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Describes the flawed incentives in the executive compensation schemes at the publicly traded government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, arguing that the problem there might be worse than at the average S&P 100 firm because of GSEs' financial structure. The development of the GSE business model is discussed before presenting two reasons why GSEs might require more stringent regulation: (1) costs of GSE failure not accounted for by shareholders and (2) holders of GSE debt need a delegated monitor to overcome a "collective action" or "free rider" problem. The kind of corporate governance of banks is seen as possibly applicable to GSEs. Attention is then given to the criteria marking greater sensitivity of executive pay to performance for GSEs: firm transparency, leverage, cash flow, growth opportunities, and size, and the importance of nonshareholding stakeholders. Discussion is in the context of privatizing GSEs.

The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework developed at the University of Indiana is very promising for advancing comparative urban studies. Ostrom's "Grammar of Institutions" is useful for addressing urban allocative conflicts. Such conflicts are useful as entry points to better grasp urban politics, especially in comparative research. This paper introduces a theoretical and conceptual framework to analyse the role of monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes in the field of urban policies. The incentives to consider in urban policies can be divided into four categories: (1) direct financial incentives; (2) indirect financial incentives; (3), non-financial incentives; (4) broader social incentives. Direct and indirect financial incentives are well studied by public choices theorists in urban economics; non-financial incentives are considered in some forms of planning theory, while broader social incentives are especially stressed by urban sociologists. This paper stresses the relevance for urban theory of configurations that articulate the four kinds of incentive conjointly, from both a bottom-up perspective and a top-down perspective. Taking into account of incentives, and not only single incentives (one by one), it is a promising advancement. It is hypothesized that this could sustain relevant development in comparative urban research.

The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework developed at the University of Indiana is very promising for advancing comparative urban studies. Ostrom's "Grammar of Institutions" is useful for addressing urban allocative conflicts. Such conflicts are useful as entry points to better grasp urban politics, especially in comparative research. This paper introduces a theoretical and conceptual framework to analyse the role of monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes in the field of urban policies. The incentives to consider in urban policies can be divided into four categories: (1) direct financial incentives; (2) indirect financial incentives; (3), non-financial incentives; (4) broader social incentives. Direct and indirect financial incentives are well studied by public choices theorists in urban economics; non-financial incentives are considered in some forms of planning theory, while broader social incentives are especially stressed by urban sociologists. This paper stresses the relevance for urban theory of configurations that articulate the four kinds of incentive conjointly, from both a bottom-up perspective and a top-down perspective. Taking into account of incentives, and not only single incentives (one by one), it is a promising advancement. It is hypothesized that this could sustain relevant development in comparative urban research.