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A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains millions of classified documents containing highly sensitive nuclear weapons design and production information. Allegations that the Peoples Republic of China obtained nuclear warhead designs from an employee of DOE's Los Alamos National Laboratory, as well as the disappearance of two computer hard drives containing highly sensitive weapons information from that same laboratory, have raised concerns about how effectively DOE protects classified information, particularly the most sensitive classified information that is contained in vaults and computer systems. DOE's security program consists of many strategies for protecting and controlling classified information, such as controlling access to classified information through physical and administrative barriers and determining whether a person's work requires a "need to know" the information. DOE has recently increased protection for top-secret documents by revising its Classified Matter Protection and Control Manual, which provides detailed requirements for the protection and control of classified matter. This report reviews the (1) extent to which DOE's Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories have implemented DOE's established access controls and need-to-know requirements for classified vaults and computer systems containing the most sensitive classified information as well as the adequacy of these requirements and (2) steps DOE is taking to upgrade the protection of its classified information. GAO found that the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories have implemented DOE's access controls and need-to-know requirements for both vaults and classified computer systems containing the most sensitive classified information. However, DOE's requirements for documenting need to know lack specificity, allowing laboratory managers wide variations in interpretation and implementation and. DOE has recently taken, and continues to take, steps to upgrade protection and control over its classified information, but additional steps are needed."

Intro -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- Contents -- Preface -- Oversight Hearing on Reform of the State Secrets Privilege -- I. Introduction -- II. State Secrets and the NSA Litigation -- III. Congress Can and Should Legislate to Reform the State Secrets Privilege -- IV. FISA and the State Secrets Privilege -- V. Electronic Surveillance Cases do Not Require Transfer to the FISA Court -- VI. Conclusion -- End Notes -- Oversight Hearing on the Reform of State Secrets -- I. The State Secrets Privilege Serves a Critical Function in Preventing the Disclosure of National Security Information -- II. The Privilege Is Rooted in the Constitutional Authorities Assigned to the Executive Branch -- III. Congress Should Not Attempt to Substitute the Judgment of the Judiciary for the Executive Concerning What Information Merits Secrecy for Foreign Affairs or National Security Reasons and Should Beware of Analogies Concerning CIPA in the Context of... -- End Notes -- Oversight Hearing on the Reform of State Secrets -- Clarification of the State Secrets Privilege is Needed -- ABA Recommendations for Legislation to Codify the State Secrets Doctrine -- Congressional Response -- Conclusion -- End Notes -- Regarding the State Secrets Privilege -- Hearing on H.R.5607, State Secrets Protection Act of 2008 -- Secrecy and Accountability -- Litigation in Secrecy Cases -- The State Secrets Protection Act of 2008 -- End Notes -- Testimony of Steven R. Shapiro, Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties -- History of the Privilege -- The ACLU Cases -- Extraordinary Rendition, Torture -- National Security Agency Warrantless Surveillance -- National Security Whistleblower -- The State Secret Protection Act (H.R. 5607) -- Conclusion -- End Noters.

In this paper, we will create a new stream key cipher generator (KG) that is based on the LFSR unit and a chaotic map. The created KG can be used for a variety of purposes, including cryptography and steganography. The suggested KG is called Efficient Stream KG, and it demonstrates its efficiency when it passes all of the basic efficiency criteria tests, namely the periodicity, linear complexity, correlation immunity, and randomness.

This monograph offers a uniquely comprehensive and in-depth legal account of official secrets in the European Union. It critically analyses their implications for oversight and fundamental rights. Based on forty interviews with practitioners and other stakeholders, it offers an understanding of the practices of official secrets and provides a critical and much-needed perspective on how parliamentary, judicial and administrative oversight institutions deal with access to classified material and the dilemma of oversight to concurrently ensure secrecy necessary for EU security policies and openness needed for democratic processes and fundamental rights. The book discerns shifts in institutional practice of oversight at the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union that disproportionately favour secrecy and the protection of classified documents while creating serious limitations to open democratic deliberations and access to justice, and delivers new insights on the EU's development as a security actor as well as its autonomy from Member States, showing how rules on official secrets were a means for the EU to gain more autonomy in external security cooperation.

The article discusses administrative regulations relating to the organization of the system for the protection of classified information in the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as presents the criminal laws on crimes against the protection of classified information in force in these countries, along with an interpretation of these laws. The article also presents selected administrative regulations governing the procedure for carrying out security clearances for the issuance of a security clearance allowing access to classified information. In addition, the rationale for classifying information and assigning it a specific classification is discussed. On the basis of an analysis of the provisions in force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 164 § 9 of the Criminal Code) and a comparison with those in force in Poland, among other things, a conclusion was drawn that Polish legislation does not include a countertype that would relieve from criminal liability depositaries of secrets who transfer classified information (without obtaining the consent of the authorities specified by law) in order to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes. The above can be the basis of a legislative de lege ferenda request. The article does not exhaust the topic covered, but merely indicates selected issues of the system of protection of classified information. The exploration that has been initiated may be used to conduct in-depth studies of the issue at hand in the future.