Suchergebnisse

Supported by Office of Water Research and Technology, USDI project no. B-175-CAL and University of California, Water Resources Center project UCAL-WRC-W-495. ; "Prepared for 'Assessment, management & politics of water', 13th American Water Resources Conference, Tucson, November 1977." ; With: Emergency water allocation : implementation of a preparedness program / R. Schinzinger . [et al.] Irvine, Calif. : EWAP, [1977] -- Emergency water allocation : restoration of a water distribution network / G. Urbach, R. Schinzinger, and H. Fagin. Irvine, Calif. : EWAP, [1977] -- Emergency water allocation : improving emeergency preparedness / H. Fagin, T. Edwards, and R. Schinzinger. Irvine, Calif. : EWAP, [1977] ; Mode of access: Internet.

Resource Allocation Mechanisms derives the general welfare properties of systems in which individuals are motivated by self-interest. Satisfactory outcomes will emerge only if individual incentives are harnessed by means of a communication and payoff process, or mechanism, involving every agent. Professor Campbell employs a formal and abstract model of a mechanism that brings into prominence the criteria by which the performance of an economy is to be judged. The mechanism approach is used to prove some fundamental theorems about the possibility of designing an economic system satisfying the criteria. It also establishes a way of thinking about economic issues that is becoming increasingly useful in special branches of economics, such as industrial organization and public finance. This book can be viewed as two different texts: one constitutes an introduction to the theory of mechanism design and the other is a treatment of welfare economics with conventional emphasis on Pareto optimality as well as providing substantial material on incentives, uncertainty, and existence of equilibrium

Although there exists a vast literature on aid efficiency (the effect of aid on GDP), and that aid allocation determinants have been estimated, little is known about the minute details of aid allocation. This article investigates empirically a claim repeatedly made in the past that aid donors herd. Building upon a methodology applied to financial markets, this article finds that aid donors herd similarly to portfolio funds on financial markets. It also estimates the causes of herding and finds that political transitions towards more autocratic regimes repel donors, but that transitions towards democracy have no effect. Finally, identified causes of herding explain little of its overall level, suggesting strategic motives play an important role.