Suchergebnisse

Transboundary water pollution management is a challenge for China at this moment in time. By introducing relevant legal arrangements, we mainly discuss the competent authorities, the legal instruments and dispute settlement procedures concerning this issue in China. The experiences from international, EU and Dutch water law gives us a comparative perspective. As a conclusion, we agree that China has set up a basic legal system to solve the problem, but a greater effort can still be made, for instance including more public opinion, clearly defining the competent authorities, and enacting more legislation. At the same time, the Chinese experience, such as a new model for a monitoring system and a target responsibility system, also provides the rest of the world with a new approach.

Competition policy is a dynamic process in which two questions arise: the configuration of the institutional framework and, on the other hand, the potential negative effects of the reforms processes. Based on surveys to employers (International Institute for Management Development, IMD), this paper evaluates the evolution of the effectiveness of competition policy at international level and how some countries' competition policy (or authority) reforms change this perceived effectiveness: United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Finland and Spain. Results show that the last Spanish competition policy reform (creation of the CNMC), was non-positive, despite some improvements in recent years.

For most bills in American legislatures, the issue of turf?or which committee has jurisdiction over a bill?can make all the difference. Turf governs the flow and fate of all legislation. In this innovative study, David C. King explains how jurisdictional areas for committees are created and changed in Congress. Political scientists have long maintained that jurisdictions are relatively static, changing only at times of dramatic reforms. Not so, says King. Combining quantitative evidence with interviews and case studies, he shows how on-going turf wars make jurisdictions fluid. According to Kin.

Las políticas e instituciones están sometidas a ciclos de reforma y contra-reforma. Éstas pueden impulsar periodos de auge o declive en la efectividad de las políticas públicas. Estos ciclos son especialmente volátiles y amplios en los países que tienen problemas de estabilidad institucional. En España, la política de competencia ilustra estos ciclos volátiles y amplios en la efectividad de las políticas públicas como pocas otras. En los últimos 20 años (1995-2014), España ha vivido dos ciclos completos de intensos auges y declives en la efectividad de la política de competencia, con una ganancia media de efectividad del 14 por 100. El último ciclo de diez años (2005-2014) ha recogido un aumento destacable y posterior caída en la efectividad de la política de competencia, saldándose sin ganancia significativa en la misma: un inane y desgastante ciclo completo de reforma y contra-reforma. La comparación de resultados con un conjunto de 54 países del mundo muestra que esta volatilidad cíclica en la efectividad de la política de competencia en España es una anormalidad estadística. Dada la relevancia del marco institucional y el enforcement, nuestros resultados apuntan a la necesidad de estabilizar la calidad institucional en materia de competencia como garante de una mayor efectividad de la misma.

This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable.