Suchergebnisse

"Gegenstand dieses Papiers ist die Entwicklung des mit dem Leitbegriff "Governance" verbundenen
analytischen Ansatzes und sein Zusammenhang mit dem steuerungstheoretischen Paradigma.
"Governance" ist, so wird argumentiert, keine einfache Weiterentwicklung von "Steuerung", sondern lenkt
die Aufmerksamkeit auf andere Aspekte der politischen Wirklichkeit. Während die Steuerungstheorie
einem akteurzentrierten Ansatz folgt, ist die sich entwickelnde Governance-Theorie institutionalistisch
und fragt nach der Beschaffenheit von Regelungsstrukturen, in denen öffentliche und private,
hierarchische und netzwerkartige Formen der Regelung zusammenwirken." [Autorenreferat]

This article summarizes progress made in a World Bank initiative funded by the UK Department for International Development to test and develop policy-relevant,politically acceptable, quantitative indicators of governance. There are two majorprinciples involved in the process of generating indicators that are useful for practical reforms. Political acceptability is key in developing neutral quantitative benchmarks of good governance that can be embraced by reformers. Measures should also be institutionally specific so that reformers know which institutions to reform and how to do so. This article explores some of the most promising second-generation indicators of good governance and elaborates on how they are being used in World Bank operations.

Decentralisation is a policy feature common to many African countries. Local governance is therefore gaining in relevance, though not yet in clarity. Based on the experience of a development project in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, the article examines the case of local governance in practice, grounding this in a historical analysis and focusing on the relationship between local government and civil society. (InWent/DÜI)

Like the United States, managers of Japan's large companies since the early 1950s have had great autonomy because shareholding is dispersed. However, most Japanese companies have a significant portion of their shares stably held by other friendly financial institutions and businesses, a significant component of the integrated, synergistic "postwar economic system" embodied in the permanent employment system of industrial relations, the main bank system, and management independence. Employees rather than shareholders are the main potential constraint, so managers have given strong priority to employee interests. Japan's mediocre economic performance since 1991, and a range of publicized corporate scandals, are now undermining this system. Government policies and public pressure have improved corporate disclosure and transparency, and have made corporate governance through capital markets feasible. While managers in the future will place greater weight on shareholder interests, only a few companies are likely to adopt the Anglo-American corporate governance model. More likely is the gradual development of a hybrid approach in which management retains considerable autonomy and employee interests remain important.