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In theory, we may envisage five principal types of national arms policy,reflecting as many policy objectives:(1) Arming to obtain the greatest possible weapons preponderance on the assumption that armed conflict is imminent. This policy of amassing military forces without regard for its effect on the other side results in an unrestrained arms race.(2) Arming to deter. The idea of deterrence is familiar to lawyers since it figures so prominently in criminal law. According to Schelling, deterrence as a strategic concept "is concerned with influencing the choices that another party will make, and doing it by influencing his expectations of how we will behave." Deterrence "requires that there be both conflict and common interest between the parties involved; it is as inapplicable to a situation of pure and complete antagonism of interest as it is to the case of pure and complete common interest."(3) Arms control. This policy envisages measures that aim at reducing the danger of war and at slowing down the arms race. Such measures may or may not involve actual restrictions upon military activities or reduction of armaments.(4) Comprehensive, reciprocal disarmament ("general and complete disarmament"), usually seen as a scheme "embodied in a single grand treaty leading by stages from less to more drastic and radical measures." In the final stage, the capabilities of national forces are reduced to those required for internal security only and a centralized international machinery is charged with peacekeeping.(5) Unilateral disarmament, a concept that is self-explanatory.

The question of international cooperation on nuclear security presents states with a conundrum. While states are wary of the potential for cheating and opportunism that would favor more legalized agreements, highly legalized agreements also create the risk of being constrained in an agreement with which others might not comply, leaving one state vulnerable. How do states balance these competing incentives? Through the study of all arms control agreements concluded, negotiated, and seriously considered since 1945, this analysis finds that at least some aspects of the legalization parameters that would make commitments more credible and sustainable through the future—in particular obligation and to a lesser extent delegation—also make bargaining over the terms of cooperation more difficult, sometimes delaying if not altogether subverting that process. These findings have implications not just for how theories of institutional design and cooperation apply to nuclear issues but also for policies related to the conduct of arms control negotiations.

Abstract
The question of international cooperation on nuclear security presents states with a conundrum. While states are wary of the potential for cheating and opportunism that would favor more legalized agreements, highly legalized agreements also create the risk of being constrained in an agreement with which others might not comply, leaving one state vulnerable. How do states balance these competing incentives? Through the study of all arms control agreements concluded, negotiated, and seriously considered since 1945, this analysis finds that at least some aspects of the legalization parameters that would make commitments more credible and sustainable through the future—in particular obligation and to a lesser extent delegation—also make bargaining over the terms of cooperation more difficult, sometimes delaying if not altogether subverting that process. These findings have implications not just for how theories of institutional design and cooperation apply to nuclear issues but also for policies related to the conduct of arms control negotiations.