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Research linking democratization, institutional strength, and war prescribes the construction of strong central government institutions prior to mass elections as a prime mechanism for mitigating the danger of international belligerency associated with democratization. However, institutional analysis of the democratization – war linkage skews institutional strength measures in favour of the executive, overlooking the other arms of government. Drawing on Côte d'Ivoire's 2010 – 2011 internationalized post-election civil conflict, which was largely engendered by excessive executive powers and limited legislative leverage, this paper quantitatively evaluates the effect state legislatures bear on the democratization – war linkage. The evaluations yield at least some evidence for the postulated influence of state legislatures. Thus, whilst heeding extant scholarly recommendations for strengthening state institutions, foreign policies promoting liberal democracy should ensure the ultimate institutional configuration of power in aspirant democracies favours parliaments over executives for more auspicious outcomes.

"Prior to the progressive development of the Law of Armed Conflict heralded by the 1949 Geneva Conventions - most particularly in relation to the concepts of international and non-international armed conflict - the customary doctrine on recognition of belligerency functioned for almost 200 years as the definitive legal scheme for differentiating internal conflict from 'civil wars' in which the law of war as applicable between states applied de jure. Employing a legal historical approach, this book describes the thematic and schematic fundamentals of the doctrine, and analyses some of the more significant challenges to its application. In doing so, the book assesses whether, how, and why the doctrine on recognition of belligerency was considered 'fit for purpose', and seeks to inform debate as to its continuity and utility within the modern scheme of the Law of Armed Conflict"--

"Prior to the progressive development of the Law of Armed Conflict heralded by the 1949 Geneva Conventions - most particularly in relation to the concepts of international and non-international armed conflict - the customary doctrine on recognition of belligerency functioned for almost 200 years as the definitive legal scheme for differentiating internal conflict from 'civil wars' in which the law of war as applicable between states applied de jure. Employing a legal historical approach, this book describes the thematic and schematic fundamentals of the doctrine, and analyses some of the more significant challenges to its application. In doing so, the book assesses whether, how, and why the doctrine on recognition of belligerency was considered 'fit for purpose', and seeks to inform debate as to its continuity and utility within the modern scheme of the Law of Armed Conflict"--

Argentine neutrality during World War II with its suspicious leanings toward fascism has become a cliché in inter-American relations. As far as the United States was concerned at that time, the Argentine Republic was the black sheep of the hemispheric community, the only nation that failed to cooperate wholeheartedly in the crusade against the Axis. The famous State Department "Blue Book," so conveniently published prior to the Argentine general elections of 1946, spelled out the aid and comfort the Nazis had derived from Argentina's neutrality. By only the narrowest margin did Argentina avoid being drummed out of the hemispheric organization and barred from membership in the new United Nations.It seems strange, therefore, to recall that it was the Argentine government that first suggested, in the spring of 1940, that the nations of the Western Hemisphere discard the posture of traditional neutrality in the face of the spreading conflagration in Europe, on the grounds that it was anachronistic and did not protect their interests.