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Series Editor Introduction Jaan Valsiner -- Introduction -- Part I. Chapter 1. Considering semiotic dynamics of social representation -- Chapter 2. Overcoming fragmentation - Semiotic dynamics of the self's construction -- Chapter 3. Theory of Proculturation -- Chapter 4. Proculturation as a systemic phenomenological process -- Chapter 5. Considering methodological preconditions for proculturation studies -- Part II. Chapter 6. Historical roots of Georgianness -- Ethnic positioning through reintegrative proculturation -- Chapter 7. Constructing social representations as sign-complexes - from historical foundations towards contemporary Georgianness -- Chapter 8. The case of emigrant's proculturation - semiotic jump in the human development -- Chapter 9. Conclusions: Proculturation of the Self in context.

Problems facing the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, which in Oct. 1990 was voted in to replace the Communists.

Конец ХХ в. останется в истории как время бурных этнополитических движений, сепаратизма государств, воссоединения разделенных народов и т.д.; время, которое способствовало возникновению сложных проблем во взаимоотношениях между советскими народами, обусловленные глубоким политическим кризисом и распадом СССР. Союзному государству стали пророчить распад на множество мелких самостоятельных государств, слабо развитых в экономическом отношении и находящихся в состоянии политической междоусобицы. Исключением не стала и Грузинская ССР. Представленная статья раскрывает процесс суверенизации грузинского общества, и показана роль З.К. Гамсахурдиа в становлении грузинской государственности в 90-е годы ХХ в. Приводятся конкретные и убедительные примеры крайних подходов в решении национального вопроса на примере южных осетин, и раскрываются убедительные факторы великодержавной политики официального Тбилиси во главе с бывшим диссидентом З.К. Гамсахурдиа. ; The end of the 20 th century will remain in the history as time of wild ethnopolitical movements, separatism of different states, the unity of parted peoples etc; the time, which promote the emergence of complex problems in the relationships between soviet peoples, led by deep political crisis and the break up of the USSR. The allied state was predicted a break up into a lot of small independent states, weakly-developed in economy. Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic did not become an exception. The represented article exposes the process of sovereignty of Georgian society and the role of Gamsakhurdia in the formation of Georgian government system in the 90 th of the 20 th century. There are concrete and convincing examples of extreme attitude in solving the national question, the example of it – is the South Ossetia, it exposes convincing factors of greatpowerful policy of official Tbilisi with former dissident Gamsakhurdia at the head.

On July 12th, 1990 the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina (SDS BiH) held its founding assembly. Less than five months later, it participated in the November 1990 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), winning a decisive majority of the vote of ethnic Serbs. Yet, SDS BiH was not an ordinary political party. In the sixteen months that followed the elections, it initiated a series of activities that eroded the power of BiH institutions to which it had been elected. SDS BiH declared its own organs superior to those of BiH and established exclusive control in Serb-majority areas. In early 1992, it united these areas into a single Serb Republic, formed an exclusively Serb armed force, and set out to violently expand the territory that would be incorporated into the new statelet. This study seeks to advance an understanding of the role of ethno-nationalist agents in the outbreak of violent conflicts fought in the name of ethnic nations by analyzing the activities of SDS BiH on the political homogenization of Serbs in the two years leading up to the 1992 onset of violence in BiH. It incorporates the tools of discourse analysis and the recent findings in the studies of human cognition, identifying the agency of SDS BiH in the power of the Party's discourse to produce affective sensibilities that served its nationalist agenda. It argues that this engineering of affect was crucial for constituting the dispersed individuals of Serb ethnic background as a palpable political group, and preparing them for armed mobilization. The analysis also argues that ethno-nationalist agency can be properly understood only by considering the case-specific structural factors with which all agents interact. Toward this point, it draws contrast between the agency of SDS BiH and that of the National Movement in the Republic of Georgia, showing that ethnic structures hold a greater explanatory value in the Georgian case. Rather than departing from pre-given ethnic groups, both case studies suggest that conflict analyses should problematize the dynamic interaction between the dominant ethno-nationalist agents and ethnic structures, which produce ethnic groups, ethnic interests and sides to armed conflicts. ; Ph. D.

Pt. 1. The best of times, the worst of times : 1985-1995. Georgia : a divided nation -- Prelude to revolution -- Populism in Georgia : the Gamsakhurdia phenomenon -- The interregnum -- pt. 2. State and society : 1995-2011. Democracy from below? -- The state -- The economy -- The myth of Georgian nationalism -- National security and foreign policy

Three revolutions, one after another, replaced the three post-communist leaders of Georgia: (1) the Round Table and Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the communists; (2) Gamsakhurdia's cabinet was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, and (3) Mikhail Saakashvili removed Shevardnadze from his post. Each of them changed the fortunes of the country and the nation, but only the last event was tagged as a "revolution." It is obviously viewed as the most important among the three and prompts us to ask whether it is absolutely correct to describe Saakashvili's coming to power as a revolution. Is it not a ploy designed to boost the importance of the regime change in the eyes of the world community and the local population? To answer these questions we should answer another, broader, question: Did the regime change that removed Eduard Shevardnadze and became known as the Rose Revolution have the characteristics of a revolution? By revolution we mean the very specific and profound impact a regime exerts on social order-it is much more than a conflict that replaces the government. A revolution brings about changes in the political, economic, spiritual, and social spheres of the nation's life, which take some time to become obvious and are never immediately manifest the very day after forces come to power which choose to call themselves "revolutionary." The events of November 2003 in Georgia were called a revolution immediately after the coup was completed. During the three years that separate us from that time enough material has been accumulated to assess the nature of the changes that have taken place and were brought about by Mikhail Saakashvili's coming to power. The Rose Revolution is a term prompted by the immediate impressions of the non-constitutional power change in Georgia. A revolution is not merely a particular method of regime change-it is an event of profound importance for the country's economic, social, and political life. Those Western authors who have devoted much time to the theory of revolution and who have written extensively on the subject 1 interpret it as a particular method of regime change that brings more radical results than other seemingly similar actions. A revolution means replacement of the top leaders accomplished by a mass illegitimate movement that results in deep-cutting changes.

Paper discusses topical problems of preserving and further strengthening tolerance in Georgia as an attribute of contemporary Georgian society. An interplay between religious and ethnic aspects of conflict is a primary focus of the paper. It is argued that despite the rarity of religion-driven conflicts between different ethnic groups, there is an acute need for preventive measures to avert conflict in the future. Effective and coordinated efforts on the part of international organizations and individual governments are seen as of increasing importance as they support Georgia's political stability and economic growth.

For a long time now elections in Georgia have been a source of political crises rather than a mechanism of democratic power change. In recent Georgian history, in fact during the entire period of its independence, the government in power has never been changed through elections. The only exception so far were the very first multiparty parliamentary elections of 28 October, 1990 when the national political force, The Round Table-Free Georgia, headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the ruling Communist Party. Later President Gamsakhurdia was overthrown. For some time after the regime change the ruling party led by Eduard Shevardnadze won all the successive elections until he, in turn, was removed from power by the revolution of 2003. After that the republic's election tradition underwent certain changes predated by the political crisis of the fall of 2007, which reached its height on 7 November when the demonstration of the opposition forces was dissipated and a state of emergency declared. The West insisted on a pre-term presidential election being held on 5 January, 2008 followed by parliamentary elections on 21 May. The elections did not replace the leadership, however they prompted those in power to bring new people into the upper echelons and carry out partial election reform. On the other hand, these elections revealed with unprecedented clarity the degree to which the republic's political system had been transformed and its trend toward non-liberal democracy.

There is the opinion that the method by which a political leader is replaced, or his own attitude to his possible loss of power, is part of his political heritage and affects the country's democratic development. If the first leader of a newly formed political system is replaced, this heritage becomes even more important. The point is amply illustrated by fifteen years of Georgia's political independence. It changed its political leaders twice, each time with violence and violations of the Constitution. Each time the change was carried out under democratic banners, and each time authoritarian trends in the country's political system became more pronounced: after coming to power each of the new leaders wanted to preserve it. To achieve this, they sought for economic domination to get a grip on badly needed material and financial resources. So each of the new leaders tried to place private business under his political control. The Georgian Constitution, however, guarantees protection of private property; the new leaders are also limited by the liberal Constitution in many other respects, the country's financial and political dependence on the West, and its desire to integrate into the European structures. This forces each of the new leaders to use methods which will not damage the country's democratic image. Political pressure on the business community became especially obvious after the Rose Revolution; today it is barely concealed and rather harsh.

Of all the post-Soviet states, the challenge of managing ethnic diversity has perhaps been the most problematic in Georgia. Following the secessions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s, Georgia has recent experience not only of the radicalization of ethnic relations but also of defeat in violent ethnic conflict. Current debates surrounding the conceptualization and management of ethnic diversity are thus inseparable from urgent questions concerning the future of the Georgian state, and explanations of the conflicts and questions of power and domination. Perceptions of the issue are further overshadowed by memories of the chauvinist rhetoric and illiberal policies of the early phase of sovereignty under President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Abroad, perceptions of Georgia as a "micro-empire" continue to be fuelled by references to the Gamsakhurdia era, above all in the Russian press, and short-sighted recourse in Western sources to theories of "ancient hatreds." Defeat also means that contrary to demographic evidence of a proportional expansion of the ethnic Georgian population, independence has not imparted to the Georgian majority a sense of security associated with majority status. As a result of Georgia's apparent inability to influence outcomes in either the peace processes or internal developments in the seceded territories, and the decline in the Georgian population in real terms, the attainment of sovereignty has not allayed Georgian fears of either permanent territorial fragmentation or ethnic "degradation." Georgians consequently approach issues of majority-minority relations from a position of perceived weakness, coupled with as yet unfulfilled "post-colonial" desires for Georgianization.

As a result of the first multiparty elections on October 28, 1990, instead of the communist regime, the national government came to power in the Republic of Georgia in the form of a bloc "Round Table - Free Georgia", Led by well-known dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia, leader of the National Liberation Movement. The new government inherited a bad legacy. Conflict zones were artificially created in different parts of Georgia. Particularly cautious approaches were needed to the regions with autonomous status. These were: the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Adjara (ASSR), the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia (ASSR) and so-called South Ossetia Autonomous District.

"Georgia: Warlords, Generals, and Politicians" published on by Oxford University Press.