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▪ Abstract  In this essay, we survey the literature on international criminal tribunals and transitional justice. We argue that the literature has been dominated by two general orientations, a legalism that is premised on a logic of appropriateness and a pragmatism premised on a logic of consequences. We also consider a third orientation, guided by a logic of emotions, that recognizes the significance of transitional justice but emphasizes strategies that diverge from the model of legalism. Our primary concern is with scholarship in political science, although we also consider work from the disciplines of law, history, and sociology and from practitioners and advocates. The normative positions of scholars have heavily influenced the development of literature in this field, in which scholarship, practice, and advocacy are deeply intertwined. Advocates and individuals who have played key roles in the development of international criminal justice institutions, domestic tribunals, and truth commissions have been prominent in setting the agenda for scholars. Nonetheless, there is also a growing body of rigorous social science research that attempts to assess empirically—and sometimes critically—the claims of advocates and practitioners and to explain changing strategies of justice.

This paper explores the relationship between international war crimes tribunals and reconciliation in post-conflict societies. The aim of the present study was to examine how the role of international war crimes tribunals has changed in the peacebuilding process since the early years after World War II. Due to the evolving nature of international law and the international criminal legal system, international tribunals have become increasingly recognized as an integral component of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was the first international tribunal with a mandate to contribute to international peace and security. The ICTY established a new precedent for the role of international tribunals. Not only did it secure accountability for past abuses, it made a significant contribution to the development of the rule of law in the region of the former Yugoslavia. As the first international criminal court since the Nuremberg tribunal and the first UN tribunal of its kind, the ICTY provides an important model for future judicial intervention in the aftermath of conflict. It has shown the extent to which international war crimes tribunals facilitate societal reconciliation is, and will be, understood within the context of the legacies they leave behind. Institutions such as the ICTY will not be judged solely on the merits of the ideals on which they were established, but instead on their concrete successes in the domestic arena and their ability to fortify domestic judicial capacity.

This article offers a new interpretation of the combined peace activism of the British philosopher‐activist Bertrand Russell and the North Vietnamese. Three new perspectives are offered on their global activism, which had a significant—but grossly understated—impact on the U.S. government. First, the article writes ordinary Vietnamese people into the diplomacy of the Vietnam War, which has largely been written from the perspective of powerful world leaders. Second, it shows that the North Vietnamese performed an important, though unacknowledged, role in the creation of the Russell war crimes tribunal that put the United States on trial in 1967. Finally, the article presents evidence of the Russell tribunal's considerable impact on the U.S. government. It shows that the Lyndon Johnson administration made plans to respond to the tribunal by holding its own "counter seminar." The administration also launched a propaganda campaign to discredit Russell tribunal staff.

IN 1993, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ESTABLISHED A WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL TO PROSECUTE ATROCITIES THAT WERE COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AFTER THE CONFLICT IN THE REGION DREW WIDE PUBLIC ATTENTION. IT WAS ENVISAGED THAT THE TRIBUNAL WOULD AID IN THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE BALKANS. MOREOVER, THE COURT WAS INTENDED TO BE AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR PUNISHING ALLEGED WAR CRIMINALS IN ORDER TO DISCOURAGE FUTURE VIOLATORS. IN 1995, THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT FINALLY BROUGHT A FRAGILE PEACE TO THE REGION, BUT MOST INDICTED WAR CRIMINALS REMAIN AT LARGE. THIS ARTICLE ILLUSTRATES THE DIFFICULTIES THE TRIBUNAL HAS TO FACE AND ARGUES THAT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE DAYTON AGREEMENT, PEACE SUPERSEDED JUSTICE, BECAUSE THE LEADERS INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS--ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC, FRANJO TUDJMAN, AND SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC--CAN ALSO BE SAID TO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILING TO PREVENT WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY TROOPS UNDER THEIR CONTROL, AND POSSIBLY EVEN ORDERED "ETHNIC CLEANSING."