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Abstract
We report the results of a questionnaire study on the fair distribution of indivisible goods. We collected data from three different subject pools, first- and second- year students majoring in economics, law students, and advanced economics students with some background knowledge of fairness theories. The purpose of this study is to assess the empirical relevance of various fairness criteria such as inequality aversion, the utilitarian principle of maximizing the sum of individual payoffs, the Rawlsian "maximin" principle of maximizing the payoff of the worst-off individual, and the criterion of envy-freeness (in the sense of Foley 1967).

"Many important markets, such as the housing market, involve goods that are both indivisible and of budgetary significance. We introduce new graph theoretic techniques ideally suited to analyzing such markets. In this paper and its companion (Caplin and Leahy [2010]), we use these techniques to fully characterize the comparative static properties of these markets and to identify algorithms for computing equilibria"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Publicado como: Barcelona GSE Working Paper, nº 610, February 21, 2012; May 6, 2013. Publicado como: Documento de Trabajo de la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad del Rosario, nº 119, Marzo 2012 Trabajo presentado como comunicación de congreso al "3rd UECE Lisbon Meeting on Game Theory and Applications" (2011); al Workshop "Recent Developments in Market Design" (2011); al "VIII Encuentro de la Red Española en Elección Social" (2011); y al "XXXVI Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía" (2011). ; We want to allocate an object among two agents who have property rights over the object; the dispossessed agent and the owner, and compensate the one who does not get the object. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee the participation of both agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. ; Financial support from Colciencias/CSIC (Convocatoria No: 506/2010), El Patrimonio Autónomo Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento para la Ciencia, la Tecnología y la Innovación, Francisco José de Caldas. Financial support from CSIC/Colciencias 2010CO0013, Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011{29847), the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009{01142). ; Peer Reviewed

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 ; Ç. Kayı gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and financial support from Colciencias/CSIC (Convocatoria No: 506/2010), El Patrimonio Autónomo Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento para la Ciencia, la Tecnología y la Innovación, Francisco José de Caldas. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from CSIC/Colciencias through grant 2010CO0013 and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011–29847) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) ; Peer Reviewed