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This article addresses the central question of why China and the European Union (EU), two players of growing importance in global governance, cooperate on some issues of conflict resolution, but fail to do so on others. Although much discussion is devoted to their respective strategic orientations and policy preferences in world affairs, more deep-rooted factors like norms and values should also be taken into consideration. This article follows a social constructivist approach to explicate how international norms have shaped the convergent and divergent actions of China and the EU in two empirical cases: the Iranian nuclear issue and the Syrian civil crisis. It argues that because China and the EU had both internalized the international norm of multilateralism, they could cooperate in pushing for a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through multilateral negotiations, and take a similar approach to the Syrian civil crisis. However, whereas China has seriously questioned the 'responsibility to protect' as a legitimate norm, the EU has embraced and promoted it. Consequently, the two took divergent actions in the second case. It is suggested that China and its Western partners closely engage each other in constructive communication to promote mutual understanding, and ultimately expand the basis of their common norms. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Why do some militarized interstate disputes involve multiple third party attempts to resolve the dispute, while others seemingly end before movement towards peace is possible? This article examines third party commitment to international conflict resolution. I argue that a third party's commitment reflects strategic interests, barriers to entry and the conflict's prospects for peace, which encourage third party involvement while having a dampening effect on their commitment. I also explore the role of bias in management onset and third party commitment. Analysis of conflict management in militarized interstate disputes from 1946 to 2001 offers significant support for the hypotheses. Adapted from the source document.

Why do some militarized interstate disputes involve multiple third party attempts to resolve the dispute, while others seemingly end before movement towards peace is possible? This paper examines third party commitment to international conflict resolution. I argue that a third party's commitment reflects strategic interests, barriers to entry and the conflict's prospects for peace, which encourage third party involvement while having a dampening effect on their commitment. I also explore the role of bias in management onset and third party commitment. Analysis of conflict management in militarized interstate disputes from 1946 to 2001 offers significant support for the hypotheses.