Конституции Украины предусматривала создание президентской республики. В итоге в июне 1991 года были приняты законы «Об учреждении поста президента Украинской ССР и внесении изменений и дополнений в конституцию», «О президенте Украинской ССР» и «О выборах президента Украинской ССР». Учреждение поста президента было направлено на усиление вертикали исполнительной власти, чтобы в перспективе сделать ее независимой от исполнительной власти союзных органов. Закон наделял президента широкими полномочиями. Например, он обладал правом останавливать действия решений органов исполнительной власти СССР на территории Украинской ССР, если они противоречили ее конституции.К середине 1991 года на Украине была создана законодательная база, которая фактически делала ее самостоятельным государством, поскольку законы, принятые в 1990 году и в первой половине 1991 года, практически вывели Украину из подчинения органов власти СССР. Единое экономическое, политическое и военное пространство СССР фактически было разрушено. К этому периоду времени Украина лишь номинально подчинялась союзным органам власти.24 августа на внеочередной сессии Верховной рады был принят Акт провозглашения независимости Украины. Тогда же было принято решение о проведении 1 декабря республиканского референдума, который должен был подтвердить Акт провозглашения независимости. Расчет был сделан на то, чтобы продемонстрировать союзным властям стремление к независимости украинского населения, тем самым придав Акту провозглашения независимости легитимность.После обретения независимости в 1991 году начался новый этап развития Украины. В региональной системе Украины проявилось два четких полюса — Донбасс и Галичина, которые определили развитие страны на последующие десятилетия.

It is need to make comparison of the architectural heritage of European countries and the USSR that in the first half of the twentieth century belonged to states with totalitarian political regimes, to establish the main tendencies in their architecture − the common features and differences − and to find out the reasons for their appearance. This time, beginning in the 1920s, marked the emergence of totalitarian regimes in European life as a reaction on the political turmoil that took place in a number of countries after the First World War. The war led to a major political, economic and cultural crisis, in the background of which there was a change of political regimes. A wave of formation of reactionary parties was sweeping through Europe, and Spain, Italy, Portugal and Germany formed a system of government which was based on a one-party system that led by the leader. For these countries it was characterized by rigorous control from the top of power absolutely in all aspects of life − the economy on the basis of private property and market relations, a policy of categorical non-perception of other political forces and movements, culture, which reflected in various forms the idea of creating a social consciousness on the basis of feeling the exclusivity of the nation, and therefore the priority right to resolve the fate of other peoples. What distinguished the Soviet political system from European political regimes? First, the idea of democracy in the form of local councils of people's deputies (the authorities from below, from the people - upwards) was absorbed by the party system, formed on the principle "on the contrary", as a command system (from the helmsman to the people). Therefore, in the process of perfection, it turned into a conglomerate in which the legislative branch of power became a puppet and completely dependent on the main party component of the system of government [1, 2]. Second, there was no private property in the USSR. Land and other natural resources, all means of production belonged to the state, were at the disposal and under the strict control of the authorities. Thirdly, public consciousness was formed in the spirit of patriotism, love for national culture, faith in the bright future, which would determine the party leadership (which meant the transfer of responsibility for its own fate to the representatives of the authorities) and friendly relations with other peoples. The public consciousness forming the direction of the development of culture was a consequence of the embodiment of the state-ideological essence of social life to thinking of the society, which was programmed by the leadership of the state. The means of architecture that are under the influence of state ideology, the specifics of the economic system, the formed psychology of society and social consciousness, forms an artificial environment of human being, which, on the one hand, reflects socio-political processes, on the other, creates an environment that educates a person in a certain the corresponding direction. Under totalitarian systems, both sides are pushing for a person stronger in the direction desired by the ruling power, limiting its freedom is felt stronger than in a democratic political system. Consequently, the first half of the twentieth century was marked both in Europe and in the Soviet Union by the creation of totalitarian regimes, which were clearly reflected in the formation of the architectural environment. So whether the common features in the political-economic system, political events and the development of the culture of European states and the USSR influenced onto architecture, its form and style? Have any cardinal differences been observed? When were they, what caused their appearance? Where did the causal link between the political-economic system and architecture look? An overview of the architectural and urban heritage has shown that for all European countries, where reactionary regimes were established, the following was typical: giantomania in the size of objects that were prestigious for the authorities and the state; style building based on national, ancient traditions; purism, asceticism, lapidary and, at the same time, simplicity and monumental forms; axial symmetry of city-building ensembles; moderate, but accurate, in the main places of use of state symbols; application of additional decorative symbols emphasizing the connection with the ancient past: figures of a physically strong man, a bull, horses, more often in the form of sculptures, less often − bas-relief; monotonous interpretation of the wall − without cavities or with identical cutouts, which served as a monumental background for a separate sculpture, emphasizing its symbolic meaning. The rationalism of architectural forms was manifested in the purity and concordance of the plan, the architectonics of the building, which brightly and precisely helped to focus the viewer's attention and emphasized the value of a single symbol. The simplicity of the formation of European functionalism, which was combined with the symmetry of the architectural-spatial composition and the neoclassical manifestations of the warrant, the great-power symbols and monumental forms, as well as expensive materials, created a special direction of the open-mindedness of the state-ideological content of architecture. By such means, the architecture articulated outside clearly demonstrative and ideological reference to an absolutely indisputable order in the state, based on conquering the authorities, carrying the order to other peoples and deciding their fate at the discretion of this power. Before the war, the Soviet Union embarked on a path of rebirth and creative rethinking of the classical heritage. Withdrew from the tendencies of the spread of constructivist industrial forms in the urban environment, Soviet architecture moved through the formation of the Russian empire. Thanks to the desire to glorify the existing system of government at that time, the USSR chose the classic principles in architecture: the classical perimeter building of quarters and the symmetrical structure of the facades were revived; the mandatory formation of the main city center on the basis of the axis of symmetry and the main buildings with towers and spikes in completion, with many state symbols, which looked like an explicit selection of decorative forms and details. In the postwar period, state symbols that had to remind of the role of the Soviet state in the life of the people and to demonstrate the differences between Soviet architecture and the architecture of the Russian Empire, began to appear anywhere. The unlimited number of that symbolism simply shouted about the ideological purpose, but at the same time it reduced its value. In addition to such obsessive use of symbolism, the psychological effect was enhanced by other decorative elements that performed an additional auxiliary function. It is a variety of symbols of fertility, labor, a bright future that awaits the people in the form of justice, equality, peaceful life, and well-being. The combination of a heavy order with a richly decorated facade created in the architecture of a fairy tale about a strong, reliable, mighty state, which promised protection and happiness to its people. An unlikely architectural form and style that did not correspond to real situations (repressions in the country and arms race among the states) formed a decorative screen that covered the real state-ideological content of the formed urban environment. Consequently, the architectural and urban heritage frankly reflected the true manifestations of the state-ideological goal of countries with totalitarian political regimes. The architectural legacy of European states significantly differed from that of the USSR by the fact that European states frankly proclaimed the ambition of their own political programs, and the Soviet state with the help of architectural means created an idyll of peacefulness and a bright future.

Introduction People say, "don't you ever want to come off?" I don't know. The thought of me getting up without taking something is totally. to me that's normal . If I haven't taken anything then I'm not normal . And for me to even, I can't contemplate not taking something, you know. I'm not a lost cause. I know what my problem is. It's other people that want me to stop. I don't want to stop. I don't want to. Does that make sense to you? (Mya) This extract is taken from an interview that formed part of my doctoral research looking at people's experiences of injecting drug use and treatment services in London, UK. Here I consider one of the ways participants described their use of drugs through a concept of becoming "normal." I pay particular attention to Mya's account and explore the very sense-making that her question (above) demands. Mya uses the concept of normality not only to reflect how drugs have become part of her everyday routines, or part of feeling normal, but actually in materially becoming herself—in embodying a "normal body." As she puts it, "if I haven't taken anything then I am not normal." In this sense, Mya's problem is not the drugs, but the people who want her to stop taking them. This understanding is important for challenging recent policy shifts towards reducing opiate replacement/substitution services in the UK (HM Government; Home Office). Methods The study took place from January to September 2014, and included participant observation at a drug treatment service, interviews with service providers, and "creative" interviews with people who inject drugs. The project was granted ethical approval by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Ethics Committee and the NHS Regional Ethics Committee. All participants were given pseudonyms. The creative interview is a term coined by Jennifer Mason to describe an in-depth semi-structured interview which produces additional types of data beyond the spoken word. The method was employed to explore participants' feelings of embodiment as enacted in the drug-using "event." I used a body mapping (drawing) task in these interviews to aid the communication of hard-to-articulate visceral experiences and depict the many actors, human and nonhuman, involved. (For a fuller explanation of the "events" perspective and methods taken in this study, please see Dennis 2016.) Below, I draw both from Mya's narrative and her pictorial account. Becoming "Normal" with Diamorphine Mya is a 52-year-old woman who was recruited to the study through word of mouth. She attended a supervised injecting clinic where another participant informed her about the study. The purpose of this clinic is to prescribe injectable diamorphine (pharmaceutical heroin) for clients to administer under supervised conditions. This unique service is specifically targeted at people who have previously struggled with the more orthodox opiate substitution treatments, such as methadone and buprenorphine. Mya explained that she had a long history of using street heroin, but in the last ten years has been injecting legally and has also illegally sought diamorphine. Mya's drug use had become very hard to sustain financially, both in paying for private prescriptions and in the illegal drugs market, and therefore she wanted a prescription through the National Health Service. She was told that this was only possible through this clinic. However, the clinic's intention was always to reduce this consumption, which Mya did not want to accept. This is because, as she explained, without drugs she is "not normal." A rhetoric of "normality," as deployed in the drug field, has taken two dominant paths. The first is in Parker et al. 's "normalisation thesis," which documents a move during the 1990s when drug use, albeit "recreational drug use," became increasingly common. A concept of "normalisation" is used to explain this social shift in acceptability towards drug taking. The second lies in a oucauldian-influenced embodied idea of performing normality in line with dominant neoliberal discourses. For example, Nettleton et al .'s study with recovering heroin users employs a concept of "normalisation" to explore the ways in which people talk about regaining certain bodily practices to fit in with "the norm." Using the work of Michel Foucault, and his concept of governmentality more specifically, Nettleton et al . argue that "normalisation" is "a crucial aspect of neo-liberal societies, where individuals are encouraged through [decentralised] political projects to become normal: 'the judges of normality are everywhere' (Foucault, 1977)" (175). Although there are vast differences, both these accounts seem to share an understanding of normality as a socially or discursively produced set of practices. However, Mya's narrative of becoming normal seems to be doing something different. She highlights how she becomes normal with drugs in a way that suggests that without drugs she is not normal. This highlights the material work involved in achieving this "normal" state. It is clear that being normal is something we do (both theories above consider normal behaviour as performative) rather than it being pre-defined. But for Mya this is enacted in an ontological rather than learnt way as she connects with drugs. To know normality—"to me that's normal"—and to be normal—"if I haven't taken anything then I'm not normal"—are conflated. Karen Barad, in her theory of agential realism, would call this an intra-action rather than an inter-action, where what we know (epistemology) and what is (ontology) collide, or rather elide. It is in these entanglements of matter and meaning that Mya becomes normal. Mya's narrative highlights the human body as an assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari) in which drugs have become a part. In this sense, drugs can be seen as part of this embodied self rather than separate. Consequently, Mya's account is about more than how her body interacts with drugs, but rather how they become together. Drawing from Deleuze's ontology of becoming, this is the idea that life does not start with any given entities or organisms, but that these forms are brought into being through the forces of life, and as such they are in a constant state of flux, becoming something else. This can challenge ideas of "recovery" (e.g. Home Office) where people are expected to remove themselves from drugs in order to regain their "normal" self. If one's "normal" includes drugs this calls into question the very attempt to de-couple an entangled relationship that, as another participant put it, "has been a long time in the making " (my emphasis). Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that Mya explains with a heavy heart that she is feeling substantial pressure to reduce her prescription. She feels the clinic staff fail to understand how drugs are part of her and what constitutes her "normal." Thus, as she sees it, her "problem" is not the drugs themselves, but the people who want her to stop taking them. Mya's frustrations start to make more sense—to return to the question in the epigraph—when we think about the body as something we do , involved in a constant task of keeping oneself together . Keeping Oneself Together One does not hang together as a matter of course: keeping oneself together is something the embodied person needs to do . The person who fails to do so dies. (Mol and Law 43) Mol and Law argue that bodies are not something we have but something we do , and that bodies are actively held together through a series of practices. For instance, in their example of hypoglycaemia, a pin prick of blood needs to be taken for the condition to be known, and then counteracted by eating a sugary substance (49). Thinking about Mya's account of becoming normal in these terms, drugs, instead of being seen as "evil" objects of misuse, can, for Mya at least, be part of this vital (life) project of keeping one elf together. This thoroughly blurs the distinctions between "good" medicine (life sustaining/enhancing) and "bad" drugs of abuse (life destroying). Following a Deleuzian understanding of the human body as an assemblage, making the body "actualise" as one is a process of life: "'A' or 'a' (one) is always the index of a multiplicity: an event, a singularity, a life." (Deleuze 388). As such, making bodily boundaries becomes essential. For Mya, drugs are part of this individualisation process in quite overt ways. For example, in her body map (Figure 1) she drew a picture of herself inside a cloud, with voices shouting inwards, penetrating the barrier from outside. About these she said, they are "shouting at me," "telling me what to do," and "what's best for me." But she was at pains to point out that the depicted cloud is not about representing a pleasurable or disassociated feeling, but more to do with blocking out these intruding voices telling her how to live her life so that they "can't get to me": Mya: That makes it sound like the drug makes me feel like I'm in a cloud, it doesn't, cos I just feel normal , it just helps me to, to deal with things better, it helps me to get less stressful, does that make sense? Author: Normal? Mya: Yeah Author: So if you haven't had it, you feel more on edge? Mya: I'm a complete nervous wreck. I'll be jumping everywhere, you know, if someone opens the window of a bus and I'm jumping. Figure 1: Mya's Body Map For Mya, then, her drug use is not about pleasure, or pain for that matter, but about something altogether more vital: it is about keeping together in a stressful, invasive world, to "deal with things better." It seems that Mya's drawing—through which she was asked to depict her feelings when using drugs—is about trying to hold the permeable, leaky body together. For the injecting body, which regularly incorporates and excorporates drugs, is an active/metabolic body: The active body has semi-permeable boundaries [.] inside and outside are not so stable. Metabolism, after all, is about eating, drinking and breathing; about defecating, urinating and sweating. For a metabolic body incorporation and excorporation are essential. (Mol and Law 54) A similar argument is made by Vitellone, citing Keane: Heroin is not separate from but becomes central to the body, selfhood, and processes of individualization. Thus according to Keane "a drug is something external that becomes internalized, blurring the distinction between not only inside/outside but also self/other". (166; see also Keane) In Mya's drawing and account, drugs are intimately involved in the task of individuating—in making clear boundaries between her and the world. In this sense, her drawing of a cloud can be seen almost like an extra layer of skin. This also occurs in the accounts of two other participants. One female participant commented on how, without drugs, she does not feel herself, to the point that she said, "I don't want to be in my own skin." And a male participant also used similar language to note that without heroin (even though he is prescribed methadone, an opiate substitute) he can feel "disembodied": Everything is all "oh oh" [he makes sounds and body movements to show a fear of things getting too close] like that, everything is like right, like if you're trying to walk around the streets and it's just like you can't handle busy high streets and you know busy like tubes and . In these accounts, drugs are playing a key role in this boundary work, that is, in enacting the body as One. This resonates strongly with Donna Haraway's idea of individualisation as "a strategic defense problem" (212). This is the idea that the individual body is not something we are born with, but something we strive towards. Haraway argues that "bodies have become cyborgs," where "the cyborg is text, machine, body, and metaphor" (212). Mya takes great care in making sure that I have understoo this process of boundary-making, which is essential to the cyborg, and on several occasions checks back with me to confirm that she is making sense. She gives the impression that she has been explaining these feelings for years, but still does not feel fully understood. This is perhaps why she seems so thrilled when she feels I have finally got a handle on the dynamic: Mya: But the methadone makes me feel heavy, lethargic, with the diamorphine I can get on with being normal, more better, and not so sleepy, does that make sense? [.] It just helps me cope with everything. You know what I mean, everything . Even . Author: Like taking the edge off things? Mya: That's it, the edge off things, you've got it! I've never thought of that before, that's a good way of putting it. Author: No cos I was thinking about what you were saying about how you can feel anxious and stuff, and I can imagine it just . Mya: You're right, you've done it in a nut shell there. Cos people have asked me that before and I haven't been able to answer. That is a good answer. It takes the edge of things. Yeah. At the end of the interview, and long past this initial reference, Mya shows appreciation of this phrase once more, as an expression which she feels could help in her bid to be better understood: Author: Anyway, I'll end the interview there. Mya: Was that alright? Author: Yeah, perfect. Is there anything else that you think is important that I've missed out? Mya: No not at all. I think you've just helped me there by saying it takes the edge off things, I've been trying to put that into words for a long time, I didn't know how to say it . Although these experiences are of course linked to withdrawal symptoms as a particular arrangement of bodily connections, when I ask about this, it is evident that it is also about something more. For example, in trying to get at why Mya feels she needs diamorphine rather than methadone, she talks about it being "cleaner," "purer," "less groggy." And even though I prompt her on the potential enjoyment, she links "the buzz" to being able to get on with "normal things," saying "I can act more normal with the heroin": Mya: Definitely it's less groggy. Author: And does it give you a slight buzz also? Mya: Sometimes it does yeah. Like I can get on with my housework better and things like that, day to day things, I can act more normal with the heroin. With just the methadone, things just slip . With an interesting use of the term, Mya says that with methadone (which would be the more usual opiate prescribed in heroin treatment) "things just slip." Again, there is a sense of diamorphine holding her together, in a way that without it she would "slip." This perhaps highlights the slipperiness of connections that are only ever "partial" (Haraway 181). Rather than becoming too porous, with methadone she becomes too shut off or "groggy," and again her body becomes unable to do things. This is perhaps why she is so insistent that diamorphine stays put in her life: "I'm not going to lie, even if I don't get it, I'm still going to use the diamorphine." Or, in Haraway's words, she "would rather be a cyborg than a goddess"(181) —she would rather endure the political and potentially criminal consequences of requiring this "outside" substance than pretend to live apart from/above the material world. Conclusion When we consider bodies as something we do, rather than have, we see that rather than Mya's account of normality reflecting a social change (Parker et al .) or solely discursive embodiment (Nettleton et al .), it actually refers to how she becomes her "normal self" in more material ways. Mya's account thoroughly disrupts a separation of object/subject, as well as several other binaries that underpin contemporary ideas of psychoactive drug use and the body, including drug/medicine, inner/outer, self/other, and of course, normal/pathological. Instead, and in trying to do justice to Mya's q estion which opened the essay, her body is seen connecting with drugs in a way that holds her together (as One) in becoming "normal." Consequently, her fears over having these drugs stopped are very real concerns over a disruption to her corporeality, which demand to be taken seriously. This calls for urgent questions to be asked over current UK policy trends toward eliminating diamorphine prescribing services (see O'Mara) and reducing opiate substitution more generally. References Barad, Karen. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. Durham: Duke UP, 2007. Deleuze, Gilles. "Immanence: A Life." Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995. Ed. David Lapoujade. New York: Semiotext(e), 2006. 384­–91. Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia . London: Continuum, 2004. Dennis, Fay. "Encountering 'Triggers:' Drug-Body-World Entanglements of Injecting Drug Use." Contemporary Drug Problems (2016). . Haraway, Donna. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature . London: Free Association Books, 1991. HM Government. "Drug Strategy 2010: Reducing Demand, Restricting Supply, Building Recovery: Supporting People to Live a Drug Free Life." Home Office , 2010. 1 Jan. 2011 . Home Office. "Putting Full Recovery First." Home Office , 2012. 5 Feb. 2013 . Keane, Helen. What's Wrong with Addiction ? Melbourne: Melbourne UP, 2002. Mason, Jennifer. "What Is Creative Interviewing?" 2010. 10 May 2013 . Mol, Annemarie, and John Law. "Embodied Action, Enacted Bodies. The Example of Hypoglycaemia." Body & Society 10.2 (2004): 43-62. Nettleton, Sarah, Joanne Neale, and Lucy Pickering. "'I Just Want to Be Normal': An Analysis of Discourses of Normality among Recovering Heroin Users." Health 17.2 (2013): 174–190. O'Mara, Erin. "The State We're In: Heroin Prescribing in the UK." Drink and Drug News (Dec. 2015). 20 Jan. 2016 . Parker, Howard, Judith Aldridge, and Fiona Measham. Illegal Leisure: The Normalization of Adolescent Recreational Drug Use . Hove: Routledge, 1998. Vitellone, Nicole. "The Rush: Needle Fixation or Technical Materialization?" Journal for Cultural Research 7.2 (2003): 165–177.

Peter Stella joined me on the podcast this week. He was back by popular demand and we touched on two important and related questions: how should the government finance its relief efforts and who should ultimately manage the public debt? The U.S. Treasury may seem like the obvious answer to both questions, but it is not the whole story. The Federal Reserve can also finance the relief efforts and, in so doing, affect the structure of public debt. But is this a good thing? Peter Stella says no, at least in the longrun. He makes the case that it is economically and politically cheaper to return the financing and management of the public debt back to the U.S. Treasury once the COVID-19 recession is over. In other words, the Fed's expansion of its balance sheet, an understandable response to the crisis, needs to be unwound as the economy improves. Otherwise, we might end up with two government agencies with very different objectives trying to manage the public debt. This is an interesting argument and one I want to flesh out in this post by taking a closer look at the two questions of financing the budget deficits and managing the public debt.Financing the Budget DeficitsThe first issue is financing the budget deficit. The question here is whether the government should fund the deficit through (1) overnight debt with a variable interest rate or (2) long-term debt with a fixed interest rate. The former option is what happens when Federal Reserve liabilities--the monetary base--finance the deficit, while the latter option arises when it is funded by treasury securities. The Fed financing of deficits, in other words, is not risk free. It could lead to higher financing costs as the economy recovers. In such a scenario, financing with long-term treasury securities with fixed interest rates would be ultimately cheaper. But is this even possible in the current crisis with the Fed buying up so much public debt? That is, even if Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin issued more long-term treasury bonds, the Fed's asset purchases have been so large they would effectively convert most of the long-term bonds into overnight reserves. That, in fact, is what has happened over the past three months. The chart above shows that for  March, April, and May, the Fed purchased about $1.67 trillion of treasury securities compared to $2.31 in new issuance. The Fed, in other words, bought up about 72 percent of the treasury securities supplied during this time.Not only was the Fed buying up most of the new issuance, but it was buying up treasury securities with a maturity far longer than overnight reserves. This can be seen in the chart below. The Fed, then, has been acting as the final financier for most of the deficit during the COVID-19 crisis and, in so doing, has transformed the structure of $1.67 trillion of U.S. public debt into overnight government liabilities.  Managing the Public DebtSo are we stuck with these short-term government liabilities forever? As Peter Stella explained in the show, the answer is no. The U.S. government could convert those overnight reserves back into longer-term treasury securities once the crisis is over.  To illustrate how, imagine that by the end of 2020 the Fed has bought up $2 trillion in treasury securities. The purchase of these treasuries were used to indirectly fund the cash transfers to households, the PPP program, extended unemployment benefits, and other economic relief efforts. The figure below shows this development in terms of the respective balance sheets of the Treasury and Fed. The treasury securities are liabilities for the U.S. Treasury and assets for the Fed and vice-versa for Fed-issued reserves. The Treasury takes the reserves on its balance sheet and sends them to the private sector as part of the economic relief efforts.If we now combine the Treasury and Fed balance sheets into a consolidated government account and also look at the private sector balance sheet, we see the following two t-accounts: The net government liabilities are now $2 trillion in overnight reserves which are assets on the private sector's balance sheet. Again, during a crisis this is not a surprising outcome as the Fed rapidly expands its balance sheet. But left unchanged, it would imply rising interest rate costs once the economy starts recovering and the Fed is forced to raised the IOER to keep inflation in check.To avoid this problem, Peter Stella recommends that after the crisis the Treasury issues additional long-term treasury bonds that lock in low interest rates. Selling these treasuries to the private sector means taking reserves off their balance sheets. The Treasury, in other words, is swapping long-term treasury securities for the overnight Fed liabilities. This is what the consolidated balance sheet would like after this activity: Peter Stella outlines this process more thoroughly in his paper titled "Exiting Well". Again, this would not happen right away, but after the crisis has ended. Historically, the Fed has financed about 20 percent of the consolidated public debt (CPD) based on data back through 1945. I define CPD as the sum of marketable treasury securities not held by the Fed and the monetary base. Using data from the Financial Accounts of the United States, I constructed the chart below that shows the share of CPD attributable to the Fed and the U.S. Treasury. Unsurprisingly, the Fed's share of CPD during the Great Inflation rose to an average of almost 30 percent and hit almost 40 percent in 1974. During the Great Moderation it fell to about 14 percent. As of May, the Fed's share of CPD is approximately 24 percent, just above the historical average. The reason it is not higher is because of large budget deficits coming into the crisis. If 'exiting well' means returning to the historical average, it might occur naturally with regular budget deficits after the crisis. If 'exiting well' means returning to something closer to the Great Moderation levels, then this will be a more ambitious project and require a vast reduction in the stock of reserves.Other ConsiderationsThe argument so far for reducing the Fed's management of the public debt is that it is likely to be economically cheaper. As noted by folks like George Selgin, Charles Plosser, Paul Tucker, and others, a second argument is that it is also politically cheaper for the Fed to avoid playing the role of public debt manager. The management of U.S. public debt is normally under the purview of the U.S. Treasury because this process is inherently politically and therefore overseen by representatives of the taxpayers. The Fed can avoid these political entanglements by minimizing its influence on public debt management. This, of course, requires a smaller Fed balance sheet.

A post-crisis journey to a smaller balance sheet, however, faces two big roadblocks. First, the Fed has chosen an 'ample reserve' or floor operating system. This keeps the stock of excess reserves large in normal times and therefore keeps elevated the Fed's influence over public debt management. A number of post-2008 bank regulations also has increased the demand for bank reserves. Some of these regulations have been tweaked in the crisis, but both they and the Fed's floor system would have to be reconsidered if we wanted to return to a world of scarce reserves and less political entanglement for the Fed. Finally, it is worth noting that maintaining large central bank balance sheets do not guarantee robust growth. The charts below show the 2009-2019 averages of central bank balance sheets sizes against several measures of nominal economic activity. They, ironically, show bigger balance sheets are tied to slower nominal growth. Now, it could be the case that the countries with the weakest nominal growth responded with the most aggressive use of the LSAP programs. This is probably true, but the data span an entire decade so one would expect to see inflation, domestic demand, and credit growth respond to the use of LSAPs over this long of a period if QE worked as advertised. If nothing else, these figures should give us pause in considering the benefits of maintaining large central bank balance sheets over long periods. Further analysis of this data supports this interpretation. So between the higher financing cost for the public debt, the greater political entanglement for the Fed, and the unclear benefits from maintaining a large central bank balance sheet over a long period, we should take seriously Peter Stella's suggestions for 'exiting well' once the crisis is over. Here's hoping we do.

For any educational policy to be successful it is necessary that it evolves in relation to its own objective context and is able to address social, cultural, economic, political and psychological requirements in the given situation. Therefore, any such policy developed in abstraction or in a different social setting cannot meet the specificities of its subjective requirements. It is so as no two social situations can be identical. However, while recognising differences, there is always scope to learn from each other's experiences and best practices. It is with this perspective that the theme of this presentation is dealt with. In spite of variations of size and socio political orientations between India and Vietnam there is scope for benefiting from each other's experiences in the realm of educational objectives, motivation and trainings. The objective of the Indian educational policy in recent years has been universal access to primary education. The Government has provided for right to education as mechanism of facilitating the universal access to education. This has to have relevance to all developing societies including Vietnam. For empowering a people ensured universal education will have tremendous relevance for human development in any society. The deficiencies if any at this level have to be met by special measures by Governments. Education from the age of 5/6 to the age of 11/12 and then to 14 has to be universally ensured and facilitated if a society has to be uplifted and empowered socially, educationally, and economically. The education at this level should be universal, non-repressive provided through play way method and in a friendly enabling atmosphere. This level education has to aim at multidimensional development of a child in cultural, psychological and social terms. This kind of education will help societies to develop a necessary edifice for prosperous, healthy, socially and politically empowered community. The teachers at this level are to be specially trained and motivated by adding to their social stature, and paying them better salary for their retention at this level of education setup. The secondary level of education focuses on skill development training and basic sciences among the students with some focus on initial level specialisation. This level of education covers the age group from 14 to 18. The much of the workforce that a healthy prosperous economy requires should be prepared at this level. This follows somewhat more specialised training and education for a third phase to further grounding the student in their respective areas of specialisation for all the superior services, teachers at various levels that can go for up to three to four years. In terms of their nature and objective there is a vital difference between lower and higher levels of education. In addition to bringing cultural refinement, social empowerment within a person, one of the main objectives of education up to the middle level globally is to impart knowledge and skill to prepare candidates for specialised services and assignments that are needed within a society, particularly in relation to skill based economic activities. That is why world-over up to middle (bachelors or equivalent) level of education in the relevant field is sufficient requirement for most of the middle and high ranked jobs. For example eligibility for highest administrative services in India is simple graduation. Higher education, particularly at the level of the universities, is not just to impart knowledge meant merely for preparing people for jobs but to prepare them for generating new knowledge by using their services for specialized academics and research assignments in sciences, medicine, engineering, social sciences and other academic disciplines. ; Để cho một chính sách giáo dục có kết quả, thì nó cần phải được đặt ở trong mối quan hệ với ngữ cảnh khách quan của nó và có thể đáp ứng yêu cầu xã hội, văn hoá, kinh tế, chính trị và tâm lý trong hoàn cảnh nhất định. Vì vậy, bất kỳ chính sách nào như vậy mà được xây dựng trong ngữ cảnh trừu tượng hoặc trong một môi trường xã hội khác biệt thì không thể đáp ứng các đặc trưng yêu cầu chủ quan của nó. Nó là như thế bởi vì không có hai tình huống xã hội có thể giống hệt nhau. Tuy nhiên, trong khi thừa nhận sự khác biệt, vẫn có thể học hỏi từ kinh nghiệm và thực tiễn tốt nhất của nhau. Chủ đề của bài báo sẽ được thảo luận từ quan điểm này. Mặc dù có sự khác nhau về quy mô và các định hướng chính trị xã hội giữa Ấn Độ và Việt Nam nhưng vẫn có cơ hội để cả hai quốc gia được hưởng lợi từ những kinh nghiệm của nhau về phương diện mục tiêu, động lực thúc đẩy giáo dục và các loại hình đào tạo. Mục tiêu chính sách giáo dục của Ấn Độ trong những năm gần đây là phổ cập giáo dục tiểu học. Chính phủ đã quy định quyền được giáo dục là cơ chế hỗ trợ phổ cập giáo dục. Điều này có liên quan đến tất cả các xã hội đang phát triển bao gồm Việt Nam. Để nâng cao vị thế cho người dân, phổ cập giáo dục sẽ có ý nghĩa to lớn đối với sự phát triển của con người trong bất kỳ xã hội nào. Những thiếu sót nếu có ở cấp bậc này phải được các chính phủ khắc phục bằng các biện pháp đặc biệt. Giáo dục từ độ tuổi 5/6 đến 11/12 và sau đó đến 14 tuổi phải được đảm bảo và tạo điều kiện nếu một xã hội cần được nâng cao và trao quyền về mặt xã hội, giáo dục và kinh tế. Giáo dục ở cấp độ này phải là phổ cập, không hà khắc được thực hiện thông qua phương pháp chơi và trong một bầu không khí thân thiện. Giáo dục ở cấp bậc này phải nhằm mục đích phát triển đa chiều cho một đứa trẻ về mặt văn hoá, tâm lý và xã hội. Loại hình giáo dục này sẽ giúp các xã hội hình thành một ngôi nhà cần thiết cho cộng đồng thịnh vượng, lành mạnh, được trao quyền xã hội và chính trị. Các giáo viên ở cấp bậc này phải được đào tạo và động viên đặc biệt bằng cách nâng cao vị thế xã hội của họ và trả lương cao hơn để họ theo giữ bậc giáo dục này. Bậc giáo dục trung học tập trung vào đào tạo phát triển kỹ năng và khoa học cơ bản cho học sinh và tập trung một ít vào chuyên môn ban đầu. Bậc giáo dục này bao gồm nhóm tuổi từ 14 đến 18. Phần lớn lực lượng lao động mà nền kinh tế thịnh vượng lành mạnh cần thì phải được học ở bậc này. Tiếp theo cấp bậc này là việc đào tạo và giáo dục chuyên biệt hơn cho giai đoạn thứ ba để tiếp nối nền tảng cho sinh viên trong các lĩnh vực chuyên môn tương ứng cho tất cả các dịch vụ cao hơn, mà giáo viên ở các cấp bậc khác nhau phải trải qua ba đến bốn năm. Về mặt bản chất và mục tiêu, có sự khác biệt quan trọng giữa giáo dục ở bậc thấp và bậc cao hơn. Ngoài việc mang lại sự tinh tế về văn hoá, quyền xã hội trong một con người, một trong những mục tiêu chính của giáo dục đến bậc trung trên toàn cầu là truyền đạt kiến thức và kỹ năng để chuẩn bị cho ứng cử viên đáp ứng các dịch vụ và các công việc chuyên môn cần thiết trong một xã hội, đặc biệt là trong mối quan hệ với các hoạt động kinh tế dựa vào kỹ năng. Đó là lý do tại sao bậc trung (cử nhân hoặc tương đương) trong lĩnh vực liên quan là yêu cầu cấp thiết cho hầu hết các công việc ở vị trí trung và cao. Ví dụ như điều kiện đủ để làm công tác hành chính cao nhất ở Ấn Độ là tốt nghiệp đại học. Giáo dục đại học, đặc biệt ở cấp độ của các trường đại học, truyền đạt kiến thức không chỉ đơn thuần là để chuẩn bị cho công việc mà còn chuẩn bị cho người học tạo ra những kiến thức mới bằng đào tạo phục vụ chuyên môn học thuật và nghiên cứu khoa học, y học, kỹ thuật, khoa học xã hội và các chuyên ngành khác.

The book contains a thorough analysis of the European Union institutional system as a specific, sui generis international organisation, in the context of its legitimization (its validity and legitimacy). The book is mainly theoretical. Primarily, the author aims at presenting a reliable depiction of the EU institutional system legitimization through the prism of the theoretical output concerning legitimization of the political power, including and accentuating the indicated specificity of the EU as a distinct international organisation. Secondly, he took into consideration the changes introduced into the legal foundations of the EU functioning, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty – the latest treaty reforming the structures of the Union. In the context of the main theme of the present study, these changes are important not only in terms of the EU institutions themselves, i.e. their competences and reciprocal relations, but also with regard to the fundamental change of the legal character of the EU, and the alterations introduced into the individual Union politics. Thirdly, the author attempts to present the problem of the EU institutional system legitimization in the special circumstances, i.e. in the situation of the most profound economic crisis that the EU members have faced since the beginning of the integration process. The EU is regarded as a specific structure, being neither a state nor a typical international organisation. Such an approach was the starting point for the main premise of the present book – the idea that the thesis about the deficiency of democracy in the EU, formulated in the literature on the subject and in the public debate, is a certain simplification, and the characteristic features of the EU and its institutions, which provoked the formulation of such a thesis, should be considered in a broader context, such as the problem of the EU institutional system legitimization and, alternatively, the deficiency of that legitimization. For the direct democratic legitimization is only one of many sources of legitimacy of the EU institutional system and of the Union as a specific international organisation in general – an extremely important source, perhaps the most important, yet not the only one. Thus, the legitimization of the EU and its institutions should be analysed in a broader perspective, which also includes other sources of legitimization – as it is done in case of every political power which, striving for its legitimization to be as strong as possible, attempts to derive it from the largest number of sources. According to the author of the book, to base the EU institutional system legitimization only on the grounds of the direct democratic legitimization characteristic of a democratic state, would be tantamount to a certain disruption of the right order. It would rather be a symptom of too advanced an integration on the "institutional" level in comparison to the extent of the "material" integration. Until the EU is a structure sui generis, in which case it is a combination of features characteristic of an intergovernmental, international organisation, a supranational organisation or a state, the nature of legitimization of this structure should also be specific. The most important role should be played by the democratic legitimization, which should be completed with other sources, owing to which the functioning of the EU institutional system, and the whole EU, could be recognised as legally valid. Apart from the main thesis also other theses and hypotheses are posed in the book. The first chapter is a certain theoretical introduction and a basis to the deliberations presented in the further parts of this study. In the first subsection, with reference to the literature on the subject, the problem of legitimization (legitimacy) of the political power, i.e. the concept, classifications and sources of legitimization (legitimacy) of the political power, have been synthetically depicted. In another part of chapter one, the author attempts to relate the problem of legitimization to the EU as a specific international organisation and to formulate his own definition of legitimization deficiency with regard to EU institutional system. Bearing in mind that the problem of legitimization deficiency in the EU (EC) has not been discussed on a larger scale until certain stage of development of integration process was reached, in 1.3. subsection, the author raises some questions concerning: the sufficiency of legitimization of the integration process during the first few decades after the Second World War, the grounds for that legitimization and the reasons why, at a certain stage of the EU (EC) development the legitimization of the Union's institutional system started to be considered insufficient, which was manifested in the opinions acknowledging the democracy and legitimization deficiency. The first chapter ends with a passage devoted to the importance of the EU institutional system legitimization, whereas the significance of legitimization to the political power and political institutions in general, consitutes its reference point. The second chapter (subsections 2.3.–2.8.) presents a synthesis of the evolution of the EU (EC) institutional system in the context of its legitimization, from the moment of the EC founding treaties ratification, till the time the changes pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty were introduced. The author focused here mainly on the competences of the particular EC (EU) institutions and their reciprocal relations, which should make it possible to observe two main tendencies in the dynamics of changes taking place in this field, and present its specificity and distinctiveness in comparison to the systems of democratic states. At the beginning of this chapter, a thesis has been formulated (simultaneously, becoming an extension of the attempt to determine why, at a certain stage of the integration process, the issue of democracy/legitimization deficiency started to be discussed – a question that was raised in the first chapter), which states that the legitimization of the EU institutional system will be sufficient, if the law regulations and political practice of their functioning are convergent with the level of advancement of the integration process in various spheres of social life; in other words, the "institutional" integration should correspond with the "material" integration (that is the Union politics). To that end, the author made an attempt to present, in a synthetized form, the development of the "material" integration (subsection 2.1.), which he completed with an analogical endeavour to illustrate the evolution of the EU (EC) institutional system in the context of its legitimization (subsection 2.9). For in accordance with the increasingly common approach, the EU institutions are treated as a system, the concept and principles of which have been presented in 2.2. subsection. In the third chapter, the author presents the EU institutional system in its current form, that is with the changes introduced under the Lisbon Treaty. Here, the selected aspects regarding competences and functioning of the particular EU institutions have been depicted, as well as the relations between them in the context of legitimization. Additionally, three selected problems regarding the EU institutional system have been raised, which are especially important in the context of its legitimization (the relation between the EU institutional system and the institutions of the EU member states, the question of transparency in the functioning of the EU institutions, as well as the Union budgets in the consecutive years). In the last subsection (3.9.) the specific features of the EU institutional system, significant in the context of its legitimization, have been identified. The fourth chapter is devoted to the functioning of the EU institutional system in the perspective of four basic sources of its legitimization, i.e. indirect and technocratic, direct and democratic, utilitarian, and one consisting of "values". The chapter ends with a conclusion outlining the specificity of the EU and its institutional system with regard to the sources of its legitimization, which is especially important in the context of the book's main thesis. The fifth chapter concerns the problem of legitimization of the EU institutions in the context of the economic crisis, which the EU member states struggle with since around the year 2008. The sixth chapter, in turn, regards the so called subjective (empirical, social) dimension of the EU institutions' legitimization, that is, the way this problem is perceived by the citizens of the EU member states. It has been based on the results of opinion polls conducted for the use of Eurobarometer, from among which these questions and answers were selected, which could be applied to illustrate the way the EU citizens perceive the Union institutions in the context of their legitimization. The closing remarks include the most important conclusions drawn from the conducted analyses and the potential reforms and modifications of the EU institutional system, which may allow for the reinforcement of its legitimization, primarily in its democratic aspect. The bibliography contains a list of sources which were cited and referred to in the book.

The European Union is a space o f continuous negotiations and an arena hosting the clashes of diverse integration options and concepts represented by EU member states and institutions. Furthermore, the disintegration of the EU (which dates back to the Maastricht Treaty) is becoming more and more visible. It is reflected directly by the presence in the European debate concerning multi-speed Europe and the current actions taken by the Eurozone states aimed at escalating the integration among selected states. Poland is also taking part in the debate concerning the future o f the European Union. The author of this paper attempted to examine Poland's place in the political and economic space o f the European Union by referring to the theory of integration. The research objective o f the paper is to analyse the Polish integration policy between late 1989 and 2012 within the context o f the international and European integration theory. The advanced research reflection in this scope in relation to Poland as the selected and important EU member state fits into the debate on the relevance of the European Union uniting concepts. The author posed the following research hypotheses in the dissertation: 1 .Considering the current stage o f development of the European Union, the Polish integration policy does not firmly support strictly one international or European integration concept. The Polish integration policy does not have a cohesive and stable integration policy concept and it is largely dependent on the policy and objectives of the current government (this is not only typical o f Poland) and the integration level. 2.Poland is strongly fixed in western structures, which makes the integration policy a vital component of development. What is more, the outlook on the European Union continues to evolve in the Polish political and social space. Poland sees the European Union as the main point o f reference in many political, economic, and social areas. 3.The organisation of the European Union does not only see Poland affect the form of the integration process, but also sees member states and EU organisations affect the functioning of Poland. The influence of a given state on the form o f the European Union mostly depends on the state's strength and significance in the EU community. This premise sees the place o f a given state in the system conditioned by the current factors, for example the European Union expansion process. Therefore, the interests o f Poland do not always correspond to the interests of the European Union, and the other way around. This deepens the EU's intergovernmental dimension. 4.Member states constitute the most important element o f the European Union. It is a union of states and nations supported by community institutions. This structure covers the convergence o f its methods, theories, and areas. This makes it impossible to profile the structure only from the perspective of the specified international integration theory. 5.The current stage o f the European Union's development, its challenges, and its problems show that the integration process continues to evolve and its result is impossible to foresee. 6.The current economic crisis influences the perception and management o f the European Union. The expectations include the intensification of intergovemmentalism and the establishment of multi-speed Union. If Poland remains outside of the Eurozone, it will find itself on the periphery o f the integration process, which is rather far from its very centre. Based on these research findings, Polish politics with regard to and, later, as part o f the EU can be divided into several principal periods. Period 1: (1989-1997) a time of consolidating Polish independence and security. This time was associated with the choice of a principal direction of the Polish foreign policy after 1989, i.e. Western Europe and declaration of Poland's will to take part in the process of its integration, without having any concrete vision for further course of those processes. This approach was often marked by a claiming attitude, both among political elites (marked by high instability) and the society (a simplified attitude, no social debate or knowledge about integration processes). During that period, Polish politics with regard to the EU cannot be ascribed to any specific model, since that policy was in statu nascendi at the time and was targeted at the EU membership, an objective in its own right. Period 2: (1998-2004) a time of negotiating Poland's accession to the EU, and the candidate's becoming accustomed to the rules o f EU's workings. There was still no vision o f integration processes from the Polish perspective and related opinions were expressed in a very cautious way. The primary aim was membership in the EU, such that was available at a given moment. At the same time, we should stress an important moment in the process of changes: the breakthrough o f the years 1999/2000. The interest in issues related to Poland's integration with the EU grew more intense then. The Polish government began to address this issue not only from the local perspective (a balance o f benefits and losses), but also expressed opinions on the reformation of the EU as a whole. Poland came as a difficult candidate for an EU member state (Polish support for US activities in Iraq and Afghanistan). This "difficulty" also emerged in the government's seeking to secure Poland's financial interests in connection with the accession. It was a period of preparations for membership, marked by a high level o f uncertainty (no clear vision, conflicting views: strong Union or preservation of independence, Common Foreign and Security Policy or working with the USA). Period 3: (2005-2007) a process aimed at building a vision of "Europe of Solidary Nations" in the EU by the government o f K. Marcinkiewicz and J. Kaczyński. Decisive, though not quite stable, support for international liberalism in the Polish integration policy. This manifested itself in reinforcing the Euro-realistic stance, both within Poland and abroad, by many considered, in fact, Eurosceptic. Period 4: (since 2008 to this day) a period of an integration vision being developed by D. Tusk's government, especially the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, R. Sikorski. It is a time of big changes and evolution in the Polish integration policy. An important issue at this time was a real sense of benefits coming from Poland's integration with the EU and the Polish government's pro-European attitude. The integration policy being developed shows a more flexible approach to the concept of independence (emergence o f collective independence) and thinking about the Polish foreign policy from the EU perspective. Additionally, we observed a return to constructing strategic partnership between Poland and Germany, rationalisation of partnership with the USA, Poland's active contribution to solving EU problems (e.g. the economic crisis), working towards a better "Eastern policy" as part of the EU. R. Sikorski was the first Polish Minister o f Foreign Affairs to have officially used the concept of federalism and vow his support for it in integration processes, mindful of Polish experiences and historical heritage in this respect. The Polish government expresses a firm objection to the idea of "multi-speed" Europe and builds an image o f Poland as an active member state (presidency at the EU Council), enjoying a good economic situation and having a society with an enthusiastic approach to the integration processes and strong Europe, and seeking to be as close to the "epicentre" o f countries behind this process.The analysis o f the integrative concepts presented in this paper shows that the different periods of the Polish integration policy (establishment and execution) saw and continue to see various levels in the majority of the international integration theory elements (of course, this is not just a Polish characteristic in the European Union, but rather a predominant trend in the Union's integration process). This has been and continues to be conditioned in large part by the foreign policy objectives of the given government, as well as by the current challenges and problems Poland is facing. In the case of the Polish integration policy, as in most other EU member states, we can observe an aggregation of interests, concepts and attitudes. This research project seeks to systematise them.

The Arnhem Land Progress Association (ALPA) has operated stores for up to twenty years in many Arnhem Land communities. It started by buying ration stores formerly operated by the Methodist Overseas Mission. These were mainly small, poorly stocked counter stores, generally operated on an intermittent basis by the mission staff and their families. The organisation at both the local level and at the central administrative level has gone through many changes during its twenty years in operation including its formal separation from the Church, the building up and expansion of the retail store infrastructure in each ALPA member community, and various changes in direction and philosophy under the leadership of the different ALPA Group Managers (now called Executive Directors). In an era when the operation of retail stores in remote communities has proved extremely risky (see Young 1984), ALPA has succeeded in providing the communities with efficient, well stocked, modem retail stores with many ancillary services. Since its inception ALPA has seen itself as an alternative development agency catering for Aboriginal communities both in Arnhem Land and in the Kimberley region of Western Australia. Not content with providing an essential retail service, ALPA has viewed the stores and the profits generated by the stores as a means of providing training, scholarships and other educational opportunities for Aboriginal people, allocating starter loans for family and clan businesses, and underwriting community projects in the settlements in which it operates. ALPA has provided store training services to other organisations such as Anangu Winkiku Stores (AWS) in Alice Springs and non-ALPA Aboriginal communities across the north of Australia. Throughout its history the Association has remained fiercely proud of its economic independence of government. Although ALPA has successfully operated stores in Aboriginal communities for over twenty years, there are many unresolved issues facing the organisation today. Many of these issues are not directly concerned with ALPA the organisation, although there are some which pertain directly to the nature and style of operation of this particular organisation. Problems have arisen because of the difficulties associated with service delivery to remote Aboriginal communities and the conflict between the 'money side' as opposed to the 'community side' of the organisation providing these services. Sometimes the problems are really part of the politics in settlements or the typical grumblings made by most store customers in any community, Aboriginal or non­ Aboriginal. And sometimes the problems are part of the wider questions about the national and Territory economy, the politics of Aboriginal autonomy, Aboriginal land rights, the apparent patemalisms which dominate many non-Aboriginal dealings with Aboriginal people and so on. As well as being proud of what the organisation has achieved and wanting this documented as a celebration of its twenty years in operation, ALPA was concerned about resolving the issues and questions affecting the stores and the Association today. For this reason the Association sought an evaluation of its work hoping that the exercise would give some pointers on how best to deal with these issues while simultaneously achieving its constitutional objective of 'the social and economic development of Aboriginal people'. After negotiations with NARU, ALPA agreed to fund a large part of a research project with the following objectives: • to produce a well documented history of ALPA, its activities and achievements over the last twenty years; • to evaluate the objectives, goals and aspirations of ALPA, the relevance of those objectives, and how they have changed over time; • to evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and impacts of ALPA programs; • to make comparisons with similar associations both in northern Australia and overseas; • to make recommendations and suggest strategies for change. These objectives were to be met by writing a history and a general historical evaluation of ALPA, preparing a draft evaluation of the Association for the Directors of ALPA, and preparing a comparative report of similar organisations. The research team assembled to work on the project comprised David Lea (Executive Director, NARU), Samantha Wells (Research Assistant, NARU), Greg Crough (Senior Research Fellow, NARU), Christine Christophersen (Research Assistant, NARU), Elspeth Young (Associate Professor, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra) and Ritchie Howitt (Lecturer, Macquarie University). Data for the project were collected from eclectic sources. Some, especially in the early stages, were obtained from background reading on outback stores, indigenous enterprises and culture contact in general, particularly those readings concerned with reconciling western thought and business practice with Aboriginal thought and modes of production. This was followed by an in-depth study of the files of ALPA, archival material and of other organisations both in Australia and North America. Much of the information collected for the project was derived from structured and unstructured inteiViews with individuals and groups in homes, offices and communities; formal and informal discussions; meetings with communities, organisations and groups; and observation of events. For reasons of confidentiality, many names of people spoken to, especially in the communities, have been withheld. Rough drafts of confidential reports were presented to ALPA's Board of Directors in July 1992. ALPA subsequently withdrew from the project leaving NARU to complete it. It is likely that NARU will publish Young's Support Organisations/or Aboriginal Stores: the Arnhem Land Progress Association and its counterparts in Central Australia and the North American Arctic, and Crough and Christophersen's Some Perspectives on the Arnhem Land Progress Association in the near future. This historical account of the Amhem Land Progress Association reflects the organisation's pride in its survival, operations and growth over the last twenty years. It also reflects ALPA's concern about where it is going and where it should go. It is to the credit of the Association that it was eager to learn from the past and to share its experiences in what is a difficult and sensitive field. It is therefore appropriate that I should first thank the Directors, management and staff of ALPA who supported this project and assisted me in many ways, in particular Stuart McMillan, George Rawnsley, Henry Harper, Lori Katarski, Donald Nulupani and David Djalangi. I would also like to thank the various ALPA representatives who read the final draft of the history manuscript and submitted comments in order to prevent or reconcile any discrepancies before publishing the work. The store managers and their spouses in various Aboriginal communities provided me with much time, hospitality and knowledge. This was greatly appreciated as was the tolerance of the storeworlcers as I nosed in and out of aisles or interrupted tea breaks for a chat. It is impossible to mention all the people who shared insights with me about their communities, lives, the stores and the Association but I would like to acknowledge this and for being given permission to experience first hand a remarlcable land, people and culture. Other people (see Appendix 2) in towns around Australia also deserve mention for agreeing to be interviewed and making these interviews as pleasant and rewarding as possible. Stephen Evans was able to provide much insight and infonnation into the worlcings of ALPA for which I am exceedingly grateful. The North Australia Research Unit provided a congenial 'home' while I was working on this book. I am extremely appreciative of the research team's support, criticisms and discussions throughout the project. Especially David Lea who read and reread drafts providing constructive criticism, helpful suggestions and fmding resting places for many wandering apostrophes. Other NARU staff and visitors to the Unit provided much assistance throughout the project, in particular Ann Webb (copy editing and production), Sally Roberts and Colleen Pyne (library research), Meriel Weir (computing), Nicki Hanssen, Janet Sincock, Jann King and Toni Bauman. NARU provided not just institutional help but financial assistance, technical help and hours of stimulating debate. The Northern Territory Archives Service, the State Library and the Uniting Church provided much assistance and made the research task a little easier. My family, friends, housemates and associates all deserve mention for coping with the stress of what, at times, became a particularly difficult project. Thanks also to 'Green Ant' who designed the cover. Finally my special thanks to Adrian Deville who served as editor, inspirationalist and friend the whole way through. Note: NARU observes a number of publishing conventions in its publications. These are set out in a style booklet which is readily available. However, because many quotations are used throughout this book, it should be pointed out that material in quotations is never changed unless a series of full-stops indicates that something is omitted or square brackets indicate something has been inserted within them. Thus, within the quotations, there are frequent infelicities of style, grammar and spellings. Abbreviations are often different from those used in the text for example there are various spellings of 'Yolngu' and Amhem Land is sometimes presented as one word. These quotations are used because they are relevant or important to the text I feel that the context will make any conflicts or ambiguities between text and quotations clear.

In the eyes of the ruling international elites, the Great War had been driven by a rising nationalism that left Europe's civilization in shambles. The elites argued that a new modernism, combined with a world that was increasingly technologically interconnected, was to blame for the ruins, anguish, and hatred that dominated peoples' minds after 1918. These intellectual elites tried to rebuild Europe's civilization and create awareness beyond national boundaries. In this context, broadcasting experts in Europe built the first radio broadcasting infrastructures inside and beyond their borders. This book examines if, how, and why the promoters of broadcasting linked their activities in the interwar period to projects that aimed to unite Europe. The book describes five cross-border issues that the emerging transnational community of broadcasting experts worked to resolve. These issues concerned the institutionalization of broadcasting; the construction of networks; the interactions between broadcasting systems such as Radio Moscow, Radio Nations, Vatican Radio, and Radio Luxembourg; the role of broadcasting within a broader international context of warfare and peace building; and international programming efforts. The book is mainly based on research in the archives of international organizations such as the International Broadcasting Union, the League of Nations, and the International Telegraph Union. These organizations could all be seen as European system builders. They functioned as arenas in which various actors simultaneously negotiated the futures of both transnational broadcasting and Europe. Chapter 2 examines the "birth of an idea." Broadcasting was originally a private activity whereby states usually granted concessions to companies that would then operate (and sometimes construct) the stations. Several of the operational and construction problems mentioned above could not be resolved without a certain amount of international collaboration. However, international organizations such as the League of Nations and the International Telegraph Union (ITU) did not face such problems. They argued that the rapidly developing technology outpaced legislative action. As a result, ten European broadcasting organizations established the International Broadcasting Union (IBU) in 1925. The IBU's institutional structure followed the European tradition of combining a technical approach with the ideals of international peace and rapprochement. A wave of nationalizing broadcasting in Europe challenged this structure. Eventually, shared European traditions, combined with the central role of a small core group of experts in the IBU, ensured minimal state interference. The IBU was able to continue to seek cross-border collaboration and became the key player for interwar broadcasting in Europe. Chapter 3 deals with the pressing problem of network construction. Radio signals traveled through the air freely, which caused interference with signals across borders and major inefficiencies in the network. The IBU, at first alone, but later in collaboration with national PTT administrations, the League of Nations' Communication and Transit Committee, the ITU and its consultative committee for long-distance telephony, drafted plans to allocate frequencies in Europe. These activities secured efficient national wireless broadcasting. Furthermore, the gradually growing transnational community of broadcasting experts complemented these wireless systems with an interconnected European relay network for broadcasting via wire and cable. This network, coupled to the national wireless networks, facilitated the exchange of music and broadcasting of international programs throughout Europe. The construction processes were contested along the way. Throughout the 1930s, the development of short waves challenged the recently established European frequency allocation standards. Attempts to standardize these short waves resulted in an unplanned global regionalization of broadcasting. Chapter 4 challenges the IBU and ITU network efforts by focusing on their interaction with other structures, such as Radio Moscow, Radio Nations, Vatican Radio, and Radio Luxembourg. These stations, with the exception of Radio Moscow, were expanding at a time when the IBU and ITU efforts were well on their way to becoming the European standard. The ideas of the new stations' promoters, which were mostly globally-oriented, did not necessarily coincide with the IBU's vision of a Europe with national wireless broadcasting systems. Fine-tuning these standards with the structure of Radio Moscow, for instance, would redefine the eastern boundaries of the European network. Furthermore, the structure of Radio Nations and Radio Luxembourg threatened the very idea of a Europe made up of nation states. These systems favored a pan-national approach to the organization and network construction of broadcasting. International fine-tuning of these different systems in Europe could usually only take place via "technified" discussions that bridged ideological and political differences. Chapter 5 looks more closely at the role of broadcasting in the context of war and peace. Illicit propaganda broadcasting created serious problems on a continent with as many states as Europe and in an era of rapidly changing international relations. Any attempt to solve this problem depended on how well international relations were progressing. In a reluctant international atmosphere, the IBU initially took a gentleman's approach, requesting that its members broadcast in a civilized way without offending people in other countries. When international relations improved in the late 1920s, the League recognized the idea of positive propaganda. The subsequent close collaboration between the League and the IBU endorsed an international mindset based on European values of civilization and Enlightenment. The collaboration came to a halt when the rise in harsh nationalism caused international relations to deteriorate in the 1930s, thereby disrupting a well-oiled European broadcasting system. Nazi Germany forced the IBU to cease any activity related to power politics. The IBU officially dropped out of propaganda regulation, but a core of IBU experts continued to individually facilitate the League on this matter. Solutions came too late – a new world war broke out in 1939. Chapter 6 explores international programming. Programs and music touched the heart of culture and had a direct impact on feelings of belonging and identity. Any effort to standardize transnational cultural broadcasting policy, build international programs, and compile a musical repertoire suitable for broadcasting became an intricate matter. IBU experts and intellectual elites, both within and outside the League of Nations, disagreed substantially on what constituted a "high quality," "high culture," or "suitable" program. Consequently, many programming issues remained unresolved in 1939. Over the years, the various promoters of broadcasting expressed different concepts of the kind of unity that international programs should convey to listeners. They related programming more directly to the creation of European unity than their other broadcasting activities. Ultimately, their programs communicated a European culture that reflected a universal idea of national diversity. The promoters contributed a relatively safe, generally accepted, high-quality, and high-art image of European culture to Europe's cultural heritage in the interwar years. They balanced the local and national diversity of Europe with the international unity of Europe. Europe – On Air concludes that interwar promoters of broadcasting did indeed connect their activities to projects for European unification. To most of these promoters, broadcasting was a matter of practical internationalism. In the First instance, this meant resolving practical problems from a technical standpoint. The promoters formed a cross-organizational and flexible transnational expert community that could adapt to the problems at hand. Diffuse personal networks offered a way out when official routes failed. Secondly, practical internationalism meant that the promoters' ultimate goal was to contribute to the internationalist ideals of peace and rapprochement worldwide. With the exception of Radio Luxembourg, systems such as Radio Moscow, Radio Nations and Vatican Radio had global aims, albeit for different reasons. As always, Europe was shimmering somewhere in the background, whether entering into construction efforts and interests for a practical in-between solution, as a geographical space, as a tradition of commerce and organization, or as an explicit goal for cultural unification and civilization. Opinions vary regarding the success or failure of these interwar efforts. On one hand, the promoters of broadcasting created suitable international institutions, material networks, a great variety of "international" programs, and managed to let their vision trickle down into European program guides. On the other hand, increasing tension during the 1930s and the outbreak of the Second World War hindered the implementation and effective employment of their efforts. Many issues remained unresolved. Europe – On Air argues that the efforts of these promoters were not in vain. They have managed to create a European space, a community, and a kind of European regulatory culture for broadcasting. Equally important, their efforts have found a new start in post-Second World War organizations like the European Broadcasting Union and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. In this way, interwar projects have influenced the broadcasting agenda right through to today.