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We use a simple, three-item test for cognitive abilities to investigate whether established behavioral biases that play a prominent role in behavioral economics and finance are related to cognitive abilities. We find that higher test scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test of Frederick (2005) indeed are correlated with lower incidences of the conjunction fallacy, conservatism in updating probabil-ities, and overconfidence. Test scores are also significantly related to subjects' time and risk preferences. We find no influence on anchoring. However, even if biases are lower for people with higher cognitive abilities, they still remain substantial.

How does central bank conservatism affect labor market reform? In this paper we examine the economic forces at work. An increase in conservatism triggers two opposite effects. It reduces the inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy and hence the benefits of a reform. It also increases unemployment variability, which increases the precautionary benefits of a reform. In combination, the two effects produce a u-shaped relation between conservatism and labor market reform. An empirical investigation provides evidence consistent with this prediction.

"How does central bank conservatism affect labor market regulation? In this paper, we examine the economic forces at work. An increase in conservatism triggers two opposite effects. It reduces the inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy and hence the cost of regulation. It also increases unemployment variability, making regulation more costly. In combination, the two effects produce a hump-shaped relation between conservatism and labor market regulation. To test this prediction, we use data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1980-1994. Our proxies for regulation are unemployment, different labor market institutions, and indices of labor market regulation. Conservatism is proxied by two common measures of central bank independence. We find support for the prediction of a hump-shaped relation between conservatism and labor market regulation." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

This paper is a challenge from a pair of lifelong technical specialists in risk assessment for the risk‐management community to better define social decision criteria for risk acceptance vs. risk control in relation to the issues of variability and uncertainty. To stimulate discussion, we offer a variety of "straw man" proposals about where we think Variability and uncertainty are likely to matter for different types of social policy considerations in the context of a few different kinds of decisions. In particular, we draw on recent presentations of uncertainty and variability data that have been offered by EPA in the context of the consideration of revised ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act.

Political conservatism is associated with an increased negativity bias, including increased attention and reactivity toward negative and threatening stimuli. Although the human amygdala has been implicated in the response to threatening stimuli, no studies to date have investigated whether conservatism is associated with altered amygdala function toward threat. Furthermore, although an influential theory posits that connectivity between the amygdala and bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST) is important in initiating the response to sustained or uncertain threat, whether individual differences in conservatism modulate this connectivity is unknown. To test whether conservatism is associated with increased reactivity in neural threat circuitry, we measured participants' self-reported social and economic conservatism and asked them to complete high-resolution fMRI scans while under threat of an unpredictable shock and while safe. We found that economic conservatism predicted greater connectivity between the BNST and a cluster of voxels in the left amygdala during threat vs safety. These results suggest that increased amygdala–BNST connectivity during threat may be a key neural correlate of the enhanced negativity bias found in conservatism.

Representative democracy translates the preferences of the electorate into policy outcomes. Individual voters do not directly vote on policy; rather, their elected representatives create and establish policy. How well do the institutions of representative democracy translate the preferences of the electorate into policy? Is there any systematic bias in a representative democracy system? After formulating a series of computational models it appears that the degree to which legislative districts are 'gerrymandered' with respect to preferences about the policy is a source of policy bias. To illustrate the phenomenon, household income is used as a proxy for voters preferences with respect to redistribution. Even when the majority of voters are in favor of redistribution, if districts are constructed with a sufficient level of conservative gerrymandering, the policy outcome under representative democracy will favor far less redistribution than the policy outcome under direct democracy. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The U.S., like much of the world, has been in the throes of political instability. Our aim is to attempt to account for the differences in beliefs that may be responsible for such impasses through a correlational study. Using the Open-Minded Cognition scale as a measure of open-mindedness, syllogistic reasoning problems to determine Belief-Bias effects, and diverse measures of political beliefs and attitudes, we were able to yield preliminary correlations of the Belief Bias items with P-OMC ( r = .144, p < .05), Openness and Intellect ( r = .150, p < .05), and the Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale ( r = -.144, p < .001). However, these data are pending further review due to participants' accuracy rates on Belief Bias syllogisms.

This article tests the hypothesis that major U.S. newspapers disproportionately label conservative politicians. We quantitatively analyze ideological labels of U.S. congresspersons and senators in newspaper articles. We then qualitatively review these articles, seeking to discern if any patterns exist, and if so, why. Disproportionate labeling of conservatives exists but not in a way that constitutes "bias," as newspapers often label liberals, at times more than they do conservatives. These labeling patterns may be explained by the rise of conservatives who entered Congress in 1994, the political pejorativization of the word liberal, and the increased conservative ideological tenor of the Congress during the past fifteen years. We conclude by discussing possible implications of our findings.

ABSTRACT Law n. 11,638/2007 legitimized the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption process in Brazil and introduced an accounting system detached from tax purposes in the country. This law aims to reduce the influence of tax law on accounting standards and improve the quality of financial reporting, as IFRS are considered to be higher quality standards. International literature shows a reduction in earnings quality in environments where accounting and tax rules are strongly linked. Moreover, the influence of tax legislation on financial accounting is seen to encourage unconditional conservatism, a bias with no advantages for financial market efficiency. Thus, tax neutrality is expected to provide a more favorable institutional environment for quality financial reporting by detaching corporate accounting from tax accounting. In light of the above, this study aims to verify whether the advent of tax neutrality influences unconditional conservatism in Brazilian public companies. The methodology used involves panel data regressions. The sample consists of non-financial publicly-traded companies with information published in Economática® covering 2002 to 2014. The results show differences in the relationship between taxation and financial reporting between firms that are subject to different levels of monitoring in the Brazilian stock market. Evidence of unconditional conservatism is only found in companies that are subject to greater market monitoring. In this group, it is observed that taxation does not induce unconditional conservatism in reported earnings, which is expected in a tax neutrality context.

The conservative central banker has come under attack recently. Explicitly modeling the interaction of a trade union with monetary policy, it has been argued that the standard solution to the inflationary bias in monetary policy might actually be welfare reducing if the trade union has an exogenously given preference against inflation. We reframe this discussion in a standard trade union model. We show that the case against the conservative central banker rests exclusively on the assumption of a strictly nominal outside option for the union. There is no welfare gain associated with making the central bank less conservative than society, however if the outside option is in real terms. As the nominal components of the trade union's outside option are mainly public transfers, we also show that the conservative central banker is always optimal if the government can choose the level of unemployment benefits as well as the degree of central bank conservatism.

OPTIMThe conservative central banker has come under attack recently. Explicitly modeling the interaction of a trade union with monetary policy, it has been argued that the standard solution to the inflationary bias in monetary policy might actually be welfare reducing if the trade union has an exogenously given preference against inflation. We reframe this discussion in a standard trade union model. We show that the case against the conservative central banker rests exclusively on the assumption of a strictly nominal outside option (for instance, unemployment benefits) for the union. There is no welfare gain associated with making the central bank less conservative than society, however if the outside option is in real terms. As the nominal components of the trade union's outside option are mainly public transfers, we also show that the conservative central banker is always optimal if the government can choose the level of unemployment benefits as well as the degree of central bank conservatism.

How do ordinary citizens react to new policy‐relevant findings that they learn about from media mentions or word of mouth? We conducted an experiment embedded in a random‐digit‐dial (RDD) telephone survey of 1,050 California adults. Respondents heard a description of a hypothetical study on one of four politicized topics or a politically neutral topic (nutrition) and were asked to describe their reactions to the study's main finding. As in prior research, citizens were more skeptical when the findings contradicted their prior beliefs about the topic. But, we also found effects of partisanship and ideology even after controlling for specific issue attitudes. Citizens, especially those holding conservative beliefs, tended to attribute studies with liberal findings to the liberalism of the researcher, but citizens were less likely to attribute conservative findings to the conservatism of the researcher.

The study of soft power in international relations suffers from a liberal democratic bias. Throughout the literature, liberal concepts and values are assumed to be universal in their appeal. This bias has led scholars to underestimate Russian soft power by instrumentalizing it, that is, to see it purely as the effect of government-sponsored programs, and to focus primarily on the cultural pillar of soft power. This paper argues, alternatively, that Russia's conservative values and illiberal governance models generate admiration and followership, even outside of what Russia claims to be its post-Soviet sphere of influence. Crucially, this admiration and followership perform the traditional function of soft power: generating support for controversial Russian foreign policy decisions. Admitting that soft power can be based on conservative values is necessary not only to understand Russia's foreign policy potential, but also the ability of non-Western states to successfully challenge the Western liberal order.

The article describes the conservative discourse in modern Russia, focused on finding an adequate conservative model for the country, taking place from 2014 to 2022 on the virtual platform - 'Russian idea'. The article uses extensive materials of the web-site, with focus on the position of the project manager Boris Mezhuyev, one of the most famous inspirers of the conservative turn. Relying on the ideas of Vadim Tsymbursky, Mezhuyev builds an independent line of conservative discourse, taking into account current situation. The project managed to include many representatives of different backgrounds and views, which allowed Boris Mezhuyev to form his concept of "conservative democracy" taking into account different positions. The formation of the concept is based on the Mezhuyev's desire to combine theory and practice, including the conservative bias of the United Russia Party, and to do so based on what they see as the main values of conservatism as a political ideology. The change in the political situation on February 24, 2022 caused Mezhuyev's decision to close the project. We believe that this experience is useful for Political Science, especially since the life of virtual platforms can be short, so it is necessary to carry out their scientific screen shot.