Suchergebnisse

A comparative study of peace movements of the early 1980s in the US, Germany, & New Zealand focuses on how their impact on foreign policy issues was influenced by interrelationships between domestic & international factors to explore the broader issue of the policy influence of movements. Relevant literature is reviewed, & mechanisms that heighten a social movement's impact on a nation's foreign policy are outlined. It is shown that, while peace movement members helped to win an important national election in New Zealand & lose one in Germany, they were a minor electoral threat in the US. However, the peace movement played an important role in ending the Cold War & preventing sustained aggressive security policies by changing political alliances & promoting policy alternatives. International constraints on the outcomes of peace movements on domestic foreign policy are discussed. These three cases reveal many different ways that protest movements can impact both foreign & domestic policy, including short-term effects & long-term changes in the political culture. J. Lindroth

Este ensaio pretende explicar a falta de movimentos antinucleares robustos na Índia durante um período que vai desde os anos 1950 até aos anos 1970. Tais movimentos surgiram em todo o mundo. Durante os anos 60, as pessoas mobilizaram-se para esta agenda nos Estados Unidos, França, Reino Unido, e mesmo na Nova Zelândia. A Índia, por outro lado, testou seu dispositivo nuclear em 1974, no conhecido teste de Pokhran-I (ou "Smiling Buddah") mas não enfrentou uma contestação popular sobre tal matéria. Neste sentido, a presente pesquisa teve como objetivo aplicar uma análise de congruência dedutiva construída com base numa revisão bibliográfica. Um estudo de caso sobre o contexto indiano testou hipóteses previamente elaboradas. Foi inferido que este fenômeno foi causado por quatro elementos: (a) poucas possibilidades de participação pública; (b) pouca informação disponível sobre política nuclear; (c) falta de cisma político entre as elites nacionais e a sociedade civil sobre este tema; e, por fim, (d) dinâmica geopolítica. ; This essay aims to explain the lack of robust antinuclear movements in India during a period that ranges from the 1950s to the 1970s. Such movements arose throughout the world. During the 1960s, people rallied for this agenda in the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and even in New Zealand. India, on the other hand, tested a nuclear device in 1974, at the known Pokhran-I test (or "Smiling Buddha"), but did not face such grassroots uprisings. In this sense, this research design applied a deductive congruence analysis built on a bibliographical review. A case study on the Indian context tested previously elaborated the main hypotheses. It was inferred that this phenomenon was caused by four elements: (a) few possibilities to public participation; (b) scant available information on nuclear policy; (c) lack of a political schism between national elites and civil society on this topic; and at last (d) geopolitical dynamics.

Corbin Harney, Western Shoshone elder and spiritual leader, rises in prayer. He lights a ceremonial pipe and upon inhaling offers it to Olzhas Suleimenov, Kazakh national poet and leader of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, who smokes it in turn. After completing the Western Shoshone Pipe Ceremony, the two reach down into the earth, each pulling up a stone, which they then proceed—in accordance with Kazakh custom—to throw at the face of evil—in this case, the face of nuclear fallout. This face is everywhere at the Nevada Test Site, and yet, nowhere to be seen. Guidelines for direct action campaigns at the test site caution would-be activists to be afraid of it—to be afraid of the dust. Contaminated from decades of nuclear weapons testing, this dust kills—just one more thing the Western Shoshone share with the Kazakhs, who, nearly a year-and-a-half earlier and halfway across the globe, gathered at Semipalatinsk, the Soviet counterpart to the Nevada Test Site, to hurl their own stones at the face of this very same evil. In 1989, inspired by Western Shoshone attempts to end nuclear weapons testing on their ancestral homeland, the Kazakhs rose up to demand an immediate cessation of Soviet testing at Semipalatinsk. They not only named their nascent movement Nevada, but they also took as their logo a Kazakh nomad sharing a pipe with a Western Shoshone. Over the next two years, Western Shoshone and Nevada activists engaged in cultural and political exchanges that sent delegates to protest in each other's respective homeland. Soviet officials have repeatedly credited the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement in their decision to halt their nuclear weapons testing program. By August 1991 Semipalatinsk closed. And without a credible Soviet threat the United States halted its own nuclear weapons testing program the following year. This essay documents the origins of this historic trans-Indigenous activism, as well as the joint strategies, tactics, and discourses employed by both movements in their bid to end nuclear weapons testing in their respective homelands.

This article examines the role of scientific experts in the post-war Japanese antinuclear power movement. It argues that experts and their movements have influenced the development of nuclear power in Japan, albeit in an indirect, constrained and sporadic way. Experts like the nuclear chemist Takagi Jinzaburō stimulated an upsurge of antinuclear protest and public opinion, especially after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which made power plant siting more difficult, contributed to longer construction lead times, and forced state and nuclear industry officials to devote considerable resources to atomic energy public relations (PR) campaigns and compensation for nuclearised communities. The antinuclear advocacy and activism of scientific experts arguably helped to slow down nuclear power development, resulting in a less nuclearised Japan than imagined by its advocates. Antinuclear experts and their movements, however, never became players in mainstream nuclear policymaking and had to be content with pressure tactics from the political peripheries. After the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster of March 2011 some observers pointed to this lack of direct political influence as evidence of the failure of the antinuclear movement. Rather than outright failure, however, this article presents a more ambivalent history marked by both achievements and shortcomings.

This article examines the role of scientific experts in the post-war Japanese antinuclear power movement. It argues that experts and their movements have influenced the development of nuclear power in Japan, albeit in an indirect, constrained and sporadic way. Experts like the nuclear chemist Takagi Jinzaburō stimulated an upsurge of antinuclear protest and public opinion, especially after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which made power plant siting more difficult, contributed to longer construction lead times, and forced state and nuclear industry officials to devote considerable resources to atomic energy public relations (PR) campaigns and compensation for nuclearised communities. The antinuclear advocacy and activism of scientific experts arguably helped to slow down nuclear power development, resulting in a less nuclearised Japan than imagined by its advocates. Antinuclear experts and their movements, however, never became players in mainstream nuclear policymaking and had to be content with pressure tactics from the political peripheries. After the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster of March 2011 some observers pointed to this lack of direct political influence as evidence of the failure of the antinuclear movement. Rather than outright failure, however, this article presents a more ambivalent history marked by both achievements and shortcomings.

This article examines the role of scientific experts in the post-war Japanese antinuclear power movement. It argues that experts and their movements have influenced the development of nuclear power in Japan, albeit in an indirect, constrained and sporadic way. Experts like the nuclear chemist Takagi Jinzaburō stimulated an upsurge of antinuclear protest and public opinion, especially after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which made power plant siting more difficult, contributed to longer construction lead times, and forced state and nuclear industry officials to devote considerable resources to atomic energy public relations (PR) campaigns and compensation for nuclearised communities. The antinuclear advocacy and activism of scientific experts arguably helped to slow down nuclear power development, resulting in a less nuclearised Japan than imagined by its advocates. Antinuclear experts and their movements, however, never became players in mainstream nuclear policymaking and had to be content with pressure tactics from the political peripheries. After the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster of March 2011 some observers pointed to this lack of direct political influence as evidence of the failure of the antinuclear movement. Rather than outright failure, however, this article presents a more ambivalent history marked by both achievements and shortcomings.