The purpose of the research is to analyze the tools of interaction between the Russian side of the conflict and the civilian population of South Ossetia during the Russo-Georgian War in August of 2008; to determine the features of Russia's informational impact on the civilians before and during hostilities. The main instrument of influence was the Russian propaganda, which was conducted before the conflict actively. The paramount ultimate goal of Russia's information operations was to form in the international community the idea of Georgia as an aggressor state, which launched hostilities on its own territory against another ethnic minority. The methodology of the research is based on the general scientific principles of historicism, objectivity, systematicity, determinism and historical and logical dialectical unity. The main research methods are: generalization, logical and chronological analysis, periodization, as well as a special method of historical research: historical comparative. The following methods have been used: structural and functional analysis, search, formal logical, system structural, and analytical. The scientific novelty is that for the first time the analysis of historical open sources was carried out, which described the methods and tools of information and psychological influence on the civilian population of South Ossetia used by the Russian Federation before and during the Russo-Georgian War in August of 2008 based on the studied source base using modern methodological approaches. The carried out research confirmed Russia's non-compliance with the norms of the international and humanitarian law, general provisions on human rights and the generally accepted principles and methods of military civil cooperation during the conflict. On the contrary, the Russian Federation special units used all possible methods in order to gather intelligence, organize systematic informational and psychological influence on the civilian population to form an opinion about the aggressor state Georgia and establish full control of the Russian Federation in South Ossetia. The Conclusions. The analysis revealed that the Russian Federation builds relationships with its neighbours, as with former colonies, without considering them as fully sovereign states. In order to achieve its goals, the Russian Federation uses separatism and irredentist claims in neighbouring countries. During the Russo-Georgian War, the main tools of influence on the civilian population of South Ossetia were the Russian propaganda and the confusion in facts. During the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, neither side established centers of civil and military cooperation due to the transiency of the conflict and the Russian Federation's unwillingness to develop civilized approaches to resolve the conflict and make peace. The lack of interaction between the civilian population and the military led to a large amount of inaccurate and falsified data on the exact number of losses of both parties and victims among the local population, which allowed the Russian propaganda to manipulate the consciousness of their own citizens and the opinion of the world community, deliberately increasing the number of victims, and thus, increase hatred and aggression against the Georgian side. Key words: civil and military cooperation, information struggle, hybrid war, the Russian aggression, Russo-Georgian War in August of 2008. ; Мета дослідження – проаналізувати інструменти взаємодії між російською стороною конфлікту та цивільним населенням Південної Осетії під час російсько-грузинської війни у серпні 2008р. Визначити особливості організації російського інформаційного впливу на цивільне населення до початку та під час бойових дій. Головним інструментом впливу була російська пропаганда, яка активно велась перед початком конфлікту. Головною прикінцевою метою інформаційних операцій Російської Федерації стало формування у міжнародної спільноти думки про Грузію як державу-агресора, що розпочала на власній території бойові дії проти іншої етнічної меншини. Методологія дослідження вибудовувалася із застосуванням загальнонаукових принципів історизму, об'єктивності, системності, детермінізму та діалектичної єдності історичного і логічного. Основними методами дослідження є: узагальнення, логічний та хронологічний аналіз, періодизація, а також спеціальний метод історичного дослідження: історико-порівняльний. У ході дослідження використовувалися: структурно-функціональний аналіз, пошуковий, формально-логічний, системно-структурний, аналітичний методи. Наукова новизна. На основі дослідженої джерельної бази з використанням сучасних методологічних підходів уперше здійснено аналіз відкритих історичних джерел, які описували способи й інструменти інформаційно-психологічного впливу на цивільне населення Південної Осетії застосовані РФ до та під час російсько-грузинської війни серпня 2008р. Проведене дослідження підтвердило недотримання РФ норм міжнародного, гуманітарного права, загальних положень про права людини та загальноприйнятих сьогодні принципів і методів військово-цивільного співробітництва під час конфлікту. Навпаки, спеціальними підрозділами РФ було застосовано всі можливі методи щодо збору розвідувальної інформації, організації системного інформаційно-психологічного впливу на цивільне населення для формування думки про державу-агресора Грузію та встановлення повного контролю РФ у Південній Осетії. Висновки. Проведений аналіз виявив, що РФ вибудовує взаємовідносини зі своїми сусідами як з колишніми колоніями, не розглядаючи їх як повністю суверенні держави. Для досягнення своїх цілей РФ використовує сепаратизм та іредентистські претензії у сусідніх державах. Під час російсько-грузинської війни головним інструментом впливу на цивільне населення Південної Осетії була російська пропаганда та плутанина у фактажі. У ході російсько-грузинської війни 2008р. жодною зі сторін не було створено центрів цивільно-військового співробітництва у зв'язку зі швидкоплинністю самого конфлікту та через небажання РФ формувати цивілізовані підходи до згортання конфлікту і встановлення миру. Відсутність налагодженої взаємодії між цивільним населенням та військовими стала причиною появи великої кількості недостовірних і сфальсифікованих даних щодо точної кількості втрат обох сторін та жертв серед місцевого населення – це уможливило маніпулювання органами російської пропаганди свідомістю власних громадян та думкою світової спільноти, свідомо збільшувати кількість жертв іу такий спосіб посилювати ненависть і агресію до дій грузинської сторони. Ключові слова: військово-цивільне співробітництво, інформаційна боротьба, гібридна війна, російська агресія, російсько-грузинська війна серпня 2008 р.
The current course of all EU regional grouping countries aimed at implementing sustainable development as a fundamental objective of the Europe 2020 strategy has been highlighted in the article. Revitalization programs are considered as a tool for achieving sustainable development goals. The study of revitalization and its programs has been carried out, in the content of which the purpose, norms and process of their implementation at the international and regional level are highlighted. Emphasis is placed on funding as a major tool in the implementation of these programs. The system of financing at all its levels is organized in accordance with the principle of division into fixed assets, which are common to all Member States of the European Union. The financial receipts from the European organizations to the national funds in the period from 2014 to 2020 have been observed. The case study of the new member states of the EU explored the system of practical application of the international and regional model of sustainable development programs. The main investor in the research process is the European Union, namely its main banking structural and investment organizations, which replenish the corresponding funds of national economies by 7080% of the total amount, the rest is earmarked for local revenues. The 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that joined the European Regional Group during the 2004 enlargement, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, are illustrative examples. The object of the analytical study was: statistical indicators of sustainable development, divided into seventeen basic goals and the volume of financing of selected countries from structural and investment funds. In the course of the correlation analysis, only a third of the Sustainable Development Goals and their financial revenues were sufficiently correlated. Other factors, such as social, technological, informational, economic, foreign economic and, above all, political, influence the achievement of other sustainable development goals. This again proves the importance of conducting national and regional policies, where particular attention should be paid to revitalization programs. ; В статье освещено современный курс всех стран региональной группировки ЕС направленный на реализацию устойчивого развития, как фундаментальной цели стратегии «Европа 2020». Рассмотрены ревитализационные программы, как инструмент реализации целей устойчивого развития. Проведено исследование ревитализации и ее программ, в содержании которых выделены цель, нормы и процесс внедрения их на международном и региональном уровне. Подчеркнуто финансирования, как главный инструмент на пути реализации данных программ. Организованная структуризация системы финансирования на всех ее уровнях по принципу раздела на основные фонды, которые являются общими для всех стран-членов Европейского Союза. Проведено наблюдение финансовых поступлений из Европейских организаций национальных фондов в период с 2014 до 2020 лет. Исследовано на примере стран-новых членов ЕС систему практического применения международной и региональной модели программ устойчивого развития. Главным инвестором в процессе исследования выявлено Европейский Союз, а именно его основные банковские структурные и инвестиционные организации, пополняющие соответствующие фонды национальных экономик на 70-80% от общего количества, остальное же отведено местным поступлением. В качестве наглядного примера выбраны показатели десяти стран Центральной и Восточной Европы (ЦВЕ),которые присоединились к Европейскому региональному объединению во время расширения союза в 2004 году, а именно: Венгрия, Польша, Чехия, Словакия, Словения, Литва, Латвия, Кипр, Болгария и Хорватия. Объектом аналитического исследования стали: статистические показатели реализации устойчивого развития, разделенные на семнадцать базовых целей и объем финансирования выбранных стран из структурных и инвестиционных фондов. При проведении корреляционного анализа выявлено достаточную связь только между третью целей устойчивого развития и их финансовыми поступлениями. На достижение остальных целей устойчивого развития влияют другие факторы: социальные, технологические, информационные, экономические, внешнеэкономические и прежде всего политические. Что опять таки доказывает важность проведения государственной и региональной политики, где особое внимание следует уделить ревитализационным программам. ; У статті висвітлено сучасний курс усіх країн регіонального угрупування ЄС спрямованого на реалізацію сталого розвитку, як фундаментальної мети стратегії «Європа 2020». Розглянуто ревіталізаційні програми, як інструмент реалізації цілей сталого розвитку. Проведено дослідження ревіталізації та її програм, у змісті яких виокремлено мету, норми та процес впровадження їх на міжнародному і регіональному рівні. Підкреслено фінансування, як головний інструмент на шляху до реалізації даних програм. Організована структуризація системи фінансування на всіх її рівнях за принципом розділу на основні фонди, які є загальними для всіх країн-членів Європейського Союзу. Проведено спостереження фінансових надходжень з Європейських організацій до національних фондів у період з 2014 до 2020 років. Досліджено на прикладі країн-нових членів ЄС систему практичного застосування міжнародної та регіональної моделі програм сталого розвитку. Головним інвестором у процесі дослідження виявлено Європейський Союз, а саме його основні банківські структурні та інвестиційні організації, які поповнюють відповідні фонди національних економік на 70-80% від загальної кількості, решту ж відведено місцевим надходженням. В якості наочного прикладу обрані показники десяти країн Центральної та Східної Європи (ЦСЄ), що приєдналися до Європейського регіонального угрупування під час розширення союзу у 2004 році, а саме: Угорщина, Польща, Чехія, Словаччина, Словенія, Литва, Латвія, Кіпр, Болгарія та Хорватія. Об'єктом аналітичного дослідження стали: статистичні показники реалізації сталого розвитку, розділені на сімнадцять базових цілей та обсяг фінансування обраних країн з структурних та інвестиційних фондів. Під час проведення кореляційного аналізу виявлено достатній зв'язок тільки між третиною цілей сталого розвитку та їх фінансовими надходженнями. На досягнення решти цілей сталого розвитку мають вплив інші чинники: соціальні, технологічні, інформаційні, економічні, зовнішньоекономічні та насамперед політичні. Що знову таки доводить важливість проведення державної та регіональної політики, де окрему увагу слід приділити ревіталізаційним програмам.
The current course of all EU regional grouping countries aimed at implementing sustainable development as a fundamental objective of the Europe 2020 strategy has been highlighted in the article. Revitalization programs are considered as a tool for achieving sustainable development goals. The study of revitalization and its programs has been carried out, in the content of which the purpose, norms and process of their implementation at the international and regional level are highlighted. Emphasis is placed on funding as a major tool in the implementation of these programs. The system of financing at all its levels is organized in accordance with the principle of division into fixed assets, which are common to all Member States of the European Union. The financial receipts from the European organizations to the national funds in the period from 2014 to 2020 have been observed. The case study of the new member states of the EU explored the system of practical application of the international and regional model of sustainable development programs. The main investor in the research process is the European Union, namely its main banking structural and investment organizations, which replenish the corresponding funds of national economies by 7080% of the total amount, the rest is earmarked for local revenues. The 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that joined the European Regional Group during the 2004 enlargement, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, are illustrative examples. The object of the analytical study was: statistical indicators of sustainable development, divided into seventeen basic goals and the volume of financing of selected countries from structural and investment funds. In the course of the correlation analysis, only a third of the Sustainable Development Goals and their financial revenues were sufficiently correlated. Other factors, such as social, technological, informational, economic, foreign economic and, above all, political, influence the achievement of other sustainable development goals. This again proves the importance of conducting national and regional policies, where particular attention should be paid to revitalization programs. ; В статье освещено современный курс всех стран региональной группировки ЕС направленный на реализацию устойчивого развития, как фундаментальной цели стратегии «Европа 2020». Рассмотрены ревитализационные программы, как инструмент реализации целей устойчивого развития. Проведено исследование ревитализации и ее программ, в содержании которых выделены цель, нормы и процесс внедрения их на международном и региональном уровне. Подчеркнуто финансирования, как главный инструмент на пути реализации данных программ. Организованная структуризация системы финансирования на всех ее уровнях по принципу раздела на основные фонды, которые являются общими для всех стран-членов Европейского Союза. Проведено наблюдение финансовых поступлений из Европейских организаций национальных фондов в период с 2014 до 2020 лет. Исследовано на примере стран-новых членов ЕС систему практического применения международной и региональной модели программ устойчивого развития. Главным инвестором в процессе исследования выявлено Европейский Союз, а именно его основные банковские структурные и инвестиционные организации, пополняющие соответствующие фонды национальных экономик на 70-80% от общего количества, остальное же отведено местным поступлением. В качестве наглядного примера выбраны показатели десяти стран Центральной и Восточной Европы (ЦВЕ),которые присоединились к Европейскому региональному объединению во время расширения союза в 2004 году, а именно: Венгрия, Польша, Чехия, Словакия, Словения, Литва, Латвия, Кипр, Болгария и Хорватия. Объектом аналитического исследования стали: статистические показатели реализации устойчивого развития, разделенные на семнадцать базовых целей и объем финансирования выбранных стран из структурных и инвестиционных фондов. При проведении корреляционного анализа выявлено достаточную связь только между третью целей устойчивого развития и их финансовыми поступлениями. На достижение остальных целей устойчивого развития влияют другие факторы: социальные, технологические, информационные, экономические, внешнеэкономические и прежде всего политические. Что опять таки доказывает важность проведения государственной и региональной политики, где особое внимание следует уделить ревитализационным программам. ; У статті висвітлено сучасний курс усіх країн регіонального угрупування ЄС спрямованого на реалізацію сталого розвитку, як фундаментальної мети стратегії «Європа 2020». Розглянуто ревіталізаційні програми, як інструмент реалізації цілей сталого розвитку. Проведено дослідження ревіталізації та її програм, у змісті яких виокремлено мету, норми та процес впровадження їх на міжнародному і регіональному рівні. Підкреслено фінансування, як головний інструмент на шляху до реалізації даних програм. Організована структуризація системи фінансування на всіх її рівнях за принципом розділу на основні фонди, які є загальними для всіх країн-членів Європейського Союзу. Проведено спостереження фінансових надходжень з Європейських організацій до національних фондів у період з 2014 до 2020 років. Досліджено на прикладі країн-нових членів ЄС систему практичного застосування міжнародної та регіональної моделі програм сталого розвитку. Головним інвестором у процесі дослідження виявлено Європейський Союз, а саме його основні банківські структурні та інвестиційні організації, які поповнюють відповідні фонди національних економік на 70-80% від загальної кількості, решту ж відведено місцевим надходженням. В якості наочного прикладу обрані показники десяти країн Центральної та Східної Європи (ЦСЄ), що приєдналися до Європейського регіонального угрупування під час розширення союзу у 2004 році, а саме: Угорщина, Польща, Чехія, Словаччина, Словенія, Литва, Латвія, Кіпр, Болгарія та Хорватія. Об'єктом аналітичного дослідження стали: статистичні показники реалізації сталого розвитку, розділені на сімнадцять базових цілей та обсяг фінансування обраних країн з структурних та інвестиційних фондів. Під час проведення кореляційного аналізу виявлено достатній зв'язок тільки між третиною цілей сталого розвитку та їх фінансовими надходженнями. На досягнення решти цілей сталого розвитку мають вплив інші чинники: соціальні, технологічні, інформаційні, економічні, зовнішньоекономічні та насамперед політичні. Що знову таки доводить важливість проведення державної та регіональної політики, де окрему увагу слід приділити ревіталізаційним програмам.
[spa] Uno de los principales tópicos en la agenda pública internacional es la actual crisis demográfica derivada de la migración . En este sentido, estudios de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas señalan que 1 de cada 35 personas es inmigrante en el mundo, dato que pone de manifiesto la relevancia e importancia de las investigaciones al respecto. Ahora bien, por lo que se refiere al Estado Mexicano anualmente transitan por el territorio 24.363.081 de migrantes y residen de forma permanente 1.007.063 de extranjeros . Desafortunadamente y a pesar de las recientes reformas constitucionales, es de destacar que en México el corpus normativo en la materia sigue siendo de corte inequitativo entre la ciudadanía y la extranjería; por ello se vuelve trascendente estudiar desde un ángulo crítico las prerrogativas con las que cuenta el ciudadano y examinar la correlación equitativa con los derechos de la extranjería. Para ello, se contempla un marco teórico general sobre dos conceptos fundamentales: ciudadanía y extranjería. El primero se aborda a través de la capacidad de goce (ethnos) y la de ejercicio (demos), ya que el ciudadano es el único individuo que contiene ambas potencialidades, el segundo, desde las prerrogativas que el Estado asigna arbitrariamente a la inmigración. Asimismo, a fin de comprender como funcionaban estos dos conceptos en la antigüedad, se realiza un estudio diacrónico sobre la extranjería en el territorio mexicano por medio del análisis de las normas constitucionales del México independiente. Consecuentemente, se analiza la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos vigente, su normatividad secundaria e instrumentos internacionales con el objetivo de identificar, analizar y contrastar las diferencias entre los derechos que tiene la ciudadanía y las prerrogativas de los extranjeros, lo anterior tomando en consideración dos ópticas: La primera, el contexto social y jurídico –debate del Poder Constituyente- que originó la composición nomotética de la Constitución publicada el 5 de febrero de 1917, esto con el objetivo de colocar de manifiesto la diversidad de elementos que dieron origen a la construcción de derechos individuales, sociales y políticos con contenido y/o estructuras xenofóbicas. La segunda, el análisis de los paradigmas que fueron modificados por la reforma Constitucional de 2011 en materia de derechos humanos, que permite observar nuevas estructuras respecto a la extranjería, pero aún insuficientes en lo que refiere a plantear una equidad entre los ciudadanos y los extranjeros en el Estado Mexicano. Para finalizar, se propone la positivización de un derecho humano emergente: derecho a la integración, lo anterior bajo las perspectivas de la gestión de la diversidad y con el contenido del discurso de los derechos humanos. Esta prerrogativa permitirá a la población extranjera salvaguardar los derechos individuales, sociales y políticos ante la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, lo anterior aprovechando la reforma Constitucional derecho humanista de 2011 respecto a los controles de convencionalidad y constitucionalidad. ; [eng] One of the main topics in the international public agenda is the current demographic crisis derived from migration. In this sense, studies of the United Nations Organization indicate that 1 out of every 35 people is an immigrant in the world, a fact that highlights the importance and importance of research in this regard. However, as regards the Mexican State, 24,363,081 migrants transit through the territory each year and 1,007,063 foreigners reside permanently. Unfortunately, and despite the recent constitutional reforms, it is noteworthy that in Mexico the normative corpus on the matter continues to be unequal between citizens and foreigners; for that reason it becomes transcendental to study from a critical angle the prerogatives with which the citizen counts and to examine the equitable correlation with the rights of the foreigners. For this, a general theoretical framework is contemplated on two fundamental concepts: citizenship and immigration. The first is addressed through the ability to enjoy (ethnos) and exercise (demos), since the citizen is the only individual that contains both potentialities, the second, from the prerogatives that the State arbitrarily assigns to immigration. Also, in order to understand how these two concepts worked in antiquity, a diachronic study on foreigners in Mexican territory is carried out through the analysis of the constitutional norms of independent Mexico Consequently, the current Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico, its secondary regulations and international instruments are analyzed in order to identify, analyze and contrast the differences between the rights of citizens and the prerogatives of foreigners, the above taking into consideration two optics: The first one, the social and juridical context -debate of the Constituent Power- that originated the nomothetic composition of the Constitution published on February 5, 1917, this with the aim of highlighting the diversity of elements that gave rise to the construction of rights individual, social and political with content and / or xenophobic structures. The second, the analysis of the paradigms that were modified by the Constitutional reform of 2011 in the field of human rights, which allows to observe new structures regarding foreigners, but still insufficient in what refers to raise equity between citizens and foreigners in the Mexican State. Finally, the positivization of an emerging human right is proposed: the right to integration, the former under the theorization of the management of diversity and the content of the discourse of human rights. This prerogative will allow the foreign population to safeguard individual, social and political rights before the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, the former taking advantage of the constitutional reform of the humanist right of 2011 with respect to conventionality and constitutionality controls.
Some socio cultural development phenomenon in Indonesia recently is very contrast with modernity dynamic. A numbers of Islamic group in Indonesia are not become more modern, progressive, tolerance and peaceful, but more become stodgy, conservative, intolerance and radical. The Islamic in Indonesia today, especially in some urban area filled advent with various extreme Islamic organizations that anti paced with religious minority, non-Muslim, other religious sect, others Islamic sect, and other local religious belief. Are those many social cultural phenomenons that very contrast in Muslim majority state shows that Islamic Society become more modern or euphoria to become classic even primitive community? Especially for those, who likes to acts barbarous and violence's. In this essay, I am eager to interpretation this phenomenon by observing community structure, where in the beginning religious community are built as an effort from community to support all individual remain intact and develop in the middle of cultural atmosphere. This community develop in to organization with religious cultural and inequality social aspiration background. And today have developed in to institution and intellectual group that related to educated Muslim middle economic class growth in Indonesia as a whole .I attempt to have dialogist approach on what is happen in the past and what is happen in the present, in to Islamic thought which more less may analyse why this violence phenomenon appears. I am attempt to rewind what is happen in the past, it is impossible that anything might happen without any causes. Taufik Abdullah, Geertz, Kuntowijoyo, Sumanto Al-Qurtuby, Kersten, Nurcholis Madjid, Nico Kaptein, and many others authors are very relevant in perceive this situation. I am also observing the role Islamic intellectual in international arena. I imagine this social phenomenon in form of sketch where Islamic idea still an evolve process. This essay is not meant to prescribe truth to be reconstructed, but to embrace historical fairness that may disclosed. At least in this discourse become initiation to move forward. Like Kersten have suggested, Indonesia Islamic contemporary idea may calls in postmodern stages. He seen Indonesia as unique sites that being mark with struggled to unify norms and value that the sources are from Islam, local culture and international public life' John Bowen (2003),'transforming Indonesia as one major sites in earth to review social diversity, political idea and religious commitment. Meanwhile tradition institution in traditional view may formulate as channel in process of Islamic domestication and Islamic transition or traditions become indigenous channel. In my point of view, diversity will become complement in Indonesia full colour spectrum of community life. Tug, struggle and dispute in Indonesian Islamic idea will continue in the future. It may become good tradition if this dispute not based on prejudice and hostility, but conversely with mutual respect even though disagree with certain pattern of ideas. ; Beberapa fenomena perkembangan sosio budaya di Indonesia akhir-akhir ini sangat kontras dengan dinamika modernitas. Sejumlah kelompok Islam di Indonesia tidak menjadi lebih modern, progresif, toleransi dan damai, namun lebih menjadi kolot, konservatif, intoleransi dan radikal. Islam di Indonesia saat ini, terutama di beberapa daerah perkotaan dipenuhi dengan berbagai organisasi Islam ekstrem yang anti dengan agama minoritas, non-Muslim, sekte agama lainnya, sekte Islam lainnya, dan kepercayaan agama lokal lainnya. Apakah banyaknya fenomena sosial budaya yang sangat kontras di negara berpenduduk mayoritas Muslim menunjukkan bahwa Masyarakat Islam menjadi lebih modern atau euforia untuk menjadi komunitas klasik bahkan primitif? Terutama bagi mereka, yang gemar bertindak biadab dan kekerasan. Dalam esai ini, saya ingin menafsirkan fenomena ini dengan mengamati struktur masyarakat, dimana pada awalnya komunitas religius dibangun sebagai upaya masyarakat untuk mendukung semua individu tetap utuh dan berkembang di tengah suasana budaya. Komunitas ini berkembang menjadi organisasi dengan latar belakang aspirasi sosial budaya dan ketimpangan sosial. Dan saat ini telah berkembang menjadi institusi dan kelompok intelektual yang terkait dengan pertumbuhan kelas ekonomi menengah Muslim terpelajar di Indonesia secara keseluruhan. Saya mencoba untuk memiliki pendekatan dialogis tentang apa yang terjadi di masa lalu dan apa yang terjadi saat ini, dalam pemikiran Islam yang lebih sedikit dapat menganalisis mengapa fenomena kekerasan ini muncul. Saya mencoba untuk mundur apa yang terjadi di masa lalu, tidak mungkin sesuatu terjadi tanpa sebab apapun. Taufik Abdullah, Geertz, Kuntowijoyo, Sumanto Al-Qurtuby, Kersten, Nurcholis Madjid, Nico Kaptein, dan banyak penulis lainnya sangat relevan dalam memahami situasi ini. Saya juga mengamati peran intelektual Islam di kancah internasional. Saya membayangkan fenomena sosial ini berupa sketsa dimana ide Islam masih merupakan proses evolusi. Esai ini tidak dimaksudkan untuk meresepkan kebenaran untuk direkonstruksi, namun untuk merangkul keadilan historis yang mungkin diungkapkan. Paling tidak dalam wacana ini menjadi inisiasi untuk maju. Seperti yang dikemukakan Kersten, gagasan kontemporer Islam Indonesia mungkin akan diputar dalam tahap postmodern. Dia melihat Indonesia sebagai situs unik yang ditandai dengan berjuang untuk menyatukan norma dan nilai bahwa sumbernya berasal dari Islam, budaya lokal dan kehidupan publik internasional 'John Bowen (2003),' mengubah Indonesia sebagai satu lokasi utama di bumi untuk meninjau keragaman sosial, ide politik dan komitmen religius. Sementara itu lembaga tradisi dalam pandangan tradisional dapat merumuskan sebagai saluran dalam proses domestikasi Islam dan transisi atau tradisi Islam menjadi saluran adat. Dalam pandangan saya, keragaman akan menjadi pelengkap di Indonesia spektrum warna kehidupan masyarakat yang penuh. Tug, perjuangan dan perselisihan dalam gagasan Islam Indonesia akan terus berlanjut di masa depan. Ini mungkin menjadi tradisi yang baik jika perselisihan ini tidak didasarkan pada prasangka dan permusuhan, tapi sebaliknya dengan saling menghormati meski tidak setuju dengan pola ide tertentu.
International audience ; Abordar el examen de la vuelta a la democracia en Argentina, de 1983 a 1997, exige de entrada referirse a la crisis económica sin precedente con la que estuvo confrontado el país durante todos esos años. En efecto, la crisis resultó determinante en cualquier dominio, político, social o cultural.En 1983, cuando los militares entregan el poder a los civiles debido a un fracaso total, legan a las nuevas autoridades una economía destrozada, una industria arruinada, una inflación anual de unos 300 % y sobre todo una deuda externa de unos 45 mil millones de dólares. Es ésta la causa principal de la inestabilidad macro-económica que va a generalizarse en lo sucesivo. Los gobiernos argentinos democráticos tendrán que adoptar las políticas de ajuste preconizadas por el Fondo Monetario Internacional las cuales van a provocar el retroceso de la actividad industrial y la regresión social. La CGT peronista multiplica las huelgas en contra del gobierno del presidente radical Alfonsín. En mayo de 1989, el candidato peronista Carlos Menem a la elección presidencial triunfa en primera vuelta y, sorprendiendo a todos, impone un nuevo modelo económico, neo-liberal. Instruye una verdader requisitoria en contra del Estado providencia y exalta las leyes del mercado. En el sector clave de la ceconomía, Menem adopta « una cirugía de choque, sin anestesia ». Las privatizaciones se llevan a cabo a paso de carga así como la desregulación. Con Domingo Cavallo, ministro de economía desde 1991 hasta 1996, ocurre lo que algunos llaman « el milagro económico argentino ». En 1996, se asiste de nuevo a la recesión. Otros factores fuera de la economía influyen en la evolución de la situación. En primer lugar, el Ejército. En 1985, el presidente Alfonsín enjuicia a los nueve triumviros de las tres juntas militares. Frente al riesgo de sublevaciones manda adoptar dos leyes que conducen prácticamente a amnistiar a todos los responsables de las violaciones a los derechos humanos con excepción de la alta jerarquía militar. Ulteriormente, proclama una amnistía general. Parece consumada la impunidad.La corrupción generalizada es otro elemento clave de aquellos catorce años. El país conoce un alud de escándalos político-financieros encarnados por Carlos Menem. Otro rasgo del sistema que se ha de recoger es el hiper-presidencialismo. Innumerables ejemplos ilustran el autoritarismo de Menem en el transcurso de sus dos mandatos. Queda relegado el poder legislativo en segundo plano mientras se somete al poder judiciario. A la crisis de la justicia se añade la crisis de la policía. Como conclusión, la vuelta a la democracia en Argentina se ha cumplido de modo muy difícil. La democracia argentina, en 1997, distaba mucho de corresponder a las pautas de una auténtica democracia. ; Aborder l'examen du retour à la démocratie en Argentine, de 1983 à 1997, exige d'entrée de jeu que l'on s'attache à la crise économique sans précédent à laquelle le pays a été confronté durant toutes ces années. En effet, cette crise a été déterminante dans tous les domaines, aussi bien dans le domaine politique que social ou culturel. En 1983, lorsque les militaires cèdent le pouvoir aux civils en raison de leur échec total, ils lèguent aux nouvelles autorités une économie délabrée, une industrie sinistrée, une inflation annuelle d'environ 300 % et surtout une dette extérieure de 45 milliards de dollars. C'est là la cause première de l'instabilité macro-économique qui va se généraliser par la suite. Les gouvernements argentins vont devoir mettre en place les politiques d'ajustement préconisées par le Fonds Monétaire International qui vont générer le recul de l'activité industrielle et la régression sociale. La CGT péroniste multiplie les grèves contre le gouvernement du radical Alfonsín. En mai 1989, Carlos Menem, le candidat péroniste à la présidentielle, l'emporte dès le premier tour et, à la surprise générale, il met en place un nouveau modèle économique, néo-libéral. Il dresse un véritable réquisistoire contre l'Etat-providence et exalte les lois du marché. Dans le domaine-clef de l'économie, Menem adopte une « chirurgie de choc sans anesthésie » : les privatisations sont menées au pas de charge ainsi que la dérégulation. Avec Domingo Cavallo, ministre de l'économie de 1991 à 1996, se réalise ce que certains ont appelé « le miracle argentin ». En 1996, on assiste au retour de la récession. D'autres facteurs que l'économie pèsent sur l'évolution de la situation. En premiuer lieu, l'Armée. En 1985, le président Alfonsín traduit en jugement les neuf triumvirs des trois juntes militaires. Face au risque de soulèvements, il fait adopter deux lois qui aboutissent pratiquement à l'amnistie de tous les responsables des violations des droits de l'homme, à l'exception de la haute hiérarchie militaire. Ultérieurement, il proclame une amnistie générale. L'impunité semble consommée.La corruption généralisée est aussi un élément-clé de ces quatorze années. Le pays a connu une avalanche de scandales politico-financiers. Carlos Menem en est l'incarnation.Un autre trait du système à retenir est l'hyperprésidentialisme. D'innombrables exemples illustrent l'autoritarisme de Menem au cours de ses deux mandats. Si le pouvoir législatif est relégué au second plan, le pouvoir judiciaire est mis au pas. A la crise de la justice s'ajoute la crise de la police. En conclusion, le retour de la démocratie en Argentine s'est réalisé de façon extrêmement difficile. La démocratie argentine, en 1997, était loin de correspondre aux normes d'une authentique démocratie.
The interview covered: first involvement with SMU, concept for SMU, parent engagement, third university, design of campus, city campus, private university, research, collaboration with Wharton, challenges. Biography: Professor of Accounting, 2000–2011 Deputy President, SMU, 1999–2001 Head of start-up team for SMU Professor Tan Teck Meng was a key player in the conceptualising and formation of Singapore's third university. In 1997, he was appointed chairman of a task force to look into the feasibility of setting up SMU. Subsequently he became SMU's first employee and was appointed SMU's founding deputy president (1999—2001). After his term in administration, Professor Tan returned to teaching in the School of Accountancy. His main research interests were in the area of corporate governance, entrepreneurship, and financial accounting. He was a highly regarded and dedicated teacher, nominated by The Straits Times as one of six 'star professors' of SMU in its Scholar's Choice series of articles. Professor Tan was also keenly involved in ensuring the welfare of students. To this end he set up the Tan Tee Chee and Tsan Kah Ngooh award, named after his parents, to be given annually to students who have demonstrated excellence in co-curricular activities. The Tan Teck Meng Gold Medal Award is given annually to a top member of the graduating class in the School of Accountancy. From 1990 to 1998 he served as dean of the School of Accountancy and Business at Nanyang Technological University. Professor Tan also served on the boards of a number of organisations in Singapore, including hospitals, schools and government statutory institutions. In 1997 he was the first Singaporean to receive the Wilford L White Award, the highest recognition given by the International Council for Small Business to individuals who have made an outstanding contribution to the development of small- and medium-sized businesses. He received the Service to Education Award (2007) from the Ministry of Education, and the Public Service Medal (2009) from the Singapore Government. He earned his bachelor of accountancy at the then University of Singapore and his master of commerce from the University of New South Wales, Australia. In 1996 he was awarded an honorary PhD by Liaoning University, China. Professor Tan passed away on 7 July 2011.
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Ann Tickner on Feminist Philosophy of Science, Engaging the Mainstream, and (still) Remaining Critical in/of IR
Feminist IR is still often side-lined as a particularistic agenda or limited issue area, appearing as one of the last chapters of introductory volumes to the field, despite the limitless efforts of people such as Cynthia Enloe (Theory Talk #48) and J. Ann Tickner. She has laboured to point out and provincialize the parochialism that haunts mainstream IR, without, however, herself retreating and disengaging from some of its core concerns. In this Talk, Tickner elaborates—amongst others—on the specifics of a feminist approach to the philosophical underpinnings of IR; discusses how feminism relates to the distinction between mainstream and critical theory; and addresses the challenges of navigating such divides.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the central challenge or principal debate in International Relations? And what is your position regarding this challenge/in this debate?
I think the biggest challenge for IR is that it is relevant and helps us understand important issues in our globalized world. I realize this is not a conventional answer, but too often we academics get caught up in substantive and methodological debates where we end up talking only to each other or to a very small audience. We tend to get too concerned with the issue of scientific respectability rather than thinking about how to try to understand and remedy the massive problems that exist in the world today. Steve Smith's presidential address to the ISA in 2002 (read it here), shortly after 9/11, reminded us of this. Smith chastised the profession for having nothing to say about such a catastrophic event.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?
I've gone through quite a few transformations in my academic career. My original identity was as an International Political Economy (IPE) scholar; my first academic position was at a small liberal arts college (College of the Holy Cross) where I taught a variety of IPE courses. In graduate school I was interested in what, in the 1970s, we called 'North-South' issues, specifically issues of global justice, which were not the most popular subjects in the field. So I always felt a little out of place in my choice of subject matter. In the 1980s when I started teaching, IR was mostly populated by men. As a woman, one felt somewhat uncomfortable at professional meetings; and there were very few texts by women that I could assign to my students. I also found that many of the female students in my introductory IR classes were somewhat uncomfortable and unmotivated by the emphasis placed on strategic issues and nuclear weapons.
It was at about the time when I first started thinking about these issues, I happened to read Evelyn Fox Keller's book Gender and Science, a book that offers a gendered critique of the natural sciences (read an 'update' of the argument by Keller here, pdf). It struck me that her feminist critique of science could equally be applied to IR theory. My first feminist publication, a feminist critique of Hans Morgenthau's principles of political realism, expanded on this theme (read full text here, pdf).
Teaching at a small liberal arts college where one was judged by the quality of one's work rather than the type of research one was doing was very helpful—because I could follow my own, rather non-conventional, inclinations. So I think my turn to feminism, after ten years in the field, was a combination of my own consciousness-raising and feeling that there was something about IR that didn't speak to me. Later, I was fortunate to be hired by the University of Southern California, a large research institution, with an interdisciplinary School of International Relations, separate from the political science department. When I arrived in 1995, the School had a reputation for teaching a broad array of IR theoretical approaches. The support of these institutional settings and of a network of feminist scholars and students, some of whom I discovered were thinking along similar lines in the late 1980s, were important for getting me to where I am today.
What would a student need (dispositions, skills) to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
It depends on the level of the student: at the undergraduate level, a broad array of courses in global politics including some economics and history. Language training is very important too, and ideally, an overseas experience. We need to encourage our students to be curious and have an open mind about our world.
At the graduate level, this is a more complicated question. The way you phrased the question 'to understand the world in a global way,' can be very different from training to become an IR scholar, especially in the United States. I would emphasize the importance of a broad theoretical and methodological training, including some exposure to the philosophy of science, and to non-Western IR if possible, or at least at a minimum, to try to get beyond the dominance of American IR, which still exists even in places outside the US.
Why should IR scholars incorporate gender in the study of world politics? What are the epistemological and ontological implications of adopting a feminist perspective in IR?
Feminists would argue that incorporating feminist perspectives into IR would fundamentally transform the discipline. Feminists claim that IR is already gendered, and gendered masculine, in the types of questions it asks and the ways it goes about answering them. The questions we ask in our research are never neutral - they are a choice, depending on the researcher's identity and location. Over history, the knowledge that we have accumulated has generally been knowledge about men's lives. It's usually been men who do the asking and consequently, it is often the case that women's lives and women's knowledge are absent from what is deemed 'reliable' knowledge. This historical legacy has had, and continues to have, an effect on the way we build knowledge. Sandra Harding, a feminist philosopher of science, has suggested that if were to build knowledge from women's lives as well, we would broaden the base from which we construct knowledge, and would therefore get a richer and more complex picture of reality.
One IR example of how we limit our research questions and concerns is how we calculate national income, or wealth—the kind of data states choose to collect and on which they base their public policy. We have no way of measuring the vast of amount of non-remunerated reproductive and caring labour, much of which is done by women. Without this labour we would not have a functioning global capitalist economy. To me this is one example as to why putting on our gender lenses helps us gain a more complete picture of global politics and the workings of the global economy.
Feminists have also argued that the epistemological foundations of Western knowledge are gendered. When we use terms such as rationality, objectivity and public, they are paired with terms such as emotional, subjective and private, terms that are seen as carrying less weight. By privileging the first of these terms when we construct knowledge we are valuing knowledge that we typically associate with masculinity and the public sphere, historically associated with men. Rationality and objectivity are not terms that are overtly gendered, but, when asked, women and men alike associate them with masculinity. They are terms we value when we do our research.
In one of the foundational texts of Feminist IR, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists' (1997, full text here, pdf), you highlighted three particular (gendered) misunderstandings that continue to divide Feminists and mainstream IR theorists. To what extent do these misunderstandings continue to inform mainstream perceptions of Feminist approaches to the study of international politics?
I think probably they still do, although it's always hard to tell, because the mainstream has not engaged much with feminist approaches. I've been one who's always calling for conversations with the mainstream but, apart from the forum responding to the article you mention, there have been very few. In a 2010 article, published in the Australian Feminist Law Journal, I looked back to see if I could find responses to my 1997 article to which you refer. I found that most of the responses had come from other feminists. The lack of engagement, which other feminists have experienced also, makes it hard to know about the misunderstandings that still exist but my guess would be that they remain. However I do think there has been progress in accepting feminism's legitimacy in the field. It is now included in many introductory texts.
The first misunderstanding that I identified is the meaning of gender. I would hope that the introduction of constructivist approaches would help with understanding that gender is social construction - a very important point for feminists. But I think that gender is still largely equated with women. Feminists have tried to stress that gender is also about men and about masculinity, something that seems to be rather hard to accept for those unfamiliar with feminist work. I think it's also hard for the discipline to accept that both international politics as practice and IR as a discipline are not gender neutral. Feminists claim that IR as a discipline is gendered in its concepts, its subject matter, the questions it asks and the way it goes about answering them. This is a radical assertion for those unfamiliar with feminist approaches and it is not very well understood.
Now to answer the second misunderstanding as to whether feminists are doing IR. I think there has been some progress here, because IR has broadened its subject matter. And there has been quite a bit of attention lately to gender issues in the 'real world' - issues such as sexual violence, trafficking, and human rights. Of course these issues relate not only to women but they are issues with which feminists have been concerned. Something I continue to find curious is that the policy and activist communities are generally ahead of the academy in taking up gender issues. Most international organizations, and some national governments are under mandates for gender mainstreaming. Yet, the academy has been slow to catch up and give students the necessary training and skills to go out in the world and deal with such issues.
The third misunderstanding to which I referred in the 1997 article is the question of epistemology. While, as I indicated, there has been some acceptance of the subject matter, with which feminists are concerned, it is a more fundamental and contentious question as to whether feminists are recognized as 'doing IR' in the methodological sense. As the field broadens its concerns, IR may see issues that feminists raise as legitimate, but how we study them still evokes the same responses that I brought up fifteen years ago. Many of the questions that feminists ask are not amenable to being answered using the social scientific methodologies popular in the field, particularly in the US. (I should add that there is a branch of IR feminism that does use quantitative methods and it has gained much wider acceptance by the mainstream.) The feminist assumption that Western knowledge is gendered and based on men's lives is a challenging claim. And feminists often prefer to start knowledge from the lives of people who are on the margins – those who are subordinated or oppressed, and of course, this is very different from IR which tends toward a top-down look at the international system. One of the big problems that have become more evident to me over time is that feminism is fundamentally sociological – it's about people and social relations, whereas much of IR is about structures and states operating in an anarchic, rather than a social, environment. I find that historians and sociologists are more comfortable with gender analysis, perhaps for this reason. I'm not sure that these misunderstanding are ever going to be solved or that they need to be solved.
Although Feminist methodology is often conflated with ethnographic approaches, in 'What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions' (2005, pdf here), you argued that there is no unique Feminist research methodology. Nonetheless, Feminist IR is well known for using an autoethnographic approach. What does this approach add to the study of gender in IR? What might account for the relative dearth of autoethnography in other IR paradigms?
I think it is important to remember that feminists use many different approaches coming out of very different theoretical traditions, such as Marxism, socialism, constructivism, postpositivism, postcolonialism and empiricism. So there are many different kinds of feminisms. If you look specifically at what has been called 'second-generation feminist IR,' the empirical work that followed the so-called 'first generation' that challenged and critiqued the concepts and theoretical foundations of the field, much of it, but not all, (discourse analysis is quite prevalent too), uses ethnographic methods which seem well suited to researching some of the issues I described earlier. Questions about violence against women, domestic servants, women in the military, violent women, women in peace movements– these are the sorts of research questions that demand fieldwork and an ethnographic approach. Because as I stated earlier, IR asks rather different kinds of questions, it does not generally adopt ethnographic methods. Feminists who do this type of ethnographic research tell me that their work is often more readily received and understood by those who do comparative politics, because they are more comfortable with field research. And since women are not usually found in the halls of power – as decision-makers. IR feminists are particularly concerned with issues having to do with marginalized and disempowered peoples' lives. Ethnography is useful for this type of research.
I see autoethnography as a different issue. While the reflexive tradition is not unique to feminists, feminism tends to be reflectivist. As I said earlier, feminists are sensitive to issues about who the creators of knowledge have been and whose knowledge is claimed to be universal. Most feminists believe that there is no such thing as universal knowledge. Consequently, feminists believe that being explicit about one's positionality as a researcher is very important because none of us can achieve objectivity, often called 'the view from nowhere'. So while striving to get as accurate and as useful knowledge as we can, we should be willing to state our own positionality. One's privilege as a researcher must be acknowledged too; one must always be sensitive to the unequal power relations between a researcher and their research subject – something that anthropology recognized some time ago. Feminists who do fieldwork often try to make their research useful to their subjects or do participatory research so that they can give something back to the community. All these concerns lead to autoethnographic disclosures. They demand a reflexive attitude and a willingness to describe and reassess your research journey as you go along. This autoethnographic style is hard for researchers in the positivist tradition to understand. While we all strive to produce accurate and useful knowledge, positivists' striving for objectivity requires keeping subjectivity out of their research.
Robert W. Cox (Theory Talk #37) famously distinguished two approaches to the study of international politics: problem-solving theory and critical theory. How does the emancipatory project of the latter inform your perspective of IR and its normative goals? And is this distinction as valid today as it was when Cox first formulated it, over 3 decades ago?
Yes I think it's still an important distinction. It's still cited very often which suggests it's still valid, although postmodern scholars (and certain feminists) have problems with Western liberal notions of emancipation. I see my own work as being largely compatible with Cox's definition of critical theory. Like many feminists, I view my work as explicitly normative; I say explicitly because I believe all knowledge is normative although not all scholars would admit it. What Cox calls problem-solving theory is also normative in the conservative sense of not aiming to changing the world. A normative goal to which feminists are generally committed is understanding the reasons for women's subordination and seeking ways to end it. It's also important to note that the IR discipline was borne with the intention of serving the interests of the state whereas academic feminism was borne out of social movements for women's emancipation. The normative goals of my work are to demonstrate how the theory and practice of IR is gendered and what might be the implications of this, both for how we construct knowledge and how we go about solving global problems.
Much of your work addresses the parochial scope and neopositivist inclination of International Relations (IR) scholarship, especially in the United States. What distinguishes other 'Western' institutional and political contexts (in the UK, Europe, Canada and Oceania) from the American study of IR? How and why is critical/reflectivist IR marginalized in the American context? What is the status of these 'debates' in non-Western institutional contexts?
With respect to the parochial scope of US IR, I refer you to a recent book, edited by Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, International Relations Scholarship Around the World. It contains chapters by authors from around the world, some of whom suggest IR in their country imitates the US and some who see very different IRs. The chapter by Thomas J. Biersteker, ('The Parochialism of Hegemony: Challenges for 'American' International Relations', read it here in pdf) reports on his examination of the required reading lists for IR Ph.D. candidates in the top ten US academic institutions. His findings suggest that constructivism accounts for only about 10% of readings and anything more radical even less. Over 90% of assigned works are written by US scholars. The dominance of quantitative and rational choice approaches in the US may have something to do with IR generally being a subfield of political science. Critical approaches often have different epistemological roots. And I stress 'science' because while IR is also subsumed in certain politics departments in other countries, the commitment to science, in the neopositivist sense, is something that seems to be peculiarly American. Stanley Hoffman's famous observation, made over thirty years ago, that Americans see problems as solvable by the scientific method is still largely correct I believe (read article here, pdf). I find it striking that so many formerly US based and/or educated critical scholars have left the US and are now based elsewhere – in Canada, Australasia, or Europe.
Biersteker sees the hegemony of American IR extending well beyond the US. But there is generally less commitment to quantification elsewhere. This may be due to IR's historical legacy emerging out of different knowledge traditions or being housed in separate departments. In France, IR emerged from sociological and legal traditions and, in the UK, history and political theory, including the Marxist tradition, have been influential in IR. And European IR scholars do not move as freely between the academy and the policy world as in the US. All these factors might encourage more openness to critical approaches. I am afraid I don't know enough about non-Western traditions to make an informed comment. But we must recognize the enormous power differentials that exist with respect to engaging IR's debates. Language barriers are one problem; having access to research funds is an enormous privilege. Scholars in many parts of the world do not have the resources or the time to engage in esoteric academic debates, nor do they have the resources to attend professional meetings or access certain materials. The production of knowledge is a very unequal process, dominated by those with power and resources; hence the hegemonic position of the US that Biersteker and others still see.
As methodological pluralism now retains the status of a norm in the field, John M. Hobson (Theory Talk #71) recently argued that the question facing IR scholars no longer revolves around the debate between positivist and postpositivist approaches. Rather, the primary meta-theoretical question relates to Eurocentrism, that is, 'To be or not to be a Eurocentric, that is the question.' To what extent do you agree with this statement? Why or why not?
Given my answer to the last question, I am not sure that methodological pluralism has reached an accepted status in the US yet. However, John M. Hobson has produced a very thoughtful and engaging book that asks very provocative questions. Unfortunately, I doubt many IR scholars in the US have read it and would be rather puzzled by Hobson's claim. But certainly the Eurocentrism of the discipline is something to which we should be paying attention. I find it curious how little IR has recognized its imperial roots or engaged in any discussion of imperialism. As Brian Schmidt and other historical revisionists have told us, when IR was borne at the beginning of the twentieth century, imperialism was a central preoccupation in the discipline. Race also has been ignored almost entirely by IR scholars.
To Hobson's specific claim that the important question for IR now is about being or not being Eurocentric rather than about being positivist or postpositivist, I do have some problems with this. I am concerned with Hobson's painting positivism and postpostivism with the same Eurocentric brush. Yes, they are both Eurocentric; but postpositivists or critical theorists – to use Cox's term – are at least open to being reflective about how they produce knowledge and where it comes from. If one can be reflective about one's knowledge it does allow space to be aware of one's own biases. Those of us on the critical side of Cox's divide can at least be reflective about the problems of Eurocentrism, whereas positivists don't consider reflexivity to be part of producing good research. Nevertheless, Hobson has made an important statement. He has written a masterful and insightful book and I recommend it all IR scholars.
Last question. Your recent work is part of an emergent collective dialogue that aims to 'provincialize' the Western European heritage of IR. In a recent article entitled 'Dealing with Difference: Problems and Possibilities for Dialogue in International Relations' you highlight the need for non-Eurocentric approach to the study of IR. In IR, what are the prospects for genuine dialogue across methodological and geographical borders? Where do you see this dialogue taking place?
This is a very tough issue. There are scholars like Hobson who talk about a non-Eurocentric approach, but given what I said about resources, about language barriers, and about inequalities in the ability to produce knowledge, this is difficult. As I've said at many times and in many places, the power difference is an inhibitor to any genuine dialogue. So, where is dialogue taking place? Among those, such as Hobson, who advocate a hybrid approach that takes other knowledge traditions seriously and sees them as equally valid as one's own. And mostly on the margins of what we call 'IR', where some very exciting work is being produced. Feminism is one such site. Feminist approaches are dedicated to dialogic knowledge production, or what they call knowledge that emerges through conversation. Feminists believe that theory can emerge from practice, listening to ordinary people and how they make sense of their lives. I also think that projects like the one undertaken by Wæver and Tickner (which is still ongoing) that is publishing contributions from scholars from very different parts of the world is crucial.
J. Ann Tickner is Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the American University. She is also a Professor Emerita at the University of Southern California where she taught for fifteen years before coming to American University. Her principle areas of teaching and research include international theory, peace and security, and feminist approaches to international relations. She served as President of the International Studies Association from 2006-2007. Her books include Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era (Columbia University Press, 2001), Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security (Columbia University Press, 1992), and Self-Reliance Versus Power Politics: American and Indian Experiences in Building Nation-States (Columbia University Press, 1987).
Related links
Faculty Profile at American University Read Tickner's Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation (Millennium, 1988) here (pdf) Read Tickner's You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists (1997 International Studies Quarterly) here (pdf) Read Tickner's What Is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions (2005, International Studies Quarterly) here (pdf)
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As much as COVID-19 is a health and economic crisis, at its core, it is also a governance crisis.
NDI President Derek Mitchell and new Director of Democratic Governance Kristen Sample delve into ways governments and the international community have risen (or not) to meet the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Derek Mitchell: As we all continue to shelter in place and respond to the colossal health and economic crisis that is COVID-19, we must not forget that at its core, pandemics are as much a result of governance failure as any failure of healthcare or health system. Since working to support democratic processes, institutions and governance around the world is what NDI does for a living, we thought it useful to delve into the role governance has played in the COVID-19 pandemic with NDI's experience in more than 50 countries around the world serving as a guide. Welcome to DemWorks. My name is Derek Mitchell, president of the National Democratic Institute. To discuss all this with me in this podcast, I'm joined by NDI's new director of democratic governance, Kristen Sample. Kristen Sample: Thank you so much Derek. DM: Kristen just joined us on March 1. She brings more than 20 years of democratic governance experience with her to NBI having advised and evaluated programs at UN Women, UN Democracy Fund, the Open Society Foundation, Global Partners, Governance and International IDEA. Kristen is an expert on countering corruption, legislative strengthening in the nexus of gender and politics and she has led projects focused on the impact of democratic reform on economic development and citizen security. At a moment when the global crisis in governance is at the center of international conversation, at least before the pandemic push pause, we are thrilled to have Kristen aboard to look at that issue with fresh creativity here at NBI. So welcome Kristen to your very first DemWorks podcast. KS: I'm really pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you today on such important issues. DM: So we'll speak about the crisis of governance but also the pandemic factor as well. But I do want to start with this global governance crisis that has sort of preceded this. This is a broader overhang. We've seen all over the world popular demonstrations over the past year and more and everywhere from Moscow to Managua, to Hong Kong, to Khartoum, to Algeria, to Istanbul, to Paris. You can go on and on. And what it represents is a frustration with the quality of governance. Democracy somehow is not delivering for people. And I want to hear your thoughts on that. It's a moment of turmoil certainly. People will look at this and say, "Well, democracy is failing," but it's more than democracy that this is happening. It's a general quality of governance question that I think actually provides an opportunity. So let me just ask your thoughts on that first off, Kristen. KS: Yeah. Thanks so much for that question, Derek. I think that NDI, since we have officers or programs spanning every region of the world basically in more than 50 countries, we're in a very good position to be able to take the pulse of what's happening in the different countries. In fact, we have been conducting surveys every two weeks of our country programs to get a sense of what's happening on the ground and we've received some very interesting signals that I'm really happy to be able to share with you today. On the one side, we are saying that in many countries governments are responding very seriously, in very concerted ways to the health crisis. I mean in more than two thirds of the countries. The governments in the countries where we work are closing nonessential businesses in over 60%, they are communicating in ways, having very intensive communication campaigns that really are reaching all citizens. But when it comes to the democracy side, when it comes to implementing that response and pursuing a response that's consistent with democratic principles and norms and values and institutions, we are seeing some troubling developments at the same time. For instance, the number of governments by our account, over 40% of the governments in the countries where we work are declaring emergency powers and it's clear that this is an extraordinary situation that requires extraordinary measures, but in many cases these emergency powers are inconsistent with democratic principles. They are not linked to the crisis. There is no provision for legislative oversight or in many cases, these have no sunset class, so there's no time limit and these are simply open-ended. And link to that and linked in many cases to these emergency powers, emergency decrees, we're seeing an uptick also in threats to fundamental freedoms. For instance, nearly half of our countries are reporting that there are measures in place where governments are repressing non-state media who are critical of the government's response to the pandemic and that in some cases, again, almost 50% of our countries, there are measures in place where governments are limiting space for civil society to engage in political actions. Another factor that I'd like to highlight too is while we're all distracted by the pandemic and while people are at home and perhaps with less access to information and less direct contact with government, there are also signals that many governments are using this as an opportunity to diminish anti-corruption controls. So that means that in some cases economic response packages or healthcare delivery is taking place with less transparency and less openness, which as you can imagine is a risk in terms of making sure that those resources are actually getting where they need to be. And all of this, all of the stresses, the frustration and these concerns of course also have impacts when it comes to citizen trust, interpersonal trust citizen trust of the government and also we're seeing greater potential for civic unrest and a deteriorating security environment. So all together, I hate to start with such a pessimistic view, but I think it is important again, through the networks that we have, the relationships that we have with political and civic actors on the ground, to convey the seriousness of the situation and to make sure that we're always communicating that well, this response requires really drastic measures. These measures need to be consonant of course, with the principles of democratic governance. DM: Right. It fits into this broader competition of narratives that occurred even before the pandemic began, where China or Russia saying, "Look, authoritarian governments are more efficient in providing services. We do this stuff better. Democracy is messy." And they're able, as you say, to take advantage of this moment when people are looking for strong central control to make that case and to both do that rhetorically but also through provision of services. And then it's not just those major countries. You'll have folks whether it's Hungary or Poland or you just go around the world, they're postponing elections. They are shutting down civil society, they're settling scores with adversaries. They're constraining public debate, saying that those things are luxuries during a time of crisis and that gives them an opportunity then as you said, for not just power grabs, but resource grabs and money grabs and they say, "Look, these are extraordinary times. They require extraordinary measures." And the concern is that these extraordinary measures will be permanent, that they'll say you need us to be surveilling people. So this is a challenge for certainly those who do democracy work and for folks inside these countries. But I think the broader question of security, we'll talk about that maybe a little bit later, but it's interesting what we're seeing on the ground as you say. You do a lot of work in the legislative sphere, you have a lot of background on that. How legislatures are particularly important. Civil society is too, but just focusing on legislature's role as a check and balance against executive overreach, can you talk about from the NDI experience or your other observation, how legislatures are being challenged, how they're dealing with this moment, how they're adapting to deal with the COVID-19 moment. KS: Yeah, absolutely. So I'm so glad you brought this point up. The first challenge that I'd highlight is this risk that the legislative branch is getting sidelined. In a crisis like this, the executive branch is generally front and center. Their role is clearly understood by citizens. Head of state might be the one out there doing daily press briefings or a health minister communicating medical reports. And there's this sense of emergency that as I sort of alluding to before, it seems to empower the executive branch. And unfortunately that seems to be, in many cases, at the expense of the legislative power. And additionally, another challenge and another reason that legislatures are perhaps getting crowded out or sidelined is simply that, the coronavirus, by it's dynamic, it's not socially compatible. And since parliaments are these multi-member bodies that have more diffuse operations, more diffuse leadership and that involve hundreds of different people, it's simply just a challenge to assemble a large group of people together, bring them together and keep them front and center in this crisis. So if that first challenge is making sure that people just keep in mind that legislatures matter and the legislatures are able to exert their rights and their authority, I'd say that the second challenge of course is just how do parliaments, legislatures operate in a virtual world. Politicians are by nature, they like to shake hands, they like to get out on the street, they need to be in touch with their constituents. And there are so many challenge involved in this current world that we have where we should all be social distancing. So looking across the world where we work, their parliaments are adopting different measures. Some of them are using social distancing restrictions like reducing the number of MPs in sessions. Others are moving to remote voting, remote deliberations. And then others are not meeting at all, which of course is quite terrible. And in those cases where legislatures have been dissolved or have been suspended for long periods of time. We are working too, as you were saying, as NDI closely with parliaments in a number of countries to try to do those adaptations to the rules of procedures so that they're able to continue meeting in session and continue deliberating and continuing exercising oversight. For instance, we have connected parliamentarians in Colombia with parliamentarians in Ecuador. We have virtual sessions to learn from Ecuador's experience in adopting a regulation for the implementation of virtual session and teleworking. So we are trying to connect parliamentarians across countries to understand how some parliaments have been moving forward in terms of remote procedures and how that's going for them. And two more challenges. One I'd highlight is that oversight role that we've been talking about. And from the same survey that we conducted with our country programs, we found that in 59% of the countries, checks and balances have been weakened, have deteriorated under the pandemic. And this is happening at such an unfortunate time when there's so many policy measures that need to be approved and put in place. If we just take the issue of debt policy for instance, I saw a statistic from the Westminster Foundation that more than 80 countries have already requested emergency aid from the IMF. I mean these countries are struggling of course to meet different types of fiscal obligations and they are desperate for cash in order to ramp up health services and put in place economic measures. And so these governments are taking on debt obligations, debt burns that are going to have far reaching impacts and long lasting impacts that should really be approved by the legislative branch and include monitoring and reporting. And that's not always the case in most of these instances. DM: So you just say it's a very dangerous time and folks are adapting procedurally, but there are really implications to this longterm, including for security. And I think we'll get to that after the break. For more than 35 years, NDI has been honored to work with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help countries develop the institutions, practices and skills necessary for democracy's success. KS: Welcome back. Derek, I've heard you speak to the issue of authoritarian systems and how they're operating in this crisis and that the authoritarian nature in itself makes health crises more likely. And you've also said in some of your speeches and some of the conversations we've had that it's not a coincidence that the pandemic started in China and I'd really like to hear from your expertise, your deep background on China specifically. Can you explain to listeners why that is? Why there is that connection? DM: Well, as I said at the top, this is not just a health crisis, it's a governance crisis. It's a factor of governance both in the prevention of the pandemic and the response to it. We talked so far mostly about the response, how we're responding to the pandemic, but the core of the pandemic is a failure of governance. The difference between a local health crisis that is contained and a pandemic lies in the ability of a political system to respond to that early challenge quickly and effectively. And that requires both government and civic action. And if you're going to deal with this crisis early, it requires both. To do that, you have to act swiftly. You have to have widespread testing and contact tracing. You need critical support from citizens. In order to do all that and to ensure that that happens, you have to have basic civic trust. Closed societies routinely fail that test of having that civic trust and that rapid action for some very practical reasons. When a government suppresses a free flow of information, when it fails to empower independent civic institutions, when it's too insecure to convey bad news candidly, doesn't feel that it has a political legitimacy, therefore, it's insecure to convey bad news. When its data can't be trusted because it's opaque, when its officials are afraid to speak truth to power or communicate inconvenient truths to their superiors or act decisively, absent waiting for some strict orders from the very center and they can't move quickly, the result can be deadly. It turns what is a local health issue into a pandemic so it crosses borders. It becomes not just a problem for one country but for all others. So democratic governance is very, very practical and once again in this regard, transparent, accountable, inclusive, responsive, open governments is essential to crisis response but it's also essential to prevent the crisis from emerging to begin with. And it is a matter of national security. This highlights frankly what many of us have known all along, that this is not just nice but has very practical national security effects. And as we just talked earlier, the irony is that just as the world needs more open democratic societies to prevent future crises and deal with the current one, there are opportunistic politicians who are closing political and civic space. That I think is a very practical reason why that closed societies cause these pandemics. KS: I think that all of those points that you've been raising in terms of the threats and the vulnerabilities are so important for us to keep front and center. At the same time, here in NDI, as you know, is we're very keen to make sure that there are also opportunities to elevate the many examples around the world where governments are acting democratically and effectively in response to the crisis and they're framing and working with citizens in ways that are absolutely consistent with democratic values and principles. And so I do want to showcase some of those. I think it's received a lot of press around the world how New Zealand, for instance has reacted, and I read this week that New Zealand is perhaps one of the very first countries to have been able to successfully eliminate COVID. They have no new COVID cases. And it's a case that really stands out for the way that the prime minister has been able to deliver information in a very clear, compassionate, inclusive way, a way that's very grounded in science of course, and transparent. And at the same time where the legislature has had an important role developing a parliamentary select committee that's providing scrutiny of the government's response. The government has also been very affirmative there I think, in terms of issues of freedom of information and media freedom and has said that they would not slow down, for instance, their commitment to responding to requests for information during the crisis. So there's certainly the case of New Zealand, which is so interesting and it's shown such early success, but there are other places around the world too where specific measures taken by the government I think have been so positive and far reaching. Uruguay comes to mind for instance. We see so many cases where authoritarian leaders are using this crisis to be able to settle scores as you were saying, or to act in a very partisan fashion. But in Uruguay, the president convened all of the former presidential candidates to give a joint press conference to send a powerful message of unity and to show that across the party divide, they were working together to develop responses. Taiwan also really stands out for its cross party coordination, the transparent communications they've had, the very creative efforts that the government has put in place there, I think they've called it humor, not rumor. A campaign to share facts in real time to counter disinformation, to manage fear. So there aren't many cases out there as I was saying, of governments that are responding effectively and in ways that are building that citizen trust that you were mentioning. DM: Yes. And then a further one, another democracy that's a leading democracy, probably the first out of the gate is South Korea. They did exactly what was necessary. People are looking at that example, a democratic example. They didn't sacrifice rights at all. They obviously had very strong controls at times of the society, but it took very swift action. They did widespread testing, contact tracing and they worked with civil society and is shown over and over that civil society is probably one of the most important factors. It's not simply a government driven thing that makes a response success. Civil society serves as a very efficient force multiplier for government. We saw that in Katrina, hurricane Katrina. We see it's proved over and over that it really is effective in getting the word out and messaging. Ensuring is like in Taiwan through their civic tech community, they're sort of hackers. They're young citizens, who themselves in a voluntary fashion, formed a community. They were viewed as allies and partners not alienated from the government. And that partnership has been a success in Taiwan, has been a success in South Korea and is essential for a success. And that means that governments need to be open, need to be transparent, they need to see society as partners. So this is absolutely critical. KS: Yeah. And I just want to add on the South Korea example. I'm so glad you brought that up because South Korea held elections during the pandemic on April 15, they had national assembly lessons and they were actually able to organize those elections in a way that was seen as very transparent, that was very consistent with electoral integrity and they had higher levels of turnout than in previous elections, which is pretty amazing. And there's so many countries around the world that are facing elections in 2020. I think the way that South Korea was able to do it with a very intensive communication campaign as you were speaking again to their transparency of communication, they had expanded early voting measures in place. They had home voting, they had very comprehensive safeguards for people to be able to vote in person. So even organizing an election in a time that seems so difficult and so challenging, I think that as you were saying, democracies like South Korea are showing that there is a way forward. DM: Right. And I think we can learn some lessons from that as well. There are groups, including NDI has been at the center of this, of putting together documents that say here are the election integrity guidelines for this moment, that democracy should not be sacrificed at the alter of crisis response, that elections need to move forward if they can be done in the right way and if they need to be postponed, it's postponed within a certain timeframe and only during a period of high crisis. So there are principles here where democracy can continue to move forward. It makes the society stronger, it builds that civic trust that's important for crisis response. But we need to... You can walk and chew gum at the same time at this moment. So I'm glad we were able to talk about some of these democratic examples. KS: Absolutely. And I will be right back after this quick message. You can hear more from other democracy heroes by listening to our DemWorks podcast available on iTunes and SoundCloud. DM: Welcome back with Kristen Sample. Of course you're new to NDI, but you know NDI very well and it's a fundamental principle everywhere that nations will only succeed when societies are fully inclusive, where they don't leave anybody behind. They enable all to contribute equally. That means women, that means young people, that means traditionally marginalized groups, LGBT communities, et cetera. It's just plain logic that if you leave anybody behind, that you're not going to get the most out of your citizen when you're going to hold your country back, and yet we are witnessing negative impacts toward these populations during this COVID-19 moment. Kristen, can you speak to this, explain what's going on here and why it matters? KS: Sure, absolutely. I mean obviously this crisis isn't occurring in a vacuum. It's occurring in a context where across the world, across all countries, there are already this array of existing intersecting inequalities where some people were coming into this crisis already in a disadvantaged place. And then the pandemic itself has differentiated impacts that affect women and other marginalized groups disproportionately. I'll just give a few examples. I mean lockdown for women who are living in relationships of power imbalance and of abuse perhaps, lockdown for them means locked in, with an abusive partner. And for instance our survey of country offices that I was referring to previously, in 66% of our countries, there seems to be an increase in sexual and gender based violence since the pandemic. In 15% of those countries, it's a significant increase. Of course these women might be locked in in vulnerable situations and then at the same time have less access to government resources, government support. So that's one example. Others, people with disabilities for instance, who have always struggled to access health services, transportation in an equitable fashion, you can imagine that that lack of access and the differentiated impact of the pandemic on them is life threatening in some cases. There are digital divide concerns, people in rural areas or women, other marginalized groups who may have less access to information, to resources. There are real concerns also and cases around the world where this pandemic is being exploited by anti migrant hate groups for instance, who try to link movement and migration to the origin of the virus. Or in some cases, for instance in Africa and some of the countries where we work, media outlets are perpetuating stereotypes against people with albinism for instance, and placing the blame for the virus on them. So there are so many challenges around making sure that people have access to resources, people are safe and that we are able to convey and support a message of social cohesion and solidarity instead of the divisions that we're seeing pop up around the world. I think that in our case, for instance in Indiana, what we're trying to do is reinforce the need for inclusive decision-making, making sure for instance, that women are involved in decision making and other marginalized groups are involved in decision making and representation and in these deliberation bodies, making sure that the policymaking is taking into account these vulnerabilities and these different differentiated needs. And also the government messaging is inclusive, getting to everybody and it's supporting the social cohesion messaging and solidarity messages. DM: And again, this is critical for the crisis response, pandemic response. I mean COVID-19 doesn't discriminate. Whoever has it, whoever is vulnerable or subject will get it and it will spread to the society writ large. So if you're not inclusive, if you're excluding folks, if politicians then see that there is an opportunity here as some politicians will to divide and conquer, to play on fear. Or spoilers from the outside may see that there are opportunities if they're divided societies, to create tensions that then require or enable them to negotiate the deal that you want to make or promote corruption within the society. There are all kinds of ways this makes societies less stable, less secure, and affects the development and certainly the response to crises. So this is not just a nice thing, it's not just a human rights thing. This is fundamentally important to national security, international security and to everything that we're seeking to achieve through democracy. KS: Absolutely. And I think along the things I'd really like to hear from you too, Derek, in terms of how you see along the lines of this being an international crisis that includes the whole world, that joins us all although we are in very different places. How you see role NDI's role in supporting that cross border cooperation and solidarity and having the international community come together? DM: Given that authoritarians are claiming their model is unique for this moment, we have to be out there making our case. But in terms of our specific adaptations that we are doing, we are working in places like Ethiopia to ensure that the public opinion surveys are necessary invents of their postponed elections or continue forward, but can be done virtually. That we can adapt legislative rules of procedure in places that need it to allow for remote voting and continue the legislative process to ensure that election integrity is maintained. As I mentioned earlier, there are certain principles and established accepted international principles for when and how to postpone elections, how to hold them during moments of crisis. And we put together crisis response kits that can be used. It's called the practical toolkit for politicians during a pandemic that can help political parties figure out how to do crisis management or help the government put together crisis communication. So a lot of things that can be done internally and done across different countries that ensure the solidarity is still there, the momentum for democracy is still there. The expectation that democratic norms are sustained in this moment so that the headlines are not simply roll back authoritarian opportunism, that massive surveillance, all the things that people may succumb to because of fear during crisis, that there is an alternative voice and it says it doesn't have to be like that. Or if it does have to be like that now, it doesn't have to continue to be like that indefinitely and that there are some standards by which these things are being imposed. So that international norm setting at this moment, it's probably more important than ever to do and we are trying to do at national level. We're trying to do it across different countries to ensure that there is not a vacuum to which the authoritarian voice moves and has free open season for its own values. It goes across, I think, a lot of different countries. And Kristen, I'd be interested in your thoughts from your perspective of governance, how that's working. KS: I think that there's a real role for the international community to play. And I wanted to highlight that too in what you're saying because these challenges are so vast that clearly we have to work together on people to people exchanges and supporting lesson sharing. And so I do think that there's an absolute role for the international community playing in terms of getting out the messages of that democracy is not a luxury, it's not something that could be put into a coma or put on hold while we're all sheltering, that it's something that has to be reaffirmed on a daily basis. And so I do think that countries also have to, in addition to standing firm, standing on their own ground on democratic principles, they also have to be willing to promote and expand those democratic principles across borders, especially to counter those liberal influences that you were referring to earlier, that in some cases are, really transmitted and increased through disinformation campaigns or phony PR campaigns that need to be called out of course by all actors. DM: Thanks again, Kristen for joining me in conversation about how democracies can best meet the challenges of COVID and how NDI with its global partners are meeting the moment. KS: Thank you, Derek. DM: I'd also like to say thank you to our listeners. To learn more about NDI or to listen to other DemWorks podcasts, please visit our website at www.ndi.org. Thanks very much.
World map of Coronavirus (Covid-19)
19. Governance is Key During COVID-19? (w/ Kristen Sample) Posted 6 days ago
Democracy (General), COVID-19 Podcast NDI Listen democracy
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Yesterday, I participated in a roundtable on gender discrimination in security studies at the annual conference of the European Initiative on Security Studies [EISS]. EISS is a relatively new network of European security scholars. This is, I believe, my third time attending, as I have been seeking to build connections between the CDSN and Europe. It doesn't hurt, of course, that the EISS conferences have been in Paris, Berlin, and now Barcelona. I presented my very preliminary work on the next project--variations in what Defense Agencies (DoD, MoD, etc) do, receiving lots of very helpful comments during that panel and the lunch that preceded it. A couple of months ago, Hugo Meijer, the Director of EISS, asked me if I would be willing to join a panel on gender discrimination. I had some hesistancy as I am not an expert--as I told the room yesterday, I am a feminist but my work does not take feminist approach to international relations and I don't study gender. That last bit is not as true as it used to be, as I am involved in a project that has surveyed Canadian security scholars about their experiences, focusing on gender discrimination. But I agreed to speak since I have seen a lot of problems over the years and was going to be the most experienced (oldest) person on the panel. Plus I was the only one to give a North American perspective. I was joined by fellow civ-mil scholar and super kind Chiara Ruffa of Science Po as well as two feminist scholars who were online: Annick Wibben of Swedish Defence University, and Vanessa Newby, Leiden University. We were asked two questions: when did we first notice gender problems in the field and what is some advice we have for handling this stuff? The first question was pretty easy: almost immediately as there was a case of sexual harassment in my grad program. I then discussed that two of the places that I worked had toxic environments thanks to male profs preying upon grad students, as well as citation patterns and hiring stuff. That men have often reported that women get all of the jobs, which is strange since there are still plenty of men in the discipline. I didn't have time to get into the love of old boys networks by some senior scholars or how some post-doc funders tended to only give to men back in the day. In short, lots of problems which I have discussed here from time to time. Chiara, Annick, and Vanessa had much more to say on this, alas. For the second question, I cautioned that I can't really tell women how to behave--not my role--but I had some ideas for making some improvements--building from my CDSN experience--to be deliberate about panel organization--no manels, deny platforms to those who are known to be predators or otherwise assholes, find or found organizations that seek to elevate and mentor women and work with them, as we have with WIIS-Canada, WCAPS-Canada, as well as Out in National Security such as WIIS Europe. In the following Q&A, folks raised questions about the pace of change and what can we do in the face of structural problems. I mentioned this meme: But then I noted an earlier presentation that day invoked structuration theory (something I wrote about in my very first IR theory class in grad school, taught be the gone too soon John Ruggie)--that agent and structure shape each other. So, we need to act individually and collectively to change the norms, the institutions, and the social structures that, well, maintain patriarchy. I pointed out that when I started, the room would have been almost entirely male, and that EISS and CDSN are efforts to foster more diverse defence/security communities. These folks have a right to be impatient, but we ought not be too pessimistic or deterred--we can make a difference and improve things. It was a good and important conversation to have, and I hope it spurs further conversations. It was strange to be discussing this stuff on a day where the US Supreme Court made things worse for women, for LGBTQ2S+, and for other historically excluded groups... but definitely much needed.
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In diesem Beitrag stellt Johanna Bunes folgenden Aufsatz vor: Öztürk, Cemal / Pickel, Gert / Schneider, Verena (2021): Religion, Vorurteile und Rechtsextremismus - kommt zusammen, was nicht zusammengehört?; in: Blättel-Mink, Birgit (Hrsg.): Gesellschaft unter Spannung. Verhandlungen des 40. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie 2020, online unter: https://publikationen.soziologie.de/index.php/kongressband_2020/article/view/1334.In diesem Beitrag thematisieren Öztürk, Pickel und Schneider Zusammenhänge und Wirkung von Religiosität und rechtsextremen Einstellungen. Doch was kann darunter verstanden werden? Während es Antisemitismus schon sehr lange gibt, gilt die Muslimfeindlichkeit als ein relativ junges Phänomen. Dabei werden AnhängerInnen verschiedener religiöser Gruppen als Ursache von Konflikten verantwortlich gemacht. Nach dieser Theorie sind die Werte dieser Religionen nicht mit den westlichen Werten vereinbar. Dadurch kommt es zu ethnopluralistischen Forderungen wie das Stoppen der Einwanderung und die Rückführung in die (angeblichen) Herkunftsländer.Der Beitrag befasst sich diesbezüglich mit zwei zentralen Fragen. Zuerst wird überprüft, ob ein Zusammenhang zwischen Religion beziehungsweise Religiosität und rechtsextremen Einstellungen vorliegt. Dabei liegt der Fokus nicht auf rechtsextremen Parteien, sondern auf dem Anteil der Bevölkerung, der für rechtsextreme Überzeugungen und Vorstellungen anfällig ist. Um adäquate Aussagen treffen zu können, wurde nach Brähler und Decker eine Konsensdefinition mit sechs Dimensionen konstituiert:Affinität zur Diktatur als Staatsform,nationaler Chauvinismus,Verharmlosung des Nationalsozialismus,Antisemitismus,Fremdenfeindlichkeit,Sozialdarwinismus.Diese Dimensionen werden seit 2002 in den Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studien mit jeweils drei Items gemessen (vgl. S. 3). Um eine These zu entwickeln, werden vier Studien aufgeführt, welche die Entwicklung der rechtsextremen Einstellungen seit 2002 erforschen. Bei diesen Studien handelt es sich umdie Leipziger Autoritarismusstudien (LAS) 2002-2020,die Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS) 2018,das International Society Survey Programme (ISSP) 2018 undden Survey des Projekts 'Konfigurationen individueller und kollektiver religiöser Identitäten und ihre zivilgesellschaftlichen Potenziale (KONID)' 2019 (vgl. S. 3).Die LAS-Studie zeigt, dass die Anzahl der Personen mit geschlossen rechtsextremen Einstellungen, also einer Zustimmung zu allen 18 Items, in Gesamt- und Westdeutschland seit 2002 rückläufig ist. Allerdings ist seit 2006 ein Anstieg in Ostdeutschland zu verzeichnen. Es wurde zudem die Beobachtung gemacht, dass die meiste Zustimmung der Items im Bereich von chauvinistischen und fremdenfeindlichen Aussagen zu verzeichnen ist. Die Ergebnisse der Studien erwiesen, dass der Anteil der Personen mit geschlossen rechtsextremen Vorstellungen gering ist, allerdings ist die Zustimmung für einzelne Dimensionen deutlich höher. Demzufolge "können rechte AkteurInnen ein Mobilisierungspotenzial sehen, indem sie an verbreitete Vorurteile …anknüpfen" (S. 4).Doch inwieweit beeinflussen sich nun Religiosität und Rechtsextremismus? Lassen sich Zusammenhänge erkennen? Mithilfe von verschiedenen Daten werden drei zentrale Thesen überprüft, die den Zusammenhang von Rechtsextremismus und Religiosität beschreiben. Die erste These besagt, dass Gruppenablehnungen religiöser Gruppen rechtsextreme Einstellungen verstärken (vgl. S. 4). Diese These lässt sich durch die Social Identity Theory und Integrated Threat Theory bekräftigen.Die erste Theorie "besagt, dass das Verhalten von Personen durch ihre Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppe bestimmt wird" (S. 4). Dieses Verhalten lässt sich erklären, da die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppe den Selbstwert steigert. Aufgrund der eigenen Selbstwertsteigerung erfährt die In-Group Aufwertung, während der Out-Group negative Eigenschaften zugeschrieben werden. Gleichzeitig stützt sich die Integrated Threat Theory auf die aufkommenden Bedrohungsängste, welche aus der Auf- und Abwertung resultieren und damit einhergehen.Diese können realistischer oder symbolischer Struktur sein. Unter realistischen Bedrohungsängsten versteht man "wahrgenommene existenzielle Bedrohungen des physischen, politischen oder materiellen Zustands der In-Group" (S. 5). Dagegen erweisen sich wahrgenommene Differenzen zwischen Normen und Werten als symbolische Bedrohung, wie beispielsweise 'die Islamisierung des Abendlandes'. Diese Wahrnehmungen können Ursache für die Entwicklung von Vorurteilen sein. Diese Vorurteile nutzen wiederum rechtsradikale oder rechtsextreme Gruppierungen für Instrumentalisierungen bestimmter Religionen als Feindbild mit der zuvor beschriebenen Vorstellung der Ungleichheit.Die zweite These der Fragestellung erwägt, ob die christliche Religiosität als Sozialform rechtsextreme Einstellungen hemmt. Dabei soll der Austausch mit Mitgliedern anderer religiöser Gruppen zum Abbau der Vorurteile beitragen. Sozial engagierte Mitglieder mit pluralistischen Ansichten greifen auf religiöse Werte in sozialer Ausrichtung zurück und wirken mit dieser Offenheit rechtsextremen Einstellungen entgegen. Diese Annahme beruht auf der Kontakthypothese, welche laut Öztürk, Pickel und Schneider empirisch nachgewiesen werden konnte. Das religiöse Engagement zur Kontaktsuche mit anderen religiösen Gruppen wird zum Schlüsselmerkmal dieser These.Die dritte These behauptet dagegen, dass rechtsextreme Einstellungen begünstigt werden, wenn die Mitglieder der In-Group einer dogmatischen und exklusivistischen Religiosität angehören. Diese These bestätigt sich durch die Ergebnisse der zuvor erwähnten ALLBUS- und KONID-Studie. Antisemitismus und Muslimfeindlichkeit weisen eine enge Verbindung mit rechtsextremen Einstellungen auf, somit sind dogmatisch-fundamentalistische ChristInnen anfällig für rechtsextreme Einstellungen und Inhalte. Beide Studien zeigen einen Zusammenhang zwischen Ablehnung anderer religiösen Gruppen und rechtsextremen Vorstellungen.Aus diesen Ergebnissen der ersten Fragestellung entwickelt sich die zweite zentrale Frage des Beitrages. Hier erörtern Öztürk, Pickel und Schneider die Wirkung von Religiosität auf rechtsextreme Vorstellungen. Dabei wird zunächst untersucht, ob rechtsextreme Vorstellungen in bestimmten religiösen Gruppen vermehrt existieren. Dabei zeigt sich - laut der Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie - keinerlei ausschlaggebende Differenz zwischen ProtestantInnen, KatholikInnen und weiteren Ausrichtungen. Es herrscht also keine direkte Verbindung zwischen Religiosität beziehungsweise religiöser Zugehörigkeit und rechtsextremen Einstellungen. Doch es lassen sich indirekte Beziehungen entdecken.Wie die zweite und dritte These zeigte, besteht ein ambivalentes Verhältnis von Religiosität und Rechtsextremismus. Religiosität kann rechtsextreme Einstellungen verstärken, aber gleichzeitig auch hemmen. Dieses Paradoxon erklären Öztürk, Pickel und Schneider im Betrag anhand der KONID-Studie. Die Studie betrachtet das Verständnis von Religion. Dabei erweist sich eine Selbstbeschreibung als religiös oder der Kontakt mit anderen Religionen positiver Art als ohne Effekt. Dagegen zeigt die Studie, dass eine dogmatisch-fundamentalistische Auslegung der eigenen Religion die Aneignung von rechtsextremen Einstellungen begünstigen und fördern kann.Ebenso überprüfte die Studie den Zusammenhang rechtsextremer Einstellungen und der eigenen Religiosität kombiniert mit sozialem Engagement. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Personen mit dieser Auffassung der eigenen Religion weniger anfälliger sind für rechtsextremistische Inhalte. Es bilden sich also zwei Pfade. Beide besitzen die Gemeinsamkeit der Selbstbeschreibung als religiös, allerdings mit einem unterschiedlichen Verständnis von Religion, was sich wiederum auf die Anfälligkeit für rechtsextreme Ausrichtungen auswirkt.Im Beitrag wird dieser Zustand noch mit einem weiteren, vertiefenden Mediationsmodell ergänzt. Zu den zwei Pfaden wird Bildung, Geschlecht und Alter überprüft. Diese zeigten allerdings keinen Effekt. Letztendlich ist ein direkter Zusammenhang zwischen der Zugehörigkeit zu einer religiösen Gruppe, der eigenen Religiosität und rechtsextremen Vorstellungen nicht erwiesen worden. Allerdings können dogmatisch-fundmentalistische Vorstellungen einer Religion eine Brücke bilden zu Vorurteilen sowie Auf- und Abwertungen. Diese können von rechtsextremen AkteurInnen genutzt werden, um Feindbilder zu kreieren und die Ideologie von Ungleichheit zu befördern.Dahingehend ist es wichtig, die eigene Religiosität mit sozialem Engagement und pluralistischen, offenen Überzeugungen zu setzen. Dieses inkludierende Religionsverständnis wirkt hemmend und ermöglicht ein Zusammenleben, ganz im Gegensatz zu der Vorstellung der Unvereinbarkeit der unterschiedlichen Religionen und Werte, welche rechtsextreme AkteurInnen postulieren.Da nur ein geringer Anteil der dogmatisch-fundamentalistischen ChristInnen auf rechtsextreme Inhalte zurückgreifen, mag es den Anschein erwecken, dass dieser Sachverhalt nicht großartig beachtet und weiterhin erforscht werden muss. Allerdings sind Annäherungen und Offenheit für rechtsextremistische Einstellungen, Vorstellungen und Inhalte ein ausschlaggebendes Argument und bieten sich somit für weitere Untersuchungen auf diesem Gebiet an (vgl. S. 11).
This bibliography addresses the discourse between Latina/o/xs and various architectural and spatial traditions. In the architectural context of the United States, Latina/o/x communities have struggled to carve a space for themselves, sometimes described as a third, subaltern, or alter/native space. Peoples of Latin American descent have experienced persecution in certain architectural settings, operating in consort with state strategies to stereotype, relegate, and criminalize Latina/o/x bodies. Examples here include the border wall dividing the United States and Mexico, urban development projects that segregate and displace historic populations, prison systems holding disproportionate numbers of minorities, and border facilities designed to control and contain immigrant communities. State-sponsored violence—witnessed historically in public lynchings during the 19th century and police brutality used to suppress the Chicano Movement of the 1960s—has likewise produced a feeling that architectural environments, particularly those in the public sphere, remain out of reach for Latina/o/xs. Yet, the architectural history of Latina/o/xs can be said to precede the formation of the United States by more than a thousand years, particularly if we consider the broader history of architecture in the Americas and the Caribbean. It is a history that reaches back to ancient monumental sites of Indigenous peoples in Mesoamerica, the Andes, Amazon, Caribbean, and US Southwest. It projects forward through Spanish and Portuguese urbanization during the colonial period, including African influences that accompanied the trauma of slavery in the Americas after 1492, and Asian material cultures that followed indentured laborers during the 19th century. It is a history that moves forward through nationalist beaux-arts and neoclassic works of the 19th and early 20th centuries into the international modernist styles of the mid- to late 20th century, associated with notable architects like Luis Barragán of Mexico and Oscar Niemeyer of Brazil, among many others. Those architects of the modern era produced spaces that would include multiple publics in a bid to rethink national identities in places like Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico. Haunted by the socio-racial and gendered hierarchies of the colonial era, modern architects strove toward utopic decolonial solutions in the built environment. We might productively place Latina/o/x architecture within those histories of the wider hemisphere, as a facet of that striving toward a decolonial future. There are political, cultural, and historical reasons, however, to study Latina/o/x architecture on its own terms. To do so requires us to critically assess the limits of categories like "Latin American" and "Latina/o/x," which are often confused, disputed, and in flux. These categories impossibly encompass huge and diverse populations. The term "Latin American" attempts to define peoples and cultures across the Spanish-, French-, and Portuguese-speaking Americas and Caribbean, while "Latina/o/x" describes members of the Latin American diaspora, particularly in the United States. Within these shifting terms of inclusion and exclusion, Latin American architecture has received notably more attention in scholarly literature, to the detriment of Latina/o/x contributions. This is, in part, because of historic discrimination faced by immigrants from Latin America in the United States and elsewhere. It also reveals a lacuna in histories of architecture more broadly, and the practice of architecture itself, which has tended to be dominated by heteronormative, white, Anglo-male norms and narratives. In the early 21st century, Latina/o/xs account for less than 10 percent of registered architects in the United States according to the American Institute of Architects (AIA). Nonetheless, with a population at nearly 40 million, Latina/o/xs are the largest minority group in the United States, projected to comprise a quarter of the population by the year 2050. The lack of representation in the field of architecture, compared to demographic realities, makes clear why the study of Latina/o/x architecture is of critical importance. The following bibliography works against social and historical factors that would ignore or erase Latina/o/xs from architectural discourse. This bibliography will focus on major works of scholarship that discuss Latina/o/xs as both users and producers of architecture. Special attention is paid to the ethnic and cultural diversity of Latina/o/x architecture, from the largest historic populations of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba to the vernacular building practices and decolonial aesthetics of an increasingly transcultural and transregional Latina/o/x population.
The aim to characterize civil liability as a component of legal liability in pharmacy. Materials and methods. During the research, the methods of analysis, synthesis, and legal comparison were used. National civil legislation, as well as general theoretical approaches and points of view to the issues of civil liability in the pharmaceutical healthcare sector were used as research material. Results. The sphere of circulation of medicines is a multifaceted complex of legal relations regulated by the norms of various branches of law. At the same time, their generalizing feature is the focus on providing the population with affordable, safe and high-quality medicines. Establishing the rights of citizens at the legislative level, the legislator always necessarily provides for mechanisms of protection against violation of these rights. One of the most effective mechanisms is legal liability. Since the above citizens' rights are civil rights, it seems relevant to investigate the essence and content of civil liability in the pharmaceutical healthcare sector. Pacta sunt servanda is a principle of international law, according to which treaties are binding and must be executed in good faith. Unlike contractual liability, delict liability occurs in cases where the violator does not have a contractual relationship with the offended party. Conclusions. Civil liability is one of the most effective measures to ensure the constitutional right of citizens to accessible. safe and quality medicines. Determination of the legal status of a pharmaceutical worker as one of the central figures in healthcare is necessary for the correct determination of the type of civil liability ; Цель работы – характеристика гражданско-правовой ответственности как составляющей юридической ответственности в фармацевтической сфере. Материалы и методы. В ходе исследования использовали методы анализа, синтеза, сравнительно-правовой. В качестве материала исследования использовали национальное гражданское законодательство, а также общетеоретические подходы и позиции ученых по вопросам гражданско-правовой ответственности в фармацевтическом секторе здравоохранения. Результаты. Сфера обращения лекарственных средств представляет собой многогранный сложный комплекс правоотношений, регулируемых нормами различных отраслей права. Их обобщающий их признак – направленность на обеспечение населения доступными, безопасными и качественными лекарственными средствами. Устанавливая на законодательном уровне права граждан, законодатель обязательно предусматривает механизмы защиты от нарушения указанных прав. Одно из наиболее действенных таких средств – юридическая ответственность. Поскольку указанные права граждан относятся к гражданским, актуальны исследования сущности и содержания гражданско-правовой ответственности в фармацевтическом секторе здравоохранения. По такому критерию, как источник возникновения гражданских прав и обязанностей, различают договорную и внедоговорную ответственность. Договорная ответственность – следствие неисполнения или ненадлежащего исполнения своих обязанностей одной из сторон договора. Pacta sunt servanda – принцип международного права, согласно которому договоры обязательны и должны выполняться добросовестно. В отличие от договорной, ответственность деликтная наступает в случаях, когда нарушитель не находится в договорных отношениях с потерпевшей стороной. Выводы. Гражданско-правовая ответственность – одна из действенных мер обеспечения конституционного права граждан на доступные, безопасные и качественные лекарственные средства. Установление правового статуса фармацевтического работника как одной из центральных фигур в сфере охраны необходимо для правильного определения вида гражданско-правовой ответственности. ; Мета роботи – характеристика цивільно-правової відповідальності як складової юридичної відповідальності у фармацевтичній сфері. Матеріали та методи. Під час дослідження використали методи аналізу, синтезу, порівняльно-правовий. Матеріал дослідження – національне цивільне законодавство, а також загальнотеоретичні підходи та позиції науковців щодо питань цивільно-правової відповідальності у фармацевтичному секторі галузі охорони здоров'я. Результати. Сфера обігу лікарських засобів – багатогранний складний комплекс правовідносин, що регулюються нормами різних галузей права. Але їхня спільна ознака – спрямованість на забезпечення населення доступними, безпечними та якісними лікарськими засобами. Встановлюючи на законодавчому рівні права громадян, законодавець обов'язково передбачає механізми захисту від порушення цих прав. Один із найбільш дієвих засобів – юридична відповідальність. Оскільки названі права громадян належать до цивільних, актуальним є дослідження сутності та змісту цивільно-правової відповідальності у фармацевтичному секторі сфери охорони здоров'я. За таким критерієм, як джерело виникнення цивільних прав та обов'язків, розрізняють договірну та недоговірну відповідальність. Договірна відповідальність – наслідок невиконання або неналежного виконання своїх обов'язків однією зі сторін договору. Pacta sunt servanda – принцип міжнародного права, згідно з ним договори є обов'язковими та мають виконуватися добросовісно. На відміну від договірної, відповідальність деліктна настає у випадках, коли порушник не перебуває в договірних відносинах із потерпілою стороною. Висновки. Цивільно-правова відповідальність – один із дієвих заходів забезпечення конституційного права громадян на доступні, безпечні та якісні лікарські засоби. Встановлення правового статусу фармацевтичного працівника як однієї з центральних фігур у сфері охорони необхідне для правильного визначення виду цивільно-правової відповідальності.
Current trends in the system of public relations indicate the development of innovative technologies in management, in turn, the widespread introduction of information and communication technologies stimulates further work on the maximum availability of administrative services. One of the topical issues of modern Ukrainian jurisprudence is the issue of settlement of social relations that were formed during the last period of development of the Ukrainian state - the period of independence. These processes were accompanied by the replacement of Soviet models of society, the adoption of positive world experience, the ratification of international regulations, the rules of which were gradually implemented in the Ukrainian system of law and legal relations. In fact, the article is devoted to one of such issues - the administrative and legal aspects of the activities of mediators, as well as the forms in which it is carried out. The establishment of the institute itself stimulated research on mediation by specialists in various fields of scientific knowledge, and falls in the second half of the XX - early XXI centuries, but within the national legal system, and therefore research of this institute in Ukraine intensified in the late 1990s and are of great relevance today. This is due to systemic transformational changes in society, the formation of information, democratic, legal society, reform of public administration, the judiciary, decentralization processes and more. Mediation is one of the forms of resolving administrative and legal disputes. To achieve this goal it is necessary to implement the following tasks: to explore the categorical meaning of the concepts "forms of administrative activity", "mediation agreement", "mediator"; to formulate own vision of problems of forms of administrative activity of the mediator. The formation of a clear understanding of the basic categorical apparatus and mechanisms for the implementation of norms in the field of mediation is the key to further development of this institution in our country. The study found that mediation is the best way to resolve conflicts as the most acute contradictions, based on modern research of society, the state, aimed at the development of civil society institutions. This type of dispute resolution is currently gaining popularity in the world. The analysis of the situation in the field of mediation in Ukraine makes it possible to identify a set of problems that require further regulation, the formation of quality human resources, ie entities that provide mediation services. ; Сучасні тенденції у системі суспільних відносин свідчать про розвиток інноваційних технологій в управлінні, в свою чергу, широке запровадження інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій стимулює подальшу роботу щодо максимальної доступності надання адміністративних послуг. Однією із актуальних проблематик сучасної української юриспруденції – є питання врегулювання суспільних відносин, що формувалися протягом останнього періоду розвитку української держави – періоду незалежності. Ці процеси супроводжувалися заміною радянських моделей управління суспільством, запозичення позитивного світового досвіду, ратифікація міжнародних нормативно-правових актів, норми яких поступово імплементувалися в українську систему права та правовідносин. Власне, одному із таких питань присвячена стаття – адміністративно-правовим аспектам діяльності медіаторів, а також форми у яких вона здійснюється. Становлення самого інституту стимулювали проведення наукових досліджень із проблематики медіації фахівцями у різних сферах наукових знань, і припадають на другу половину ХХ – початок ХХІ століть, однак в рамках національної системи права, а відповідно і наукові дослідження цього інституту в Україні активізувалися наприкінці 1990-х років і мають на сьогодні значну актуальність. Це пояснюється системними трансформаційними змінами у суспільстві, становленням інформаційного, демократичного, правового суспільства, реформою системи публічного управління, судової системи, процесами децентралізації тощо. Медіація виступає однією з форм вирішення адміністративно-правових спорів. Для досягнення мети необхідно реалізувати наступні завдання: дослідити категоріальний зміст понять «форми адміністративної діяльності», «медіаційна угода», «медіатор»; сформулювати власне бачення проблематики форм адміністративної діяльності медіатора. Формування чіткого розуміння базового категоріального апарату та механізмів реалізації норм у сфері медіації є запорукою подальшого розвитку цього інституту в нашій державі. В результаті проведеного дослідження з'ясовано, що медіація є оптимальним способом вирішення конфліктів як найбільш гострих протиріч, заснована на сучасних дослідженнях суспільства, держави, спрямоване на розвиток інститутів громадянського суспільства. Цей вид врегулювання спорів наразі набирає все більшої популярності у світі. Аналіз ситуації у сфері медіації в України дає змогу виокремити комплекс проблем, що потребують подальшого нормативного врегулювання, формування якісного кадрового потенціалу, тобто суб'єктів, що надають послугу посередництва.
