Suchergebnisse

While political accommodation and the passage of time may heal the wounds in Iraqi society, it is just as likely that the lack of real reconciliation will undermine the political process. (Survival / SWP)

AbstractThis paper examines ethno‐symbolic and instrumental explanations of ethnic and sectarian identities placed within the constructivist turn in the study of political identity, both in the abstract and how they have been deployed to explain the increasing contemporary influence of ethnosectarian mobilisation in Iraq and the wider Middle East. The paper identifies explanatory value in these approaches but finds their focus on either ideational structures or individual rationality too narrow to provide a comprehensive explanation of what happened to political identities in Iraq after 2003. Instead, the paper deploys what can be termed a 'Bourdieusian method', in an attempt to get beyond the polarities of structure and agency. It uses Bourdieu's conceptions of political field, principles of vision and division and symbolic violence to understand the influence that de‐Ba'athification, the creation of the Muhasasa Ta'ifia or sectarian apportionment system and national elections had on political identities in Iraq since the 2003 invasion.

From one war to another: 1991-2001 -- Bush 43 and September 11: January-December 2001 -- The axis of evil: January-September 2002 -- The negotiations: September-December 2002 -- The rupture: January 2003 -- The confrontation: February 2003 -- The war: spring-summer 2003 -- Epilogue: reconciliation, 2003-2007

The article examines how multi-ethnic publics negotiate questions of legitimacy. It explains the deep public scepticism surrounding the Iraq war (2003) and subsequent security policy, not just in terms of declining trust in Prime Minister Tony Blair and in the news media, but as a corrosive 'legitimacy deficit' with significant implications for the prospects of participatory democracy and multicultural citizenship. The arguments are grounded in a collaborative ethnography of news audiences across the UK, including multilingual and multi-ethnic ones. Using a Weberian framework, the article analyses the patterning of interviewees' responses to the justifications given for going to war, and it assesses the implications of the 'legitimacy deficit' for notions of security and UK security policy.

War and the international legal order -- From '9-11' to the 'Iraq War 2003' -- International law and the wars on terrorism and on Iraq -- International law and the Iraq War 2003 -- The United States and the international legal system -- Winning the peace: an Iraq for the Iraqis -- World order(s) for the twenty-first century.

Each country seeks, through its internal policies, to combat any crime or phenomenon that occurs on its territory or in areas under its sovereignty, including the drug phenomenon. The responsibility for confronting this problem, treating it, and finding effective solutions lies with the state and its political system. The government's control over all areas, as well as the strict monitoring of individuals, leads to reducing the risk of this problem, and this is clearly evident in Iraq as a result of the political situation and the security chaos that was reflected in the role of successive governments after 2003 in finding relevant measures to address this phenomenon and develop appropriate solutions to it. In this research, we will discuss the most important treatments at the security, health, media and awareness levels of the drug phenomenon

SummaryOver the past century, the laws of armed conflict have limited or prohibited the use of a number of weapons, principally due to their cruel effects or indiscriminate nature. Among the examples are chemical and biological weapons, anti-personnel mines, and blinding laser weapons. In recent years, one of the most controversial armaments used by states has been the cluster bomb. Cluster weapons are inexpensively produced area weapons with a high propensity for failure. The source of constant condemnation since the Vietnam conflict, the legality of cluster weapons remains highly questionable. With such weapons, the question is not so much whether there is a need to create new instruments of limitation, or indeed prohibition, but whether the existing laws of armed conflict are already sufficient to address any human and environmental concerns.

The Iraqi political and social arena has been characterized, subjectively and objectively, by the weakness of leadership building. This has led to a leadership crisis, reflected in the quality of the outcome of the process of rebuilding the state in Iraq. Thus, this building process lacked the simplest requirements and conditions of success. It suffered from a major and obvious failure: the situation in Iraq has raised conflict leaders, not building leaders, and this confirms the existence of a cultural crisis in the production of conscious, aware leadership compatible with democratic action. The weakness of the leadership in Iraq is reflected in a series of ongoing crises that require radical solutions in accordance with long-term strategic plans; the crises are especially reflected in the absence of building visions and the predominance of self-interest, along with the impact of social reality on leadership practices, which has an adverse effect on state-building.

Beginning in 2003, diverse and significant actors, both domestic and international, engaged in reconstruction activities in Iraq. The total budget committed to Iraq's reconstruction was unprecedented among postconflict operations mobilized by the international community. Despite the vast sums of money spent, and the implementation of its many projects and programs, the donors and the Iraqi people view the reconstruction efforts in Iraq in a negative light. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures focuses on the period between 2003 and 2014—that is, after the United States–led invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and before the sudden rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh. This book assesses several dimensions of Iraq's reconstruction. First, it considers the response of key international actors, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States, and other bilateral donors—specifically, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom—as well as nongovernmental organizations. Second, it analyzes the process and results of the reconstruction of key sectors (electricity, oil, education, and health), and the interventions geared to institution building and governance reform. Pursuing effective reconstruction within the context of conflict and fragility is a formidable challenge because of the uncertain, fluid, and complex environment. Based on the experience in Iraq, how can the international community support the effectiveness and durability of reconstruction? This book identifies lessons in seven areas and offers four recommendations for international and domestic actors and citizens engaged in reconstruction activities. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 is important reading for development practitioners and policy makers who are or will be engaged in reconstruction efforts in fragile and conflict-affected environments.

إن تداول السلطة و تبادلها ديمقراطياً ، مسألة تأخذ اهمية سياسية بالنسبة للنظام السياسي العراقي بعد عام 2003 ، فتداول السلطة و إنتقالها بصورة ديمقراطية، وبنزاهة إنتخابية، يعد مؤشراً جيداً لحالة الاستقرار والتقدم السياسي في النظام السياسي البرلماني العراقي، كما ان انتقال السلطة من حيث اعتماد الاسلوب التداولي يمثل بعداً بنائياً ومؤسسياً للعملية السياسية، ويؤدي ايضاً الى ان تصبح السلطة سلطة مؤسسة تمارس وفقاً للدستور والقانون وليست سلطة فعلية، ويؤدي ايضاً الى الاقرار بوجود معارضة برلمانية رسمية وحقها في تولي السلطة السياسية في وقت لاحق ومن خلال صناديق الاقتراع يجعل من عملية تداول السلطة، عملية سلمية وديمقراطية لا تقرن بالتهميش والعنف، أو بالوسائل غير القانونية، ولا تسمح الاستئثار بالسلطة لأي كتلة او حزب أو طائفة مهما كانت الحجة، سياسية ام اجتماعية.