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The alt-right movement dates from 2008 when white supremacist Richard Spencer invented the term to identify contemporary right-wing and far-right socio/political movements. The movement relies on mass media, communicating graphically and symbolically through "trolls," "tropes," and "memes." The "Sadomasochist trope" valorizes aggressive actors like Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, while demonizing "passive" individuals like Hillary Clinton and Barak Obama. Trolls communicate through memes, single-frame or short video phrases matched with photos and cartoons, to attract online audiences. When not attacking liberals and progressives, alt-right memes turn on traditional conservatives. The alt-right community maintains it is "under assault" in today's politically correct, overly secularized, culturally diverse society. However, Donald Trump elevated alt-right icon and former Breitbart ceo Stephen Bannon to chief advisor, providing the alt-right movement access to the highest government levels. Will alt-right organizations continue their recent expansion, or will the public lose interest in the movement?

AbstractThis essay offers a philosophical analysis of the misogyny women experience in the alternative right (alt-right) movement. I argue that this misogyny takes on a paradoxical form: the better alt-right women propagandists promote hate, the greater the hostility they experience from their fellow racists and critics; the more submissive women alt-right members become, the harsher the impact of misogyny on them. I develop this argument in four parts. Part I explores the self-conception of racist white women using the concept of social imaginaries. Part II describes three dominant images in racist propaganda—the goddess/victim, wife and mother, and the female activist—which inform the more popular images of the white power Barbie and the tradwife in the alt-right. Part III explores the misogyny paradox and presents how alt-right women could be seen as both misogynists and victims of misogyny. Part IV reflects on the absurdity of the alt-right's dependence on women's economic labor, a feature that could make the movement vulnerable to political intervention.

The 2016 U.S. presidential election coincided with the rise of the "alternative right" or "alt-right". Alt-right associates have wielded considerable influence on the current administration and on social discourse, but the movement's loose organizational structure has led to disparate portrayals of its members' psychology and made it difficult to decipher its aims and reach. To systematically explore the alt-right's psychology, we recruited two U.S. samples: An exploratory sample through MTurk (N = 827, N(alt-right) = 447), and a larger nationally representative sample through the National Opinion Research Center's Amerispeak panel (N = 1283, N(alt-right) = 71 – 160, depending on the definition). We estimate that 6% of the U.S. population and 10% of Trump voters identify as alt-right. Alt-right adherents reported a psychological profile more reflective of the desire for group-based dominance than economic anxiety. Although both the alt-right and non-alt-right Trump voters differed substantially from non-alt-right non-Trump-voters, the alt-right and Trump voters were quite similar, differing mainly in the alt-right's especially high enthusiasm for Trump, suspicion of mainstream media, trust in alternative media, and desire for collective action on behalf of Whites. We argue for renewed consideration of overt forms of bias in contemporary intergroup research.

Citizens' perceptions of the alt-right are not well explored in political science. We view the alt-right as a successor of the Tea Party movement. While the Tea Party described itself as organized around spending, the size of government, and the American Constitution, examinations of the movement found that the unifying concerns of people who identified with it or viewed it favorably were negative feelings about racial minorities and patriarchal views of gender roles. Using panel survey data, we show that whites with higher levels of hostile sexism, racial resentment, perceptions of discrimination against whites, and who were more favorable towards Donald Trump evaluated the alt-right movement more positively. We find no evidence that self-placed ideology informed these evaluations. On the whole, latent cultural conservatism appears to inform evaluations of the relatively unknown — at the time — alt-right movement.

Identifying the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol as an inflection point, this article analyzes the historical relationship between White supremacy and the US military from Reconstruction after the Civil War to the present. The article posits causes for the disproportionate number of current and former members of the military associated with White power groups and proposes steps the Department of Defense can take to combat the problems posed by the association of the US military with these groups.

As with so many technologies, the Internet's racism was programmed right in—and it's quickly fueled the spread of White supremacist, xenophobic rhetoric throughout the western world.

While often associated with a liberal demographic, the increasing online visibility of rhetoric such as "snowflakes," "politically correct," "postmodern identity politics," and "cultural Marxism" demonstrates the presence of right-wing sentiments and populations in American convert Buddhism. This article situates these sentiments largely as a reaction to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives in these communities. We chart this backlash across a broad right-wing spectrum that spans from "reactionary centrism" to the alt-right. We illuminate the ways in which participants both de-legitimate DEI as political rather than Buddhist and naturalize their own position as Buddhist rather than political. Next, we show how American convert Buddhist lineages have become a site of the "culture wars," longstanding clashes between religious conservatives and progressives, that are playing out in multiple contexts across the US. Finally, we locate these reactionary right-wing forms of American Buddhism in relationship to modern and postmodern forms of global Buddhism.

"Christianity and the Alt-Right: Exploring the Relationship looks back at the 2016 presidential election and the support the President has enjoyed among white Evangelicals. This cutting-edge volume offers insights into the role of race and racism in shaping both the Trump candidacy and presidency and the ways in which xenophobia and racism and religion intersect within the Alt-Right and Evangelical cultures in the age of Trump. This book aims to examine the specific role that Christianity plays within the Alt-Right itself. Of special concern is the development of what is called "pro-white Christianity" and an ethic of religious tolerance between members of the Alt-Right who are Pagan or atheist and those who are Christian, whilst also exploring the reaction from Christian communities to the phenomenon of the Alt-Right. Looking at the larger relationship between American Christians, especially white Evangelicals, and the Alt-Right as well as the current American political context, the place of Christianity within the Alt-Right itself, and responses from Christian communities to the Alt-Right this is a must read for those interested in religion in America, religion and politics, evangelicalism and religion and race"--

Introduction -- The dilemma of definitions and categorizations -- Myths and realities surrounding Alt-Right gangs -- Alt-Right gangs' broken toys : risk factors for membership and gang formation -- Identity and ideology : music, culture, and "Hitler stuff" -- Alt-Right gangs' use of space -- The leaderless resistance of online memes and hate -- Criminality and violence -- The Alt-Reich in the twenty-first century : dealing with "The Upside Down" -- Appendix : operationalization of Alt-Right gang definition.

ObjectiveTo determine how the alt‐right label informs how voters assess individuals and political candidates.MethodsWe use a survey experiment with a hypothetical candidate. Along with a control, we vary the ideological label the hypothetical candidate uses, including conservative and alt‐right.ResultsThe alt‐right label leads people to view candidates as holding more right‐leaning ideological and issue positions relative to no label and often—specifically on issues relating to race, gender, and norms—relative to a more explicit conservative label.ConclusionThese results shed light on how citizens come to understand and use new ideological labels and suggest that the alt‐right label conveys context‐specific information that differs from that connected to the conservative label.