Suchergebnisse

"For many years, the British Army was considered to have a particular expertise at counterinsurgency campaigning. John Newsinger's British Counterinsurgency challenges this view. The book examines the post-1945 campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, South Yemen, Dhofar, Northern Ireland and most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. It looks at the opponents the British faced, the methods that were used against them, the successes and the failures, and the reasons for these outcomes. It contests the British claim to have used minimum force in order to win hearts and minds, showing that as much force was used as was thought appropriate, that torture was widely used and that coercion was always more important than consent. The book ends with an assessment of the disastrous campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, with particular focus on the damage done to the British Army's reputation and credibility."--Back cover

Rezension von: Shafer, D. Michael: Deadly paradigms: the failure of U.S. counterinsurgency policy. - Princeton/N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1988, 331 S

"For many years, the British Army was considered to have a particular expertise at counterinsurgency campaigning. John Newsinger's British Counterinsurgency challenges this view. The book examines the post-1945 campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, South Yemen, Dhofar, Northern Ireland and most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. It looks at the opponents the British faced, the methods that were used against them, the successes and the failures, and the reasons for these outcomes. It contests the British claim to have used minimum force in order to win hearts and minds, showing that as much force was used as was thought appropriate, that torture was widely used and that coercion was always more important than consent. The book ends with an assessment of the disastrous campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, with particular focus on the damage done to the British Army's reputation and credibility."--Back cover

2014 Fall. ; Includes illustrations (some color). ; Includes bibliographical references (pages 142-153). ; The United States military requires models that estimate the number of forces needed or that measure success during a counterinsurgency. These types of models depend on data from historic counterinsurgencies, but scholars differ on how to compare historic counterinsurgencies to an ongoing or future conflict. One such method to analyze counterinsurgencies applies a classification scheme to them, and then compares past counterinsurgencies of the same type to the counterinsurgency in question. We test existing classification schemes and a data-driven classification scheme to determine the best groupings of historic data to use in modeling counterinsurgencies. We use these groupings in a math program that: (i) employs a linear regression model with transformed variables to estimate the number of counterinsurgent deaths for each year, and (ii) uses this estimate with a logistic regression model to maximize the likelihood of a favorable resolution and minimize casualties for a fifteen year horizon. Constraints in the model include: i) upper and lower limits on counterinsurgent and host nation forces and their rates of increase and decrease, (ii) an assessment of the category of a counterinsurgency, based on the values of multiple decision variables, (iii) an estimation of the number of counterinsurgent deaths, and (iv) the estimation of the likelihood of one of four resolutions of the counterinsurgency. We apply the math program by using available historic data to examine a case study for a current conflict. The results of this model provide valuable insights for military analysts and leaders on counterinsurgency modeling techniques and trends in historic counterinsurgencies.