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Bailouts and austerity
This paper studies with disaggregated budget data how expenditures, revenues, and borrowing evolve in municipalities that receive bailouts. It asks whether higher-level governments enforce austerity measures after bailing out indebted municipalities. The sample consists of 421 municipalities in the German federal state of Hesse over the 1997-2010 period. The results indicate that municipalities cut personnel, construction, and social expenditures, increase tax revenues and property tax rates, and reduce deficits after they receive a bailout from the state government. The state government appears to be both able and willing to enforce austerity after granting a bailout.
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Bailout Bickering
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 75, Heft 5, S. 171
ISSN: 2327-7793
Designing Corporate Bailouts
Although common economic wisdom suggests that government bailouts are inefficient because they reduce incentives to avoid failure and induce excessive entry by marginal firms, in practice bailouts are difficult to avoid for systemically significant enterprises. Recent experience suggests that bailouts also induce litigation from shareholders and managers complaining about expropriation and wrongful termination by the government. Our model shows how governments can design tax-financed corporate bailouts to reduce these distortions and points to the causes of inefficiencies in real-world implementations such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Bailouts with minimal distortion depend critically on the government's ability to expropriate shareholders and terminate managers.
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SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
Overconfidence and bailouts
Empirical evidence suggests that managerial overconfidence and government guarantees contribute substantially to excessive risk-taking in the banking industry. This paper incorporates managerial overconfidence and limited bank liability into a principal-agent model, where the bank manager unobservably chooses effort and risk. An overconfident manager overestimates the returns to effort and risk. We find that managerial overconfidence necessitates an intervention into banker pay. This is due to the bank's exploitation of the manager's overvaluation of bonuses, which causes excessive risk-taking in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that the optimal bonus tax rises in overconfidence, if risk-shifting incentives are sufficiently large. Finally, the model indicates that overconfident managers are more likely to be found in banks with large government guarantees, low bonus taxes, and lax capital requirements.
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Designing Corporate Bailouts
Although common economic wisdom suggests that government bailouts are inefficient because they reduce incentives to avoid failure and induce excessive entry by marginal firms, in practice bailouts are difficult to avoid for systemically significant enterprises. Recent experience suggests that bailouts also induce litigation from shareholders and managers complaining about expropriation and wrongful termination by the government. Our model shows how governments can design tax-financed corporate bailouts to reduce these distortions and points to the causes of inefficiencies in real-world implementations such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Bailouts with minimal distortion depend critically on the government's ability to expropriate shareholders and terminate managers.
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verboten
In: Wasserwirtschaft: Hydrologie, Wasserbau, Boden, Ökologie ; Organ der Deutschen Vereinigung für Wasserwirtschaft, Abwasser und Abfall, Band 104, Heft 10, S. 3-3
ISSN: 2192-8762
Designing Corporate Bailouts
In: Journal of Law and Economics, Band 59, Heft 1
SSRN
Working paper
Trading for bailouts
Government interventions such as bailouts are often implemented in times of high uncertainty. Policymakers may therefore rely on information from financial markets to guide their decisions. We propose a model in which a policymaker learns from market activity and where market participants have high stakes in the intervention. We study how the strategic behavior of informed traders affects market informativeness, the probability and efficiency of bailouts, and stock prices. We apply the model to study the liquidity support of distressed banks and derive implications for market informativeness and policy design. Commitment to a minimum liquidity support can increase market informativeness and welfare.
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Soll die NPD verboten werden?
In: Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik: GWP ; Sozialwissenschaften für politische Bildung, Band 61, Heft 2, S. 151-158
ISSN: 2196-1654
"Nach den Morden eines 'Nationalsozialistischen Untergrundes' ist die Diskussion um ein Verbot der NPD erneut aufgeflammt. Auch bei Anhängern der streitbaren Demokratie überwiegt die Skepsis gegenüber einem Verbotsantrag." (Autorenreferat)