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PurposeThe impact of financial reforms and financial development on an economy has received considerable attention over the recent past. This paper aims to investigate whether financial liberalisation and financial development increase the likelihood financial crises in Southern African development community (SADC) countries.Design/methodology/approachDue to the binary nature of the dependent variable, the logit model is used for the analysis using data for the period 1990 to 2015.FindingsThe results showed that financial liberalisation captured by real interest rates reduces the likelihood of financial crises. Furthermore, regulatory quality strengthens this reductive effect of financial liberalisation on the probability of financial crises. On the other hand, financial development represented by bank credit increases the incidence of financial crises. The results also suggest that financial liberalisation may increase the likelihood of financial crises indirectly through financial development.Research limitations/implicationsThe study recommends that a sound regulatory and supervisory framework be established as well as institutional quality raised to curb the effect of financial development on the incidence of financial crises.Originality/valueThere is scant evidence on the role that financial liberalisation and financial development play in the incidence of financial crises in the SADC. This study incorporates the effect of institutional quality in the analysis which has been neglected by most studies on financial reforms in SADC countries. A number of recent studies in SADC countries conclude that financial development resulting from financial reforms, may hinder economic growth. Therefore, this study sheds light on this negative relationship.

The United Kingdom (UK) has one of the largest financial services sectors in the world, and strong consumer protection regulation. Yet, despite nearly 2 decades of financial inclusion policymaking, persistent problems remain. Many individuals, often the most vulnerable, are unable to get financial products and services that meet their needs at affordable prices. New forms of exclusion are emerging as digital technology advances and risk profiling becomes increasingly sophisticated. The self-employed face particular problems, having high levels of unsecured debt and being less likely to have pension savings than employees. There are long-standing competition and conduct problems in the market for small business finance, and lending to small firms has both decreased and become more expensive since the financial crisis of 2007 - 2008. Despite many small businesses having similar levels of financial sophistication as retail consumers, the regulatory system does not protect them to the same degree. Financial capability is low among the UK population. Often, the groups with the lowest capability are also those at most risk of financial exclusion. Policy recommendations include: better coordination for financial inclusion policies; support for teaching financial education in schools; more progressive savings incentives; basic banking to meet the needs of the most vulnerable; streamlining government support for small businesses; and specialized advice and financial education for small businesses and the self-employed.

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